RE: Reflections and Explorations

A Forum for Deliberative Dialogue

Edited by
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Lyusyena Kirakosyan

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Volume II in the "RE: Reflections and Explorations" series

In 2013, the Virginia Tech Institute for Policy and Governance (VTIPG) launched an edited online essay series, RE: Reflections and Explorations, for Virginia Tech graduate students to share articles and commentaries about their evolving research, interests and experiences on topics relevant to the VTIPG mission. The "RE: Reflections and Explorations" book series features essays from the online platform selected and edited by VTIPG Director Max Stephenson Jr. and affiliated research faculty member Lyusyena Kirakosyan. Volume I of the series was published in 2015.

RE: REFLECTIONS AND EXPLORATIONS

A Forum for Deliberative Dialogue

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For Jessica who is daily an inspiration and catalyst for hope.
MOS

For Mauricio who has been a constant source of love, motivation, support and insight.
LK

Acknowledgments

We wish foremost to thank the graduate students who share their imagination and talent in this volume's essays. *RE: Reflections and Explorations* is their series and an impressive testimony to their intellectual reach and prodigious energy. Thank you, too, to Regina Naff, of the Institute for Policy and Governance, for her enthusiastic support of this book. In ways large and small, we know we could not have brought it to fruition without her good will and many efforts. We also wish to acknowledge Peter Potter and Robert Browder of the Virginia Tech libraries for assistance in navigating today's emerging publishing world. They were always available and always willing to provide needed guidance, and we thank them. Finally, Max Stephenson Jr. wishes to thank his co-editor Lyusyena Kirakosyan for her imagination, energy and thoughtfulness. Her collaboration made this enterprise not only intellectually fascinating, but a pleasure to undertake at every turn. In turn, Lyusyena Kirakosyan wishes to thank Max Stephenson Jr. for his leadership and mentorship that has ensured the continuity of the *RE: Reflections and Explorations* graduate student essay series and this publication as well.

Foreword

Thoughts on this Book's Cover Art and Its Central Themes

In Gratitude

We are grateful to several individuals who helped us bring this volume's covers to fruition. Andrew Morikawa, Virginia Tech Institute for Policy and Governance (VTIPG) Senior Fellow, composed the initial photographs, with the assistance of Regina Naff, Executive Assistant to the Institute's Director. Regina also created several models for the photographs, adjusting them multiple times to achieve the final art. We are also indebted to Valquiria Alves Zorzan, for her editing work on the cover photographs. We also wish to thank Elizabeth Allen, a Program Associate at VTIPG, and Cathy Grimes, Communications Director for the Virginia Tech Graduate School, for their efforts to ensure the quality of the cover art. Thank you to all for helping realize this idea!

Why Block Towers?

We chose to use the Jenga block constructions for the book covers as a metaphor for the book's central theme, the criticality of democratic deliberative dialogue. As Aristotle (350 B.C.E., chapter 3, para. 3) wrote, "We deliberate not about ends but about means," and many of the terms on the Jenga block towers depicted on our covers constitute means or characteristics and conditions needed to engage in and sustain just such a possibility. As Scott London has argued,

> [T]he objective [of deliberative dialogue] is not so much to *talk* together as to *think* together […]. Thinking together involves listening deeply to other points of view, exploring new ideas and perspectives, searching for points of agreement, and bringing unexamined assumptions into the open (n.d., Italics in the original).

For her part, Katy Harriger has described deliberative dialogue as an "essential component of democratic decision making, as well as an experience that can serve a positive educative function for democratic citizens" (2014, p. 53). We hope this book both encourages and represents an opportunity for those who have contributed to it and those who read it to

find themselves in conversation concerning its arguments and themes. Indeed, at their best, such exchanges can enliven democracy, even as they sharpen the thinking of all engaged, especially those within the academy.

The concepts that appear on the Jenga blocks highlight the inherent fragility of democracy and self-governance and the omnipresent tensions that reliance on individuals to govern themselves contain, and will always, evidence. The terms on the blocks point to the many characteristics needed in the body politic to sustain freedom and to the enduring dangers and pitfalls that inhere in humanity that make their maintenance an ongoing and very significant social challenge. History teaches that democracies can fall prey to majority or minority tyranny far more quickly than one might imagine. Shares of democratic societies' populations may kindle that result out of imprudence, fear, hatred and animosity, ignorance or the siren call of promised material or economic benefits in return for diminished or no freedom. One might add challenges to this list, but this suffices to suggest how treacherously complex sustaining democratic institutions and the freedom that underpins and animates them can be. Democratic institutions resemble frail and leaning towers far more often than solid bulwarks. Ultimately, democracies depend on the capacities of human beings willing to discipline themselves to secure freedom for all of their number.

As if to provide evidence for this point, as we write, a manifestly unqualified populist authoritarian occupies the U.S. presidency, and other autocratic leaders are now serving in like posts in Turkey, in Venezuela and in Hungary. Poland has also exhibited similar tendencies as has the leadership of many other nations, including, particularly, of course, Russia, which is led by a corrupt autocrat. While this trend has many supporting elements, it appears most basically to be born of fear and anger at the consequences of continued globalization. This turn has had enormous implications for identity and employment security for those groups in affected societies that have traditionally worked in farming, factory or resource extraction occupations that did not require advanced education, and whose employers have migrated to other locations in search of reduced labor costs, or whose roles or posts have been undermined by global competition, technological change or, in some cases, all of these factors.

The drift toward authoritarian leadership also appears to be rooted in some instances, as in the United States, in the growing heterogeneity of populations and the fears among those adversely affected by economic change that they are also losing their social standing as well. In the U.S., these concerns have occasioned ugly othering and scapegoating behaviors that Donald Trump exploited to gain power and continues to use to help maintain a base of support among roughly 25 percent of the American voting population.

And, significantly, these economic and social tendencies have been exacerbated by a reigning public philosophy for several decades, neoliberalism, that argues that markets alone are almost entirely sufficient to govern complex societies and that democratic political institutions are merely excess detritus that will do little but hamper or even fetter individual freedom as they work clumsily to realize goals on behalf of the commons. In the United States, a virulent form of this view has been enshrined as a virtually unassailable ideological orthodoxy in the Republican Party, also known as the GOP (for Grand Old Party). The GOP has fought strongly to prevent government from assisting population groups adversely affected by globalization in the name of its essential opposition to self-governance and enshrinement of the market as the answer to all social organization. Meanwhile, it has simultaneously appealed to those people adversely affected by those changes with its individualist anti-government rhetoric. While the paradox is real, so is the community and social trust breakdown this confluence has occasioned and continues to energize.

Speaking Truth to Power

The essays in this volume treat dimensions of these broader trends at all scales of analysis, examining the elemental issue of democratic agency and obstacles to its exercise, the difficulties inherent for self-governance in inter-governmental cooperation and in racial, ethnic and religious diversity and the antagonisms resulting from rapid widespread economic, social and technological shifts. These articles also investigate the dynamics of political change and movements in a time when the prevailing social imaginary makes such action, always difficult, especially tough to achieve. While we have divided the essays into seven sections, as they address a variety of topical concerns at discrete levels of analysis, all may be said to treat in one form or another the consequences for Western liberalism of its embrace of neoliberalism's elevation of capitalism to a governing role and its view of freedom as atomistic individualism. Adherents have embraced this perspective without acknowledging the daily reality that human beings live in families and societies and that freedom will never be sustained by the pursuit of material goods alone.

In many ways, neoliberalism as orthodoxy, and especially its extreme ideological variant, which fuels today's GOP in the United States, seems content to allow capitalists to rule, rather than the people. Those embracing this view appear to hope such will provide employment for the masses while, and this may be the truth of the matter, also enriching the employment-providing class. But, as these essays reveal, this view of governance has only created penury for millions, anger and disillusionment for millions more and diminishing job and life security for still more citizens. The result is a

current United States politics of cynical exploitation by demagogic leaders of often confused and angry citizens that realize that they have lost freedom and economic standing and are deeply resentful of that fact. These individuals also often lash out in anger at the only means available to right their situation, democratic institutions, out of the insecurity and rage arising from undue reliance on markets in the first instance. As inequality and hopelessness grow and those in power exploit citizen disaffection by blaming self-governance, we fear these trends are likely only to deepen unless elected leaders see the broader folly of their power-fed ideological stance, and/or the populace awakes and punishes those now abusing their trust at the ballot box.

These essays illuminate these deeper political trends and both give hope and signal the alarm that social change is necessary if self-governance in the United States and beyond is to be preserved. Taken together, the articles in this volume speak truth to power and highlight forcefully the need for democratic change. It has been our privilege to compile them for a broader readership.

Max Stephenson Jr. and Lyusyena Kirakosyan

Blacksburg, Virginia

August 3, 2017

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Editor's Preface

Editing *Reflections*: Pedagogical Project and Emblem of Democratic Possibility

One key goal when the Institute for Policy and Governance launched *RE: Reflections and Explorations* was to provide the graduate students who write for it a professional editorial experience, since most are at the start of careers that will involve writing as their lingua franca. That editorial responsibility has fallen to me as I work with authors each week during the fall and spring semesters to polish their efforts for publication. I have found myself reflecting on that editorial role and its relationship to the potential for students' growth as authors, professionals and scholars.

I was fortunate as a graduate student to work with a scholar considered an especially lucid and artful writer who helped me enormously as I developed my own writing capabilities. He proved endlessly patient and wise and willing to explain why he made specific suggestions to improve my prose. And more, he trusted me to edit his drafts, including a redrafting of his most famous book, in an effort, I am sure in retrospect, to help me develop as a writer and intellectual. I have always been grateful and humbled by these opportunities, even as they sensitized me as a young man to how important editing and editors can be in helping writers develop their finest possible work.

In that spirit, what follows are some thoughts on editing as democratic and pedagogical possibility and aspiration. I have sought to organize my treatment of these concerns around the recollections of a number of contributors to the *New York Review of Books* concerning the role of that journal's editors' guidance in their careers as they remembered their work with Robert B. Silvers, who died in March 2017. I was struck, by how similar those writers' comments on his prodigious efforts were to my editorial aims for this series. While the *Review* is world renowned and its editor was perhaps unparalleled in his talent and intellectual reach, as an editor his work nevertheless embodied lessons and experience for all of those who would shoulder such responsibilities. I seek to highlight those here with profound respect for Silvers' towering achievements.

Silvers was the legendary co-editor of *The New York Review of Books (NYRB)* from its founding in 1963 until 2006, and lone-editor from then until his death. He was 88 when he died and still working long hours at what he called the "paper." He was fondly remembered in the ensuing weeks by the countless authors and reviewers whose lives he had touched and work he had helped shape. I was particularly interested to learn what those writers

valued in his efforts and why. I here share some of those perspectives because they illustrate the goals I have sought to attain as I have worked with graduate student contributors to this series on the wide array of topics and concerns they treat.

In his comments on the role Silvers played in his writing career, professor and author (and now editor of the *New York Review of Books*) Ian Buruma argued,

> My life as a writer owes everything to Bob's editorship. He had too much respect for writers he trusted to wish to change their individual styles. … But he had an infallible eye for loose thinking. … He made you think harder. There was no room in his "paper" for fuzziness or vague abstractions. He wanted examples, descriptions and concrete thoughts (Buruma, 2017, p.31).

When I read this remembrance, I thought, "just so, I experienced this, too." My aim as editor in this series has, in consequence, consistently been to be a curious and interested reader who respects contributors' writing styles, but who always asks that they ensure that what they say is as clear and clean as they can make it. My motive is two-fold as I press for editorial clarity and concision. First, when authors make such efforts, they become better thinkers and more capable of precisely articulating what they wish to contend substantively and why. And, one central aim of graduate education is to produce sophisticated analytical thinkers who can contribute to scholarship in their selected fields or to their chosen professions with equal aplomb. Secondly, to have an impact and to realize their personal goals, authors must share the fruits of those capacities, and lucid writing can do so with power, grace and, at its best, èlan. So, my work on this series is aimed at helping students develop precise thinking and writing in tandem. I do so by asking that they write so all can understand them, and so the joy or quickened pulse that first animated their interest in a topic can shine through.

Fintan O'Toole, the famed Irish columnist, drama critic and literary editor recalled Silvers' editorial acumen this way:

> The great editor is a chimerical creature, combining contrary qualities in one mind: assertive, and self-effacing, commanding and sensitive and infinitely curious and sharply focused, patient and fearfully demanding, wide angle and close-up. Robert Silvers was the greatest editor of our time because he managed these contradictions with a seemingly effortless elegance (O'Toole, 2017, p.35).

I have been editing *Reflections* for four and one-half years and can attest that this editorial role demands just these contradictory capacities and

characteristics and they are ever difficult to balance. In my experience, this series' authors are wildly different despite the fact that all are graduate students. Some think and write broadly and are deeply interested in the intersections among phenomena, while others cast their intellectual nets more narrowly and work to focus their analyses as much as possible. Some are naturally interested in developing their writing capacities, while others are less so. Some are preternaturally curious about a wide array of concerns, while others have singular and single-minded interests. Some wish to explore broad philosophic frames, while others crave the specificity of particular policy choices. And so on.

As their editor, and as one who wishes to help each develop their intellectual and writing capacities, I seek weekly to discern their interests and direction and to help them attain it. I try to impart key concerns as sensitively and sharply as possible, while working to ensure the highest quality outcome feasible in the time frame available. As O'Toole notes in his paean to how well Silvers balanced these claims, these imperatives can be treacherous and yet, in their evocation, editors can highlight that which is most significant about their shared enterprise with authors, and help the writers realize their own aspirations more fully. This is not merely a technical matter, but ethically tricky ground that demands imagination, empathy, self-awareness and discipline on the part of the editor. To be blunt, the responsibility is humbling.

O'Toole also noted that Silvers sought to edit the *Review* for a broad, but literate, audience:

> He believed that there is such a thing as the general reader, that public life depends on the existence of a common space in which ideas can be shared, absorbed, mulled over, kicked around (O'Toole, 2017, p. 35).

We began the *Reflections* series with a like aspiration. I hoped it could serve both as a lens into the catholicity and fruitfulness of a major university's intellectual life, at least as it pertained to democratic politics and governance. Moreover, I hoped it could contribute to a larger social conversation about just such concerns within the university and well beyond its boundaries. I see and saw *Reflections,* too, as an example of what former Yale University President A. Bartlett Giamatti once labeled the university in its role in cultural life: "a free and ordered space" (Giamatti,1990). My continuing hope as its editor is that *Reflections* can offer its contributors a vital and fulfilling opportunity to share their intellectual interests and ambitions in a forum dedicated to the best of democratic probity and sensitivity, and in a context of civility and genuine and sustained engagement. These are ideals certainly, just as they are for the university writ large, but I hope the essays collected here suggest that all involved take them seriously.

O'Toole also observed that Silvers unfailingly exhibited a related attribute in increasingly short supply in our present socially fractious moment, courtesy. I have sought to realize a similar aspiration for this series:

> I always come back in thinking about Bob to his imperturbable courtesy. His good manners were not mere mannerisms. They said something. They were a constant reminder to the rest of us … to remember that it all matters, that the life of a great journal is part of the life of democracy itself (O'Toole, 2017, p.35).

Universities, certainly, should be places in which many may hold diverse perspectives and may be granted leave and space to articulate and defend those as persuasively and vigorously as they can. Such freedom of thought and speech is the sine qua non of inquiry itself and central to the idea and potential of the university. *Reflections* includes a wide array of perspectives, and my role as editor is to help those offering them present them as cogently as possible. I do not seek to judge what is or is not acceptable against any sort of litmus test other than analytical rigor, clarity and cogency.

Columbia University political scientist and historian of ideas Mark Lilla has suggested *The Review* from its start

> … was a democratic pedagogical project. … Bob was a teacher, one of the greatest I have ever encountered. Many stories have been told of his legendary interventionism—the late-night calls about an obscure sentence, the flood of packages, faxes and later emails with suggested reading. …What the journalists missed, but his authors knew, is that the process of endless refinement was the point. … It was a vocation, in the strict sense, an expression of magnanimity (Lilla, 2017, p.34).

As with the *Review's* essays for its authors, I hope that *Reflections* constitutes a journey for its contributors, and one that encourages them to continue to refine and develop their writing and intellectual capabilities, and to do so in a way that readers may access so that their ideas can become part of broader conversations and potentially thereby influence the evolving views and understanding of those they reach. More, I hope that engagement with *Reflections* teaches contributors that the life of a scholar is an ever-unfolding process of wonder and refinement in which one is continuously captivated by questions one did not originally even know to ask as an expanding tableau of inquiry unfolds. This is literature and analysis as a metaphor for an intellectual life, and for how the same can inform democratic opportunity.

This refinement orientation also embodies a broader philosophic reality: many, if not most of the essential questions that confront humankind are not "answerable" in some finite sense, but instead represent constant preoccupations and approximations as men and women struggle to live justly

and to secure freedom for themselves and for others in the face of their own frailties and brokenness. Perhaps writing as metaphor for such processes of endless and ambiguous personal enlightenment, social experiment and approximation is an especially apt mechanism by which graduate scholars can begin practically to address this reality of human existence.

While now under attack by an illiberal trend in social norms and governance, universities, at their best, embody the ideal of democratic possibility as perhaps no other institution can. They are forums and repositories for restless learning and for imagination. They are spaces in which talented individuals can follow their intellectual and moral hunches and explore the antecedents of those notions as well as their likely implications against a wide range of possibly relevant criteria. Indeed, the reach of universities is theoretically only limited by the reach of the human mind.

I hope, too, that this series helps its contributors develop a sharper and deeper understanding of the imperatives of democratic agency and citizenship, and the relationship of the university and of scholarship to the development and maintenance of those capacities in the body politic. More, I hope they glean insights into how their research may help shape their own democratic identities as well as those of their students. I can think of few aspirations more critical to the preservation of freedom than these.

Finally, we should remind ourselves periodically that many of today's graduate students will lead tomorrow's higher education institutions. What a privilege, then, to offer those individuals opportunities to unleash their imaginations, to engage in the exhilarating passion of discovery and to learn the discipline that freedom and free inquiry demand. My fond hope is that *Reflections* can continue to play a role in the realization of these vital goals for those whose work it presents and for the broader society it serves.

Max Stephenson Jr.

August 2, 2017

Blacksburg, Virginia

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PART I

NEOLIBERALISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE

The turn towards neoliberalism in thinking and political-economic practices in the United States and Great Britain took place in the late 1970s, which entailed bringing all human action into the domain of the market, from welfare and education to health care and pensions (Harvey, 2005). This ideology assumes that governance, as practiced by the neoliberal state, must be carried out within the constraints of the limited in scope governments and largely self-regulating markets. In this view, too, governments must refrain from imposing virtually any limits on the capital-holding class and they must not simultaneously, and for like reasons, advocate for equal opportunity. The upshot of these beliefs has been a continuing shift of power away from average citizens and their representatives towards those with capital (Ives, 2015).

Neoliberal governance involves practices that result in both shifting previously communal or governmental responsibilities to individuals and to the marginalization of many of those people. On the one hand, neoliberal policies persistently call for and/or assume the development of "responsible citizens" who can take care of themselves without the assistance of government or others in the commons, thus creating new expectations concerning the relationship between the well-being of individuals, their families and the population. On the other hand, and for precisely the same reason, neoliberal governance practices exacerbate social and economic inequities, and differentially allocate social, economic and political risks and opportunities along existing and new lines of privilege and oppression (Polzer and Polzer, 2016).

The authors of the eight essays in this section examined neoliberalism as a political-economic-cultural phenomenon, highlighting the links between governance, neoliberal policies and institutions, struggles for power and forms of resistance. In the first essay, Davidson examines the recent evolution of higher education in the United States and the relationship of that trajectory to the nation's regnant neoliberal public philosophy. He argues that those policies have posed very significant access and affordability challenges to students from less privileged socio-economic backgrounds.

MacAuley considers the implications of viewing alternative agri-food systems as both social movements and communities of practice. She contends that adopting such a perspective provides a much richer analytical portrait of the dynamics and possibilities of such initiatives. Laney reflects on Appalachia's current political, cultural and social ecology, on creating a just economy in that region, and on cultivating sustainable relationships to attain those aspirations.

For his part, Back questions whether building more universities is an appropriate policy response to the fast-growing youth populations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as the economies of those countries lack sufficient jobs for their university graduates. Breske recounts how multi-national corporations have established a form of biocolonialism in recent decades, instrumentalizing indigenous knowledge and local biodiversity for profit and without due compensation to the native populations possessing it. This problem is exacerbated by the inconsistent enforcement of indigenous rights throughout the world since individual nation states presently determine how such claims will be resolved within their territories and these often have discriminated against native peoples.

Grow analyzes the Democratic and Republican primaries in the 2016 election cycle through comparing the presidential nomination campaigns of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, and highlights the narratives of entertainment and media spectacle that the candidates embraced during the campaign. He suggests that this form of campaign politics leads to the emergence of fewer alternatives to neoliberalism within current Democratic and Republican party politics. Smirnova examines the capital accumulation crisis and focuses on the land ownership as an 'illusory solution' to its contradictions. She argues that the current rush to acquire properties that diminished in value during the 2008-2009 recession is indicative of a deeper inability to manage the contradictions evident in capitalism. Finally, Apriliani puzzles over the reigning ideology that has encouraged the establishment of an on-demand-economy in the U.S, drawing on Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony that sought to explain how those advantaged in capitalist society use cultural institutions to maintain their privilege and power.

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Public vs. Private Good: How Neoliberalism has Changed the Role of Higher Education and Created Issues of Access

Chris Davidson

(Originally published on February 12, 2015)

During the past year, I have participated in several classes that have caused me to take a step back and think about my own framing assumptions and how they influence how I see the world generally and my area of study specifically. In my subject domain, Higher Education Administration, we often discuss concerns related to the access, affordability, accountability and quality of higher education in the United States. So, as I watched President Barack Obama deliver his 2015 State of the Union Address recently, I found it interesting that he outlined several new initiatives related to these challenges. For example, he proposed a program aimed at lowering the cost of a community college education to zero, while noting that 40 percent of students who attend college choose a public two-year institution to do so. President Obama argued that this plan would provide an opportunity for many more Americans to obtain a post-secondary degree, making them ready for the new economy (Obama, 2015). This proposal would help address the central issues of ensuring that higher education remains broadly accessible and affordable. However, one might ask, will the Republican-controlled Congress buy into this idea?

For its part, the Republican Party calls for alternatives to traditional four-year college education, such as expanding community colleges, technical schools and online programs as ways to educate and train workers for the job market (Republican National Committee, 2012). So, with both political parties indicating they wish to increase access to college-level education, why are public higher education administrators struggling to make such opportunities available? There is no single answer to this question. However, the roots of the problem lie in the evolution of higher education and its relationship to the neoliberal public philosophy now dominant in the United States.

Evolution of higher education access

Colleges and universities in the United States began as a way for churches to educate ministers with a liberal education focused on classical languages, ethics, metaphysics, natural philosophy or sciences and some general world knowledge. While there was some influence from state governments after the American Revolution, higher education institutions remained predominately private in character as the new nation began. This view of colleges as a private good prevailed well into the 19th century (Geiger, 2005; St. John, Daun-Barnett and Moronski-Chapman, 2013).

"Higher education in the United States today is firmly rooted in the neoliberal paradigm that Reagan first pressed in California. Most citizens now view college principally as a private good and responsibility, and as a means to provide workers to meet the perceived requirements of the current market place."
-Chris Davidson

As the American Civil War raged, Congress passed the Morrill Land-Grant Act of 1862, offering federal property to each state to establish colleges to teach agriculture and engineering along with "scientific and classical studies and including military tactics" ("Morrill Land Grant," 1862). Congress agreed to the statute to create universities to allow a broader portion of the population to gain access to higher education. The law embodied the idea that colleges constitute a public good for society. Following the Civil War and between Reconstruction and the 1920s, higher education changed significantly with the emergence of women's and junior colleges and urban service-oriented universities. During this time, too, high school graduation became an entrance requirement for admission to college and academic disciplines began taking their modern form (Geiger, 2005; St. John, Daun-Barnett and Moronski-Chapman, 2013).

The Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, or GI bill, provided support for returning World War II veterans to attend college at taxpayer expense. Thereafter, higher education came truly to be seen as a public good to benefit society. Individuals who had served in the war and conflicts thereafter flooded colleges and universities, including emergent community colleges, into the early 1970s (Geiger, 2005). Overall, it may be argued that from the time of the Morrill Land-Grant Act of 1862 into the 1970s, access to higher education steadily increased because of federal programs. However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the dominant governance paradigm of the United States began to shift to neoliberalism and that focus changed our collective vision of the appropriate role of higher education in society once more.

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is a perspective on the appropriate relationship between politics and economics in society. Scholars associated with the University of Chicago first offered this argument (Brown, 2003), which rests on four principal assumptions: (a) a belief in the self-interested individual, (b) free market economics, (c) a commitment to laissez-faire economics, and (d) staunch support of free trade. Assuming individuals are self-interested implies that they are driven disproportionately by pursuit of their economic interests and are the best judge of their needs. Free market economics refers to the idea that the market is a more efficient and morally superior mechanism for social choice-making and for allocating resources than any other mechanism available in society, including democratic politics. Since, in this view, the free market is self-regulating and influences individual behavior more effectively than democratic decision-making can, proponents of neoliberalism are also committed to limiting the role of government in individuals' lives while simultaneously enlarging the role of the market in them. The last assumption is tied to a commitment to free trade that abolishes state protections and supports for the economy (Olssen and Peters, 2005)

Neoliberalism and higher education

In the 1960s, California possessed one of the most successful and widely respected systems of higher education in the world. Nonetheless, when elected in 1966, Governor Ronald Reagan (R) contended that it was time that the state's taxpayers stop subsidizing higher education. Reagan took five steps to change the California higher education system based on his ideological beliefs. The governor sought:

- An end to free tuition for state college and university students
- 20 percent annual "across-the-board cuts in higher education funding" for multiple years
- Deep reductions in "construction funds" for state campuses
- The firing of Clark Kerr, the popular President of the University of California system.
- Overall, to contend that it was not the taxpayer's place to subsidize student "intellectual curiosity" (Clabaugh, 2004).

Prior to Reagan's ideologically rooted attack on public support for higher education, most students had majored in arts or sciences (Geiger, 2005). When Ronald Reagan became President in 1981, however, and in keeping with the assumptions he brought to his governorship, business had become

the most popular major for students. Additionally, other professional and pre-professional programs had become quite fashionable because of neoliberalism's utilitarian emphasis on college as a place to prepare students for the job market (Berrett, 2015; Geiger, 2005; St. John, Daun-Barnett and Moronski-Chapman, 2013).

Higher education in the United States today is firmly rooted in the neoliberal paradigm that Reagan first pressed in California. Most citizens now view college principally as a private good and responsibility, and as a means to provide workers to meet the perceived requirements of the current market place. This orientation influences many aspects of the university, ranging from academic programs offered to the services provided to students. Today, for example, we see an increase in Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics, and Health (STEM-H) programs. Both political parties have emphasized these STEM-H fields as national priorities for higher education because officials in both perceive the current economy of the United States as requiring individuals with preparation in these fields.

With consistent cuts in state higher education budgets during the last three decades rooted in the view that higher education was at best a quasi-public good, public colleges and universities now must compete with each other and other institutions for students, since they are increasingly tuition-driven enterprises. Students and parents are now "customers" in all aspects of the process of higher education because it is now largely their responsibility to pay for the primary share of its full cost using their own funds or loans or grants. To compete for these students, universities now provide upscale residence halls with individual bedrooms and baths. Colleges and universities have also built top-notch campus wellness centers with Olympic-size pools. Rock-climbing walls, too, have become a normal feature on college campuses. Dining options have moved from the traditional cafeteria with few selections to multiple facilities with choices ranging from international cuisine to meals that include locally sourced fruits and vegetables. Universities have moved in this direction because their consumer/students have demanded it and as a way to distinguish themselves from other institutions in their "market place." Since students and their families have demanded these services, costs have consequently risen dramatically at institutions of higher education. The combination of decreasing public financial support, competition through service provision and labor costs for a highly-specialized workforce is raising the price of college for enrollees. One marked result of these trends is that it is increasingly difficult for students from less well-off families to obtain a four-year degree at public colleges.

Implications for the character of higher education and access to it

Neoliberal policies have changed the face of higher education during the past 40 years. The increase in STEM-H majors on college campuses has caused many policymakers and even some university administrators to question the role of the liberal arts. With rising student demand for STEM-H and other majors perceived to be "employment producing fields," fueled by neoliberal assumptions, some institutions have cut budgets for their liberal arts programs while others, primarily traditional liberal arts colleges, have been forced to reevaluate their missions and provide more programs perceived to be "market-preparing," or risk failing. Overall, the continuing neoliberal focus on preparing students for the current job market and the steady real decline of state appropriations for higher education, coupled with a relative decrease in federal financial aid in the form of grants and an increase in student loans, has led to a return to a widely accepted social definition of higher education as a private good.

This shift in perceived purpose matters because it represents not only a fundamental change in how education is perceived popularly, but also a move toward redefining its character to a more technical and job training role, rather than as an engine for the development and dissemination of knowledge more broadly. Obviously, employers need workers with the specific skills necessary to fill a share of their positions. However, the characteristics they repeatedly tell university placement professionals they most desire in university graduates are critical thinking skills, analytical capacities, the ability to work in teams and the capability to communicate both verbally and in written form. Ironically, as it happens, these capacities are not simply technical in character and are best learned through a liberal arts education and not via curricula geared to equip students with the latest technical knowledge of software applications or use of existing technologies.

Higher education's move in the citizenry's consciousness from its position as a public good to a private one means that those who can afford college and those students who have a strong academic preparation in their K-12 schools will most likely be successful in obtaining a two-year or baccalaureate degree. Meanwhile, students who rely on financial aid programs will be still more likely in coming years to be shut out of universities simply because in the supposed "free market" they may not be able to afford to attend them. So, one vexing question now facing the nation collectively is whether we should persist in our devotion to neoliberalism, the motive cause of these difficult trends. Assuming that a shift in our celebration of the market does not occur in the near term, another concern is how to balance the neoliberal mindset's negative implications for higher education access against the need to ensure that students from less privileged socio-economic backgrounds have the chance to attend college so they can move into the middle class.

Barring a change in our culture's collective devotion to neoliberal premises and its emphasis on the technical and the present in lieu of student preparation for varying roles and the longer-term, another question confronting voters, legislators and higher education leaders alike is how to ensure that all students, irrespective of their economic status, can continue to gain the benefits of liberal arts curricula as incubators of citizenship and professional capacities.

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2

Alternative Agrifood, as a Social Movement, as a Community of Practice and as One Voice

Lorien MacAuley

(Originally published on February 26, 2015)

Between scares of salmonella on spinach, talk of an obesity epidemic among the nation's children, migrant farmworker rights protests and controversy concerning what constitutes a nutritious school lunch, the public is becoming more and more aware of the complexity and implications of our country's agrifood system. What has not yet emerged, however, is any consensus on how to move forward to address these concerns. Our language to discuss our agrifood system is limited, not just in the public realm, but in the academy, as well. This essay examines two possible theoretical lenses from which alternatives to agrifood can be viewed, and considers the implications of each.

Alternative agrifood has emerged as a social movement, on par with the feminist and civil rights movements (Allen, 2004). For Allen, "discourse is what forms and maintains social identity." (p. 6) So, with a coherent discourse, and relatively stable vision over time, one may have a social movement. But do current alternative agrifood efforts evidence these characteristics, especially the first named? Constance, Renard and Rivera-Ferre (2014) have argued the discourse of the alternative agrifood movement addresses four major topical areas: the environment, agrarian communities, quality food and emancipation.

The environmental domain concerns the biophysical sustainability of our current food system. The alternative agriculture discourse also addresses how society should collectively value the quality of life of its farmers and agrarian communities. Advocates for new thinking regarding food production have likewise explored the ability of the existing system to produce fresh, healthful food.

Finally, those seeking change in existing organization and practices have offered conceptions of what might constitute a more emancipatory and socially just food system. The alternative agrifood discourse is suffused with claims concerning, "social, economic, and environmental justice and health, democratic participation, the importance of local wisdom, local dreams, community spirit, and often [commitment] to spiritual traditions" (Feenstra,

2002, p. 105). These advocates and the rhetoric they employ are rooted in an "anti-oppression ideology premised on notions of social justice and autonomy" (Sbicca, 2012, p. 464).

The alternative agrifood effort may also be considered a community of practice, as in Figure 1.

Figure 1



Source: Community of Practice construct and the "dimensions of practice as the property of a community" (Wenger, 1998, p. 73)

"While our dominant agricultural production system has created a plethora of issues that we must address as a society, neoliberal ideas continue to dominate the alternative agrifood discourse, making it difficult to secure widespread and meaningful social and economic change."
-Lorien MacAuley

A community of practice (CoP) (Lave and Wenger, 1991) is a body of skills, knowledge, and practices engaged in socially with others. Scholars have argued that sociocultural learning occurs through legitimate participation (Lave, 1988) in a joint enterprise. In a community of practice, a novice learner starts on the periphery, mutually engaging in a shared effort with the experts at the center of the community. Through these exchanges, the learner develops a repertoire of language and skills and passes through boundaries governed by rituals, institutions and artifacts, while negotiating their new identity as an expert in the community of practice.

Farmers may be the experts at the center of the alternative agrifood CoP. Guthman, Morris and Allen (2006) found that farmers were indeed valued and privileged relative to other participants in alternative agrifood discussions and so could be considered the epitomic insiders in these communities of practice. Others, however, could also be regarded as the insiders, including community or opinion leaders, such as farmers market

coordinators and food writers. Novices, new entrants into the alternative food CoP, negotiate social identities to progress to the middle of the community, and so become experts themselves. They engage in joint enterprises with existing authoritative actors, such as growing food at community gardens, cooking wholesome meals for potluck dinners, shopping at the farmer's market, attending canning workshops and otherwise supporting community agriculture. The more they learn the closer they become to becoming experts themselves, and they begin to negotiate an identity as a practitioner of alternative agrifood. They may be called "hippies," "veggies," "foodies" or "aggies" and further to community of practice constructs, use words and perform rituals that may not relate to the expressed values of their CoP (such as wearing certain clothing).

Is there evidence that novices negotiate around boundary objects in alternative agrifood communities of practice? Is there a rite of passage, or mode of belonging to the alternative agrifood CoP? Let's envision starting a home garden or volunteering on a farm as potential rites of passage for membership. Or perhaps being given a kombucha starter, undertaking a juice cleanse or slaughtering a chicken could be considered rites of passage for the community. These are all imagined possibilities for consideration of alternative agrifood as a community of practice. Viewing CoP provides a language and model for a rich description of activities within a local food community.

So, what are the implications of these two perspectives for alternative agrifood? Both theoretical lenses acknowledge there is a unified group of people engaged in a shared effort in the same types of activities. Both views highlight a mutual repertoire of activities and capacities or common culture in which people learn from each other.

Social movement theorists often argue that mutual grievances serve as a cohesive force in such groups (Allen, 2004). This is not a strong argument for alternative agrifood, since its activities are often not linked to any specific concern. Social movement theory also lacks a descriptive language for the sociocultural learning that occurs within alternative agrifood groups, a gap filled by community of practice theory. CoP theory describes how and why people learn socially within groups involved in the same activity and how their shared activities act as a cohesive force binding them together. This frame also directs our gaze to the power differential between newcomers to a community and old timers, who determine acceptable discourse, so change will occur slowly, and social reproduction will be prevalent. What community of practice theory lacks, however, is recognition of the potentially transformative power behind the cohesion of beliefs among members, and the capacity that represents in turn for groups to act together to influence others outside the community. In sum, alternative agrifood can be described as both a social movement and a community of practice, but a

much richer analytic portrait of the dynamics and possibilities of the phenomena can be drawn by combining insights arising from application of each frame.

Both theoretical lenses are also helpful in understanding why among this body of actors, there is little consensus concerning how to move forward. Social movement theory stresses the collective discourse that ties members together. The community of practice construct suggests that novices learn from experts, thus reproducing knowledge through identity shift towards the center of the community. Lavin (2014) has argued, however, that the alternative agrifood movement lacks sufficient language with which to address the issues that its members wish to change because it is embedded in the North American political neoliberal regime. Lavin (2009) has pointed out that Michael Pollan (2006), who has emerged as a major (unofficial) champion of alternative agrifood after publishing *The New York Times* Best Seller *Omnivore's Dilemma*, argues that buying local, among other consumer spending habits, is the best strategy to realize the alternative agrifood system. Lavin contends that this approach is popular precisely because it fits well within our hegemonic principles of neoliberalism with their emphasis on the primacy of the market in society. Others have also argued that the neoliberal agenda has dominated the discourse concerning alternative agrifood (Niewolny and Wilson, 2007).

Employing the community of practice construct lens suggests that the economic focus of alternative agrifood discourse will likely continue to dominate as social reproduction occurs. Viewing alternative agrifood as a social movement, meanwhile, reveals that those pressing claims are actually working from conflicting values. Civic action to change the background paradigm or frame guiding actions (demanded by advocates' equity claims) is not currently occurring in lieu of the "vote with your dollar" approach. Voting with dollars means that those with more consumptive capacity have more votes, which is anathema to the democratic ideals of the community/movement. Thus, it remains unclear how those advocating for food system change will move forward.

While our dominant agricultural production system has created a plethora of issues that we must address as a society, neoliberal ideas continue to dominate the alternative agrifood discourse, making it difficult to secure widespread and meaningful social and economic change. Viewing the alternative agrifood phenomenon as both a social movement and a community of practice makes painfully obvious the major tensions now in play within this discourse, and why a food revolution is not now imminent. By finding new ways to frame their arguments, perhaps proponents will more readily unify their efforts and begin to speak with one voice to promote change.

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3

Beyond (internal) Colonization, Blame and Binaries: Towards a Relational Economy

Jordan Laney

(Originally published on April 9, 2015)

A few weeks ago,[1] I was reunited with a group that blurs the line between activists and academics at the 38th Annual Appalachian Studies Association Conference in Johnson City, Tennessee. The Association's annual gathering draws an estimated crowd of 900 musicians, farmers, dancers, writers, scholars, teachers, community organizers, healthcare professionals and others with loose ties or deep roots to the region that is the group's namesake. The space is unique: at once welcoming, communal and rigorous. The conference boasted panels on literature, ethnicity, pedagogy and sustainable development. I presented on a New River Valley musician and moderated a panel addressing the area's hip-hop and rap scenes. I sought in my presentations to push the boundaries of what is and is not considered the regional soundscape and to understand why those presuppositions exist.

The event included wonderful moments of sharing and exploring. However, it was the session, "Internal Colony—Are You Sure? Defining, Theorizing, Organizing Appalachia" that has lingered in my mind.[2] Internal colonization has conceptually been helpful for many scholars to begin to describe desolate conditions in the region without recurring to a culture of poverty model or a world systems analysis. As the roundtable's title suggested, the use of the construct (internal colonization) is being questioned by many, and rightly so. The panelists and attendees left without answers, but with fresh questions—suggesting this session's importance.

What was evident for me as I reflected on the roundtable was that, 1) many interested analysts and other individuals long for discussions of political ecology and social economy, and 2) we do not yet have a language for next steps.[3] Rather than dive into the debate concerning whether internal colonization is a suitable model for studying the region, I seek here to reflect and engage briefly with the questions: What do we make (literally and conceptually) of the region's current political, cultural and social ecology? How do we re/create a just economy in Appalachia? In order to attain that aspiration, what relationships must be cultivated, what bridges must be crossed and what concepts must we question? In my view, regional scholars

must address these questions since, as Douglas Reichert Powell has argued, "[T]he function of critical regionalist cultural scholarship ideally should be not only to criticize but also to plan, to envision … more just and equitable landscapes" (Powell, 2007, p. 25).

Different understandings of poverty in Appalachia

Scholars, public officials and journalists have largely attributed the economic difficulties in the region to a "culture of poverty" or to the effects of capitalism (through world systems theories). World Systems perspectives, heavily influenced by the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, "conceptualize capitalism as an expansionist 'world system' evolving over centuries and operating over and above the collective decisions of individuals" (Lewis cited in Straw and Blethen, 2004, p. 62). Internal colonization was introduced to scholars through the pivotal work, *Colonialism in Modern America: The Appalachian Case,* edited by Helen Lewis.

"In order to reach a sustainable and just economy and 'organize towards brighter futures,' Appalachia's residents must look beyond borders, beyond here and there, insider/outsider, public/private distinctions and address the many levels of oppression, dependence and privilege which weave between and around—and most certainly within—the region."
-Jordan Laney

Lewis and her contributors argued that the purpose of the "Colonialism Model" (also known as internal colonialism, exploitation or external oppression) was to, "stand in contradistinction to other ways of viewing and interpreting the problems of the region, most significantly the deficiency or Culture of Poverty Model and Underdevelopment Model" (Lewis cited in Straw and Blethen, 2004, p. 13). Lewis' text's authors did not accept portrayals of "hillbillies" as "backwards and barbaric," nor did they view the region as a space that needed to be saved by outside intervention. Rather, the book created a clearer understanding of how Appalachia (a "relational term" according to Douglas Reichert Powell (Powell, 2007) has been manipulated by economic and political interests via (micro) dominance within communities and (macro) systematic oppression. This perspective proved incredibly empowering for many people within the region, as was evident at the ASA conference, where many were vocally hesitant to move beyond this theorization.

Implications of being an internal Other

One can see the implications of accepting and utilizing internal colonization not only as an explanation for exploitation, but also as a vessel

for change in Ron Eller's *Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945*, a heralded text within Appalachian Studies (Eller, 2008). It offers a thoughtful analysis of the political and economic situation of the region as increasingly understood and demarcated by policies. Eller explored the implications of the fact that so many public officials and citizens have perceived Appalachia as an anomaly and incorrectly imagined its people as isolated and backward. While conceptual "otherness" may conjure romantic views of "yesterday's people," it historically led as well, as Eller contended, to the belief that advances in technology and science could "overcome" such differences and supposed deficiencies and create a more equal playing field for those afflicted (Eller, 2008, pp. 62-63).

Nonetheless, while this culture of poverty model has reaped few analytic rewards, it is equally problematic to apply a generic one-size-fits all program or strategy, as entailed in an analysis guided by the assumptions of the internal colony perspective. Eller's assessment of the efforts of the United States Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) illustrated this point, even as its animating ideological "push" proved helpful in stirring social movements in the region. Indeed, it was only when the OEO began to press to include "the poor" on its various organizational governing boards that the region began to see true momentum towards realizing more equitable community relationships and projects, and thereby a more just political ecology. This characteristic—the inclusion of different types of knowledge/s and gendered, racial, socio-economic or insider/outsider experience within communities—is also what I find exciting and promising about Appalachian Studies generally.

Eller's discussion of faith-based programs, such as the Christian Appalachian Project, (CAP) clearly articulated the grave danger of exceptionalizing the region in order to assist it:

> Drawing on perceived images of Appalachian isolation and degeneracy to justify its programs, the CAP reinforced the popular idea of Appalachian otherness and limited its own ability to effect change … fail(ing) to confront the realities of injustice and economic exploitation that continued to marginalize poor people (Ibid, p. 123).

The inability to place Appalachia within the context of America at large and an incorrect belief that the region's residents were "other" and distanced from the national ecology characterized CAP's depiction and undermined the effectiveness of its efforts—as well intended as it projects were. Overall, Eller's text argued that poverty arises largely as a result of exogenous forces and true change must act in reverse, arising from within communities. As Reid and Taylor have suggested, "Allen Bateau warned us twenty years ago about emphasizing the cultural distinctiveness of Appalachian to the point of

limiting the political consciousness of the similarity between the domination of the region and the other forms of oppression" (Reid and Taylor, 2002, p. 13).

Cynthia Duncan's (2000) sociological comparative study, *Worlds Apart: Why Poverty Persists in Rural America,* offered an example of a shift in methods for approaching poverty in the region. Her book provided a compelling descriptive narrative of how and why poverty persists in Appalachia, from the viewpoint of those in and above poverty levels in the fictional town of "Blackwell," a typical coal town in the area. Duncan contended that cyclical poverty had long been understood through the lens of social structures and systemic issues, but that analysts had more recently begun to view it as the result of "social relationships and institutions in the community" (Duncan, 2000, p. 187). Duncan's text connected Appalachia to other American sub-regions and found similarities regarding their governance. Those relationships, I believe, are key to the profiled jurisdictions moving forward as communities—moving beyond imposed boundaries and binary understandings of rich/poor, insider/outsider and towards more equitable practices and change processes.

Today, with heightened awareness of the neoliberal state and its protean reach, the impact of personal relationships on economic progress must be addressed. The emotions connected with money; the affectual aspects of our economic positions and class limitations and dreams are interwoven. Thomas Lemke has written that neoliberalism is a mode of governmentality in which subjects become "entrepreneurs, wholly responsible for their well-being. In this construct, citizenship is reduced to successful entrepreneurship" (Lemke, 2001, p. 201). Neoliberal subjects are controlled "through their freedom; those acting in line with neoliberal ideals are widely seen as responsible, worthy and moral" (Lemke, as quoted in Brown, 2005, pp. 43-44). Within this confused relational paradigm, in which many routinely hold Appalachia's residents solely responsible for the area's relative poverty, new moral conceptions must emerge or older and more empirically accurate indigenous norms and mores must resurface if the region is to develop a more just economy.

Helen Lewis has described the region's distributive justice challenge as resulting from the "morals" of capitalism, as evidenced in the quotation above. On the most simplistic level, this is a consequence of the ways in which our nation and population have rationalized capital, labor and economics. The financialization of everything represents a grim reading of the state of our collective psyche. Nevertheless, I believe there is reason for hope. I agree with Lewis that our values must change and I agree with Brown that the demos is being destroyed by a neoliberal rationale and must be rebuilt on the basis of a radical reimagining. That is, we must work across boundaries and false binaries to seek an economy as relational as the spaces

to which we collectively cling for meaning. I argue that the work of theorists such as J.K. Gibson-Graham and analyses such as Duncan's can offer the foundation for just such a profoundly necessary project.

Radical imaginaries beyond binaries

Scope for future studies and hope for impoverished mountain communities may be found in the examples of thrift economies or share economies scattered throughout Duncan's selected interviews. J.K. Gibson Graham's work has shed light on this contra-hegemonic structure, which requires an undoing of our emotional and moral relationship with money, arguing:

> We may need to produce a noncapitalist economic imaginary in the absence of desire (or, in the presence of multiple and contradictory sites). Whereas we may 'desire' the capitalist totality because of the powerful antagonistic sentiments we feel in its vicinity, we may not want to live with it. We may want instead a landscape of economic dissidence, in the presence of which paradoxically we feel no desire. The process of social representation calls forth and constitutes desiring subjects—persons with economic, professional, sexual, political and innumerable other compulsions and desires. But the representation of noncapitalist class processes has barely begun (Gibson-Graham, 2006, p. 21).

Examples of this sort of imaginary in practice may be seen in Duncan's description of cars lining the side of the road with quilts over their hoods and items for sale arrayed on them. Another example is vegetable gardens planted beside mobile homes. Communal dinners and childcare are also examples of this ethic, as are local radio stations with airtime dedicated to residents.

I have seen this form of economy flourish in my hometown (McDowell, North Carolina) and in my own life in local farmer's markets and in the example of my father trading fiddle lessons for grazing land for our horses. Larger cities, such as Asheville, North Carolina, have proven that by diversifying and focusing on small community or co-op-based projects one building can bring in more revenue for a community than a Wal-Mart can produce (Montgomery, 2015). These are obviously not non-capitalist examples, but instead are predicated on alternate understandings of production and value.

Duncan has used the term "underground economy" to describe these sorts of "off the books" ways of making ends meet that encourage community bonds and support. In a world where thrift stores, trade lots, flea markets and Craigslist have emerged as social spaces, different understandings or relations to product, labor and money may develop. This shift in space and

power does not necessarily boost individuals out of poverty, but it may alter the playing field in a unique way and serve as possibilities for "contradictory sites" or different ways to imagine collectively understood social mores.

Looking forward

I believe there is much hope if we rewrite the moral foundations of the Appalachian economy. This may begin with the false dichotomies of internal/external, here/there, and "other" dialogue that have prevailed in conversations concerning how to view the region. The ASA roundtable specifically asked the following overarching question linked to this concern:

> … As the need for major economic transitions within Appalachia, perhaps especially the coalfields, becomes more widely accepted, questions about how to define and theorize the past in order to overcome its legacies and organize towards brighter futures become more urgent. Does "internal colony" adequately clarify the context and aims of our struggle? Is ridding the region of outsider ownership and control our central organizing goal? If not, what is? (Appalachian Studies Association, 2015).

In order to reach a sustainable and just economy and "organize towards brighter futures," Appalachia's residents must look beyond borders, beyond here and there, insider/outsider, public/private distinctions and address the many levels of oppression, dependence and privilege which weave between and around—and most certainly within—the region. Until then, as the ASA conference session revealed, we must begin crafting a new language with which we can better articulate our hopes and the possibilities of our collective (radical) imagination.

Notes

1. The Appalachian Studies Association Conference was held March 27-30, 2015 on the campus of East Tennessee State University in Johnson City, Tennessee.

2. The roundtable was co-chaired by Barbara Ellen Smith (Virginia Tech) and Steve Fisher (Emory and Henry College). Participants included: Mary Anglin (University of Kentucky), Dwight Billings (University of Kentucky), Silas House (Berea College), Cathy Kunkel (Advocates for a Safe Water System), and Ada Smith (Appalshop).

3. The Beehive Collective has made a tremendous impact bridging this divide through their work with visual media. Collecting personal narratives for use in creating more general and untold versions of regional histories, their murals serve as spaces that transcend local/global divides through stories of lived experience.

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4

The Youth Bulge in the Middle East and North Africa is Breaking Higher Education in the Region: How to Address the Challenge?

Donald Back

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The youth bulge in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is at the root of many social issues across the region and beyond it. The current conflicts in Syria and elsewhere in the area notwithstanding, much of the 'normal' migration to Europe from MENA nations is to obtain jobs, given the high unemployment in the region (Gubert and Nordman, 2014, p. 2). This situation arises from fast growing youth populations across the area that have outpaced its economic growth (Gubert and Nordman 2014, p. 27). MENA governments have sought to address the baby boom in part by increasing access to higher education. They are building more and more universities and frequently doing so without the resources—trained faculty, for example—to support them (Jaramillo, 2011; Lamine, 2010). While expanding university systems to accommodate more students may seem, on the face of it, an appropriate policy response to a growing youth population, providing more post-secondary schools is stressing resources and lowering educational quality in nations across the region. Moreover, once students graduate, MENA nations' ill-developed market economies offer them few opportunities (UNICEF MENA Regional Office, 2010, p. 64).

My original animating question for this essay was: Is building more universities an appropriate policy response to the youth bulge in the MENA states? What follows is an excerpt from the draft introduction to my dissertation, written some months ago, which addresses the topic of higher education financing in the Middle East. I thought I might tweak it for this week's *Reflections*. In re-reading it critically, however, I noticed how caught up I had become in the arguments in the original literature—from the World Bank and similar sources. I was struck in this reading, however, by the paradox implicit in building universities to train youths for jobs that do not exist. Bear with me for the concluding thoughts.

A 2011 World Bank report on higher education in the MENA countries pointed to three primary issues facing governments in that area: increasing access to higher education, financing university studies and preparing young

adults for the job market (Jaramillo and Melonio, 2011, p. v). As noted above, underlying these issues is a systemic problem of rapid population growth across the region, particularly among youth. A 2009 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on security issues confronting Arab states described the problem succinctly:

> The most evident and challenging aspect of the region's demographic profile is its 'youth bulge.' Young people are the fastest growing segment of Arab countries' populations. Some 60 percent of the population is under 25 years old, making this one of the most youthful regions in the world, with a median age of 22 years compared to a global average of 28 (UNDP, 2009, p. 3).

This phenomenon is not expected to peak across all MENA countries until 2045 (Galal, 2008, p. 55).

"The intractable issue is not the inability of higher education to prepare students for the job market, but the failure of policymakers and free market proponents to accept the limitations of the market economy in this part of the world."
-Donald Back

This large cohort of youth is currently working its way through the area's universities. A 2009 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) report estimated the number of students in higher education across Arab states had increased 256 percent between 1998 and 2008, from 2.967 to 7.607 million (Lamine, 2010, p.11). During a similar period, the number of universities in the MENA region more than doubled from 178 to 398. The UNESCO analysis argued that two principal factors were contributing to this increase in relatively equal measure: rising population and growing social demand for higher education. The variety of higher education institutions has also grown to include more open and virtual and private for-profit and not-for-profit institutions and international branch campuses (Jaramillo, 2011; Lamine, 2010). In addition to building new universities, MENA governments have added many alternatives such as community and teacher training colleges and technical training programs to the higher education mix (Lamine, 2010, p. 19). While the region's states have made progress in providing broad access to post-secondary school opportunities, the numbers of students entering universities continue to grow at a phenomenal pace (Jaramillo, 2011).

The rapidly growing populations in MENA countries have created staggering pressures on higher education. While college and university enrollments doubled for the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states between 1995 and 2009, they tripled for MENA nations during that same period. During the eight-years from 2000-2008,

average enrollments at Middle Eastern and North African universities increased an average 20 to 30 percent. World Bank Senior Education Specialist Adrianna Jaramillo has predicted an additional rise in MENA higher education enrollments of as high as 50 percent by 2023 (World Bank, 2013). She has called for colleges and universities to find alternative sources of funding to support this growth, given that "tax increases are highly unlikely" (World Bank, 2013). Enrollment pressure resulting from the region's youth bulge has stressed facilities, caused teacher shortages and stretched financial resources (Jaramillo and Melonio, 2011).

State supported higher education in MENA nations is challenged by a relative dearth of financial resources, underprepared students entering the system and difficult employment situations for graduates. As historic numbers of youth make their way into higher education, universities throughout the region are facing the challenge of educating more individuals with diminishing resources. On the surface, higher education spending as a portion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in many MENA states appears on par with state expenditures for the purpose in the European Union (averaging 1.4 percent of GDP) and OECD (averaging 1.2 percent of GDP). Some nations in the region, such as Algeria (2.6 percent of GDP) and Libya (3 percent of GDP), for example, approach or exceed spending by the U.S. (about 2.7 percent of GDP).

However, when the populations of MENA countries are factored into their spending for higher education, i.e., higher education spending *per enrollment* as a portion of GDP *per capita*, the financial stress these nations now confront becomes clear. As the number of students enrolling in universities increases at a greater rate than the growth occurring in the general population, which is the case with the current youth population bulge among the MENA nations, higher education spending per student decreases. Indeed, while average spending per student among the region's states increased from U.S. $1,288 to U.S. $ 2,082 between 1995 and 2009, higher education spending per student as a proportion of GDP per capita decreased by an average 45 percent during the same period (Jaramillo and Melonio, 2011, p. 17).

A 2010 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) report criticized school systems in MENA countries at all levels as of "uneven quality and relevance" and inconsistently preparing students for careers (UNICEF MENA Regional Office, 2010, p. 84). Students in these nations evidence a lack of interest in the science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) fields, high dropout rates and relatively low average educational attainment compared to other world regions (UNICEF MENA Regional Office, 2010, p. 64). The UNICEF analysis also cited a "lack of feedback loops between the education system and the needs of the labor market," and advised:

> The global marketplace calls for new competencies that the current education system is not fully prepared to teach. And to adjust to the realities of globalization, schools must be prepared to transform their curricula even while they diversify their funding sources (UNICEF MENA Regional Office, 2010, p. 64).

The 2013 World Bank report cited above echoed this assessment, noting that large numbers of MENA graduates in the humanities and social sciences are ill-suited, "to meet the demands of the recent private sector expansion in the manufacturing and service sectors" (Jaramillo and Melonio, 2011, p. 5).

Compounding the severity of the situation confronting higher education in MENA countries is a lack of jobs for university graduates. While unemployment among this group tends to be lower than for those who have not completed higher education, individuals who do complete college are thrust into a very competitive job market. Unemployment among youth in MENA nations is higher than that in any other world region—averaging more than 27 percent in the Middle East and 29 percent in North Africa in 2013. The International Labor Organization (2014) has reported that in many MENA countries unemployment increases with educational attainment:

> For instance, over 29 percent of those with tertiary education are unemployed in Tunisia; over 26 percent in the Palestinian Authority; 22 percent in the United Arab Emirates; and over 18 percent in Morocco, 15 percent in Algeria; and around 14 percent in Egypt (International Labour Office, 2014, p. 64).

Both the UNICEF and World Bank reports cited above concluded that higher education in MENA countries should provide the skills that graduates need to become productive members of the workforce, i.e., that a market-oriented strategy should be central to higher education planning and curricula in the region (Jaramillo and Melonio, 2011, p. 6; UNICEF MENA Regional Office, 2010, p. 64).

What strikes me about the World Bank and UNICEF report conclusions is that neither addresses the fundamental issue of the numbers of universities in the region. Jobs in the MENA states are scarce and the economies of these countries are demonstrably ill prepared to absorb more graduates (Gubert and Nordman, 2014, p. 2, UNICEF MENA Regional Office, 2010, p. 64). Why, then, are area nations continuing to build more schools and graduate more students despite a perceived decline in the quality of those graduates and the lack of jobs available in MENA state economies? The World Bank and UNICEF have criticized MENA governments for not providing job-specific skills (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, p.5, UNICEF MENA Regional Office, 2010, p. 64). But, offering such training will not solve the

unemployment problem; it will simply add an additional group of skilled graduates to the ranks of the unemployed. If a lack of capacity is the real issue, then the real challenge—the failure of the market economy under the weight of demographic change—should be the focal point.

There is a nuance in the employment situations across MENA. Particularly in the Gulf States, Western expatriate professionals have assumed many jobs in highly skilled sectors such as oil or energy. Foreign nationals such as Pakistanis, Indians and Nepalis typically fill less skilled jobs in these countries. This sort of stratification exists in many MENA states. Migration for jobs not only occurs from the region to Europe, but also internally from non-oil-producing nations to oil-producers (Kabbani and Kothari, 2005, p. 25). This notwithstanding, there have been far more people entering the workforce in the past few decades than there have been jobs to absorb them (Kabbani and Kothari, 2005). The private sector in MENA states is inadequate to absorb the current bloom in youth population. Neither the World Bank nor UNICEF's proposed solutions address this reality. The intractable issue is not the inability of higher education to prepare students for the job market, but the failure of policymakers and free market proponents to accept the limitations of the market economy in this part of the world.

Reading report after report critiquing the MENA situation in the same way gives one pause. Are we so caught up in the neoliberal imaginary that we see fault in ourselves before we see any in that construct? Does it really make sense to contend that MENA governments are culpable for poor higher education standards or high unemployment in their countries given the demographic challenges they confront? Or to hold higher education at fault for not preparing students adequately for jobs that do not exist? We can blame the victim, as have the World Bank and UNICEF in this case, or we can look beyond the elephant in the room for other solutions.

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5

Biopiracy and the Threat to Indigenous Knowledge

Ashleigh Breske

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A conflict between western and indigenous forms of knowledge appears to be endemic in our current globalized world. While western knowledge has been divided into different disciplines, specialties and subjects, indigenous knowledge is disseminated amongst the people possessing it and no one person is considered its 'owner' (Harry 2011). These communal, rather than individual, intellectual property rights have left the door open for the cooption of indigenous knowledge by multinational corporations (MNCs). Through biopiracy and the patenting of indigenous knowledge, the global "free" market has established a form of biocolonialism in recent decades, instrumentalizing indigenous knowledge and local biodiversity for profit.

MNCs enter biologically diverse areas, a process dubbed bioprospecting, to seek biodiversity and indigenous knowledge as resources that can then be used for future profits in pharmaceuticals, gene manipulation for food sources and other development (Delgado 2002; Ismail and Fakir 2004). Corporate success rates in these efforts increase greatly when they incorporate or are predicated on indigenous knowledge and guidance. Since at least the 1990s, MNCs have presented themselves to the international community as protectors of this valuable knowledge, claiming that if it were not for them, the information might otherwise be lost.

Many indigenous groups have come to realize during this period they were being excluded from the vast economic benefits obtained from their knowledge (Ismail and Fakir, 2004). In short, bioprospecting projects can quickly lead to biopiracy, defined as the appropriation of indigenous knowledge and biodiversity without due compensation to the native populations possessing it (Delgado, 2002). MNCs claim that since indigenous knowledge is communal, and not privately "owned," everyone is free to use it—indigenous and nonindigenous alike. But this is not how indigenous people view their traditional knowledge and resources. For them, the knowledge and resources are to be kept within the community and shared between generations. Unfortunately, existing laws protect those who obtain patent or intellectual property rights more readily than they assist original knowledge holders. MNCs are able to afford the cost of court battles and possess the knowledge and capacity to file for patent and intellectual

property rights they deem necessary. This biocolonial form of neoliberalism has resulted in indigenous communities paradoxically losing control over their traditional forms of knowledge.

Neoliberalism and biopiracy

Neoliberalism has led to globalized use of patent laws and the cooptation of indigenous information and intellectual property rights by MNCs that are not necessarily accountable to the state, but only to their shareholders (Pojman, 2006). The pharmaceutical industry, particularly, has pressed to obtain TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) as a means by which to prevent indigenous communities from profiting from their own knowledge (Heywood, 2002).

"Multinational corporations are able to afford the cost of court battles and possess the knowledge and capacity to file for patent and intellectual property rights they deem necessary. This biocolonial form of neoliberalism has resulted in indigenous communities paradoxically losing control over their traditional forms of knowledge."
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These corporations often change minor elements of genetic codes or chemical formulas to strip indigenous communities of possible intellectual property rights claims, insisting thereby that their product is no longer related to its initial source. As Harry has observed: "At the core of the biocolonial process is the control, manipulation and ownership of life itself, and the ancient knowledge systems held by Indigenous peoples" (2011, p. 703). The problem stems both from the idea that native populations are simply caretakers of communal knowledge and that their territorial rights to the resources on their traditional lands need not be considered (Harry, 2011). This concern is exacerbated by the inconsistent enforcement of indigenous rights throughout the world since individual nation states presently determine how those are resolved within their territories.

There are numerous ways MNCs influence current trends to control patent and intellectual property laws. One mechanism by which it occurs is gene manipulation. Such efforts pose difficulties for indigenous peoples on multiple levels:

1) Scientists and the general public do not know the long-term effects on local environments and crops produced,

2) Indigenous groups are routinely not compensated for the knowledge they possessed that led to the development of these new genetically-modified organisms since companies stipulate they are different from the original resources obtained through bioprospecting, and

3) If local food systems are altered, that fact can affect the health and well-being of local indigenous communities.

This situation underscores Corntassel's observation that, "Indigenous connections between well-being and food security/livelihoods are critical to the realization and practice of a sustainable self-determination" (2008, p. 118). Gene manipulation can also lead to monocropping (monoculturing). The current trend to adopt such agricultural practices leads to ecological degradation and a loss of biodiversity, even as it disregards and erodes indigenous knowledge related to local, traditional crops. It is, however, very profitable for corporations that convince native communities to try new food staples created through genetic modification.

Counter-hegemonic possibilities

Given the power and resources of multinational corporations, the question arises whether there is any recourse available by which to protect indigenous knowledge. One such entity is the international Convention on Biological Diversity (Convention on Biological Diversity, 1993) the main treaty that seeks to safeguard native populations' intellectual property rights. It includes "provisions to protect developing countries and indigenous people" (Zenobia and Fakir, 2004, p. 177), but it often does not protect well against the more powerful TRIPS agreements. Capital is a very loud voice in today's world and corporations that acquire formal patent and intellectual property rights are frequently able to drown out indigenous peoples' voices.It is important to understand the barriers that patent and intellectual property rights create for the poor of the world. Unfortunately, the production of knowledge is governed and legitimated by major western nations and this fact often disempowers indigenous peoples seeking to protect the legacy represented by their shared cultural understanding. Too often westerners consider such accumulated wisdom insignificant or primitive unless it is controlled by outsiders, such as MNCs, and produces wealth.

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knowledge cooption. Nonetheless, non-indigenous firms need to make amends for the past exploitation of indigenous knowledge through some form of restitution.

Although the battle for indigenous peoples' rights in these scenarios has often proven unsuccessful to date, several communities have nonetheless effectively pressed efforts to contest these continuing MNC attempts at knowledge cooption. Nonetheless, non-indigenous firms need to make amends for the past exploitation of indigenous knowledge through some form of restitution. This could include compensatory payments for past use or possibly offering a share of relevant patent–related profits. New, stronger laws need to be created to protect traditional knowledge and natural resources from firms desiring to use them to secure profits not shared with the native groups affected (Corntassel, 2008). Moreover, communal indigenous knowledge must be allowed to continue as a shared cultural practice between generations if it is to survive (Ibid). That is, it should not be circumscribed and overridden by legal forms alien to its origins and the understanding of the peoples possessing it. More broadly, and in order to ensure such treatment, indigenous peoples need to have their rights universally recognized and protected by international law (Harry, 2011). It is conceivable to imagine that native peoples could reclaim their rights utilizing current neoliberal practices—patents, property rights, etc.—that have kept them subjugated, or through some as yet unknown shifts in power structures, but that is surely uncertain. What is clear is that indigenous communities must be permitted to control and employ their traditional knowledge as they wish and not be exploited for profits by MNCs.

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6

Hashtag Revolutions, Spectacles and Politics

Johannes Grow

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The nomination process for the next presidential candidates is in full swing in the United States. Although this election cycle has been noteworthy for several reasons, the most notable is not only the success of billionaire Donald Trump, but of the self-proclaimed "socialist," or at different times, "democratic socialist," Bernie Sanders. Although both the Democratic and Republican primary races are fascinating, this analysis will focus on Trump and Sanders and their ongoing presidential nomination campaigns. Specifically, what concerns me is the role of what Luke has called "entertainmentality" in both the Democratic and Republican primaries. Luke has suggested:

> Plainly, 'entertainments' are arrangements to keep one preoccupied, to engage one in a specified manner, or to maintain one as such. To speak of entertainment, one already moves rhetorically into spaces of 'entertainmentality,' or practices that keep us held in some mutually pre-specified manners (2002, p. 4, quoted in Nickel, 2012, p. 168).

In other words, as Nickel (2012) has noted, this "preoccupation" with entertainment narratives "not only holds our attention while holding us apart, it also imparts a false sense of individualized entertainment as a form of togetherness" (p. 169). These "celebrity parables" have turned the race for President of the United States into the equivalent of a TV reality show complete with heroes and villains, obscuring alternatives to crisis-ridden and contradictory neoliberal governance, or "roll-out neoliberalism" that has continued under both the Left and Right (Peck, 2010). The current Democratic and Republican primaries represent the latest iteration of this entertainment narrative. Americans' preoccupation with the celebrity character of the Democratic and Republican primary races, despite their ideological differences, is propelled by a "media spectacle" that precludes any "political revolution" or anti-establishment politics (Kellner, 2009, p. 783; Fletcher, 2016).

Although I argue that all of the candidates fall within this entertainmentality narrative, Sanders and Trump have each proclaimed that

they are "anti-establishment" candidates and thus beyond "political orthodoxy" (Roberts and Jacobs, 2016). These presidential candidates adhere to ideologically different views, but nonetheless embrace entertainmentality narratives and media spectacle. As a result, these continue to dominate Democratic and Republican election politics.

"The reliance of U.S politics on E-politics and media spectacle obscures the 'real issues' 'interests' and 'ideologies' behind the façade it creates. This form of campaign politics also reduces the potential for alternatives to neoliberalism within Democratic and Republican party politics."
-Johannes Grow

While we are continuously told that both of the potential presidential nominees treated here are tapping into the anger of the disenfranchised, the excluded and outraged citizens, Sanders and Trump's campaigns are radically different (Brooks, 2015; Savage, 2016). Sanders has promised to lead a "political revolutio" by securing major campaign finance reform and has embraced universal higher education and the breakup of big banks while also advocating New Deal-era style policy projects. He seems to be energizing the much-Maligned Millennial Generation, albeit to a lesser extent than "Obama's Miracle" accomplished in 2008 (Davis, 2016; cf. Schaeffer, 2016). This is not to say that Sanders is refusing to speak about issues that need to be addressed. The massive amount of student loan debt, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Citizens United* that opened space for an almost unfettered role for money in politics and the role of the banking-financial sector in the recent global financial crisis, should be addressed. Yet, we must be careful when proposed remedies for these concerns are advertised as a "political revolution," when in reality, these ideas remain ensconced within a neoliberal narrative that presumes that we can solve our issues solely through offering more education, providing more jobs or repairing crumbling infrastructure (Halsey III, 2015).

Trump, on the other hand, has espoused vitriolic, xenophobic and bizarre policies. For example, his statements on "irregular migration" from Mexico or his stance embracing torture are outrageous and have very little basis in reality (Porter, 2015; Davidson, 2016). Nonetheless, Trump's presidential nomination campaign has gone from being a "joke" and a "public stunt," to a serious political phenomenon. Indeed, unless the Republicans can somehow finagle a "brokered convention" and prevent Trump from gaining the required 1,237 delegates, the businessman may capture the GOP presidential nomination (*RealClear Politics,* 2015).

Despite their significant ideological differences, the 2016 campaigns for the GOP and Democratic Party presidential nominations have fully embraced what Kellner (2009) has termed the "media spectacle," a phenomenon marked by the promotion and production of would-be

presidential nominees as "faux-celebrities propelled by the 'implosion' of entertainment, news and politics" (p.716). This is perhaps no more evident than in the meteoric rise of Trump. Kellner has also highlighted the fact 2008 Democratic Party presidential candidate and presumptive 2016 Democratic Party presidential nominee Hilary Clinton enjoys the same faux-celebrity (Ibid). Clinton's entertainmentality narrative has developed as a result of her husband, former President Bill Clinton's sex scandal as well as the current "email server scandal" (Kellner, 2009). Kellner has suggested that in the 2008 election:

> … The spectacle of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton—the first serious African American candidate versus the first serious women candidate—generated a compelling spectacle of race and gender. … As media spectacle, the Democratic Party primary could be seen as a reality TV show. For the media and candidates alike, the Democratic primary was like 'Survivor' or 'The Apprentice' ('You're Fired'), with losing candidates knocked out week by week (2009, p. 717).

In retrospect, Kellner's portrait of the 2008 Democratic primaries seems prescient, capturing both that Party's nomination race and that of the GOP as well. Not only were there originally seventeen potential nominees to "knock out" during the Republican primaries, but the current delegate leader for the Republican Party nomination is also the former host of a reality television show, *Celebrity Apprentice.* Moreover, Trump's rhetoric on the campaign trail and during debates has been deeply intertwined with his TV persona. Indeed, his constant references to his ability to "win" and the success of his business ventures connects his celebrity persona with his presidential aspirations (Porter, 2015).

Sanders has also reached and embraced a certain celebrity status. Similar to the 2008 Obama campaign, whose "masterful leveraging of Web 2.0 platforms," such as Facebook and Twitter, marked a "major E-ruption in electoral politics," Sanders has also become a Web and media spectacle, across platforms that include, "Bernie Sanders' Dank Meme Stash" as well as countless hashtags and videos on social media and the Web (e.g., #feelthebern) (Dewy, 2016; Dutta and Fraser, 2008). Similar to Obama's presidential campaigns, Sanders has made effective use of YouTube, hashtags, Facebook and Twitter (Kellner, 2009). The reliance of U.S politics on E-politics and media spectacle obscures the "real issues," "interests" and "ideologies" behind the façade it creates. This form of campaign politics also reduces the potential for alternative(s) to neoliberalism within Democratic and Republican party politics to emerge (Ibid, p. 783). Yet, this is not to contend that Sanders' campaign, partly modeled on the recent Occupy and Black Lives Matter social movements, will not help build a "more egalitarian

and diverse Democratic Party" (Marcus, 2016). On the contrary, regardless of whether he wins the Democratic Party nomination, he may have changed the direction and composition of the party for the future (Ibid).

In sum, although what Sanders espouses is no doubt imperative, the increasing entertainmentality of presidential elections, with Trump representing perhaps the pinnacle of this (con)fusion, continues to obscure alternatives to the currently dominant (neo)liberal public philosophy (Brown 2005). In the end, Sanders' calls for a "political revolution" must be contextualized. Yes, inequality must be reduced; yes, higher education should be accessible; yes, our infrastructure must be repaired. Nonetheless, Sanders' calls for a "hashtag revolution" and for Americans' collective participation in politics remain superficial and deeply intertwined and even enthralled, with entertainmentality and spectacle.

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7

The Land-Crisis Nexus: Commodification of Nature as a Means of Crisis Management

Vera Smirnova

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> With all frontiers now closed, we might ask if the capitalist world-economy today confronts a situation at all similar to that faced by feudalism some seven centuries earlier. Like feudalism, capitalism appears to be approaching the limits to growth inscribed in its production system. The crucial difference is that capitalism's ruling classes lack the option of the spatial fix enjoyed by medieval Europe's ruling strata (Moore, 2002, p.315).

Commodification of nature—conversion of natural resources into commodities through privatization, alienation and dispossession—appears to result from deepening contradictions related to capitalist crisis management through land (Castree, 2003). During moments of crisis, capitalism attempts to overcome barriers to its accumulation by gaining control of, commodifying and capitalizing on not-yet-commodified resources. Thus, recently intensified economic instabilities and uncertainty related to, for example, sustaining steady agricultural production, paired with the increasingly limited availability of not-yet-commodified resources, or 'cheap nature,' have generated renewed interest in land as a potentially liquid asset (Moore, 2014). This interest has resulted in a rising inflow of international speculative capital directed towards urban and agricultural property and resources linked to it, including water, forests, energy, waste, farms and housing that lost a share of their market value during the recent economic recession.This essay interprets this struggle concerning land ownership as an 'illusory solution' to a fundamental accumulation crisis now occurring under the capitalist mode of production (McMichael, 2012).

While policies during the last several decades have restructured the municipal services previously linked to 'landed property' (one of the pillars of Marx's analysis) such as food production, resource extraction, social housing or infrastructure development, and instead sought to deliver those programs through private markets, this step is likely only "to buy time (and space) in the short run" to offset a new economic crisis in the future (McMichael, 2012, p. 681).

"This complex process did not simply result in privatization and dispossession of urban or rural land. It also enabled institutional reassignment of control of much resource management from the state to private actors, a triumph of neoliberal logic."
-Vera Smirnova

Indeed, in the long run, these attempts to resolve the contradictions of capital accumulation by commodifying nature may simply reproduce the economic risks related to distributional struggles over access to affordable land. That is, I argue, the current rush to acquire land, particularly properties that diminished in value during the recent recession, is symptomatic of a deeper inability to manage the contradictions now evident in capitalism. I address the following questions in this brief analysis: 1) how is commodification of land articulated and manifest at times of economic crisis, and 2) how is that process different from the daily workings of capitalism?

Theorizing commodification of land through crisis

Capitalist commodification of resources as a means to manage economic crises is more than a mere fix. This process in many cases encourages a 'new territorial rationality' that sustains the myth of a crisis-free accumulation of capital, supports diverse practices resulting in material and immaterial displacement, and functions across a range of different scales and time periods (Sevilla-Buitrago, 2015). Moments of economic crisis create an opening for "predatory practices of capital accumulation" (Harvey, 2011, p. 107). Such efforts vary widely from the privatization of municipal resources in cities to the complex speculative dynamics of state-led devaluation or disinvestment and subsequent gentrification of urban land, or practices of global land grabbing via large-scale land acquisitions by domestic or foreign capital. Although these practices are not always 'intrinsically brutalizing' to the most deprived, when they operate within moments of urgent necessity of economic recovery it can become tricky to understand who wins and who loses.Land is at once productive and political. It is a "relation of property, a finite resource that is distributed, allocated and owned" (Elden, 2010, p. 804). Land plays a crucial role in Marxist scholarship in its relation to rent and ownership. For Marx, land was foremost a commodity. Marx contended that enclosure of space or the 'commons' in pre-industrial England represented an essential solution to the crisis of feudalism. In the context of English 'Inclosure by the Acts of Parliament,' land was not simply a finite resource upon which feudal rent could be imposed, but also the means by which a large-scale reorganization of the accumulation processes via changes in its

forms of ownership could occur. Gradual privatization of common land along with colonial geographical expansion allowed feudal proprietors to overcome economic stagnation and severe agrarian crisis.

Marxist scholars differ in how they understand the relationship between land commodification and economic crisis (see Table 1 below). Some analysts have cited the crisis of Fordist-Keynesian economic development that began with the simultaneous appearance of high inflation and unemployment in the 1970s (Davoudi, 2009; Metzger, 2000;), while others have examined specific manifestations of the recent 2008 financial crisis, including oil and food market crises and their repercussions for local land markets (Desai, 2013; Hadjimichalis, 2014; McMichael, 2012).

Still other researchers have emphasized the intersection of multiple forms of crises including, the global 'housing crisis' and the commodification of policy discourse (Wyly, 2015), or the feudal crisis and the crisis of governance (Sevilla-Buitrago, 2012). Scholars view these historical episodes as drivers of the ongoing commodification of nature due to the momentum each has lent to speculative investors by sudden devalorization of land market values (Hadjimichalis, 2014), rapid inflation of food prices followed by outsourcing of agricultural activities (McMichael, 2012) or lack of profitable reinvestments in land followed by capitalist land capture of not-yet-commodified areas (Desai et al., 2013). Table 1 provides a summary overview of these cases.

Table 1. Case examples of crisis-led commodification of land and land-related resources

Resource	*Crisis and its aspects*	*Commodification/ speculation typology*	*Consequences*	*Emergent crisis tendencies*
The commons	Crisis of feudalism	Market-led agrarian reforms in the Third World; Commodification of the commons; Gradual privatization of public space	Homogenization in the social organization of agriculture – elimination of autonomous social reproduction linked to common land	Class crisis; State crisis
Housing stock	Fiscal crisis in the early 1970s	Redlining; Privatization of municipal land	Gentrification; Evictions of tenants	2008 subprime mortgage crisis
Waste industry	Banking crisis in the early 1970s	Institutional restructuring of resource management	Struggles over resource control	Managerial crisis
Public and private land	Greek government-debt crisis of 2008-09	Privatization and speculative investments of international capital in municipal land	Brain drain; De-valorization and dispossession of land market value	Crisis of land affordability
Urban land; Informal housing;	2008 economic crisis	Individual titling in the informal land market	State-led evictions of tenants; Reduced household expenditure	Land affordability crisis
Food; Agricultural land;	Food prices inflation, 2008 crisis	Enclosure of the off-shore crop land	Degradation of land; Impoverishment of peasant cultures	Agrarian crisis; Energy crisis
Real estate	Systemic urban crisis	Commodification of discourse; Weakening of rent controls	Social Darwinism; Gentrification; Largest displacement in the Global South	Housing affordability crisis
Housing and land markets	2008 economic crisis	Capitalization of ground rent; Cycles of disinvestments/ reinvestments; 'Planetary rent gaps'	Global-scale dilemma of 'gentrification or an urban decay'	Housing and land affordability crisis

The 'Inclosure' Acts of Parliament to accommodate the crisis of feudalism

> Many farms and large flocks of cattle, especially of sheep, became concentrated in the hands of a few men, whereby the rent of land has much risen and tillage has fallen off, churches and houses have been pulled down, and marvelous numbers of people have been deprived of the means wherewith to maintain themselves and their families (Marx, 1887, p. 504).

Marx interpreted Parliament's Inclosure Acts in pre-industrial England as a key process of capitalist territorial formation in response to the crisis of feudalism. A brief reference to this historical moment is crucial because it represents a primary model for contextualizing capitalist crisis management through land. The historical era's economic crisis was partly shaped by the "relation of the feudal system of social production to land" (Moore, 2002, p. 304). More precisely, the problem was that investments in property aimed at improving agricultural productivity were routinely undermined by the levy of feudal rents. This reality led repeatedly to radical real and opportunity costs in farm revenues.

For Marx, the fixed character of land suggested that it could only be modified through its destruction. This phenomenon played a key role in Harvey's idea of 'accumulation by dispossession,' which he derived from Marx's concept of 'primitive accumulation.' Both approaches refer to the pre-conditions necessary for capitalism's development, and transition from feudalism in particular. In a time of economic crisis, accumulation by dispossession "provides an outlet for over-accumulated capital" (Levien, 2012, p. 940) by releasing assets at a very low cost. The result helps to sustain steady and 'crisis-free' economic growth (that, as we know, is neither steady nor crisis-free after all). The Inclosure Acts represented an internal fix to a crisis of feudalism by commodifying the 'commons' that, paradoxically, had been preserved by feudal rule prior to their passage. These processes were coupled with geographic expansion of the volume of land available by means of colonization. Some authors have described this process as a 'scalar fix' to the feudal crisis. However they are labeled, these steps constituted a new territorial formation articulated through the conversion of property rights:

> A closer look at Marx's description of primitive accumulation reveals a wide range of processes. These include the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive private; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labor power and the suppression of alternative, indigenous, forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets, including natural resources; monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; slave trade; and usury, the national debt and ultimately the credit system (Harvey, 2003, p.74).

This change in land ownership turned the periphery into a strategic territory for accommodating the crisis of land degradation under feudalism by means of a 'spatial fix.' Thus, the frontier of feudalism became at once the space for accumulation, "of new merchant capital for old rentier landowners and also a space of exploitation in which emerged a new army of dispossessed populations, totally dependent on the sale of their labor power" (Sevilla-Buitrago, 2012, p. 213).

New enclosures of land

This historical moment of capitalist territorial formation can serve as an analogue of the extent to which a similar logic of resource dispossession through restructuring of prevailing modes of land ownership can be embedded in modern crisis management processes. For example, many scholars have considered the slowing of economic growth in the 1970's to be the impetus for a new wave of land enclosures that neoliberalists pressed to undermine organized labor (Hodkinson, 2012). As Hodkinson has noted, these new enclosures of resources were not designed to offer new locations for profit creation in a time of crisis, but instead to create, "the large-scale reorganization of the accumulation process itself in order to undermine collective organization and place-based struggles, depress wages, and make workers vulnerable and precarious and thus more compliant to capital" (2012, p. 506). This complex process did not simply result in privatization and dispossession of urban or rural land. It also enabled institutional reassignment of control of much resource management from the state to private actors, a triumph of neoliberal logic. Many have highlighted the emergence of a new regionalist politics and the growth of so-called social Darwinist competition among urban localities for municipal services and investment funds in recent decades. In this view, policies that underscored the logic of interurban competition over resource management led to an, "inefficient use of public money, degradation of local communities, and created the capacity to trigger a fiscal crisis of the state" (Jones and Ward, 2012, p. 409). Thus, in a way, it was the urge for privatization of public services along with a cutback in public housing subsidies and other social welfare initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s that grew into the need for many families to turn to subprime mortgages in the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium. The resulting housing and speculative bubble spurred a severe recession that spread around the world.

I have sought to raise some issues that I hope will contribute to the recently revived dialogue concerning the land-crisis nexus. First, following Sevilla-Buitrago (2012), I highlighted the fact that a restructuring of land ownership in a time of crisis does not result in a mere pyrrhic fix, but also leads to the formation of a 'new territorial rationality' that reproduces the

myth that crisis can be resolved by commodifying land. Second, I viewed these moments of crisis management, including dispossession of land and land-related resources, displacement and forced evictions of local community members and erosion of inherited systems of landed local knowledge as representing a new form of a systemic crisis that will potentially lead to reproduction of economic risks and uncertainties into the future. These issues are complex and, thus, require more thorough examination via case studies. Although, as Table 1 illustrates, some individual scholars have begun to address this task, my hope is that this theoretical inquiry will spawn additional and more systematic empirical research on this topic.

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8

Evaluating the Meaning of Consent in the Gig-economy

Putu D. Apriliani

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Last week, Gerald Davis, the Gilbert and Ruth Whitaker Professor of Business Administration at the Ross School of Business, and Professor of Sociology at the University of Michigan, gave a talk in the Virginia Tech Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) Series, on the topic "New Institutions for a New Economic Order." In his view, the increasing financialization of society has had tremendous impacts not only on the for-profit sector, but also on households and the state.

Nikefication, a term that he used to refer to a branding strategy without actual industrial processes behind it, is a direct implication of such irrepressible capitalist forces. Just imagine several American fashion brands such as Nike, Kate Spade, Michael Kors, and GAP that market their products in the United States, but produce most of what they sell abroad. Moreover, and similarly, many government programs are implemented by contractors today. Davis asserted that the way multi-national corporations now work and the *contractorship* of various jobs, has resulted in a deepening income inequality in the United States.

With the advent of application-based businesses, such as Uber, AirBnb, Lyft, and Booking.com, investment models have shifted from a corporate-based and heavily industrialized process into peer-to-peer transactions organized by a programmatic application. In this regard, industrial organizations have also turned increasingly to a *contractorship* organizational model.

For example, AirBnB, an online community marketplace for people to list, discover, and book accommodations, provides a platform for residence owners who want to rent their unoccupied rooms to earn extra income by signing up as lodging providers. This model requires zero physical investment on the part of the firm and creates no new full-time employees either. I here seek to analyze the meaning of *consent* in these sorts of firms by employing Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony and Marcuse's concept of one-dimensional man.

There's an app for that!

The *Economist* (2014) published a review entitled, "There's an app for that," and it brought widespread attention to the fascinating changes in consumer behavior and expectations associated with the new form of exchange represented by that technology. Despite the lack of a widely-accepted definition for this new form of trade, which has been variously labeled the gig-economy, on-demand economy or sharing-economy (Burns, 2017; Petropoulos, 2017), it has expanded at an incredible rate and its reach is now global.

> "By using the rhetoric of attractive self-employment and low barriers to entry, companies such as Uber and Postmaster can easily hire drivers and/or handymen as independent contractors, without investing large sums to provide what a traditional company would offer its employees, namely training or a safety net."
> -Putu Apriliani

This said, the fact there is no shared definition for the phenomenon has made it more difficult to determine the precise extent of consumer use of this form of exchange (Burns, 2017). An online organization, 'The On-Demand Economy,' consists of members of this emerging industry and now includes a variety of companies, whose foci range from delivery (e.g., Eat24 by Yelp, Postmates, and Ebay Now), to family care (e.g., Heal, Care.com, and Urbansitter), to parking reservations (e.g., Parking Panda, Spot Hero, and Luxe). According to officials at On-Demand (n.d.), the United States alone has at least 682 firms operating in the gig economy, mostly in densely populated metropolitan areas, such as Los Angeles, New York and Washington D.C. The simplicity of the system makes it seductive for consumers. Because the demand for this type of service has increased exponentially in a short period, it is no surprise that a platform-based company such as Uber is now valued at $62.5 billion. However, despite their unprecedented growth, these firms have faced resistance and criticism for their unregulated character (Martin, 2015; Schofield, 2014).

Puzzled in cultural hegemony

An online poll conducted by Future Work Initiative, *Time* Magazine, and Burson Marsteller, between November 16-25, 2015, sought to capture the views of a representative sample of 3,000 Americans concerning the on-demand economy (Burson-Marsteller, n.d.; Steinmetz, 2016). Because the survey sample was representative of the U.S. population, its developers argued that its results suggested that the equivalent of an estimated 45 million American adults have provisioned goods and/or services through popular on-demand economy models such as ride sharing (Uber, Lyft, and

Sidecar), accommodation sharing (Airbnb, VRBO, Homeaway), service platforms (Handy.com, Care.com, Taskrabbit), car rental (Car2go, Zipcar, Getaround) or food and goods delivery (Instacart, Postamates, Caviar). Demographically, the survey found that 61percent of those who have offered such services (often called offerers) were male, 55 percent were members of a racial or ethnic minority, 51 percent were ages 18-34 and 41percent were urban residents. Moreover, the majority of the offerers claimed that they were in a better economic situation compared to the year before. Slightly more than 60 percent of those responding believed that their economic standing would continue to improve in the year ahead. Fully 71 percent of survey respondents working in the industry in some capacity indicated they felt positive about doing so, while only 2 percent indicated the opposite. The remaining 27 percent of those responding claimed to be neutral concerning their employment experience.

Nonetheless, 58 percent of those responding also suggested that the industry exploits the fact it is unregulated. As Burns has contended, the gig economy is not as simple as accepting jobs through an app on the phone. It is, rather, a growing portion of the economy whose workers "… work with no benefits, no job security, and no unions" (2017, p.89). Furthermore, by using the rhetoric of attractive self-employment and low barriers to entry, companies such as Uber and Postmaster can easily hire drivers and/or handymen as independent contractors, without investing large sums to provide what a traditional company would offer its employees, namely training or a safety net. In doing so, these firms in effect ask individuals to forego benefits and a measure of security for flexible working hours and the freedom to conduct business relatively autonomously. This fact confirms Davis's observation that economies of scale are no longer applicable under this scheme. This is because a platform-based company creates its equity in the form of computer programs and applications, which are much less costly to produce than large scale machines or industrial infrastructure. What these companies do is basically (re)create a niche within the existing market by employing infrastructure and/or expertise owned by the "workers" it employs (e.g., Uber drivers use their own cars).

Furthermore, the gig-economy also influences some high-skilled professions by challenging the traditional business model on which they have long rested and by suggesting that those jobs could be accomplished or approached differently. For example, a platform called HEAL is designed to bring a doctor to a patient's home simply by tapping on a smart phone screen, without the need for cash.[1] The system's founder, Nick Desai, has argued that the $3 trillion healthcare industry in the U.S. is fundamentally broken. Doctor shortages cause long wait times, which prompt patients to use urgent care options that provide fewer treatment options and at higher cost (Thayer, 2016). By shifting to a peer-to-peer transaction model, Desai

has suggested, doctors ideally could have more time to care for fewer patients with greater efficiency. Since physicians would see patients in their homes, they could offer more nuanced treatments, since they would have direct knowledge of the environmental conditions and lifestyles of those they are seeking to assist.

This essay was prompted by my sense of puzzlement regarding the reigning ideology that has encouraged the establishment of this sort of demand-economy in the U.S. Today's pseudo-self-sustaining culture encourages individuals to monetize every dimension of their lives. Such is certainly true of the gig-economy. Antonio Gramsci, an Italian neo-Marxist theorist who lived in the early part of the 20th century, offered a theory of cultural hegemony that sought to explain how those advantaged in capitalist society use cultural institutions to maintain their privilege and power. He defined hegemony as

> the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12).

The shared-economy model exhibits two important elements of hegemony as Gramsci defined that condition––it allows both consent and domination to coexist by means of the way offerer/worker-company relationships operate—and thereby legitimates the coercive power of capitalism. Consider Uber, for example. Popular consent for this new form of business activity has been relatively easy to achieve because it requires few background checks, does not demand much by way of qualifications except for two very basic ones, i.e., a driver's license and an automobile with four doors, and provides the offerers convenience and competitive fares for their (under-employed) resources. Marcuse (1964) argued that the advanced industrial society has created false needs that trap individuals into the one-dimensional role of seeking to fulfill unbounded desires. In his view, one-dimensional thought and behavior wither ones' ability to think critically and behave appropriately when confronted with capital-induced oppression. Seen through this lens, society has fallen into the following conditions: a relentless cycle of production and consumption mystification exacerbated via mass media; common *contractorship* of goods and services provisioning; and the emergence of a contemporary mode of thought, which in the on-demand economy, is clearly affirmed as especially practical.

A case study of Tom (Khaleeli, 2016), a 24-year-old bicycle courier in London who works for an app called *Deliveroo* that appeared in the *Guardian* newspaper, demonstrated that he confronted an employment situation with only limited options available to him as a member of the working class.

When he signed up to be a part-time cycle courier, the company that employed him assigned him to work for at least three-hour shifts and offered pay of £7 an hour and £1 per delivery, without health insurance, paid time off or sick pay. The firm also expected him to provide and maintain his own bicycle and to ride in heavy traffic and all weather conditions. He told the author of the news article concerning him that he believed his employer wants citizens to perceive that its delivery riders, "are all young, middle class-men who wear trendy clothes, making a little extra cash" (Ibid), which is simply not true, given that most of the workers are doing it full-time and as their primary position. Though he is very critical of the unfair conditions under which he works, Tom remains in his role because he loves cycling and because he believes he does not possess adequate qualifications to obtain other jobs (Ibid).

As many gig industry firms treat their "workers" in quite similar ways (i.e., no sick leave, no health insurance, flexible hours, etc.), I support the implication of Gramsci's argument that Tom's tacit consent, and that offered by millions of other workers in similar situations, preserves capitalistic domination. Furthermore, this also renders repression as economically and socially natural for all workers who choose this form of employment. My judgment is that these values are not natural, but instead are created by people with vested interests in particular social, economic and political orders. Lastly, the idea of "pulling oneself up by the bootstraps"—that one can succeed if one just tries hard enough—is a false aphorism that has achieved the status of received popular wisdom. This claim is untrue because it masks what is, in fact, a system of structural sexism, racialism and ableism that prevents disenfranchised populations from effectively bettering their conditions. The logical follow-up question further to this realization is, is it possible to attain passage of laws aimed at minimizing the economic costs of such relentless cultural pressure, given the reality that the nation remains under the sway of a dominant neo-liberal public philosophy?

Notes

1.HEAL is financially supported by 17 investors, including the pop-artist, Lionel Richie, and has collected $26.9M Series A venture funding within two years since first introduced in October 2014. Retrieved from https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/heal.

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PART II

FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As Hellmann and Urrestarazu (2013) explain, some scholars emphasize the distinction between two fields within the discipline of international relations (IR): "systemic" international relations, which provide for a panoramic perspective on the international system as a whole, and "subsystemic" foreign policy analysis, which focuses on the placement and actions of states considered to be the most essential unit of this system. Additionally, Alden and Aran (2017) have observed that there are several different approaches to understanding the conduct and impact of states and sub-state and non-state actors in foreign policy making. While foreign policy focuses on the intrinsic possibilities of human agency and sub-national actors to affect and even change the international system, the field of International Relations emphasizes the role and influence of structural constraints on the international system (Alden and Aran, 2017).

The seven essays in this section examine the relationship between policy, agency and actors, discussing wide-ranging, globe-spanning contemporary examples set in a context of blurred lines between domestic politics and external environments. The issues explored in the following essays demonstrate a layered complexity of international politics and deal with the nature of the political institutions, the basic features of society, the institutional and organizational arrangements linking state and society and the role that state and non-states actors have within the process of foreign policy decision making, as well as the influence of institutional and societal factors in shaping foreign policy.

In the first essay in this section, Engel examines economic instruments of foreign policy besides diplomacy and security. He argues that the Eurozone crisis is far from being solely a European phenomenon and its implications can be generalized for the U.S. foreign policy and international political economy. Next, Sanchez explores the complexities of efforts to interpret the actions of the Chinese state from the perspective of everyday politics, which, she argues, allows analysts to uncover their fragmented nature, as the boundaries of jurisdictions in the nation's law are blurred making it difficult to discern what behaviors and activities are and are not permissible across

various locations in the country. Chandler explains the details of the recent historic Japanese-South Korean agreement concerning comfort women and discuss their implications. Furthermore, she outlines the potential effects this accord may have for any future actions these nations might take concerning this long-festering matter.

Keyel argues that individuals, institutions and states throughout the world must foster a cosmopolitan attitude as a first necessary step in addressing the global challenges that humanity deals with in the 21st century. Because cosmopolitanism focuses on the world as a whole rather than on the interests of a particular nation or territory, it encourages human societies to move beyond limiting their concern for implications of their collective choices for their populations and bounded political communities. Karle discusses America's use of military force in Iraq in 2003, in Libya in 2011 and again in Iraq in 2014, detailing how the US failed to plan appropriately for what would happen after its initial intervention. He argues that the newly elected US president will not only inherit the problems afflicting Iraq, but will also likely make the same mistake of employing military force in the region without planning adequately for what should occur afterwards. Breske explores the soft power of culture and its effect on the international politics, arguing that it is imperative to protect cultural heritage for its importance for citizen identity development and for its role in the social recovery following conflict. Finally, Grow examines the argument that frames EU as an empire, with a goal to reveal some of the contradictions between the Union's normative claims and its external policies, in particular its refugee policies.

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9

What the Eurozone Crisis Can Tell us about Sino-American Relations

Sascha Engel

(Originally published on September 17, 2015)

G20 economists and other observers have described the ongoing Eurozone crisis as a drag on global, and particularly American, growth (Guerrieri, 2012). It seems to some that leaders of European Monetary Union countries are unable to move beyond monetary union into a full fiscal union (Habermas, 2012). In this view, this inability has kept the Eurozone in the grip of conflicts stemming from nationalism on the one hand, and austerity fundamentalism, on the other hand (Bastasin, 2012). Similarly, American critics have described Europeans as "moral hazard fundamentalists," as incapable of living up to their global responsibility of stabilizing financial markets and as willing to sacrifice the economic strength of the continent, and indeed global markets, for stubborn austerity policies (Geithner, 2014). At the same time, other critics have described the Eurozone crisis as a merely European problem.

I maintain that the Eurozone crisis, far from being solely a European phenomenon, allows inferences beyond that continent's institutions. It allows one to draw larger conclusions about financial market mechanisms—particularly the duality of sovereign bonds as a fiscal instrument and an asset class. This dualism can be found in the empirical context of Sino-American relations, which have long been characterized by conflict-ridden cooperation stemming from significant investments by Chinese Sovereign Wealth Funds in United States Treasury securities. Since the structural integrity of the American financial system and hence of Chinese exports depend on this cooperation, the Eurozone crisis is of interest to U.S. foreign policy and international political economy analysts alike.

The ongoing European financial instability has highlighted the role of seemingly arcane financial technicalities in shaping policy. This is particularly the case for sovereign bonds—assets issued by governments and purchased by financial market participants, who thereby lend money to the offering nation (Eaton, 1993; Lo Conte, 2009). Bonds of this kind yield little interest compared to other possible investment instruments. Instead, their

main selling point is that the sovereign involved can require its citizens to contribute funds toward repayment via taxation, virtually guaranteeing repayment (Mundell, 1996).

"The Eurozone crisis has yielded insights into these dynamics that can help American and Chinese leaders respond more effectively to this turn. Just as in Europe, U.S. domestic economic policy inevitably has consequences for other nations."
-Sascha Engel

Investors purchase sovereign bonds to stabilize their international portfolios precisely because they are considered exceptionally stable. In regulatory terms, this makes these offerings tier 1 capital (BIS, 2013), the reserve a financial institution holds that constitutes its basis for leverage borrowing (Epstein and Habbard, 2013). For example, at a leverage ratio of five, if a bank or fund holds sovereign bonds valued at $100, it will be legally allowed to lend money from other financial businesses up to a total volume of $500, funds the bank or fund can use for its own operations despite only $100 being genuinely its own.

This fact implies that any changes in the value of sovereign bonds can have significant consequences for the businesses holding them. If the value of the government paper in the above example was to fall by $10, for example, the portfolios of firms that contain it would decline by $50. Assuming that financial actors hold more than one such asset and that their leveraging ratios are often higher than five and that sovereign bonds trade for significant sums, a decline in the value of these instruments can create significant difficulties for entities holding them. Moreover, the effects of this reality ripple outward, as other businesses, to which the firm in this example lent for its leveraged transaction, will demand repayment if they begin to question their loan's viability.

Many European banks held other Eurozone governments' bonds prior to the region's recent crisis and that exposure proved to be one key precipitating factor of those events. For example, French banks were exposed to Greek sovereign bond deterioration to a significant extent in 2010 (Lucarelli, 2011). Rapid French and other European bank sell-offs of that paper reduced the value of Greece's offerings in the region's sovereign bond markets, threatening their asset function and thereby stimulating further sell-offs (Shambaugh, 2012). In turn, the fiscal function of sovereign bonds was threatened as sell-offs reduced buyer demand and drove up interest rates. This combination negatively affected state finances, resulting in marked deterioration in the fiscal status of several countries (Botta, 2013). The workings of sovereign bond markets thus became vitally important to European policy-makers.

These findings can be generalized beyond the Eurozone in two ways. First, and well illustrated in the recent European scenario, are the fiscal constraints imposed on nation-states by financial market practices. In lieu of levying taxes—an option in popular disrepute since the late 1970s—governments throughout the Western world have often financed their expenditures by issuing bonds at market interest rates (Schäfer and Streeck, 2013). As a result, debt service prioritization—austerity—had become a permanent condition for many nations long before the Eurozone crisis (Pierson, 2002). Secondly, by issuing debt, states provide assets for international investor portfolios and thereby serve a securitization function in international finance (Lo Conte, 2009). In this way, government finances have become a *sui generis* form of international relations.

Sino-American relations exemplify this turn in international politics. U.S. sovereign bonds (Treasury securities or Treasuries) are widely considered a 'safe haven' asset and are therefore employed as debt securities in a range of international portfolios (Noeth and Sengupta, 2010). Interestingly, however, to a significant extent, their price stability—which allows them to perform their financial steadying function—stems from ongoing Chinese investment in them. As of June 2015, Chinese Sovereign Wealth Funds held $1.3 trillion in American sovereign debt (U.S. Treasury, 2015). Japan holds a similar amount. China employs this strategy to lower the relative value of its currency, keeping its products cheap vis-à-vis the American Dollar and strengthening its export capacities to the U.S. (Liang, 2012). Simultaneously, this investment in United States Treasuries allows these assets to serve as portfolio stabilizers for American financial businesses. Those firms extend credit to U.S. consumers based on the security provided by ongoing high Treasury prices, who then often use it in turn to purchase Chinese goods (Cohen and DeLong, 2010).

The Chinese stock market correction that occurred from June through August 2015 provides an example of the implications of this structure and its associated dynamics. As investors worked to reduce their exposure to China's stocks in their portfolios, they sought safety in U.S. Treasuries, raising the initial price of those offerings and reducing their interest rates. Between June and August 2015, the return associated with U.S. two-year, five-year and ten-year Treasury notes decreased by a third, a fifth, and a fifth, respectively, as demand for them increased. At the same time, the Dollar increased in value relative to the Chinese Yuan (Bloomberg, 2015).

Despite their minuscule appearance, these fluctuations have had notable economic and political effects. First, U.S. exports have become more expensive because of the rise of the value of the Dollar, potentially decreasing their volume and threatening domestic employment. Secondly and simultaneously, American purchasing power for goods produced in China

has increased as available credit has expanded. Maintaining a balance between these two forces has emerged as a primary challenge of Sino-American relations for the foreseeable future.

The Eurozone crisis has yielded insights into these dynamics that can help American and Chinese leaders respond more effectively to this turn. Just as in Europe, U.S. domestic economic policy inevitably has consequences for other nations. For America, maintaining an economic environment favorable to Chinese purchases of U.S. Treasury Securities is essential if the nation is to ensure continued availability of credit to American businesses and consumers. Debt ceiling standoffs of the kind that occurred in Washington in 2011 and 2013 are thus not likely to be isolated American affairs any more. More positively, U.S. economic aims could also be achieved through bilateral efforts, as increasing Chinese (and other) investments in Treasury Securities raises the price of those offerings and thereby increases the lending leverage available to American financial businesses. In all of these cases, examining the Eurozone crisis carefully with an eye toward the implications of internationally integrated capital markets for domestic policy allows analysts to abandon the dangerous assumption that the United States is an isolated hegemon—and to pay more attention to just how much its economic strength owes to its fruitful relations with China and other nations.

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10

Shifting Signals in the "Two" Chinas

Jamie Sanchez

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On July 11, 2015, several foreign tourists connected to a South African humanitarian aid organization were arrested in Ordos, Inner Mongolia on suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Local authorities claimed the group, which included visitors from Great Britain, South Africa and India, was watching propaganda videos in their hotel room. However, the guests, who were in the midst of a 47-day excursion throughout China, maintained that they were reviewing a documentary about Genghis Khan in preparation for a visit to the Genghis Khan Mausoleum located near Ordos (Institution of Genghis Khan, 2015). After some negotiation between British Consular officials and Chinese authorities, the local government freed those detained on July 17 (FT Ltd., 2015). In a press release, members of the group characterized their incarceration as a "misunderstanding" due to, perhaps, confusion caused by "unfamiliarity with the English language." (Wong, 2015) Chinese authorities have not officially commented on the situation. This example highlights the complexities and contradictions that may arise when dealing with the Chinese government, which, despite its totalitarian character, does not always speak with one voice or reflect a common stance as it wrestles with maintaining its power and authority amidst rapid economic and social change.

This essay explores the complexities of efforts to interpret the actions of the Chinese state. It draws on Stern and O'Brien, who have asserted that investigating China's government actions from the perspective of everyday politics allows analysts to uncover their fragmented nature. That situation, in turn, is exacerbated by the blurry boundaries of jurisdictions in the nation's law, which make it difficult to know what behaviors and activities are and are not permissible at various locations in the country (Stern and O'Brien, 2012).

The disjointed character of the authoritarian Chinese state, combined with the recent emergence of a variety of modes of resistance throughout the country, have prompted Stern and O'Brien to conclude that, "there are at least two Chinas: the stable, high-capacity juggernaut familiar from the headlines and a hodgepodge of disparate actors" (Stern and O'Brien, 2012, p. 175). The curious dichotomy of China's identities can be examined by

investigating and contextualizing the geographical location in which the tourists were arrested and by understanding the political ideology that drives state and society relationships throughout the country.

Autonomy means loyalty

The dualistic character of the Chinese state was evident in the establishment of Inner Mongolia in 1947 as the first of China's five ethnic minority provinces (Bulag, 2004, p. 90).

"Ethnic unrest combined with global criticism of the China's human rights record and the environmental degradation arising from its aggressive economic development efforts has created a tense ethnopolitical environment in Inner Mongolia. This has left the government concerned with how to prevent unrest in the province from escalating to the same level it reached previously in Tibet and Xinjiang."
-Jamie Sanchez

The Chinese Communists created the administrative category, zizhi qu, which literally means "self-rule," as a means of coaxing members of minority groups to identify with the emerging state. The regime's leaders hoped that establishing autonomous regions would create an "expectation of belonging" in which ethnic minority groups could also enjoy ownership of land (Bulag, 2002, p. 9). However, in reality, the relative autonomy declared as part of the official name of Mongolia was meant foremost to encourage its residents to align with Mao and the Communists, thereby preventing possible collaboration with the Nationalists or foreign external powers, such as the Soviet Union. The Chinese government never really intended that Inner Mongolia, or any of the other ethnic minority areas of the nation would enjoy true political independence. Instead, the state's course enabled it to construct what Anderson has called an "imagined community" of belonging by, "… stretching the short tight skin of the narration over the gigantic body of the empire" so that Mongols could view themselves as a part of the Chinese nation (Gladney, 2004, p. 16).

Do not (even appear to) disrupt "social harmony"

For China's government, an "expectation of belonging" implies that all citizens will adhere to the national identity the state has assiduously promoted. These efforts have included the promotion of the hexie shehui (harmonious society) ideology. Hu Jintao, former president of the People's Republic of China (PRC) reintroduced this construct, rooted in Confucian thought, as a socio-economic vision in 2005 (Li, Sato and Sirular, 2013). He coupled this construct with the idea of a harmonious society characterized by minzu tuanjie (ethnic unity), thereby allowing all those living in China to

be one nation. The antithesis of this term is minzu fenlie (ethnic separatism). And the government has drawn the line between these ideas very sharply. Put simply, those who are viewed by the state as disrupting unity run the danger of being termed separatists. The suppression of separatism has become an essential political tool by which the state justifies its ethnic policies in regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang.[1] By framing any civil unrest in the country's minority regions as evidence of divisiveness, the regime is able to signal other groups in the country that aim to disrupt "societal harmony" (Morrison, 2014, p. 89) of the challenge they will face from authorities if they protest the existing order.

Indeed, authorities in Inner Mongolia have been on alert for hints of social unrest in that region for the last few years due, in part, to the ongoing ethnic tension that erupted in Tibet just months prior to the 2008 Olympic Games and in Xinjiang in July 2009 (See Barnett, 2009; Wei, 2011). Social discord in other areas of China has prompted government officials to remain on the lookout for social unrest in ethnic minority regions such as Inner Mongolia. In recent years, the PRC has confronted resistance led by the religious sect Falun Gong, been the target of sharp criticism by artist turned human rights activist Ai Wei Wei and seen itself accused of religious persecution because of its decision to raze a Christian church in Zhejiang province (See Jacobs, 2011; The Economist, 2001; Johnson, 2014).

In May 2010, just a year after widespread minority group unrest had occurred in Xinjiang, protests erupted in Inner Mongolia in response to the hit and run death of a Mongol shepherd. Since that time, there have been other demonstrations throughout the region concerning issues of internal colonization, the state's aggressive assimilation policies and environmental degradation.[2] While residents have complained about the environmental destruction occurring in Inner Mongolia for many years, Western media are now reporting on the issue, adding a new dimension to the government's challenge (Maughan, 2015).

This tense situation has prompted the Chinese state to watch carefully for potential threats to its desired "harmonious society," because external actors, who include kin and those with ethnic ties to residents, are often mobilized to act on behalf of a particular ethnic group suppressed by the state. Han has argued that outside actor involvement is tied closely to a group's ability to mobilize politically against the regime (Han, 2013, p. 9). This is particularly true with Tibetans and Uyghurs who have a large diasporic network. While Mongols do not have a strong diaspora from which to draw, there are other interested actors—namely human rights organizations—that pose a potential threat to the Chinese state. Thus, ethnic unrest combined with global criticism of the PRC's human rights record and the environmental degradation arising from its aggressive economic development efforts has

created a tense ethnopolitical environment in Inner Mongolia. This has left the government concerned with how to prevent unrest in the province from escalating to the same level it reached previously in Tibet and Xinjiang.

The Chinese state: Ambivalent and ambiguous

This situation brings the argument back to the arrest of the foreigners with which this essay began. When I discussed the news of their detention with colleagues, the first question many asked me was, how did the authorities know what the tourists were watching in the privacy of their hotel room? While the specific details of how the state obtained its information are unknown, the reality is that the Chinese government maintains strict control over much of what happens throughout the country. The state exerts even more power in Inner Mongolia because of its concerns about the restive minority ethnic population there. What video the group was watching was not as important to the state as the potential threat that the visitors posed to the maintenance of social harmony. From the regime's perspective, a group of tourists from three different nations, connected to a humanitarian organization traveling and for a prolonged period of time throughout the country, posed a risk. As such, although the visitors claimed they were not doing anything "wrong," local authorities still found a way to expel them from China.

This situation highlights why the shifting nature of the Chinese state has prompted Western scholars to use terms such as "ambiguous" and "ambivalent" to describe the complexities arising from efforts to interpret PRC responses to different situations (See O'Brien and Li, 2006, p. 188; Lee, 2010, p. 51; Yang, 2009, p. 131). Those living in and visiting China are often taken by surprise by the dual nature of the Chinese state. For even the most skilled expert, the regime's signals can often be contradictory and, in any case, are almost always difficult to read. The group of tourists highlighted above planned to visit one China, the country well known in the media and global politics. But, they inadvertently found themselves confronting the other China, a nation whose state lurks in every dimension of society and where watching a movie in the "privacy" of a hotel room can result in expulsion.

Notes

1. Many scholars address the Chinese state's use of "separatism" in minority policies: Mackerras, China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation; He Baogang, "The Power of Chinese Linguistic Imperialism and Its Challenge to Multicultural

Education," Eds. James Leibold and Yangbin Chen, Minority Education in China: Balancing Unity and Diversity in an Era of Critical Pluralism, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014), 64.

2.The Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center chronicles the ongoing protests that take place in Inner Mongolia. See: www.smhric.org.

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11

Korean Comfort Women: Bargaining Chips in East-Asian International Relations

D'Elia Chandler

(Originally published on January 28, 2016)

Until recently, the issue of the comfort women—the name given to approximately 200,000 women and girls, mostly from the Korean peninsula, who were forced to work as sex slaves by the Japanese military between 1932 and 1945—had stymied any genuine warming of Japanese-South Korean relations (Nippon, 2014). However, on December 28, 2015, the two governments came to an agreement that looks set to end the political gridlock between the countries for good. The accord was negotiated behind closed doors, without the direct involvement of any surviving comfort women, and reached to ease trade, territory and military tensions.

The absence at the table of the women on whom this recent difficult negotiation centered was not new. From retracted or dismissed apologies, to historical misrepresentations of facts, Korean comfort women have long been spoken about and spoken for, and marginalized by state leaders in both their native country and in Japan. This new agreement, like others before it, does not fully address what the comfort women have sought. Since this issue came to the political forefront in the Republic of South Korea (ROK) in the early 1990s, comfort women and their advocates have demanded a formal apology and compensation for their suffering from the government of Japan and specific acknowledgement of the Japanese Imperial Army's involvement in the creation and maintenance of the comfort stations. Notably, the new agreement is not legally binding, leaving the door open for either Japan or South Korea to retract its assent and thereby re-victimize the comfort women; this time as pawns in broader interest calculations.

I have organized this essay into five parts. I first describe who the comfort women are and show how the patriarchal character of South Korea precluded surviving comfort women from coming forward for so long. I then explain how euphemization laid the foundation for the utilization of the comfort women as a group for unrelated domestic and international political purposes. Next, I demonstrate that there has been uneven support for the

survivors from the South Korean government on this issue historically. Thereafter, I explain the details of the recent historic Japanese-South Korean agreement concerning the issue and discuss their implications. Finally, I outline the potential effects this accord may have for any future actions these nations might take concerning this long-festering matter.

The comfort women and patriarchy in South Korean society

"Comfort women" is the name given to, "young females of various ethnic and national backgrounds and social circumstances who became sexual labourers for Japanese troops before and during the Second World War II" (Soh, 2000, p. 59). In an effort to expand its national territory, Japan's Imperial Army conquered much of what is now China and South Korea between 1910 and 1945. During this time, the Japanese Imperial Army systematically set up what its officials dubbed "comfort stations" to which the Army's personnel could go for sexual release. These facilities were also intended to avoid the spread of sexually transmitted disease in camps and to prevent the men from raping women and girls in occupied villages.

> "From retracted or dismissed apologies, to historical misrepresentations of facts, Korean comfort women have long been spoken about and spoken for, and marginalized by state leaders in both their native country and in Japan."
> -D'Elia Chandler

Firsthand accounts by comfort women of their experiences are harrowing. Some were kidnapped, while others were conscripted forcibly to "serve" in comfort stations by ruling Japanese authorities. Because of inadequate documentation, the precise number of women subjected to this systematic degradation is unknown. Amnesty International has argued that up to 200,000 women were forced by the Imperial Army into what is now generally recognized as a form of sexual slavery during World War II. The ages of the women and girls affected varied, but most were under 20 and some were as young as 11 (Amnesty International, 2009).

To understand how this occurred, one must examine the intersection of gender, hierarchy, class and colonization. These victims were predominantly from poor families, "that belonged to the landless tenant or semi-tenant class in rural areas or to the jobless migrant groups in cities" (Min, 2003, p. 951). While national conquest and colonization are helpful in partially understanding the plight of these women, that awareness does not account for the fact that the South Korean government played a role in exacerbating the comfort women's suffering after the war's end. Indeed, power and class help to explain why comfort women were ignored for so long following that conflict. As one comfort woman has observed:

> If [President Kim Young Sam's] daughter or sister had been victimized as a Japanese military 'comfort woman,' he would have taken some action long ago to make the Japanese government acknowledge the crime and compensate [to] us (Lee Young-Ok, Min 2003, p. 952).

The number of surviving comfort women is unknown. Korean gendered norms of respectability and honor played a role in many of the comfort women's silence about their experiences for more than 50 years. Honor refers to a girl or woman's virginity and chastity in Asian society. During World War II, The Japanese Imperial Army especially prized Korean virgins for their comfort stations. Many of the women have suggested that they were "stripped of their dignity and robbed of their honor," both during World War II by Japan's military and after the country's liberation by the indifference of their nation's government (Human Trafficking Team 2007: 53). As Sami Lauri, a member of the Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues has noted, "the majority of [comfort women] were never married. In Korea, the mentality is that virginity is one of the most important factors in a marriage … so they were victimized twice" (Richardson, 2015).

Euphemization of the women's experiences

The darkly connotative euphemism, "comfort women," coined by the Japanese Imperial Army, is now used internationally to describe those individuals coerced into "staffing" comfort stations. Naming is a form of power, a means of identification, which plays a key role in establishing definitions of self (Karam, 2011, p. 7). In this sense, the term "comfort women" can be seen to be deeply misleading on multiple levels. Most notably, the term evades describing the lived experiences of these women, while also implying that they were "camp-following prostitutes" (Soh, 1996, p. 1227). As one survivor, Yu Ok-seon, has stated:

> We were snatched, like flowers that have been picked before they bloom. They took everything away from us. When I think back I remember only tremendous pain. We were not living as human beings (McCurry, 2014).

Indeed, thousands died from illnesses arising from deplorable living conditions and brutal beatings. Others were murdered in mass killings.

The term "comfort woman" sought to rob the individuals so described of their agency: "When we speak for others we must be careful not to remove agency from the other, and force upon them our definition of who they are" (Marino, 2005, p. 35). A former comfort woman, Yong Soo Lee, has captured this point,

> I never wanted to give comfort to those men. That name was made up by Japan. I was taken from my home as a child. My right to be happy, to marry, to have a family, it was all taken from me. … I am a proper lady and a daughter of Korea, I am not a "comfort woman" (Constable, 2015).

The survivors' traumatic experiences of torture and trauma have long been masked by the name given them–"comfort woman"–which has allowed their society to view them as one- dimensional. Indeed, analysts have used descriptors such as "victim," "prostitute," "volunteer" and "Korean grandmother" to describe the women who underwent this ordeal. Euphemizing these women's pasts and categorizing them in misleading ways doubtless made it easier for otherwise squeamish South Korean organizations and government officials to discuss them, but these deceptive constructions have rarely resulted in more than a still deeper wounding of survivors.

South Korea's support for the comfort women

Since this issue came to light in the 1990s, comfort women and their advocates have obtained only intermittent support from the South Korean government. For example, in 1993, President Kim Young "made public assurances that the Republic of Korea would not request any material compensation with regard to the comfort women issue from the Government of Japan" (Commission on Human Rights, 1996). Meanwhile, the Government of Japan argued that it was not at all sure it had a legal responsibility to compensate individuals for crimes committed more than 50 years ago. Again, as late as 1993, a former South Korean ambassador to Japan was reported to have "questioned the veracity of statements by the women and for categorizing the issue as 'unimportant'" (Soh, 1996, p. 1231).

Civil society organizations have played a major role in helping surviving comfort women share their stories and helped create a space for them to do so. When Special Rapporteur, Radhika Commaraswamy traveled to South Korea and Japan to investigate the comfort women issue in July 1995, she noted in her report that other sectors of society voiced strong demands on their behalf:

> The position of these organs of civil society closely reflects the demands made by the surviving victims themselves, including an official apology by the Government of Japan, the admission of State responsibility for war crimes committed "to restore the honour and dignity of all former comfort women," the release of all documents and materials relating to the issue, compensation by the Government of Japan to be paid to individual surviving victims, and the enactment by the Government of Japan of

> special legislation so as to enable a settlement of individual claims for compensation through civil lawsuits at Japanese municipal courts (Commission on Human Rights, 1996).

With the help of nongovernmental organizations, this issue soon became much harder for the South Korean government to avoid addressing. From holding weekly protests outside of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, to attracting attention from larger, international organizations such as Amnesty International, more and more surviving comfort women began to come forward and to seek redress for their suffering.

The Republic of Korea government became much more involved on an international scale when it became compulsory for it to do so in 2011. The Constitutional Court of Korea ruled on August 30, 2011, that the South Korean regime's failure to seek a solution with Japan to compensate the former comfort women "constitutes infringement on the basic human rights of the victims and a violation of the Constitution" (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012). After the verdict, an order that the government pursue negotiations concerning the topic, Cho Tai-young, a spokesman for South Korea's foreign ministry, stated: "The Japanese government should take sincere measures that can be accepted by the victims. We will continue to use different methods to urge Japan to resolve this issue" (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012). The outcome of the Constitutional Court case prompted South Korean government officials to make demands of Japan for formal rectification of the comfort women issue during international summits and meetings.

Since being sworn in as President in 2013, President Park has advocated for comfort women during formal addresses, such as her most recent March 1 Independence Movement Day speech, in which she implored Japan "promptly to address the human rights violations against comfort women victims" (Dae, 2015). However, as the following section will show, the current agreement falls short of what comfort women have sought since the early 1990s. It brings into question whether this deal was made in the best interests of the comfort women survivors, or whether it was completed to expedite normalized relations between South Korea and Japan.

Japan-Korea Agreement

On December 28, 2015, more than 70 years after the end of WWII, South Korea and Japan reached an agreement that "resolved finally and irreversibly" the comfort women dispute between the nations. Under the accord, Japan apologized for the "grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women." Surviving comfort women argue that while Japan has made public apologies before, such as the Kato Statement in 1992 and the Kono Statement in 1993, the Japanese government has never taken legal

responsibility for the Imperial Army's enslavement of women. In this new accord, the Japanese government promised $8.3 million to the South Korean government to provide care for the surviving women (Sang-Hun, 2015). It will be interesting to see how the Republic's government distributes these funds and, more specifically, if the surviving women are able to access and use their allocations as they see fit. Currently, both governments are negotiating concerning what to label the promised funds. South Korea refers to the settlement as "reparations," while Japan favors the word "atonement" to describe its action (AP, 2015). Leaders from both nations also promised to "refrain from accusing or criticizing each other regarding the issue in the international community, including the United Nations" (MOFA Japan, 2015).

To this day, the Japanese government continues to contend that it does not have a legal responsibility to offer an apology or to provide compensation to the comfort women. Japan argues that it paid all wartime reparations in full to South Korea in 1965 with the signing of the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty. Accordingly, Japanese officials describe their country's recent allocation as a "humanitarian gesture" (McCurry, 2016).

The White House hailed the news of an agreement between the two nations concerning this festering concern. The Obama Administration had been pushing both South Korea and Japan to negotiate a deal. Mindful of the need for stable relations in Asia for America's military and trade agendas, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry noted: "We applaud the leaders of Japan and the Republic of Korea for having the courage and vision to reach this agreement, and we call on the international community to support it" (Kheel, 2015).

There is a caveat to this new cooperation between the two nations, however. The Japanese government has asked that South Korea work to remove a statue of a comfort woman that sits 100 feet from the main door of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. The statue, however, is not owned by the state. Rather, a civic group installed the life-like sculpture of a seated woman in 2011 and it has since become a national landmark of sorts. The South Korean government noted in its agreement with Japan that it understands Japanese concerns about the art's placement and will work with related organizations "about possible ways of addressing this issue" (MOFA Japan, 2015).

The statue serves as a reminder of the atrocities of war as well as the destruction that social norms and forced silence can have on those afflicted. It silently highlights the short-sightedness of this new deal by pointing up the fact that both the Japanese and Korean government officials apparently do not understand the depth of the pain experienced by those who were forced to be comfort women. Symbolically at least, working to relocate the statue once again places strong bilateral relations between the ROK and Japan

ahead of the comfort women's suffering. Comfort women dissatisfied with the new agreement contend that Japan's stance concerning the statue suggests that nation remains unwilling to accept full responsibility for its crimes committed during WWII. For these survivors, the sculpture constitutes a necessary reminder to the Japanese government of what its actions stole from them 70-years ago.

As noted above, as in previous agreements and apologies concerning this issue, no comfort women or advocacy group representatives were afforded a seat at the table when this agreement was negotiated. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, many surviving Korean comfort women have argued that this pact does not satisfy them. As Lee Yong-Soo, a survivor, has noted: "What we demand is that Japan make official reparations for the crime it committed" (Sang-Hun, 2015). In a recent news conference, she observed that, "the accord fell far short of the women's longstanding demand that Japan admit legal responsibility and offer formal reparations" (Sang-Hun 2015). Two Korean comfort women have come forward publicly to request an in-person meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan to voice their concerns about the agreement and perhaps receive a face-to-face apology from him, but he has yet to respond.

Rewriting history

One other issue remains unresolved between the two nations concerning this issue that may affect the stability of their recent agreement. Japan's Prime Minister Abe is presently pressing for "reform" of the Japanese K-12 history curriculum. The goal is to offer a "correct history" of Japan in a way that is positive. Meanwhile, the United States publisher, McGraw-Hill Education, recently published a history textbook entitled, *Traditions and Encounters: A Global Perspective on the Past,* containing this statement: "The Japanese Army forcibly recruited, conscripted and dragooned as many as 200,000 women aged 14 to 20 to serve in military brothels" (Fackler, 2015). Abe sent diplomats to New York to dispute this contention as well as another passage that referred to the Sea of Japan as the East Sea. This continuing effort to "correct mistaken views abroad" greatly hinders the comfort women's redress movement because it explicitly questions their testimonies. Abe told the Japanese Parliament in 2014 that certain countries are deliberately trying to cast Japan in a terrible light:

> There's propaganda to depict Japan in a way that's far from the truth. There is danger emerging, where such propaganda will have a huge influence on our children's generation. I would like to think of a strong public relations strategy going forward (The American Interest, 2014).

This public relations strategy consists, in part, of removing all references to the "comfort women" from government approved textbooks. This step is especially notable because since 1993, all seven textbooks approved by the Education and Science Ministry for use in junior high schools had initially acknowledged the involvement of the government and military of Japan and the use of force in the comfort women system (CEDAW, 2009, p. 4). However, the salience of the issue in Japan has slowly declined. In February 2004, for example, the Minister of Education stated: "It is wonderful that words like 'military comfort women' and 'forced recruitment' no longer appear in most textbooks" (CEDAW, 2009, p. 4). In 2006, the Japanese government completely erased the term "comfort women" from all history textbooks. Under the agreement, Japan could continue this process at home and continue to press its claims abroad as well. This could have a significant impact on how future generations in Japan and perhaps other nations view the struggles that the comfort women endured both during WWII and since, as they have sought assistance from the Japanese government. South Korea has voiced its own serious concerns about these steps and policies, and their continuation could strain that nation's already fragile relationship with Japan in the future.

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12

Migrant Crises: The Cosmopolitan Imperative

Jake Keyel

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The founding of international institutions in the wake of the Second World War represented, in some ways, a significant step toward realizing cosmopolitan norms (Benhabib, 2006; Held, 2009). Despite this progress, however, "nationness" remains, as Anderson has observed, "the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time" (2006, p. 3). While states remain a primary site of politics, the on-going migration crises originating in Afghanistan, Iraq and more recently Syria, demonstrate the problematic nature of continued reliance on nations as primary mechanisms for developing and implementing responses to global dilemmas.

That is, these emergencies demonstrate that the increasing interconnectedness of people around the world demands an outward-looking cosmopolitanism that is becoming not only desirable, but also necessary. Rather than offering a comprehensive proposal for building cosmopolitan institutions here, I follow De Greiff (2002) and argue that individuals, institutions and states must assume responsibility for fostering a "cosmopolitan attitude" as a first necessary step in addressing the global character of issues confronting humanity in the 21st century. This essay focuses on the United States and European leaders' decisions but, to prove successful, a cosmopolitan attitude should not simply be encouraged among those individuals, but also should be fostered in their respective countries' populations and those of states' citizenries throughout the world.

Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism

Audi (2009) has argued that nationalism and cosmopolitanism exist on a spectrum. Nationalists give priority to concerns of their own nation while cosmopolitans place a higher value on human needs and interests (Audi, 2009, p. 466). Those with a nationalist outlook base decisions on a threshold criterion that those choices benefit a country's population first and foremost, without regard to their effects on individuals living elsewhere. A nationalist

response to crises gives preference to citizens and perhaps resident non-citizens first and only secondarily, if at all, considers the impacts of governmental decisions on anyone else.

In contrast, according to Calhoun, cosmopolitanism requires "focusing on the world as a whole rather than on a particular locality or group within it" (2008, p. 428). Held has contended that cosmopolitan claims are the "principles of democratic public life" stripped of the liberal assumption that they can only be enacted in a "territorially based political community" (Calhoun, 2008, p. 440). The essential thread running through the work of these scholars is an effort to encourage human societies to move beyond limiting their concern for assessing the implications of their collective choices to their own populations and bounded political communities. Basing his argument on *Habermas's Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1996) among other works*, De Greiff has argued that individuals, irrespective of their state of citizenship or residence, must develop a cosmopolitan attitude that, "consists of an obligation to assess the morality of one's acts at least in part in light of the acceptability of their consequences by everyone affected by them, regardless of borders, territorial or otherwise" (De Greiff, 2002, p. 419).

"The great numbers of people affected by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and interventions in Syria were not included, nor possibly even seriously considered, when decisions to carry out those actions were made in Washington D.C., London and other European capitals. Yet continued adherence to a nationalist attitude, particularly by those in positions to affect the lives of others greatly, is simply insufficient to confront the consequences arising from that decision calculus."
-Jake Keyel

Building a widely shared and deeply committed cosmopolitan attitude among individuals throughout the world is important for several reasons. First, judging decisions by their consequences for everyone affected is not only a moral consideration, as De Greiff (2002) has argued, but is also a minimum normative standard for democratic decision making as well. All those endeavoring to build democratic institutions and to improve existing ones should strive to realize this metric. Second, according to Beck, the nationalist outlook fails to understand that the consequences of a state's political, economic and cultural actions today "know no borders" (As cited in Rantanen 2005, p. 251). This is key to the current nation-based international system's general inability to address global problems that transcend traditional borders. A cosmopolitan attitude, on the other hand, begins from an understanding that state borders today exist primarily on maps, and the movement of ideas, goods, pollution and people will continue regardless of what form these formal boundaries assume.

Nationalist Responses to Forced Migration

At the end of 2014, a total of 59.5 million individuals were forcibly displaced from their homes worldwide by conflicts and circumstances beyond their control (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 3). In the first half of 2015 alone, 5 million individuals were displaced and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expects these numbers only to grow. During 2014 and the first half of 2015 the largest number of individuals fled from Syria, followed by Afghanistan. More than a decade after the U.S. led invasion of Iraq, that nation remains in the top ten countries with the highest number of displaced persons (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 6). One result of such large movements of people, both internally and across international borders, has been extreme nationalist reactions.

In late 2015, for example, many U.S. governors reacted to the November 13 suicide bombing attacks in Paris, France by issuing statements that they would not allow Syrian refugees to settle in their states (Fantz and Brumfield, 2015).[1] Current Republican Presidential candidate Donald Trump has gone further to contend that the U.S. should bar all Muslims from entering the country (Healy and Barbaro, 2015). Similarly strident calls to limit cross-border movement and immigration of Muslims have been common in recent months in Europe as well (Park, 2015).

Such responses take the alleged "security" of the nation as their top priority, while the human needs of those fleeing conflict are subordinated or ignored altogether. In the face of on-going violence in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and the resultant continuing mass migration from those countries, those calling for border closings choose to ignore the fact that the actions of one state have consequences for others and that "opening and closing of gates affects flows in the stream as a whole, and particularly the pressure on other gates" (Zolberg, 2012, p. 1213).

As nationalist responses attempt to block entry to North America or Europe, many of those fleeing from violence in these three countries have found their way to states with less capacity to deal with a large influx of newcomers. Lebanon, for example, a small nation with relatively weak institutions, has taken in nearly 1.5 million refugees since conflict began in Syria in 2011 (UNHCR, 2015b). This situation highlights another failure of nationalist responses: when a state responsible for a crisis fails to address it, the burden is shifted to countries that were not necessarily included in the original decision and that then are unable to choose whether to respond.

Finally, and crucially, those who choose the nationalist path fail to understand and accept responsibility for the root causes of the migration(s) to which they are responding. The 2001 and 2003 U.S. and European invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq displaced millions of people in those countries directly and indirectly and displacement-related crises continue to

the present day as a result (International Organization for Migration, 2015). Although the Syrian government and forces challenging it bear primary responsibility for the conflict causing mass migration from that country, the long-term effects of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, including the rise of groups such as ISIS, clandestine American efforts to destabilize the Syrian government since at least 2006 (Roebuck, 2013) and later direct military involvement (Weaver and Borger, 2015) have all contributed to the social, political and economic instability that has caused many Syrians to seek refuge abroad.

Conclusion

The great numbers of people affected by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and interventions in Syria were not included, nor possibly even seriously considered, when decisions to carry out those actions were made in Washington D.C., London and other European capitals. When considered now, claims of securing the United States and the European Union from external threats have predominated as justifications in many instances. Yet continued adherence to a nationalist attitude, particularly by those in positions to affect the lives of others greatly, is simply insufficient to confront the consequences arising from that decision calculus.

An alternative is to build a cosmopolitan attitude among citizens and their leaders that first considers the effects decisions will have on everyone affected, regardless of their nationality and ultimately seeks to bring all affected into relevant decision-making processes. The former is an arguably easier standard to meet than the latter, although both imply great challenges if they are to be realized. However, these difficulties notwithstanding, such standards constitute normative goals toward which to strive in a world in which actions taken in Washington D.C. or London so often have repercussions for those in Baghdad, Damascus, Kabul and beyond.

Notes

1.U.S. state governors do not have the legal authority to set such policies. This rhetoric, therefore, appears intended to garner support amongst a base of voters to which such a ban might appeal.

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13

America's Recent Military Actions in the Middle East

Joseph Karle

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Plan for war, but do not plan for anything after that

Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump should be considered Hawks when it comes to the United States' (US) role in the Middle East, as Clinton's policy stances and actions and Trump's militaristic language warrant that label. As a Senator from New York, Clinton voted for the war in Iraq, followed by the later commitment of a "surge" of US troops. She was also a proponent of American intervention in Libya. Trump, although short on foreign policy credentials, has routinely used bellicose rhetoric promising to "bomb the s—t out of ISIS" and to send 30,000 additional US ground troops to Iraq (Engel, 2015). These policy stances concerning the Middle East are in keeping with a recent trend in American efforts in the region: undertaking military action in the area without planning vigorously for what may follow thereafter.

The US has deployed military force three times in the region since September 11, 2001 (9/11), and in each case, has done so without a clearly defined objective or plan for what should happen once that action was complete.This failure to define post-conflict objectives has created power vacuums that actors hostile to the US in Iraq and Libya have filled. This essay will discuss America's use of military force in Iraq in 2003, in Libya in 2011 and again in Iraq in 2014, detailing how the US failed to plan appropriately for what would happen after its initial intervention. I will also argue that whoever is elected president on November 8 will not only inherit the problems now afflicting Iraq, but will also likely make the same mistake of employing military force in the region without planning adequately for what should occur afterwards.

Winning the fight, losing the peace since 2003

This disposition to deploy military forces without careful attention to the consequences of such action originated in recent years with President George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003. From a conventional

military standpoint, the conflict was a resounding success, as American forces toppled Saddam Hussein in less than a month. The pre-war military planning was meticulous, consuming nearly 15 months, but Department of Defense and White House officials did not give the question of what should occur after hostilities had ended the same attention.

"American officials painstakingly planned the military operations, but gave little attention to what should happen after regime change had occurred."
-Joseph Karle

The US failed initially to have a robust plan in place to anticipate and coordinate post-war reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In order to help stabilize the nation, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was quickly created and President Bush named Paul Bremer to lead it. Bremer saw himself as the President's "personal envoy" in Iraq, believing he had a mandate to make sweeping decisions in the country (Bremer, 2006, p. 4). In an effort to tighten United States' control in Iraq and purge any remaining authoritarian elements from its government, Bremer issued CPA orders 1 and 2.

CPA order 1 implemented de-Ba'athification, essentially removing all members of the Ba'ath party (Hussein's party) from their positions in government and barring them from service in the public sector in the future. Given the size and the scope of the Ba'ath party in Iraq, this meant a large portion of the population was now comprised of individuals officially considered *personae non grata*. CPA order 2 disbanded the Iraqi military, relegating the members of that once proud force to unemployment. As both of these institutions were Sunni Muslim dominated, CPA orders 1 and 2 alienated large swaths of that group's population, making them vulnerable to recruitment by groups such as al Qaida that were now flowing into Iraq. These American-led steps helped create a viable insurgency in the country, further fragmented the nation along sectarian lines and led to the violence between Sunni and Shia Islamic groups that persists in Iraq today.

President Barack Obama's decision to support a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya followed a similar pattern of failure to develop a strong post-war plan. In an effort to prevent Muammar Qaddafi from "commit[ing] atrocities against his people," the United Nations (UN) Security Council approved Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011: a no fly-zone barring all fights over Libya, except for humanitarian purposes (Obama, 2011). The US then "led a coalition in launching air and missile strikes against Libyan forces" beginning on March 19 of that year that cost approximately $1.1-billion and avoided any NATO force casualties (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012). However, while the operation was billed as an initiative to save civilian lives, it morphed into an effort to secure regime change. Eventually, the NATO actions helped lead to Qaddafi's removal from power.

Once again, however, American officials painstakingly planned the military operations, but gave little attention to what should happen after regime change had occurred. President Obama was determined to avoid the mistakes of his predecessor by not committing a large occupying force to Libya, and therefore ceded much of the responsibility for nation rebuilding to NATO and the UN (Goldberg, 2016). However, post-Qaddafi regime assistance from NATO, the UN and the US did not focus on building a viable security structure. Instead, those organizations and Libya's transitional leadership focused on "preparing the country to vote for a national legislative assembly" just 240-days after liberation (Wehrey, 2016). The choice to focus on elections rather than security allowed competing militia groups within Libya to grow unchecked and these eventually helped deepen factional divides within the country.

Instead of Qaddafi's removal resulting in improved conditions, Libya has become a failed state characterized by various highly armed factions, "leading to deadly turf battles between rival tribes and commanders" (Kuperman, 2016). Worse yet, Libya now serves as a haven for radical Islamist groups affiliated with ISIS and al Qaeda.

The US' third recent attempt to employ military action in the Middle East, President Obama's decision to redeploy American troops to Iraq to help combat ISIS, has followed a similar pattern. In this case, US deployment steadily evolved, resulting in significant mission creep. The Administration's initial plan in June 2014 called for deployment of a few hundred Special Forces troops, but that total has since climbed to approximately 5,000 (Cooper, 2016). As the number of US troops has grown in Iraq, the scope of their mission has increased subtly as well. To be fair, American forces in Iraq are far from carrying out full-fledged counterinsurgency operations, but they are deployed close to the battlefield and have even engaged in direct action raids at times.

The Obama administration's plan to combat ISIS in Iraq has proven successful during the last two years, resulting in the terrorist group losing nearly 50 percent of its territory in Iraq. Some of this change has arisen as a result of the efforts of Iraqi forces supported by US advisors and airpower. Additionally, the State Department's Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, said in June that the number of ISIS(L) fighters inside Iraq and Syria had shrunk to as few as 18,000-22,000, a sharp decrease from the 33,000 combatants that organization commanded in those two nations in 2014 (Hudson, 2016). All of this news about tactical success on the battlefield should be welcomed, but should not be a surprise. American led coalitions easily overthrew Hussein in 2003 and Qaddafi in 2011. Although United States troops are not doing most of the ground fighting today, American airpower has proven an undeniably dominant variable in ISIS' recent defeats.

Nonetheless, as in Libya and Iraq (circa 2003), the US does not appear to be formulating a clear plan for what happens when ISIS is pushed out of Iraq. Even as Iraqi forces retake Mosul as this is written, the same social and political problems that gave rise to that organization's emergence are no closer to being solved. Iraq is still fractured along sectarian lines, Sunnis are still distrustful of the government in Baghdad and Shia militant groups are as strong as ever. Moreover, US training and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces since 2014 has yet to make that military group strong enough to fill the power vacuum ISIS will leave. Additionally, the Iraqi government has not shown that it can provide social services, such as needed food, water, trash collection and even a police force in the area ISIS is vacating, responsibilities at which the terrorist group has proven surprisingly effective during its occupation of the area.

Plus ça change?

The challenges of a post-ISIS Iraq are already beginning to emerge as the US presidential election looms. This fact may actually prove beneficial, as new administrations often bring fresh ideas, which might just be what American policy for a post-ISIS Iraq needs. Unfortunately, however, assuming past trends hold, regardless of who is elected on November 8, Americans can still expect their next president to use military force in the Middle East, without planning adequately for what comes afterwards.

If Hillary Clinton is elected, and even if she continues to pivot American foreign policy toward China, she will still have to address problems arising in the Middle East (Clinton, 2011). President Obama was determined to end America's costly involvement in Iraq, but an unsuccessful withdrawal from Iraq and the unexpected Arab Spring taught America that getting out of the region might prove an impossible task.

If Donald Trump is elected president, he will face the same challenges. Moreover, Trump will have a much steeper learning curve than Clinton, given his lack of knowledge of the Middle East. Examples of this ignorance include confusing Iran's Quds forces for the Kurds, incorrectly claiming Kuwait does not pay for US protection (Ghabra, 2007, p. 341) and being unable to differentiate between Hamas and Hezbollah (Collins, 2016). In addition, despite Trump's on-again, off-again opposition to war in Iraq in 2003, he has indicated at times during this campaign, as noted above, that he would commit substantial numbers of American ground troops to Iraq to combat ISIS. However, the GOP presidential nominee's policy flip-flops and his dearth of knowledge of the Middle East along with his bellicose rhetoric suggest that he is even more likely than Clinton to call for military action without sufficient planning for what should occur following such engagement.

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14

Protecting Cultural Property and Heritage Sites during Conflict

Ashleigh Breske

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> … collective memory is not an inert and passive thing, but a field of activity in which past events are selected, reconstructed, maintained, modified, and endowed with political meaning (Edward Said, 2000, p.183).

As the world watched, ISIS moved into the ancient city of Palmyra, Syria in May 2015. Throughout the following summer, descriptions of destruction and executions continued to reach an international audience. The photographs and videos of death and ancient monuments reduced to rubble were brutal and shocking. But, not only did ISIS destroy what they called idolatrous images, the terrorist group also sold smaller cultural artifacts on the black market to fund its activities (Jeffries, 2016).

Palmyra provides an example of what can happen when conflict, unrest and political turmoil prevent protection of archaeological sites, museums and cultural property. Public displays of art, history and culture are political in that they constitute a form of soft power that can be used to stabilize national identities and promote community unity.The soft power of cultural heritage has vast possible implications for states and that influence can extend well beyond national borders.

I argue that it is imperative to protect cultural heritage since it is important to citizen identity development and can also aid in the social recovery following conflict. International governing bodies also have a role in protection and recovery of cultural property during times of political turmoil. But due to a lack of transnational enforcement, their efforts can be hampered. Understanding existing frameworks for cultural property protection will aid in expanding such efforts in the future.

The significance of cultural property

As a global community, we define the interaction between humans and cultural property/heritage sites based both on the physical attributes we

employ collectively to define value *and* the symbolic meanings we attach to them. Cultural property and heritage sites are also important to national development since they are used to contextualize present national identities and to relate them to past achievements. Objects and sites in a single nation related to ancient civilizations also influence and connect with international audiences on the basis of a shared past that extends well beyond any one country. Cultural property is, therefore, a tangible type of collective memory and as noted above, control of those assets—and cultural heritage in a broader context—is a form of soft power for states.

"Public displays of art, history and culture are political in that they constitute a form of soft power that can be used to stabilize national identities and promote community unity. The soft power of cultural heritage has vast possible implications for states and that influence can extend well beyond national borders."
-Ashleigh Breske

Exploring cultural property's soft power

"Soft power" describes international relations not based on military or economic pressure (hard power), but on the ability to influence other actors in the international system. Its reach and sway are intangible: "When it comes to soft power, museums are particularly strategic for international relations, whether as symbolic meeting places or as part of a network of relationships with other museums" (Lord and Blankenberg, 2015, pp.22-23). The artifacts and objects housed in museums and preserved as heritage sites symbolize common cultural proximity to the ancient past. As apparatuses of soft power, museums—and the objects they house—can shape collective values and social understandings. They act as tools to create a unified national identity (Anderson, 1983; Luke, 2002) because they are significant tangible entities used to interpret and understand a society's past (Lubar and Kingery, 1993) and to shape its future. Consequently, when these are attacked or destroyed, the effects of that destruction go beyond the local to the international.

Protecting cultural property during conflict

The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict was the first international agreement of its kind (UNESCO, 1954). This pact arose in the aftermath of WWII with the decolonization of former colonies seeking to control their wealth (Merryman, 1990; Brodie, 2015). The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer

of Ownership of Cultural Property followed and sought to establish guidelines for objects that had been unlawfully removed from nations (UNESCO, 1954; Merryman, 1990). It created processes for ascertaining the provenance of objects transported transnationally. UNIDROIT, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, is an independent intergovernmental organization that first met in 1995 to continue an international conversation on the illicit movement of property and to investigate how private and commercial law can be used to restore objects previously removed from nations to their original locations (Merryman, 2005; UNIDROIT, 1995). Together, these 1954,1970 and 1995 international agreements comprise current international policies aimed at safeguarding cultural objects during situations of deep political and/or armed conflict (Brodie, 2015). Unfortunately, these conventions lack universal enforcement mechanisms and are therefore understood and addressed differently throughout the world. Since these agreements cannot be enforced, these conventions act more as ethical guidelines or injunctions for nations and belligerents, rather than as provisions enjoying the force of law.

The 1954 Hague and 1970 UNESCO Conventions established the conditions under which artifacts taken by nations could be returned to their original locations. Although, as noted above, cultural heritage is often used to promote a national image and identity (Calhoun, 2002), all of humanity can claim some level of proximity to ancient cultural artifacts, whether this is through an inherited understanding of its role in the world or a larger perspective on history. Future international agreements targeted to the problem of cultural heritage protection should begin from the premise that individuals possess both a national or sovereign identity, AND a shared global cultural identity.

How is the international community helping?

International agreements have redefined the question of cultural property protection from a national issue to a global concern by recognizing that the matter does not respect state boundaries. However, those efforts have often been controversial since they have involved transnational policies and dealt with issues that cross territorial borders (Bevir, 2012, p.89). Nonetheless, such agreements represent an integral part of the solution to protecting world heritage sites and to ending illicit trafficking in historic artifacts taken from them.

UNESCO, other international organizations and specific states[1] are currently pressing numerous initiatives designed to put policies and processes in place that will help safeguard cultural property during and after political unrest in nations throughout the world. These efforts are seeking to fill voids created by intra-national conflicts not fully addressed by the private

or public sectors in those countries. For example, the International Council of Museums has developed databases that track missing—or endangered—artifacts and sites so that experts, military personnel and civilians know which cultural property has been looted and trafficked (ICOM Red List Databases, 2016). UNESCO has also proposed setting up protection zones around cultural heritage sites to reduce the amount of plundering that occurs in those locations during conflict. But the feasibility of this project is doubtful when considering other humanitarian crises in conflict zones that often demand more immediate attention: bombings, refugee relocation, crumbling infrastructure, etc.

Conclusion

Culture can be used as collateral, whether to represent national ideals or to promote a specific policy agenda. Said (2000) has claimed that public memory has long served as a political tool for the establishment of nations and his argument should be understood to extend to cultural heritage and all that it represents. Globalization has made it easier for citizens around the globe to become more aware of the imperative of cultural heritage protection and that salience has increased the international community's willingness to develop efforts to preserve humanity's shared past. The power of cultural heritage lies in its ability to connect human beings with objects and places that are not specific to their culture's histories, but nonetheless tie them to the evolution of humankind as it has unfolded far beyond and single country's borders.

Notes

1.National governments are working to protect illegal cultural property crossing into their countries from conflict zones. For example, the US introduced H.R. 1493—the Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property Act on March 19, 2015, which became Public Law No: 114-151 on May 9, 2016 (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2016).

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15

Empires and Barbarians: The EU and Violence at its Margins

Johannes Grow

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The Brexit referendum to leave the European Union (EU) has been applauded by some scholars and politicians as a victory for the sovereign people of Great Britain in response to the undemocratic and technocratic nature of the EU. These analysts consider the United Kingdom's (UK) decision to withdraw from the Union a win for state institutions and political responsiveness at the state level (Cunliffe and Ramsay, 2016). Brexit has been critiqued by other scholars, however, as a cynical and wishful attempt by UK elites and right-wing conservative politicians to resurrect Britain's former imperial glory by strengthening the UK and its Commonwealth, or the so-called "Anglosphere" (i.e., its former colonies: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the USA), as an alternative to the supranational and globalized EU "invader" (Bell, 2016; Morozov, 2016). Yet, while proponents on both sides of this argument rightly criticize the EU bureaucracy as removed and even immune from popular and public contestation, neither scholarship critiques the EU's increasingly illiberal external policies, whether successful or not, which I argue are quite evident if the Union is examined through the "EU-as-empire" conceptual lens.

Political theory and international relations have had difficulty as fields identifying the EU as a "political object." Theorists and politicians alike have made various attempts to define this *sui generis* or "unidentified political object" (Delors, 1985). In an effort to conceptualize the EU, scholars have theorized the entity as a "normative power" (Manners, 2002), "post-modern" (Diez, 1997), "civilian power" (Telo, 2006), or a "communion" (Manners, 2013).

In contrast to the above conceptualizations, the "EU-as-Empire" argument, popularized by Jan Zielonka's 2006 *Europe as Empire*, claims that the Union can, and perhaps should, be viewed as some form of empire.Former EU Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso buttressed this argument by labeling the Union a rather paradoxical "non-imperial Empire" (Mahony, 2007). An important aspect of considering the EU-as-empire is what Behr has termed "governing from a distance" (Behr and Stivachtis, 2015, p.11). In

essence, political entities that use policies "that are supposed to and organized to govern over vast geographical and territorial dimensions" are inherently violent because these strategies often ignore place-specific and contextual situations in favor of "universal," and in this case, Western-based frames of reference (Behr, 2015, pp.33-34).

"While the EU Commission, member states and various other institutions continue to promote a liberal and cosmopolitan Union, their simultaneous efforts to "govern from a distance" reflect a political entity that is beset by contradictions."
– Johannes Grow

As a result, they recreate core-periphery relationships reminiscent of former imperial rule (Behr and Stivachtis, 2015). Thus, although this brief post does not seek to determine whether the EU can truly be considered an empire, it does argue that the "EU-as-empire" scholarship highlights the Union's increasingly coercive policies in the developing world. This has been particularly evident in the EU's efforts to prevent the migration of people, specifically sub-Saharan refugees, from moving into the Schengen zone. Even though disagreement between a share of the member states and the EU Commission concerning how to "solve" the so-called "refugee crisis" has seemingly fractured concord among them, the Commission and some of its member states, including Spain, Italy, and Germany, nonetheless continue to employ coercive policies in an attempt to halt the "flood" of refugees (Nail, 2016).

While U.S. President Donald Trump's attempted immigration ban and the rising xenophobia in the UK, as well as in several other EU member's states (e.g., Germany, France, Hungary) has garnered attention in the media, the Commission's effort to prevent continued outmigration of people from several sub-Saharan African nation-states, including Eritrea, from which large numbers of refugees have emanated, has resulted in a number of EU agreements with several dictatorial regimes. For example, one of the primary refugee routes into the Union leads through Libya. While Muammar Gaddafi was in power, he accepted "aid" from Italy to halt the movement of African refugees through his nation and on into the EU (Macdonald, 2017). After the 2011 Arab Spring, the Union's Commission and its member states proposed not only new initiatives with Libya, but also with Sudan's president Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, who is wanted for crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (Plaut, 2017). Moreover, Plaut (2017) has highlighted the fact that the EU has given the one-party government in Eretria, which has never faced elections, 200 million Euros in "development aid" without any strictures concerning how the money could be used in order to gain that regime's cooperation in stanching migration.

While the EU Commission, member states and various other institutions continue to promote a liberal and cosmopolitan Union, their simultaneous

efforts to "govern from a distance" reflect a political entity that is beset by contradictions. In addition to the policies noted above, the heavily militarized Spanish enclaves in North Africa, Ceuta and Melilla, which play an integral role in preventing refugee movements, further evince the coercive nature of the EU's attempts to "secure" its territory (Peters, 2011).

In conclusion, while this essay did not seek to prove that the EU is an empire, it is my hope nevertheless that it reveals some of the contradictions present among the Union's normative claims and its external policies. That touchstone should allow a more nuanced critique of the EU's refugee policies.

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PART III

INTRICACIES OF INTEREST POLITICS

Recent research concerning interest group activity has argued that three concepts of power—"power-over," "power-to" and "power-with" (McFarland, 2006)—are intertwined in the political practice of interest associations. The seven essays in this section offer both theoretical and empirical analyses of the political influence and impact of various interest groups. Their findings and conclusions provide readers with a critical understanding of the significance of interest groups and public policy formation and implementation in the domains of higher education, social and institutional relations, electoral politics and gender politics, among others. These authors also raise the broader questions of whether special interests advance or threaten democratic institutions and the public weal, whether they lead to a more pluralistic and balanced society, and whether their growing role in politics poses challenges to effective governance.

In the first essay, Walz examines the legal understanding of academic freedom and the implications of its changing interpretations and application for individuals and higher education institutions. N'Jie explores the idea of Pan-Africanism in his effort to examine the challenge of xenophobia in Africa. He argues that African leaders and their citizenries must first acknowledge that the potential for such hatred exists in their countries and that it cannot be eliminated by appeal to a stipulated shared abstract bond based on geography that, in fact, does not exist. Stubberfield addresses current trends in rhetoric within the American patriot movement and describes the Oath Keepers, a radical rightwing organization whose avowed purpose, based on its idiosyncratic interpretation of the United States Constitution, is to prevent supposed further violation of Americans' individual liberties. In conclusion, he offers a possible way forward for diffusing such inflammatory social and political commentary before it becomes uncontrollable.

Izar examines the ramifications of adoption of the public-private partnership (PPP) mechanism for the provision of urban infrastructure and service by surveying the multidisciplinary literature concerning the efficacy and equity of PPPs and, particularly, the issue of risk to the general public that they pose. Engel explores the phenomenon of communicative abundance in different contexts and examines three ways in which the

dynamic of increasing communication and decreasing informational content per communicative act operates. Camacho adopts several theoretical perspectives—among them Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Weberian and Taylorism—to examine the importance of participatory practices in workplaces during conditions of technological change. Patterson examines the links between social norms and women's use of public spaces and suggests the changes in belief and behavior that will be necessary to transform these so that women may act with as much freedom in the built environments in which they live and work as men already do. Finally, Bernal examines the reasoning behind the erroneous predictions of the 2016 American presidential election. He contends that greater attention should be paid to the affective dimension of politics rather than continuing to focus alone on supposed voter interests, as analysts develop more refined approaches to describe and predict citizen voting behavior.

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16

Academic Freedom for Whom: Institutions or Individuals?

Jerald H. Walz

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> To the extent the Constitution recognizes a right of 'academic freedom' above and beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in individual professors (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, *Urofsky v. Gilmore,* 2000, p. 410).
>
> The freedom which is the subject of this report is that of the teacher. Academic freedom in this sense comprises three elements: freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extra-mural utterance and action (American Association of University Professors, *1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure,* 2015, p. 4).

Academic freedom is a term often used in higher education to describe the unfettered intellectual space required for preserving, exploring or discovering knowledge (Poch, 1993). As one of the most important values in academe, faculty members and administrators alike consider academic freedom an essential aspect of American higher education (Alexander and Alexander, 2011; American Association of University Professors [AAUP], n.d.; Kaplin and Lee, 2014; O'Neil, 2011; Poch, 1993). It is the foundation for "active discourse, critical debate, free exchange of ideas, and communication of values that characterize effective scholarship, teaching, and learning" (Poch, 1993, p. 1). A 2005 statement issued by 23 university presidents defined the term as, "the freedom to conduct research, teach, speak, and publish, subject to the norms and standards of scholarly inquiry, without interference or penalty, wherever the search for truth and understanding may lead" (Global Colloquium of University Presidents [GCUP], 2005).

In 1940, the AAUP adopted a statement since endorsed by more than 200 professional organizations that outlined three forms of activity covered by academic freedom: teaching, research and publication and extramural speech (AAUP, 2015). Regardless of the definition one embraces or its importance in American higher education, the question of who benefits from academic freedom—institutions or individuals—sometimes arises. That is,

"As disputes concerning academic freedom arise, the courts can weigh the specific interests of claimants to resolve their disagreements. By balancing interests rather than favoring one form of academic freedom to the exclusion of the other, the courts in fact have preserved a greater degree of diversity of thought and experience."
-Jerald H. Walz

does the right inhere in universities, as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals quotation above suggests, or with individuals, as the AAUP has argued?

The answer is, "it depends," since academic freedom can be accorded to different beneficiaries—institutions, faculty and students—and such may be necessary to secure its possibility (Alexander and Alexander, 2011; Gordon, 2003; Kaplin and Lee, 2014; McConnell, 1993; Poch, 1993; Rabban, 1993; Schauer, 2006; Yudof, 1987). As the 2005 GCUP *Statement* issued by the university presidents further declared:

> The activities of preserving, pursuing, disseminating, and creating knowledge and understanding require societies to respect the autonomy of universities, of the scholars who research and teach in them, and of the students who come to them to prepare for lives as knowledgeable citizens and capable leaders. The autonomy of universities is the guarantor of academic freedom in the performance of scholars' professional duties (GCUP, 2005).

This statement suggests that scholars must enjoy rights and prerogatives to think, teach, write, and research, subject to scholastic standards (Alexander and Alexander, 2011). Students possess a similar right to learn (Kaplin and Lee, 2014). But society must also ensure that institutions have sufficient autonomy to be self-governed, self-directed, and self-determined (Alexander and Alexander, 2011; Byrne, 1989; Hutchens, 2009; Schauer, 2006). This institutional independence applies to both public and private institutions, whether as "government interests" for public colleges and universities, or as First Amendment constitutional rights for private ones (Kaplin and Lee, 2014, p. 297).

Legally, as the appellate court quotation above highlighted, academic freedom, when invoked at public universities, falls under a broad understanding of the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized academic freedom "as a special concern of the First Amendment" (*Keyishian*, 1967, p. 603), and has issued opinions affirming both individual and institutional academic freedom. Indeed, that Court first upheld academic freedom under the First Amendment as a right accorded to an individual professor at a public university in *Sweezy v. New Hampshire*, a 1957 decision that began when a

scholar refused to answer questions from a state attorney general about his teaching. A decade later, in *Keyishian v. Board of Regents* the Court again emphasized individual academic freedom when it affirmed:

> Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom (1967, p. 603).

However, the idea of institutional academic freedom also originated with the landmark *Sweezy* decision, in a concurring opinion offered by Justice Felix Frankfurter. He described it as the Four Freedoms of the University: "to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study" (*Sweezy*, 1957, p. 263). Subsequent Court decisions also emphasized institutional academic freedom and applied Justice Frankfurter's opinion to resolve other academic freedom disputes. In *Bakke v. Regents of the University of California* (1978), a case addressing affirmative action in admissions, the Court upheld the university's use of race as a factor in admitting students, emphasizing institutional academic freedom by citing one of the Four Freedoms of the University from *Sweezy*: to determine on academic grounds who may be admitted to study. In 1985, in *Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing*, the Court expressed "reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom" (1985, p. 226). In this decision for a unanimous court, Justice John Paul Stevens also noted the tension between institutional and individual academic freedom:

> Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students … but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by the academy itself (*Regents*, 1985, p. 226).

After examining the Court's academic freedom jurisprudence, one legal scholar remarked during the late 1980s, "There has been no adequate analysis of what academic freedom the Constitution protects or of why it protects it. Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in law, picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles" (Byrne, 1989, p. 253). Accordingly, the Supreme Court's academic freedom jurisprudence appeared "equivocal," to a lower court of appeals, since

> [the term 'academic freedom'] is used to denote both the freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without interference from the government …

> and the freedom of the individual teacher (or in some versions—indeed most cases—the student) to pursue his ends without interference from the academy; and these two freedoms are in conflict (*Piarowski*, 1985, p. 629).

Thus, when disputes arise between individuals and institutions and claimants and respondents appeal to First Amendment protections of academic freedom, the courts wrestle with this tension.

So far, I have stressed the legal understanding of academic freedom and the frictions implicit within it in its application to individuals and institutions, but there are also more specific variants of this concern that arise from the character of organizations' missions. For example, the tension between individual and institutional academic freedom can be seen clearly when colleges and universities pursue a religious mission. The AAUP recognized this in its *1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments,* declaring, "Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject," but where appropriate, the group also suggested such liberty must be practiced within the "limitations of academic freedom because of [the] religious or other aims of the institution" (AAUP, 2015, p. 14). Indeed, at some Christian colleges and universities, faculty members must affirm the institution's official statement of faith as a condition of employment (Benne, 2001; Litfin, 2004; Ream and Glanzer, 2007; Wagner, 2006). Some consider the religious mission of such institutions a threat to faculty academic freedom (Bowen, Schwartz, and Camp, 2014; MacIver, 1955; Nelson, 2010). Others consider such commitments necessary to the pursuit of a unique mission and preservation of a distinct identity (Gordon, 2003; Litfin, 2004; McConnell, 1993). These analysts have emphasized that academic freedom can be provided at these institutions, but to the college or university first—which allows the institution the freedom to pursue its mission—and to the individual professor second, which allows faculty the ability to pursue their research and publication, teaching and extramural speech, but within a framework of faith (Cavanaugh, 2004; Jeffrey, 2007; Ream and Glanzer, 2007). To be sure, such dual commitments create a dilemma:

> Christian institutions of higher education [and Christian scholars] are poised between the demands of free academic inquiry and committed theological loyalty. Without the first, it is hard to see the Christian colleges preserving intellectual viability, but without the second they will not retain their Christian character (Noll, 2006, pp. 35-36).

Certainly, such a two-tiered view of academic freedom is complex, but in practice it may align with the legal argument that the concept of academic freedom is "equivocal" (*Piarowski*, 1985, p. 629).

Regardless of what one thinks about religious versus secular education, the fact that the possibility exists for both individual and institutional academic freedom should be considered to be a strength of our American system of higher education. One need not choose one at the expense of the other and resolve the tension between the two once and for all. As disputes concerning academic freedom arise, the courts can weigh the specific interests of claimants to resolve their disagreements. By balancing interests rather than favoring one form of academic freedom to the exclusion of the other, the courts in fact have preserved a greater degree of diversity of thought and experience.

The First Amendment, often cited in legal cases involving academic freedom, guarantees Americans five freedoms—of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition. These different rights are contained in the First Amendment to provide for the greatest freedom possible for citizens, regardless of the tensions that might arise within, between or among them. If one or another of these rights were not included, American citizens would surely be less free than we are now. As with citizen rights generally, so it is for academic freedom specifically, greater freedom exists when both individual and institutional academic freedom are accepted.

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17

The Challenge of Heterogeneity: The Frailty of the Pan-Africanist Ideal

Saul N'Jie

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When Africans speak of Pan-Africanism and African Unity, they do so mostly in abstractions. The recent xenophobic attacks on other Africans in South Africa have now prompted an honest conversation about the concept of Pan-Africanism. The idea was born out of a quest for self-determination for the people of African descent around the world. This was the thread that bonded Marcus Garvey, Aime Cesaire, W.E.B. Du Bois, Kwame Nkrumah, Haile Selassie and other leaders to a shared interest in the idea (Ackah, 1999). Their common belief was that the oppressed black peoples of the world needed to come together to form a coherent bloc to oppose the West's imperialist power. Their thinking represented a good start, but it was based on unrealistic hopes. Nonetheless, the idea that there should and could be a united Africa, or better yet, the equivalent of a United States for black peoples around the world that could stand up to the western powers, including Britain, France and Belgium, was a bold, admirable and, to some degree, cathartic statement.

Many ideas, including Pan-Africanism, capitalism and the millenarian conceptions of communism and socialism, are alluring and apparently prophetic on paper, until individuals seek to realize them and learn a lesson in human fallibility. This is not simply to dismiss the works and aspirations of the Pan-Africanists. After all, a century or so before, a group of colonies, which became the United States of America, had successfully attained independence from the most imposing imperial power of that time—Great Britain—an idea that was surely easy to critique when first advanced. The notion, therefore, that black peoples of the world could potentially form such a union doubtless appeared romantic, rebellious and emancipating to many, and in concept at least, it was surely alluring.

Nevertheless, there were various problems with the construct from the outset. To begin, a United States of Africa, a new construct for the African consciousness, was not and is not realistic, for many reasons. The first of these concerns is the remarkable diversity of Africa, with its many tribal and ethnic divisions, and most importantly, the fact that the continent's

inhabitants never saw themselves as Africans before Europeans so labeled them. For example, I could argue, and accurately, that my great-great grandparents never heard of Africa. They saw themselves first and foremost as tribal members of their land and never imagined their identities as tied to a concept of Africa as a whole.

"South Africa's existence served as a Pan-Africanist rallying cry for many during that nation's apartheid regime. Today, that nation is demonstrating that the idea of African Unity is little but an abstract and emotionally charged concept to which many Africans turn when in distress or perceiving themselves under attack."
-Saul N'Jie

Second, and as a point of emphasis, Pan-Africanists neglected the many divisions among tribes, groups and nations in Africa as they called for a self-conscious unity. These would come to the fore, as I noted above, once any idea of unity was put to the test. Third, xenophobia is not unique to South Africa or to Africans. One could contend that it is a very human inclination and unlikely to disappear soon as a result. We have seen many civil wars in Africa that have had nationalism and chauvinism as their genesis. The recent terrible civil war in Cote d'Ivoire serves as a sad example (Business Africa, n.d.). Unfortunately, it would be too easy to cite additional examples of such behavior among Africans.

Given this reality, my concern comes to this: It is time to reexamine the idea that Africans are/or should be one, and that residents of the continent should therefore understand each other on that basis. Should those interested in mitigating conflict in Africa or in building on its current development and immense potential appeal to the better angels of our humanity rather than our Africanness, whatever that is, to accomplish these purposes? It is time to admit that Africans, from Antananarivo to Algiers, are not the same, that they are in fact quite different and typically quite foreign to each other, and that, every now and then and however regrettably, they are likely to attack fellow Africans on the basis of their perceived otherness.

Alternatively, we should finally agree that we are Africans because of a European, Western narrative, since the only things we can point to as a common denominator are our shared struggle with imperialism and the name those powers gave to the continent. We need serious and honest conversations around these topics, for they are the elephant in the room that most Africans are not discussing. To address the challenge of xenophobia meaningfully, African leaders and their citizenries must first acknowledge that the potential for it exists in their countries, and that it is not an isolated South African or Maghreb problem and cannot be eliminated by appeal to a stipulated shared abstract bond based on geography that in fact does not exist.

It is perhaps worth recalling that there has never been a nation in modern Africa that has unified the continent or even substantial swathes of it, under the Pan-Africanist banner. Ironically, apartheid South Africa may have come the closest to this possibility. This was the country whose white Afrikaner government for generations marginalized, criminalized, killed, imprisoned and impoverished that nation's black citizens (Evans, n.d.). All of black Africa, in unison, stood up, supported and marched for the end of racial discrimination in the Transvaal, Witwatersrand, Natal, the South West Townships (Soweto) and other tribal areas, including Qunu. One might therefore assume that South Africans would understand discrimination, marginalization and the process of "othering" better than citizens of any other country on the continent, but recent events suggest this is not the case. Humans are more complicated and complex and willing to stereotype and scapegoat on the basis of "difference" than we often imagine.

Interestingly, South Africa's existence served as a Pan-Africanist rallying cry for many during that nation's apartheid regime, and today, that nation is demonstrating that the idea of African Unity is little but an abstract and emotionally charged concept to which many Africans turn when in distress or perceiving themselves under attack. Sadly, this point was underscored in Gambia in the summer of 2003, when citizens of that nation destroyed and looted Senegalese shops and businesses in the country in the name of their nationalist identity after Senegalese soccer hooligans attacked a Gambian soccer team bus in Dakar (BBC, 2003). If Gambians, the overwhelming majority of whom are of Senegalese descent and share the same languages, history and lineage of those whose businesses they attacked, could perpetrate such violence, how might a Nigerian, Congolese or Liberian national, with no ethnic ties to South Africa, be treated in that nation following a similar incident?

Perhaps the Rwandan genocide could serve as the case for the concept of Pan-Africanism. More than three-quarters of a million people were hacked to death in that tragedy on the basis of their ethnicity (History, n.d.). If this horrific and macabre genocide could occur in a small country of a few million people, imagine involving an entire continent with thousands of tribal and ethnic groups, who have nothing in common, other than skin color? And, no analyst should forget the millions of non-black Africans as one ponders the challenge of heterogeneity for continental unity.

One might ask rhetorically, what makes one African, anyway, and how can we deal peaceably with our own diversity? Are Africans, irrespective of their national identities, willing soon to discuss the challenge of heterogeneity and xenophobia? Are Africans content to wait for another Rwanda or, less far ranging but no less disturbing, another set of incidents like those so recently witnessed in South Africa, while pretending that xenophobia only occurs in the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia) (Huffington Post,

2015)? I hope that Africans of all tribes, ethnicities and national identities can soon admit our common humanity, but also our shared frailty and begin the hard work of addressing our diversity in healthy ways in our own backyards, whether that be The Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire, South Africa or any other African nation.

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18

Extending an Olive Branch: The Oath Keepers and the Paranoid Style in American Politics

Alex Stubberfield

(Originally published on December 3, 2015)

This essay addresses current trends in rhetoric within the American patriot movement.[1] It describes the Oath Keepers, a rightwing organization whose avowed purpose, based on a fundamentalist interpretation of the United States Constitution, is to prevent supposed further violation of Americans' individual liberties. The group's presence and message has led The Southern Poverty Law Center to label its leader, Elmer Stewart Rhodes, an extremist (Rhodes, 2015).[2] The Anti-Defamation League has described the movement as anti-government and conspiratorial— characteristics common to far-right, non-racist militia groups. Their rhetoric, however misguided, must be understood (Anti-Defamation League, 2009). I here seek to diagnose the group's style and offer a possible way forward for diffusing such inflammatory commentary before it reaches an uncontrollable level. The majority in America cannot afford simply to brush off the Oath Keepers as crazy paranoiacs. Instead, I argue that citizens should seek to understand the roots of anti-government extremism in the United States and press our governments, at all levels, to address their causes without adding to the hysteria and paranoia that already characterizes these groups' apocalyptic messages.

The Oath Keepers

In 2010, Justine Sharrock, writing for *Mother Jones,* published a penetrating article describing the Oath Keepers movement (Sharrock, 2010). Her analysis provided an in-depth, first-hand look at the budding organization, particularly the character of its membership.

The group is comprised of former United States uniformed service members. In order to be a full member of the organization one must have served in the military, or police or as a firefighter or emergency services first responder (Oath Keepers, 2015). The Keepers' by-laws stipulate that to be considered for membership, one can never have been formally or informally associated with any racist or hate-group (Ibid). Sharrock found that a

disproportionate share of the group were white working class males who had been marginalized in some way and perceived that outcome as symptomatic of a government that no longer represented them. Oath Keepers rhetoric regularly paints the United States government as a malevolent force bent on complete abolition of individual civil liberties in service to a New World Order.

"Citizens should seek to understand the roots of anti-government extremism in the United States and press our governments, at all levels, to address their causes without adding to the hysteria and paranoia that already characterizes these groups' apocalyptic messages."
-Alex Stubberfield

The New World order is common symbol and claim in militarist conspiracy theories and refers to the alleged emergence of a global totalitarian government run by a secret elite. The two Oath Keeper members Sharrock interviewed for her article embraced this sort of rhetoric, which has been typical of rightwing conspiracy theories within militia movements (Sharrock, 2010; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015b). Elmer Stewart Rhodes, a Yale University Law School graduate and practicing lawyer founded the Oath Keepers on April 19, 2009 on Lexington Green in Massachusetts (Rhodes, 2015). The entity's stated purpose was to reach out to men and women in uniform and remind them of their duty to protect and uphold the Constitution of the United States.

Rhodes serves as the group's founder and president and regularly repeats his view that the government of the United States no longer represents the interests of its people by routinely violating the Constitution in service to an agenda of totalitarian control. Although the Oath Keepers are officially non-partisan (Sharrock, 2010), progressives are nonetheless treated with suspicion and demonized (Oath Keepers, 2015; Krieger, 2015). For example, in a column for *SWAT* magazine, Rhodes constructed a caricature of former Senator and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton— "Hitlery"—who, he warned, would institute a police state upon election to the presidency and disarm the populace to prepare it for domination as dominatrix-in-chief (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015a). Rhodes worked on the Ron Paul campaign in 2008 and became disillusioned with establishment politics after Barack Obama won that national presidential election—he argued that grassroots organizing was the only true way to avoid the poisonous environment of the political elite (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015a). His inflammatory remarks and the rhetoric of other leaders and members of the Oath Keepers is characteristically paranoid in the style first identified by political scientist Richard Hofstadter in *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (1964).

Paranoia as a style

Hofstadter's book provides an analytic framework for diagnosing what he called, "the paranoid style" of the American ideological right. His work provides an excellent entry for understanding the links between status and interest politics. It is vital to understand that Hofstadter was not psychologizing the adherents of particular ideologies, but was instead highlighting an orientation inherent in their beliefs and orientation. The paranoid style is characterized by: "The central image … of a vast and sinister conspiracy, a gigantic and yet subtle machinery of influence set in motion to undermine and destroy a way of life" (Hofstadter, 1964, 2008, p. 29). Adherents of this perspective, "regard a 'vast' or 'gigantic' conspiracy as the *motive force* in historical events" (Hofstadter, 1964, 2008, p. 29). In this view, "History *is* a conspiracy, set in motion by demonic forces of almost transcendent power, and what is felt to be needed to defeat it is not the usual methods of political give-and-take, but an all-out crusade" (Hofstadter, 1964, 2008, p. 29). There is never a middle ground for those influenced by this outlook and their leaders are typically militants operating outside the confines of the political establishment (Hofstadter, 1964, 2008, pp. 30-31).

Another distinguishing characteristic of the paranoid style is its pedantry, "One of the impressive things about paranoid literature is precisely the elaborate concern with demonstration it almost invariably shows" (Hofstadter, 1964, 2008, p. 35). The paranoid style marshals as much evidence as its proselytizers can to support the logical leaps it must make in its message. Hofstadter contended that what distinguishes this outlook, "is not, then, the absence of verifiable facts, but rather the curious leap in imagination that is always made at some critical point in their recital of events" (Hofstadter, 1964, 2008, p. 37). Oath Keeper leaders regularly display this odd turn in their rhetoric. For example, the organization's chaplain Chuck Baldwin (2015), argued after the recent terror attacks in Paris that ISIL[3] poses an existential threat to Western democracy, but he also went further to contend that the tragic murders for which it was responsible were the direct result of a vast conspiracy,

> Make no mistake about it: the wars in the Middle East are Washington's wars. The refugee crisis is the direct result of Washington's wars. G.W. Bush's invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the continued violent attacks by the Obama administration throughout the Middle East (Baldwin, 2015).

He then suggested without any evidence (for which, in truth, there is none), "not to mention, the direct intervention of, and supervision by, the CIA, British intelligence, the Israeli Mossad, and the governments of Turkey and Saudi Arabia" (Ibid).

Investigators have thus far found no evidence to support the idea that refugees committed the Paris attacks. The acts were the product and responsibility of homegrown terrorists (The Economist, 2015b). Baldwin (2015) recognized this fact, "The attacks in Paris were NOT committed by refugees," but he nevertheless attributed them to Western governments and their allies, "they were committed by CIA-backed, Saudi-backed, Mossad-backed, Turkey-backed, MI6-backed ISIS terrorists." His supposed "evidence" for these claims was a chauvinistic appeal to his audience,

> In addition, how did those terrorists successfully pull off these coordinated attacks? How did they get fully-automatic rifles and bombs into Paris? These sand people are NOT that sophisticated. They do NOT have those kinds of connections. Do you think you could successfully get a group of people together and smuggle dozens of automatic weapons and explosives into a European country–and then successfully coordinate a large-scale attack in a high-security major downtown city? The only people capable of such a thing are Special Ops military personnel. In other words, ISIS had help, folks–a LOT of help (Baldwin, 2015).

It is simply unfathomable to him that ISIL acted alone or that Europe's freedom of travel between nations and a weak Eastern border contributed the terrorist group's ability to carry out its attacks, as the *Economist* has argued (The Economist, 2015b).

The obvious question is, why would Western states terrorize their own people? Baldwin contended they do so because,

> The refugee crisis is a tool of globalists to destabilize the West and help usher in a global Police State. Again, the goal is a global economic system. …The only thing that globalists can do to circumvent this inevitable collapse is create global panic, global war, and a global Police State (Baldwin, 2015).

His logical leap is the attribution of an act of terrorism to an international plot by an elite bent on global domination. Baldwin's comments illustrate the circular logic and witch-hunting characteristic of the paranoid style. He supports his interpretation of events with a conspiratorial theory and underpins his view with that same claim. Those who subscribe to such ideology act, as Hofstadter remarked, like transmitters and not as receivers of information, "His effort to amass it has rather the quality of a defensive act which shuts off his receptive apparatuses and protects him from having to attend to disturbing considerations that do not fortify his ideas" (Hofstadter, 1964, 2008, p. 38). Placing this contention in the context of the Oath Keepers, Baldwin sees enemies everywhere, but especially in Washington and the world's ills are explained as the product of a massive secretive conspiracy at work creating them each day.

How can we, as a democratic society, understand the paranoid style sufficiently so that we may take steps not to silence its purveyors, but to neutralize the potential effects of their wild rhetoric? Hofstadter was also illuminating on this point,

> At the time, we were struck by a salient fact: the literature of the American right was a literature not of those who felt themselves to be in possession but those who felt dispossessed – a literature of resentment, profoundly anti-establishment in its purposes (Hofstadter, 1964, 2008, p. 82).

Dispossession refers to individuals and groups who once perceived themselves as part of the core culture, but now believe they have suffered a loss of status within it. Status politics is inherently emotional and concerns identity. As such, one must first understand what is motivating these individuals so as to be able to provide them information and arguments that might help them refuse to adopt the sort of Manichean mentality Baldwin's formulations concerning the Paris attacks evidenced.

Burt has extended Hofstadter's work in *American Hysteria: The Untold Story of Mass Political Extremism in the United States* (2015), and offered a strategy to reduce hysterical moments, such as the Oath Keepers reflect in American politics. His strategy to ameliorate and prevent such extremism involves three major elements, "In times of hysteria, we must *accept*, *affirm*, and *attack"* (Burt, 2015, p. 183). Acceptance means, "irrational as the movement might seem, there is an intrinsic power to political hysteria, built upon a deep appeal during times of profound change in America's national identity" (Burt, 2015, p. 183). In short, society and the broader population may not brush off the Oath Keepers simply as lunatics. Their group demographic is conspicuously blue-collar and that portion of the population has, in fact, suffered disproportionately with globalization generally and during several recent economic downturns, specifically. The Oath Keepers believe themselves marginalized and unsupported by the government they once pledged to serve. We must dignify their position not for the messages its representatives express, but out of recognition that they have suffered injury as a group and have sought to explain those wounds by aligning with the simple "answer" provided by the Oath Keepers.

Burt's proposed second step is affirmation:

> we must realize that political hysteria arises from insecurities in American national identity, and as such, *affirming* an inclusive version of our national identity–both before such movements arise, and in the midst of each episode–can serve to lessen their sway (Burt, 2015, p. 184).

Our nation's recent veterans present an example of one group prone to social insecurity amidst change. A recent report by the Department of Veterans

Affairs, for example, suggested that poverty among returning Gulf War II[4] veterans is on the rise (Department of Veterans Affairs, 2015). Demographically, veterans in this 18-34 age group are at the highest risk of poverty and their immiseration represents a growing trend (Department of Veterans Affairs, 2015). We must do more for our veterans in order to boost democratic enfranchisement and to ensure that they do not fall into a cycle of poverty and marginality.

Finally, individually, we must *attack*, "the assertions made by each such movement's adherents, exposing their wild theories for what they are: unjustifiable demonizations and wildly exaggerated readings of the facts at hand" (Burt, 2015, p. 184). Tactically speaking, each paranoiac assertion contains some small measure of truth and some connection to reality. We must dance a fine line when confronting people who have adopted this orientation because we cannot afford to alienate them further by dismissing their assertions full-stop. Such disregard would shut down communication entirely and there would be little chance for constructive dialogue thereafter. The object, then, should be to highlight the truthful parts of their stories while contradicting and challenging their more fanciful assertions in open and non-violent discussion.

The paranoid style marshals facts selectively and marries these to sweeping unfounded claims to create an echo chamber surrounding its adherents. The broader society's counter strategy must be to extend an olive branch of understanding while also creating a cultural context of inclusivity. Those challenging the fear-filled groups on the Right, including the Oath Keepers, must help members of those organizations develop a spirit of realistic criticality in place of their paranoid style. Above all, *we must avoid a confrontation* based on obedience to authority. Adherents of the paranoid style suffer from, "a disorder in relation to authority, characterized by an inability to find other modes for human relationship than those of more or less complete domination or submission" (Hofstadter, 1964, 2008, p.58). Put more broadly, to put Burt's guidance into practice, lawmakers and citizens alike should do all in their power not to demonize those who are otherwise actively involved in demonizing them.

Notes

1. This article was published on December 3, 2015. On January 2, 2016, a militia group calling itself Citizens for Constitutional Freedom under the leadership of Ammon Bundy, captured and occupied the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge located in Harney County, Oregon. Their occupation lasted until February 11, 2016, when federal agents arrested the armed occupiers after shooting a friend of Bundy's, LaVoy Finicum, following a high-speed chase. The Oath Keepers, who are the concern of this essay, were not involved in the armed occupation of the refuge. However, Jason Van Tatenhove, an Oath Keeper, conducted an interview with Finicum on January 20,

2016, six days prior to his death. Additionally, Stewart Rhodes, and Tatenhove interviewed Finicum via telephone on the radio show "The Patriot Report" on January 24, 2016, two days prior to his death.

The advance of communications technology and the proliferation of the Internet has allowed for greater network density within Patriot and Sovereign Citizens circles and any further study of these groups should include a commentary on their communications network as part of their organizational structure. Given this fact, it is impossible to discern who is directly responsible for the continued spread of armed Patriot groups in the United States. However, new evidence is surfacing that the Oath Keepers have allied themselves with establishment Republicans and have been involved in protecting right-wing "Free Speech" rallies in Oregon following the stabbing of three men by a white supremacist in Portland, Oregon who attempted to intervene as he was harassing two Muslim women on a train. The white supremacist, Jeremy Joseph Cristian, shouted "Free speech or die, Portland. You got no safe place. This is America – get out if you don't like free speech," during his court hearing on May 30, 2017.

Paranoia and political acrimony now characterize the state of U.S. politics in 2017 as more reports of violence surface committed by actors on both the right and left. We must understand the phenomenon of paranoid reasoning in politics and develop countermeasures against it if the Republic is to survive.

2. At the penning of this essay in 2015, information concerning the Oath Keepers and other right-wing militia movements was readily available on sites such as the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Anti-Defamation League. On return to these sources for purposes of citation reformatting, the author has found that they no longer exist as of July 2017.The author assures the reader that these sources were in circulation and print at the initial publication of this essay. Regardless, the SPLC and ADL served a perspectival function in this essay and does not necessarily hurt the analysis of the Oath Keepers.

3. I chose ISIL, the Islamic State in the Levant rather than the now more familiar ISIS, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as it is a broader term that covers a region rather than merely two nation-states.

4. I term both the invasion and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan by U.S. troops, Gulf War II to differentiate the military involvements of the George W. Bush, and Barak Obama, and Donald J. Trump administrations from Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm of the George H.W. Bush administration commonly known as the Gulf War.

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The Unaccounted Risks of Public Private Partnerships

Priscila Izar

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This brief article examines the ramifications of adoption of the public-private partnership (PPP) mechanism in the urban infrastructure and service sector. I focus on the debate concerning the efficacy and equity of PPPs and, particularly, the issue of risk. I first provide a definition of public-private partnerships and discuss how the literature concerning them has approached risk. I highlight the fact that public-private partnership proponents and critics alike are concerned with this question, albeit in very different ways. The mainstream management literature sets up a comprehensive list of risks associated with these structures so that these may be delimited for each project and addressed as efficiently as feasible to avoid cost increases. The political and economic literature focusing on such partnerships meanwhile, approaches the question of risk more broadly.

These analysts outline the challenges that attend the PPP mechanism in comparison to other development alternatives, such as traditional procurement, and traditional public sector provision of public goods and services. Of particular concern to scholars in this literature are the effects of public-private partnerships on popular participation in decision-making, on power sharing among groups and on the distribution of wealth. These investigators contend that, unchecked, these risks challenge the very premise that PPPs can more efficiently address a widening infrastructure gap. These concerns also work against regulatory frameworks founded on the principle that greater public participation and control in public decision-making can better address geographic service-related disparity and income inequality.

Broadly defined, public-private partnerships may be considered, "contractual arrangements of varied nature where the two parties share rights and responsibilities during the duration of the contract" (Farquharson, de Mästle, and Yescombe, 2011, p. 9). Hodge and Greve (2007, 545) have similarly loosely defined PPPs as "co-operative institutional arrangements between public and private sector actors." The World Bank, which along with other multilateral agencies is committed to the use of PPPs worldwide, has defined these collaborations as:

> a long-term contract between a private party and a government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance (The World Bank, 2014).

This definition assumes that the private sector bears the brunt of a PPP's associated risks. However, several analysts have sharply challenged this view, as discussed below.

"There is a wide gap between the management of risk in public-private partnerships at the project scale and the implications of such efforts for the broader political economy of the jurisdictions in which they are implemented."
-Priscila Izar

The principal animating or foundational idea underpinning public-private partnerships is to enhance the production and delivery of public goods and services, while at the same time addressing governmental funding and technical constraints. PPP proponents argue that governments alone are not able to address a widening gap of urban infrastructure and service needs resulting from, among other factors, rising rates of urbanization. These individuals point to estimates that suggest that globally, the current need for investment in infrastructure development is as high as $3 trillion (World Economic Forum, 2010), with actual annual investments estimated at about one-half of that total (Boston Consulting Group, 2013). At the same time, many analysts have suggested that inadequate infrastructure has a detrimental effect on economic growth worldwide, a dynamic that is particularly pervasive and critical in less developed nation contexts, where service levels are usually below what is required to meet existing demand. In these situations, economies face "congestion or service rationing, [where] infrastructure services are also often of low quality or reliability, while many areas are simply un-served" (Farquharson, de Mästle and Yescombe, 2011, p. 31). This scenario routinely poses a challenge to governance and often reflects not only insufficient fiscal resources and financial forecasting and management, but also generally inadequate planning and design, poor project ordering and weak or insufficient capacity for infrastructure maintenance. Proponents of partnerships contend that greater private sector participation can help governments overcome these challenges, "by mobilizing additional sources of funding and financing for infrastructure" (Ibid).[1]

The mainstream literature highlights PPPs' advantages as encompassing:

- *whole of life costing*, or the integration of all project-related technical and financial responsibilities under a single partner, which, proponents assume, "incentivizes the single party to complete each

project function (design, build, operate, maintain) in a way that minimizes total costs;"

- *risk transfer*, meaning that part of the risk associated with owning and operating infrastructure is shifted from the public to the private sector, imagined (once again) to be "better able to manage it;"
- *a focus on service delivery and performance*, facilitated by the establishment of a long-term contract in which a private agent is given the flexibility to incorporate innovations, and to pursue additional sources of funding to help defray project costs in ways that the public sector cannot (Farquharson, de Mästle and Yescombe, 2011, p. 32).

Advocates of partnerships acknowledge that every PPP carries risks, which can negatively affect a project's 'financial value.' To mitigate this drawback, proponents argue that each proposed effort should include a comprehensive list of its likely risks and a calculation of their estimated costs and how these might be allocated or mitigated, as appropriate. Analysts have argued that there are,

> … two main goals of [such] risk allocation. The first is to create incentives for the parties to manage risk well—and thereby improve project benefits or reduce costs. The second is to reduce the overall cost of project risk by 'insuring' parties against risks they are not happy to bear (Iossa, Spagnolo, and Vellez, 2007, cited in The World Bank 2014, p. 149).

PPP risks commonly are divided into three types: macro, or those related to the economic and political environment, as well as to extreme events such as natural disasters; meso, or risks specifically associated with a project, such as land acquisition and production management; and finally, micro-level concerns, associated with relationship and personnel issues within a collaboration's management structure. These last factors may include inadequate experience with PPPs, lack of commitment from one or more parties and staffing challenges (Bing et al., 2005).

Given the multi-dimensional character of these challenges, critics have suggested that mainstream public-private partnership studies have been overly focused on microeconomic analysis and have therefore failed to acknowledge how the public sector—as well as the citizenry—are likely to bear most (if not all) of the costs associated with the risks of such initiatives (Flinders, 2005). As Shaoul has observed, "far from transferring risk to the private sector, PPP[s] transfer the risk to the government, workforce and the public users and tax payers … the concept of risk transfer in the context of essential services is fundamentally flawed" (in Flinders, 2005, p. 226). Examining the national government's experience with public-private partnerships in Great Britain, Edwards and Shaoul have argued, that "public

agencies, not the commercial partner, bore the management risk and costs fell on the public at large and/or other public agencies" (2002, p. 397). Overall, these studies are concerned with the way in which PPPs affect, and distort, the distribution of wealth among social groups, the public sector and the market, transferring resources away from the general citizenry and to private elites (Shaoul, 2005).

Miraftab has analyzed the effects of partnerships on power sharing between the public and private sectors, as well as local communities in South Africa, and concluded that analysts must be more careful in assuming that any given partnership's major players can perform their designated roles, i.e., the state, the private sector and the community, as these vary in their political, fiscal and administrative capacities to address needed project scale and implementation requirements (2004). In the context of decentralization, which has characterized South Africa's post-apartheid regime, private actors involved in the delivery of public infrastructure worked with recently established local government agencies that lacked capacity to play the mediating roles required in complex PPPs. As result, the partnership initiatives Miraftab investigated often resulted in the privatization of community assets and further dispossession of poor communities from their locally mobilized resources (Ibid, p. 98).

Arguing that public-and-private cooperation is not new, Hodge has sought to identify what, specifically, contemporary partnerships entail (2004). Thus, he has argued that today's PPPs are characterized by: "the use of private finance arrangements, the use of highly complex contracts to provide the infrastructure or services, and the altered governance and accountability assumptions accompanying this" (Ibid, p. 37). The preference for private financing, he notes, can result in greater costs for taxpayers. The innate complexity of these cross-sectoral arrangements can limit policy makers' and citizens' understanding and ability to evaluate their outcomes, including their actual direct and indirect costs. In this sense, PPPs can make it difficult for government officials and the public to determine accountability for such project's outcomes, while also failing to promote community involvement. Hodge has argued for the need to separate project specific 'commercial needs' and broader 'governance risks.'

He has applied his evaluative criteria to a road infrastructure PPP project in Melbourne, Australia (City Link) and concluded that in that case the private sector bore the bulk of the project's commercial risk, as stated in the contract for the effort. However, in addition to those foreseen risks, there were also unforeseen ones, related to legal disputes among the private parties involved and to public mistrust of the project. Those risks, which Hodge classified as political and governance related, were extremely large and were borne wholly by the public sector. Hodge concluded that the actual price citizens paid for the development of City Link never became clear, and

suggested that PPP contracts, "need not only to be optimal in the technical sense, but also accompanied by a priority for democratic debate, transparency and clarity" (2004, p. 47).

More recently, Greve and Hodge found improved private sector performance and accountability in PPP implementation (2013). However, they focused this fresh analysis on projects in Australia and the United Kingdom, and not on developing nation efforts, where public-private partnerships are still often unfamiliar. Moreover, these authors were unable to ascertain in their review of the literature whether PPPs overall could save the public sector money or secure improved efficiency, as often argued. Instead, they concluded that partnership outcomes are highly contextual. They also highlighted the fact there is often far greater concern with regulating and monitoring the roles, responsibilities and potential benefits to the public and private sector actors and much less attention to the outcomes of PPPs for local citizens. Henjewele, Fewings and Rwelamila have also recently contended that public-private partnerships "across Africa, North and South America, Australia and Europe" often marginalize the citizenry (2013, p.226). While directly affected communities are often addressed in PPPs, their impacts on the general public are often not assessed as a result of a lack of proper community consultation and involvement (Rwelamila et al. in Henjewele et al., 2013).

This review suggests that there is a wide gap between the management of risk in public-private partnerships at the project scale and the implications of such efforts for the broader political economy of the jurisdictions in which they are implemented. Project managers and those analysts who adopt their perspective approach risk as a set of initiative specific challenges that must be identified, allocated and mitigated so as to avoid increases in costs. For these individuals, the focus of analysis is restricted to a particular project and risk is measured in terms of financial value. Their ultimate goal is to address a widening infrastructure gap that is also measured in financial terms. Scholars in the political economy literature take a very different view and assess risk in terms of the challenges that PPP's represent to wealth allocation, power-sharing and popular participation in decision-making.

Overall, it is valuable that critical analyses of PPPs take into consideration that these efforts are dynamic; lessons learned in past experiences can be, and have been, used to improve the design of new collaborations. However, it is even more important that analysts and managers alike address the broader concerns raised by the political-economy literature, for these are at the core of the current political and policy debate regarding deepening international and intra-national economic and social inequality. To be sure, this examination must be grounded in the crucial understanding that, in developed and developing economies alike, public-private partnerships have not had a good record when it comes to sharing power and resources with

local community and civil society groups. Public and private sector actors have developed improved capabilities to devise more effective partnership contracts while local community groups remained marginalized. To some analysts, this lack of public control helps explain why PPPs often deepen, rather than alleviate, the concentration of power and wealth amongst political and economic elites (Miraftab, 2004; Shaoul, 2005). Such findings should be taken very seriously in light of Miraftab's (2004) conclusion that PPP trajectories are shaped by local cultural and regime characteristics and past experiences.

Notes

1.It is important to describe the methodology for calculating the global infrastructure gap. This figure is based on OECD's forecast expenditure on infrastructure for OECD and emerging countries for the period 2000–2030, as percentage of global GDP (equivalent to 2.84 percent for the period 2000-2010 and 2.58 percent for 2010-2020), and its comparison with the World Bank's estimate for required infrastructure investment needs for emerging economies. This last estimate is equivalent to 7 to 9 percent of emerging countries' annual GDP (World Economic Forum 2010, pp. 6-9). This is therefore a subjective measure, which can vary significantly from country to country, according to local characteristics and values, needs and resources.

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Theorizing Technological Change and Participatory Practices in Workplaces

Luis Felipe Camacho

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This brief essay promotes the development of new theories and approaches to replace traditional perspectives on the sociology of work and organizations. I will use as examples of this imperative recent theoretical developments and empirical findings concerning the relationship between technology change and participatory/democratic practices in workplaces. Indeed, studies of labor processes in the late 20th century have suggested there is a need to develop new approaches if scholars are to understand the emerging workplace dynamics of the 21st century.

One of the main questions workforce analysts must now address is why participatory/democratic practices in workplaces are becoming more important despite increased firm adoption of automated and other technologies. I briefly consider Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Weberian, Taylorist, Neo-Taylorist, and Cooperative theoretical perspectives on this issue.

From a Marxist perspective, the increasing rate of workplace technology change alienates workers irrespective of any other of its effects (Grint, 2005). These scholars suggest that because personnel neither own production processes nor control their structure and pace, they remain in a powerless position, and capitalists are therefore free to oppress them to maximize profits. Meanwhile, Neo-Marxists contend that managers choose specific technologies or automated forms of production to gain control of the organization of work vís-a-vís their workers (Agassi, 1986).

From a Weberian perspective, very few employees will have autonomy in their workplaces because all are enmeshed in bureaucratic forms of organization and administration in modern societies (Grint, 2005). According to this view, laborers do not possess the power to embrace participatory/democratic practices in their workspaces, and in any case, capitalists perceive such initiatives as a threat to their capacity to promote and profit from technological change. That is, these frames suggest that automation and participatory/democratic practices in the workplace cannot coexist.

From a different perspective, Taylor argued that worker involvement in production tasks is important, but that employees should not be included in decisions regarding businesses' futures (Hodson, 2001). Neo-Taylorist advocates, meanwhile, have contended that staff participation in production tasks is beneficial, because employee goals are thereby aligned with corporate aims. Critics of this position, however, have pointed out that because participatory/democratic practices arise from managers' initiatives in this view, that fact promotes a false sense of worker satisfaction (Burris, 1998). In short, these perspectives suggest that forms of democratic participation matter even though their influence may be limited.

"Past theories have often not acknowledged that automation and technological change and participatory processes can coexist within firms, while empirical studies have found that just such occurs routinely. This sort of 'mixed' condition is likely to endure as economic innovations continue to spur changes in workplace organization and processes."
-Luis Felipe Camacho

Meanwhile, Cooperative theorists have contended that automation or other technology changes can lead to empowered workers in production decision-making while offering them the possibility of ownership and democratic self-management. Cooperation offers a way to overcome worker alienation arising from such shifts by affording users opportunities to work beneficially with others toward shared aims (Atzeni, 2012). Some information and communications technologies, including Wikipedia, Linux and community broadband networks, promote just such collaborative possibilities. However, proponents of cooperatives, as well as some participatory theorists, have encountered problems demonstrating that technology change, even of this sort, leads to more participatory or democratic workplaces.

Overall, with the exception of the Cooperative view, these 20th-century theories either rejected or sharply circumscribed the role that participatory/democratic practices could play in workplaces confronting automation and technology change. However, some empirical studies of these various theories have challenged them. According to Burris, for example, organizational restructuring and changes in worker skills as well as in power and authority relationships present challenges for these perspectives (1998). Workplace computerization has resulted in simultaneous employee de-skilling and up-skilling as well as work organization and production changes. Likewise, this change in employment conditions has replaced craft jobs with new high-tech posts and has led to general up-skilling of production work with limited expansion of laborer autonomy. This office reality, a product of just 35 or so years of technology change, cannot be explained by the dominant frameworks concerning the relationship of automation and employee autonomy and participation.

Fresh conceptions are needed to explain these and related workplace shifts: "[T]he new types of work and organization emerging along with computerization do not readily conform to existing theories, but this does not imply that they cannot be theorized" (Burris, 1998, p. 154). I wish to contend that both organization-specific and environmental forces will result in an increasing coexistence between automation and participatory/ democratic practices in workplaces in coming decades, although this may not occur as a consequence of specific intentional managerial interventions.

How corporations manage fast-paced technological change will be key to their capacity in coming years to insure a voice for workers. Thoughtful management of such initiatives will be essential "to understand better not only the impact of computerization on work organizations, but also the impact of work organization on computerization" (Burris, 1998, p. 155). Interesting examples for such study would be companies that have adopted the Worldblu Freedom at Work Model.[1] These firms may serve as exemplars of how the goals of worker voice and swift change may be reconciled.

Sociology-of-work scholars must also examine the common assumption that workplace and technological innovations benefit all. What roles can/do more democratic participatory offices and workrooms play in helping manage the disruptions, including employment-related shifts, caused by unanticipated change? For instance, one might hypothesize that additional automation will result in more participatory/ democratic practices in workplaces in indirect ways. By indirect, I refer to the innovation context in which effective organizational strategic management promotes workplace processes based on benefits from product change and alliances between competitors to cooperate in the development and diffusion of technological innovations. Over time, such action can promote change in the organizational cultures of the firms involved toward increased participatory/ democratic practices in order to ensure collaborative possibilities.

In sum, past theories have often not acknowledged that automation and technological change and participatory processes can coexist within firms, while empirical studies have found that just such occurs routinely. This sort of "mixed" condition is likely to endure as economic innovations continue to spur changes in workplace organization and processes. These will have to be reconciled with new ways of imagining how those working in those environments can play roles in shaping how their new offices and facilities will be structured, Sociology of work and management scholars will need continually to craft new lenses through which to make sense of these ongoing challenges from the standpoint of organization-scale potentials amidst evolving contextual shifts.

Notes

1.The Worldblu Freedom at Work Model consists of 10 principles of organizational democracy that aim to promote participatory/democratic practices in the workplace. Detailed information on the framework, offered by a for-profit corporation, was retrieved February 17, 2016 from https://www.worldblu.com/democratic-design/principles.php.

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4'33" at the Edge of Intelligibility

Sascha Engel

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According to Michel Foucault, every *episteme*—that is, every historically distinct discursive formation—can be characterized by a principle of communicative scarcity that guarantees its intelligible integrity: "on the basis of the grammar and of the wealth of vocabulary available at a given period, there are, in absolute, relatively few things that are said" (Foucault, 2010, p. 119). This scarcity, as Foucault argued, is neither established by outright censorship (by the state, the church or other vested interests), nor by 'internal exile' of authors, by the magic of spin doctors, or by other mechanisms of silence. Rather, the historically distinct principle of communicative scarcity is situated at the margin of speech, governing what each age rules to be meaningful, and what it does not. It designates the value of statements, a "value that is not defined by their truth … but which characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange, their possibility of transformation" (Ibid, p. 120).

I argue that the contemporary principle of communicative scarcity is, paradoxically, an abundance of speech. By this, I do not mean simply to endorse the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia's concurrence/dissent in *McConnell v. FEC* (later invoked by Justice Anthony Kennedy in *Citizens United v. FEC*) that "there is no such thing as too much speech" (540 U.S. 93, 14 [2003]). As has been noted by many commentators, Justice Scalia's perspective argues against the imposition of governmental censorship, and thus serves to strengthen privileged speech at the expense of its marginalized counterparts (Batchis, 2012; Hasen, 2010). His adherence to the long-standing tradition of Supreme Court arguments "interpret[ing] the First Amendment in a rigid, literal manner" (Hill, 1994, p. 6)—that is, with a pure and classical focus on defending speakers against government censorship—also neglects to note that the defining feature of contemporary speech is its abundant proliferation rather than an artificially imposed scarcity through censorship (Foucault, 1990).

Thus, following Foucault's caution against putting too much weight on classical gestures of censorship, one can nevertheless identify in current discourse a seam of silence that governs its intelligibility. The contemporary abundance of speech has the paradoxical result that each individual

message's informational value tends towards zero. This follows from the classical definition of information as a coefficient measuring what can be called a surprise effect. Independent of the content of a statement,[1] when "the actual message is one selected from a set of possible messages" that the receiver had been expecting, the receipt of this particular content produces information by excluding all other anticipated or possible statements. Thus, given a finite number x of anticipated possible messages, a corresponding number y=1/x "can be regarded as a measure of the information produced when one message is chosen from the set, all choices being equally likely" (Shannon, 1948, p. 379).

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It follows that the informational value of each statement is higher the less the receiving party expected this particular content, if their anticipated likelihood is differentiated. Furthermore, each message's value is lower when the number of equally likely statements is higher. Under both assumptions, knowledge gained per communicative act asymptotically converges to zero as the absolute number of messages goes up: the likelihood of encountering genuinely new information diminishes as the total number of available—and hence possible—messages increases (Shannon, 1948).

The well-known Internet phenomenon of 'information cocoons,' "communication universes in which we hear only what we choose and what comforts and pleases us," (Sunstein, 2006, p. 9) is thus not just due to selection mechanisms, such as personal preference reflected in social media and search engine algorithms. In a saturated environment, all messages are always already anticipated and expected within the given discursive networks designed to label, relegate and discredit them: 'liberal slander,' 'mainstream media,' conspiracy theory. Speech is not scarce in today's environment of abundant communication, but information is, as the vast majority of all messages are already anticipated. The tendency toward increasingly vulgar echo-chamber politics, therefore, has nothing at all to do with diminishing intelligence or a breakdown of cultural values under liberal assault, as some have argued, nor with the conservative attack on higher and elementary and secondary education, as others maintain (Bernal, 1997). Instead, the effects of informational abundance operate as simple mathematical coefficients prior to psychosocial or groupthink mechanisms (Sunstein, 2006).

Yet how is abundance a principle of scarcity governing social intelligibility in general? To be sure, an individual may have less access and understanding to specific messages, yet does not the totality of contemporary discourse

expand ever further? I argue that the dynamic of increasing communication and thus of decreasing informational content per communicative act operates as a principle of regulative scarcity in three ways: by the psychology of information overload, in so-called absolute events and through the proliferation of what Jean-Francois Lyotard (1988) has called differends: communicative acts whose ethical or political efficacy is made impossible by their very condition of possibility. I address each of these contentions in turn.

1. In the age of generalized communication and diminishing information, the latter becomes a scarce commodity. Thus, commercial and technical differentiations in the difficulty of access to specific useful messages—selected out of the stochastic noise of abundant communication—is the first result of the contemporary principle of informational scarcity. In some cases, this effect stems from differentiated access to communications technology. It should not be forgotten, but is all too frequently, that access to the Internet is still not universal and, under current economic and social configurations, is not likely to become so any time soon (Raymond, 2013). According to World Bank data, the percentage of U.S. citizens using the Internet on any host, with any device, and from any location in 2014 was 87.6 percent of the overall population, while such countries as Bolivia (39 percent), Afghanistan (6.4 percent), and the Central African Republic (4 percent) lag far behind (World Bank, 2016). This Internet access challenge also excludes the blind, the illiterate and to a lesser extent, the dyslexic and those whose cognitive preference is auditory or tactile rather than visual. Moreover, the majority of its text is written in the English language (54 percent of the Web's top ten million websites, as of April 2016), followed by Russian (6.4 percent), German (5.6 percent), and Japanese (5.1 percent). It furthermore uses the Latin Alphabet and employs Arabic numerals in more than two-thirds of the top 10 million websites as of April 2016 (W3 Technology Survey, 2016). As a result, the Internet is more difficult to access for those for whom these three elements are foreign. Other forms of entry restriction concern selective capacity to review specific economic and particularly financial data, such as the Bloomberg terminals, whose superior latency guarantees its users faster access to market information—fractions of a second may be worth hundreds of millions of dollars to those who have superior ability to parse particular data (Philips, 2012; Troianovsky, 2012).

Even when entry to the Internet's information is available, however, economies of scarcity result from its abundance on a psychological level: "We are … in a situation of information glut, of an excess, an overload, of information," where an "imbalance between the supply and demand of attention lies at the root of the panic-depressive syndrome called infostress" (Marazzi, 2008, p.65). What is scarce here is not messages or

communication, but the ability to obtain specific information. One direct effect of communicative abundance of endless streams of messages is scarcity of meaning for the person receiving it.

2. If the individual informational value per message decreases with the total number of communicative acts, it asymptotically approaches zero as the latter number approaches infinity. That is, the vast majority of all messages are already anticipated in the daily maelstrom of statements. By the same token, genuinely new content whose informational value is sufficient to break through the wall of existing noise must be ever more disruptive. Thus, the excessive overall number of communicative acts today results in the escalating importance of watershed events in the so-called 'real world' (as opposed to the realm of electronic transmissions). Since such defining events do not increase in frequency, while messages do, the former's informational value approaches infinity as that of individual messages within abundant communication approaches zero. The principle of scarcity at work here results from the distinction between the already anticipated totality of communicative events (individual messages), whose informational value approaches zero, and what Jean Baudrillard has called 'absolute events:' "the pure event" by which "[t]he whole play of history and power is disrupted, … [and] so, too, are the conditions of analysis" (Baudrillard, 2002, p.4). Absolute events are not anticipated, which means that their informational value increases rather than decreases with the total number of circulating messages.

Moreover, absolute events change the boundaries of possible or permissible speech by restructuring the principle of scarcity regulating contemporary intelligibility. According to Baudrillard, the events of September 11, 2001, constituted an absolute event that changed the boundaries of permissible speech:

> When global power monopolizes the situation, … when there is such a formidable condensation of all functions in the technocratic machinery, and when no alternative form of thinking is allowed, what other way is there but a terroristic situational transfer? (2002, pp. 8-9).

In this particular example, the events subsequently known as '9/11' disrupted the post-Cold War complacency of American capitalism, ushering in an era of ever-increasing uncertainty in the West: concerning its military strength, its socio-economic attractiveness and ultimately even its core values.

The absolute event is predicated upon the disruption of its own condition of possibility: the twofold principle of scarcity of informational value arising from the abundance of communication in general. On the one hand, it can only become an absolute event because the contemporary profusion of messages results in a scarcity of information. On the other hand, the absolute

event structures the realm of possible speech after it occurs, by introducing a new principle of scarcity. One such absolute event was the attacks of September 11, 2001. One can assume that the fall of the Berlin Wall was also an example. The Gulf War, as Baudrillard (1995) has famously argued, was not an absolute event, or even, strictly speaking, an event at all. Likewise, one could argue that neither the long-anticipated outbreak of World War I, nor the dreaded, yet equally certain, outbreak of World War II were absolute events.[2] Neither a Trump nor a Sanders presidency, by this measure, would be an absolute event, although either of them could give rise to one.

3. The distinction between absolute events and their anticipated counterparts within communicative plenty has led to a third dimension of contemporary informational scarcity: the proliferation of differends. Here, as in the previous cases, communicative overload has generated a situation in which the content of individual statements is negated by their own conditions of emergence. For the victims of the Gulf War claimed on both sides, there is no difference in their suffering from that experienced by those who were injured or lost in the September 11, 2001 attacks, and the subsequent War on Terror. In both cases, the regulative principle of communicative scarcity is the absolute silence of death (Butler, 2009). Yet, in the circulation of abundant communication—permanent 24/7/365 TV and Internet coverage—the Gulf War has long since receded to a phantasmagoric quasi-presence. The American victims of September 11, 2001, on the other hand—but not their counterparts slain in the War on Terror—are memorialized in the pomp and circumstance of pools reflecting, if anything at all, the unquestioned legitimacy bestowed upon the U.S. security apparatus and us-versus-them discourse concerning the absolute event of 9/11 (Debrix, 2008).

The suffering of the victims of forgotten wars, as well as the casualties of U.S. drone strikes and invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, has been relegated to the status of a differend. In this case, a "plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes for that reason a victim" because the "'regulation' of the conflict between [the two parties] is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom" (Lyotard, 1988, p. 9). Any attempt to raise the specter of the forgotten dead—the fatalities arising from U.S. drone strikes or those of the Gulf War—drowns in the absence of informational value arising from an overload of total communication.[3] Even if heard, however, it is received as speech meaningful only in the idiom of the security apparatus's self-righteousness, equating the victims of drone airstrikes with those who died in the September 11, 2001 attacks. This principle of scarcity applies not only to war dead, but also operates among the living and the physically and mentally wounded. Numerous analysts have observed that the survivors of domestic violence and rape face a differend, where the condition of possibility of their speech

acts rests on grounds that frequently make their successful communication impossible (Lyotard, 1988; Menaker and Cramer, 2012). Survivors of police brutality likewise face such conditions. They often, if not always, face an institutional wall of silence, and that condition—a differend—arises from the doubly insufficient grounds of their speech: the justice system violating them is the same legal system tasked with restoring them and the political system responsible for hearing them is the same regime silencing them (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

The differend relegating the lives of Sandra Bland and Eric Garner, for example,[4] to the communicative overload between *#Blacklivesmatter* and *#Alllivesmatter* is thus neither deliberate policy, nor censorship, but an effect of communicative abundance. Likewise, the relegation of speech by survivors of rape and domestic violence to what platforms such as 4Chan, Reddit, and Tumblr derisively call Social Justice Warrior (SJW) speech, is a media effect.[5] It results from the power of abundant communication to discredit. Since the vast majority of all possible speech is anticipated in the generalized economy of communicative abundance, and if it is not directly anticipated, its argumentative validity rests on grounds that are already discredited, this situation gives the opponents of any speaker ample platforms and time to retaliate, for example, by declaring a rape survivor or advocate a mere SJW. Moreover, in the context of informational overload, conditions such as infostress also serve to make all messages equally (in)credible. Finally, this situation also results in each message becoming an event in itself (DeLillo, 2006, pp.195-196). A tweet is enough for a news cycle, and anybody can be a celebrity, merely for being well known. For the survivor, the victim, the claimant, the speaker, all of these conditions constitute differends, doing irreparable harm to these individuals' social standing, quality of life and identity (Chivers-Wilson, 2006). Such differends and their numerous offshoots and variations, pervade contemporary speech. Their abundance is the regulative principle of contemporary discursive scarcity.

Notes

1.It is noteworthy, as N. Katherine Hayles (1999) has pointed out, that there were actually two formative definitions of information proposed at the Macy conference in 1957, and one of them (Donald MacKay's definition) is content-based, rather than predicated upon surprise value. However, Shannon's mathematically computable definition has prevailed in the relevant discussions, and is assumed here, too.

2.This leaves open the question whether the Weimar Republic and its saturation with the *Volksempfänger* airwaves, cinema imagery, and *Extrablätter* coverage was similar to contemporary conditions of 24/7/365 TV coverage, Flashmobs, Flamewars, and Fappenings, and targeted advertising, for the World War distinction to be meaningful in the context of this discussion.

3.That is, if it is not censored outright, as Apple did in 2015 when the company rejected the integration of two apps, named Metadata+ and Ephemeral+ into its store, both of which show details on the targets and victims of U.S. drone strikes (Dredge, 2015).

4.Sandra Bland, 28, was an African-American administrative assistant who died in a jail cell in Waller County, Texas, in July 2015. Though officially ruled a suicide, the circumstances of Bland's arrest and detention have raised public suspicion concerning whether her death was a suicide. This suspicion arose particularly because her death seemed to be part of an ongoing series of racially motivated incidents of police overreach and violence. Almost exactly a year earlier, Eric Garner, 44, an African-American former horticulturist, had died in a chokehold while being searched by New York City police. His death highlighted issues of racist police brutality and is often seen, along with the deaths of Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown, as a seminal event sparking the Black Lives Matter movement and its Internet offshoot, #Blacklivesmatter.

5.Social Justice Warrior: "A pejorative term for an individual who repeatedly and vehemently engages in arguments on social justice on the Internet, often in a shallow or not well-thought-out way, for the purpose of raising their own personal reputation." Retrieved March 27, 2016 from http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=SJW.

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22

Reflections on Social Norms, Women and Public Space

Natalie Patterson

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I am most conscious of my place as a woman in the built environment when I am running alone. I have become intensely aware, for example, on the Roanoke (Virginia) River Greenway of which bushes individuals are employing for housing and of the shady, secluded spots that could hide an attacker. My parents consistently recommend that I carry a weapon for protection when I run—a gun, or pepper spray or a Taser. While women in the last half-century have become much more mobile and visible as members of the workforce, there are still significant safety and cultural barriers that prevent them from freely and fully utilizing public spaces. Fear of street harassment, physical attack or social exclusion if a woman should use common areas without a male companion, or at certain times of the day or night, have significantly influenced and continue to shape the way women consider public spaces.

I examine this concern briefly in the essay that follows. I first link the challenge to social norms. Thereafter, I seek to contextualize it and suggest its implications for women's use of public spaces. Finally, I suggest what changes in belief and behavior will be necessary to change these conditions so that women may act with as much freedom in the built environments in which they live and work as men already do.

With the exodus of white, middle-class families from the cities to single-family detached dwellings in the suburbs following World War II, women became responsible for the upkeep of those houses and for caring for children while their spouses worked outside the home (Silbaugh, 2008). The physical design of houses reflected these norms by providing specific spaces in which women spent their time (for instance, designated areas for a laundry room). More generally, social norms prescribed that women should create a "nurturing and soft environment" in their homes, while their spouses were expected to work in the larger, more risk-filled, work-a-day professional environment beyond (Bondi, 1992). The dominant customs of

the period expected women to spend minimal time outside their homes, apart from ensuring that responsibilities for the care and management of that dwelling and their children were met.

This social expectation of separate spheres of activity and influence continues to characterize the behavior of some men, and therefore shapes, in turn, how women affected by that male conduct relate to public spaces. Parks, sidewalks and public transportation are areas where women must be alert, due to the constant potential for harassment there. Sexualized comments directed to women occur, "generally in the public world where people are strangers to one another" (Thompson, 1993, p. 315). Men engaged in such behaviors are often demonstrating "territorial harassment"—untoward comments ultimately predicated on a view that the public environment in question, whether a street, sidewalk, a subway or a park, is "distinctly male turf" in which, in this view, women do not have the right to act autonomously. In these cases, as these males understand gender roles, women traveling to work or otherwise active in public spaces are outside of their "appropriate" home-sphere, and their goal (conscious or not) is "effectively to drive women back into their private sphere, where they may avoid such violations" (Thompson, 1993, p. 323). The message of such catcalling is that women do not belong in public spaces unaccompanied by a man. While, in most instances, lewd and vapid remarks remain just that, as ugly and hateful as they may be, they do serve to signal a vague hostility and as a reminder of the constant potential of personal violence to those women so targeted.

"Given that males are more likely to be the architects and planners of our urban spaces than females, men influence the character of the built environment deeply. Because males are much less likely to be victims of a random sexual or physical assault in public spaces than women are, they may not prove as sensitive to that potential as one might hope, as demonstrated—in the case of the Roanoke River Greenway—by the presence of public bathrooms without doors and locks."
-Natalie Patterson

Men, as the "standard of normality," still disproportionately write the rules concerning how public spaces are developed and utilized (Bondi, 1992, p. 167). Given that males are more likely to be the architects and planners of our urban spaces than females, men influence the character of the built environment deeply. Because males are much less likely to be victims of a random sexual or physical assault in public spaces than women are, they may not prove as sensitive to that potential as one might hope, as demonstrated—in the case of the Roanoke River Greenway—by the presence of public bathrooms without doors and locks. This is to say that leisure activity for women "is deeply gendered, both in terms of the spaces and places that young women occupy and their behavior within such spaces"

(Green and Singleton, 2006, p. 2). In short, women's mobility and activities are persistently circumscribed by the social production of public space and its attendant risks (Green and Singleton, 2006). Being able to run, bike or go for a walk on trails or even sidewalks alone is restricted for women by such structural elements as "poorly lit spaces, boarded up houses, alleys, a tunnel to the supermarket, parks and bushes" as well as by time of day (Green and Singleton, 2006, p.7). This reality limits women's engagement with such public entities in ways that men need not, and often do not, consider (McDowell, 1983).

Whether these specific potentially threatening spaces actually produce physical or verbal attacks does little to allay the feelings of fear, anxiety and avoidance experienced by women who must nevertheless remain mindful of them (Green and Singleton, 2006). Indeed, prevailing social norms dictate that females *should* be fearful and cautious about using public spaces perceived as potentially dangerous or threatening. In fact, women who have been found to be in the "wrong place at the wrong time" have borne at least partial blame for the harassment or attacks they endured in some court decisions.

The recent case of former Stanford University undergraduate Brock Turner and his unnamed victim provide an example of this phenomenon. Turner capitalized on one of these questionable spaces (a poorly lit area near a dumpster) to rape an unconscious female resident, and the presiding judge in his trial has been sharply criticized for the leniency of the sentence he imposed. Moreover, Turner's father publicly insinuated that the victim had placed herself in a dangerous scenario and contended that women should be more careful in the future to avoid such spaces. These behaviors suggest that some people persist in judging women harshly for using public spaces and that social conventions concerning those norms continue in practice to restrict female freedom of movement and action and, thereby, their civil rights.

Personally, I have chosen not to carry a weapon when I run, but this is not to say that I am not conscious of the potential risks of physical or psychological abuse I bear when I use the Roanoke Greenway. Running, for me, as for many of the other female runners I know, is a therapeutic and self-esteem boosting activity. I do occasionally wear headphones to block out catcalls and similar harassment, but I do not pretend to be completely comfortable on the Greenway at dusk or in that path's bathroom at any hour, without someone standing watch outside. Nevertheless, I do routinely pursue an activity I enjoy in that public space.

Sadly, however, it is nonetheless true that many women have been completely deterred from utilizing the Greenway (and similar public spaces in Roanoke and elsewhere) in light of the potential personal risks to self or psyche or both that these locations may harbor. I do, however, remain

hopeful that increased public recognition of this discriminatory reality, more gender aware and sensitive design of public spaces and ultimately, a more complete change in social norms and expectations, will soon ensure that women enjoy the possibilities such locations represent safely, and without a second thought.

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23

Politics, Prediction and the Rise of Donald Trump

Amiel Bernal

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Many academics and pundits were surprised by the recent presidential victory of Donald Trump. The Americanists within political science provide unique resources for explaining and predicting the political landscape, yet few scholars of political behavior anticipated Trump's narrow win. For his part, one philosopher was so confident Trump's political ambitions were doomed that he endorsed the businessman in the primaries in an effort to foment factionalism within the GOP (Leiter, 2015). This disconnect between analysts' expectations and reality poses a problem. How can we, as scholars, explain the failed predictions of many of our peers? Any fully adequate account would consider a wide range of plausible rationales. This essay considers only a small subset of those. I first consider poor reasoning by engaged citizens and academics alike, then turn to features of political science that may have led in part to the recent erroneous election forecasts concerning Trump.

Psychologists and logicians have developed several explanations for the types of fallacious reasoning that citizens and analysts may commit. For example, these researchers have found that humans tend to be overly optimistic and to favor groups and information that confirm their biases (Nickerson, 1998). That is, like-minded individuals often form de facto echo chambers that reject countervailing evidence while affirming confirming information. These findings surely explain some of why so few academics and pundits correctly predicted the 2016 American presidential election results.

These psychological and logical mistakes were almost certainly in play during this election cycle, as they are in many other arenas. As such, they do not provide a unique answer to the question of why many predictions went awry for this election. Moreover, people who conduct polling are trained to avoid such tendencies. Baumeister and Bushman (2010), for example, found that deliberative processing of information reduces the rate of fallacious reasoning and cognitive bias. Nevertheless, such training did not prevent erroneous predictions in 2016. I turn instead to unique features of political science to explain the relatively poor electoral predictions of many academics in the recent presidential contest.

Political science and rationality

Marquis de Condorcet provided a boon to democracy in an essay in 1785, by showing that voting may be conducive to deciding on the best alternative. The Condorcet Jury Theorem holds that if each voter has a greater than 50 percent chance of choosing the better of two alternatives, adding more voters increases the probability of arriving at the best result (McCannon, 2015). For example, if each voter has a 0.6 chance of selecting the superior alternative, it takes only 300 voters for that result to become a statistical certainty (List and Goodin, 2001). This argument has long been understood as a vindication of democracy, insofar as it implies that an informed electorate is more likely than not to make good choices. Moreover, the sheer size of contemporary populations is, in this view, large enough to ensure the selection of the better choice in a voting decision. Similar work in game and rational choice theory has sought to predict policy outcomes and voter behavior. These approaches embrace an axiomatic commitment to the view that agents act in their best interests, whether as preference maximizers or satisficers (Simon, 1982). Accordingly, these analysts contend, one can predict outcomes and decisions based on models anticipating the choices of individuals within various scenarios. This is, for example, fundamentally what game theory does. It suggests political decisions become readily predictable when one assumes rational, informed agents acting in their self-interest with transparent and transitive preferences. Unfortunately, these models often fail to predict electoral decisions. Further, this scholarship dismisses as irrational or leaves unexplored whole areas of voting behavior. For example, this view cannot explain, and so dismisses as irrational choice-making, the fact that poor voters often vote for individuals who campaign on promises to reduce the welfare programs on which they depend.

> "Political scientists must place more emphasis on the affective dimensions of voter behavior and policy choice to describe and predict political phenomena. A sense of pride, and shared purpose within a community seem to be just as viable predictors of voter decisions as self-interested economic behavior."
> -Amiel Bernal

Conventional accounts of rationality, in terms of promoting one's interest or adopting the most efficient means to an end fail to account for these types of political behavior. Part of why some analysts were surprised by the results of the November election arose from their dependence on these approaches. Of course, turnout and problems with ensuring trustworthy responses to pollsters also explain part of the miscalculation, but my proposal, sketched below, can account for these considerations. I next briefly provide a sense of

the direction that political studies must move, in my view, if it is to develop and sustain a capacity to explain and predict voting choices with routine accuracy.

Affective politics

First, political scientists must place more emphasis on the affective dimensions of voter behavior and policy choice to describe and predict political phenomena. A sense of pride, and shared purpose within a community seem to be just as viable predictors of voter decisions as self-interested economic behavior, for example. This insight allows observers to assess puzzles such as the approval rating of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, which consistently is above 80 percent in his nation despite a tanking economy and rapidly devaluing Ruble, not to mention the seizure of Crimea and growing tensions with Europe (Heintz, 2016). Part of the reason for Putin's popular standing is the fact that state-controlled media disseminates a pro-Putin message. Silencing journalists via jailing and assassination has also become frighteningly common during the current Russian President's rule. Despite these realities, a sense of pride in their nation and leader as powerful and influential seems to compensate for at least a share of the losses in wealth and savings that many Russians have suffered during his tenure. While good data on this question is not available, my hypothesis is that this variable (i.e., Putin as a symbol of national pride) at least partially explains the Russian electorate's tolerance of continued economic decline under his leadership. Similarly, a sense of pride in being an American and valorization of the *demos* against contrived "others" are not accounted for by rational choice theory models. Americans have the information available to them that shows that ISIS is not a major direct threat to them. But, as with their Russian counterparts, many US citizens did not act on that information in the recent election, even though they possessed it, adopting a fear-filled stance instead. In light of these facts, I posit the following: analysts should acknowledge that popular consent may also be rooted in non-rational factors, such as a sense of pride.

Conclusions

Rational choice and informed voting models are excellent heuristics. They may provide a helpful basis for describing how an electorate *ought* to behave. Further, we can systematically study deviations from such posited "rational" behavior, given accurate assumptions about the specific ends voters view as worthy of pursuit. But overall, interested analysts must engage with the reality that the passions, more than reason, dictate the conduct of most people most of the time. With that acknowledgment as their starting place,

those interested in describing voter behavior more accurately will be in a better position to do so. While this essay does not prove that there is a need for a methodological shift in political voter behavior models or that political scientists culpably failed (there is little, for example, they can do about dishonest poll responders, after all), I hope it directs more attention to the affective dimension of politics as analysts develop new approaches to describe and predict citizen voting behavior.

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PART IV

GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Grassroots activism has become an important social element in many democratic societies around the world. Grassroots groups have laid the groundwork for social change by building power among those most affected by inadequate and unequal policies and by providing new sites for public deliberation on a great variety of issues. Social movements focused on expanding opportunities and public participation to help populations envision the possibilities for greater social justice (Oakes, Rogers, Blasi and Lipton, 2006). Not all social movements speak directly to major national or international issues; some are primarily local in the scope and target of their actions and typically go unnoticed beyond such contexts because they operate beneath the metaphoric radar of national and international media (Snow, Soule and Kriesi, 2004).

However, not all grassroots groups, organizations, coalitions, and interest groups, in themselves, constitute social movements. Social movements scholars have offered several definitions of the phenomenon, but key requisites include: "collectivity," "organization" and "continuity" (Snow, Soule and Kriesi, 2004, p. 11.); "conflictual relations," "informal networks" and "collective identity" (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.20). Snow and his colleagues have argued that social movements can be thought of as,

> collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part (2004, p. 11).

The eight essays in this section provide insights into the relationship between grassroots activism, social movements and social change. They discuss alternative forms of participation concerning such issues as environmental sustainability and climate change, human rights and social justice, food security, youth engagement and democratic governance. In the first essay, Halvorson-Fried reflects on the role of grassroots citizen

engagement for effective implementation of anti-discrimination legislation to address the "collateral social consequences" that often afflict ex-felons as they seek to reintegrate into society. Landis's essay argues that faith communities possess untapped capital that could permit them to move beyond emergency food provision and toward more community food security-oriented programs, and that such a step would accord with their values and beliefs. Laney critically examines the actions required to nourish the bonds needed for youth engagement in social justice work aimed at the places they live. Hanks examines trends and challenges that the nonprofit sector faces in the United States and offers several key questions that may help sector leaders move beyond rhetoric to hope-filled actions that can realize marked social change.

Guerra explores the concept of "green economy" and outlines several mechanisms that have been or could be used to promote and advance environmental and economic sustainability. Raonka argues that the specific ways social movements now practice democracy in India may be laying the foundation for more radical governance possibilities in the future. Drawing on personal experiences and reflexive exploitation of spaces for resistance, Laney explores the power of individual and collective voice in encouraging social change. She offers several examples of the too often untapped potential of sound and voice. Finally, Kolandaivel discusses the implications of climate change and explains the contributions of natural and anthropogenic sources to rising CO2 levels in our atmosphere, while also calling on government and corporate officials to educate the general public about the crucial and currently observable changes in climate around the world.

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24

The "Ban the Box" Movement: What it Says about Local Power

Sarah Halvorson-Fried

(Originally published on February 5, 2015)

The implications of arrest, conviction, and incarceration go beyond overcrowded prisons and negative psychological effects. Such "collateral consequences" include voter disenfranchisement for people with felony convictions, registration requirements for those found guilty of sex offenses and employment discrimination through disclosure requirements and background checks. These penalties can stymie rehabilitation efforts by restricting an individual's ability to re-integrate into society. National data showing African Americans and Latinos disproportionately convicted and imprisoned at a rate that does not correspond to their actual crimes committed (Blessett and Pryor, 2013) suggests that these penalties affect communities of color most. Thus, biases in criminal justice result in further discrimination that restricts long-term well-being.

In particular, gaining employment after release from prison is important for many reasons. Employment provides a daily structure to combat depression and the income needed to avoid further criminal activity (Bohmert and Duwe, 2012). This reality has prompted some scholars to advocate for the inclusion of ex-offender status in firm-level diversity management programs (Blessett and Pryor, 2013). Some rehabilitation-focused organizations have even found the employment of ex-offenders beneficial in relating to other ex-offender clients (Tomlinson and Schwabenland, 2010). Yet those who have completed their sentences are regularly thrown out of applicant pools because they are perceived as possible threats. Due to liability standards, hiring firms fear they might be held responsible for possible future offenses by such individuals should they victimize clients or co-workers while in their employ (Henry, 2008). The "Ban the Box" movement in local and state governments provides one solution to this form of employment discrimination by physically removing the "box" that job seekers must check on application forms to indicate past criminal convictions. Advocates for this solution argue that eliminating the requirement prevents employment discrimination as well as ex-offender discouragement as they seek reentry into society (Henry & Jacobs, 2007). Several reports have surveyed this movement occurring throughout the

United States. The National Employment Law Project found recently, for example, that 13 states and 97 localities have eliminated the reporting requirement since 1998 (National Employment Law Project, 2015). This trend appears to be gathering force, illustrated by the fact that the eight most recent state bans passed in 2013 and 2014.

"Besides creating the potential for lasting positive change for individuals formerly involved with the criminal justice system and thereby contributing to the health of communities and society at large, the "Ban the Box" anti-discrimination movement also highlights the power of grassroots efforts."
-Sarah Halvorson-Fried

One of the most contentious elements of these efforts relates to their application to private as well as public employers. A large percentage of the "Ban the Box" ordinances regulate businesses in some form, a stipulation that complicates the issue for many. Since many firms reacted negatively to previous anti-discrimination legislation compliance requirements, such as affirmative action, one could predict a similar response in this case (Sabharwal, 2014). However, those views did not prevent affirmative action from yielding positive effects. Most federal, and some state, contracting companies are required to implement affirmative action plans, which have been found to be effective in reducing employment disparities across race and gender in organizations (Kalev et al., 2006). Thus, despite negative views of these policies among some groups, they nonetheless appear to be effective instruments in accomplishing their goals.

I suspect that the history of anti-discrimination compliance regulations has normalized these practices. As a result, my sense is that despite initial negative reaction by some, ultimately, provisions that require ex-offenders to reveal that status in job applications following their incarceration will be eliminated. Martin Luther King Jr. famously stated that although he knew hearts could not be legislated, the law could still correct some injustices (King, 1968). Affirmative action and "Ban the Box" policies have the potential to do precisely that by eliminating key discriminatory barriers for the populations they address. By legally requiring a new practice, "Ban the Box" can change minds as well as erode discriminatory practices in the long run.

Besides creating the potential for lasting positive change for individuals formerly involved with the criminal justice system and thereby contributing to the health of communities and society at large, the "Ban the Box" anti-discrimination movement also highlights the power of grassroots efforts. Several scholars have suggested the potential of this form of local legislation to serve as an example for more sweeping regulation (Henry, 2008). The fact that 13 states have recently enacted such laws, many after the successes of local policies within their jurisdictions, supports this view.

One reason for this may be the relative logistical ease of passing laws at the local government level, yet I also wonder if so many cities would have implemented "Ban the Box" legislation without citizen pressure. Bennett and Giloth's comparative case studies of five cities' "equity policies" suggested that "even the best of cities can only go so far in adapting and promoting equity ideas without a grassroots, multiracial, multiclass coalition for change" (2008, p. 221). Such coalitions across the nation, along with advocacy from organized groups such as All of Us or None and the National Employment Law Project, may have led to this anti-discrimination movement's success to date.

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Faith Communities and Food Security: A Match Made in Heaven?

Rebecca Landis

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Food insecurity in one of the world's richest and most productive nations is a reality and constitutes a social injustice that many Americans are working to eradicate. Those seeking to assist come from all sectors, with their efforts taking many different forms and occurring in communities throughout the country. In brief, according to Guptill, Copelton and Lucal (2013), there are three categories of food security/anti- hunger programs in the United States. Entitlements, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance and Women Infants and Children programs; emergency efforts, including food banks, soup kitchens and food pantries; and empowerment efforts, those that involve the food insecure in the sustainable food system change they require. Each of these merits brief consideration.

Despite the positive and altruistic intentions of much food security work, some researchers and practitioners have suggested that many such practices are not providing a sufficiently radical or sustainable approach to food system change (Allen, 1999; Poppendieck, 1998). One approach, for example, that at first glance appears to be operating effectively, is emergency food provision. When viewed longitudinally it is clear that many food aid institutions began during a recession or a particularly difficult economic time, and were not designed to exist forever (Poppendieck, 1998). Nonetheless, the emergency food system has grown enormously since its inception in the early 1900s (Allen, 1999) and several analysts have argued that dependence on such assistance works against household and community self-reliance, as well as the development of sustainable systemic solutions to food insecurity (Allen, 2004; Pothukuchi, 2007). Faith communities have been a part of this now institutionalized emergency food aid structure since its beginnings, and the federal government has often encouraged their efforts, as demonstrated by the George W. Bush administration's creation of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, as well as his elimination of some federal barriers to civil society organization action to address hunger (The White House, n.d.).

Food security advocates promote a comprehensive approach to food insecurity that creates, "a situation in which all community residents obtain a safe, culturally acceptable, nutritionally adequate diet through a sustainable food system that maximizes community self-reliance and social justice" (Hamm and Bellows, 2003, p. 37). This definition outlines the concept of community food security, a frame gaining salience among those seeking more systemic change. This essay argues that faith communities possess untapped capital that could permit them to move beyond emergency food provision and toward more community food security-oriented programs, and that such a step would accord with their values and beliefs.

"Given the challenges the nation now confronts in making effective, equitable and sustainable food systems a reality, faith communities represent an enormous reservoir of capacity to contribute to community food security in the United States."
-Rebecca Landis

Faith-based social programs can serve a sacramental function for those who view such efforts as a ministry and symbolic response to a divine command (Harden, 2006). In the United States, hunger relief efforts are generally perceived to be the province of Christian denominations, but providing such support is integral to numerous faith traditions. Judaism, for example, enjoins its faithful to heal the world through righteous acts of charity and justice (Bielefeld and Cleveland, 2013). Meanwhile, the Quran encourages Muslims to serve humanitarian values of justice, fairness, responsibility and accountability (Yaghi, 2009). Mohandas Gandhi, a Hindu leader, embraced humanitarian work as an example of his faith tradition as well. In addition to its connection to faith and service, food also plays roles in worship practices and celebrations for many religions; feasting, fasting and communion in the Christian church are examples (Mann and Lawrence, 1998).

Empowerment programs aim explicitly to address the conditions that result in hunger in the first instance. These initiatives typically embrace a community development approach and seek to assist those who are food insecure by helping them obtain health care, job training and/or work experience that will aid their ability to ensure against future periods of hunger (Guptill, Copelton and Lucal, 2013). Empowerment program proponents do not dismiss the need for a functional emergency safety net, but contend that such assistance can become dangerous if too often viewed as the lone resource available (Guptill, Copelton and Lucal, 2013; Poppendieck, 1998). Rather, a combination of approaches could lead to greater community food security (Allen, 1999).

Given the challenges the nation now confronts in making effective, equitable and sustainable food systems a reality, faith communities represent an enormous reservoir of capacity to contribute to food security in the

United States. Aside from being present in almost every jurisdiction in the country, faith communities typically have a number of other assets including a building, green space, kitchen facilities, a volunteer-base, and common goals (Rosenberger et al., 2006; Schneider, 2012). Congregations can be developed and nurtured to create social capital that can contribute directly to encouraging greater community food security in the populations they serve. Many faith communities need support, however, in helping them determine how they might aid in this way. Proponents can point to many examples of church actions to assist the hungry. Some congregations host farmers markets in their parking lots, others support produce buying clubs for their members while still others provide space for community gardens on their sites or provide cooking lessons or transportation to grocery stores for those who require these services. There is a virtually endless list of ways faith communities can take part in efforts to reduce food insecurity that do not rely on charity, but doing so first requires that congregations understand that emergency programs, as necessary as they are, will not lead to the empowerment of those they serve. Indeed, a shared interfaith creed of justice necessitates a move away from continued support primarily of emergency programs and toward increased aid for empowerment-oriented initiatives.

In fact, a number of United States faith-based organizations are now engaged in strong efforts to educate the public concerning food issues and to identify ways by which the nation may build a more just food system. For example, the Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon offers a Food and Farms Program that aims to empower communities to build just and sustainable food systems (Furbush, 2008). This collaborative brings together congregations and civic groups to launch grassroots projects including produce buying clubs, food and wellness assessments, community gardens and policy and advocacy work. Come to the Table, located in North Carolina, works with congregations to devise strategies that turn their own and community assets into usable capital by convening annual conferences, which provide networking opportunities for church members, farmers, community development professionals and policy makers to share food system related challenges and to exchange ideas concerning how to address them (Hermann, Lin- Beers and Beach, n.d.). The Baltimore Food & Faith Project in Baltimore, Maryland and Shalom Farms, in Richmond Virginia, are examples of faith-based organizations now seeking to provide empowerment programs to alleviate long-term food insecurity in targeted populations while also ensuring that none go hungry in the near term.

The marriage of food and faith has long resulted in an outpouring of emergency support during periods of economic hardship and widespread hunger. However, these initiatives do not build food security among those they assist. Doubtless, faith communities will continue to offer temporary assistance programs to ensure that people are fed, but reducing or even

eliminating institutional emergency food and replacing it with programs that address the sources of the food insecurity of those served should be the ultimate goal of these congregations. People of faith are obliged by their beliefs to feed the hungry, but they also wish to take actions that result in improved opportunities for justice for those whom they assist. There is no single prescription for how the latter may be achieved, but I see vibrant, active churches and faith-based organizations offering food programming that builds equity, dignity, sustainability and community as a long- term response to the imperatives of their faith traditions and the needs of individuals in the communities they serve.

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Keeping our Hands on the Plow: A Personal Reflection on Organizing and Empowering Mountain Youth

Jordan Laney

(Originally published on September 10, 2015)

> Even a victorious strike will have its bitter side; even dazzling right choices will be followed by murky dilemmas with no clear solutions. The coal industry in particular and the American economy in general will still be in deep trouble. … But neither can it be denied that there are moments of transcendence that are capable of teaching us, of making us feel the possibilities that reside in us, in the people around us, and in the groups of which we are or can be a part (Sessions and Ansley, 1993, p. 217).

Deeply moved by the events of the "festival where a conference breaks out," "It's Good 2 Be Young In The Mountains" (IG2BYITM) held August 13-16 in Harlan, Kentucky, I use this essay to examine critically the actions required to nourish the bonds needed for people to engage jointly in social justice work aimed at the places they live.

Friday, August 14, 2015

It was easy enough to find the Harlan Civic Center, located at 201 S. Main Street in downtown Harlan, Kentucky. I followed the familiar uphill climb from my hometown where "main street meets the mountains" up through Asheville, surrounded by the blue outline of the mountains that make up the Eastern Continental Divide until the sun began to rise, somewhere near Johnson City, Tennessee.

I continued along the highway into Kentucky, through Pennington Gap where the curves become a bit sharper and kudzu climbs the steep hills on both sides of the road, to a gathering I had heard about through hashtags on social media and friends connected to the Appalachian Studies movement and its abiding commitment to social justice concerns.

Officially, "It's Good to be Young in the Mountains" was a four-day event (August 13-16), largely organized by and for people under the age of thirty living and working, or hoping to live and work, in the Appalachian mountain region. As the program's website noted:

> We want to come together to inspire each other and create unity in our region. We want to listen to each other, learn from each other and from those with more experience than us. We are daring to say that it can be good to be young in the mountains. We will make it so (IG2BYITM, 2015).

To say, "it's good to be young in the mountains" is a politically, socially, economically and culturally bold statement. It is not one made naively by this group, ignoring the hardships of rural or mountain communities, nor is it made flippantly, ignorant to degrading stereotypic portrayals of mountain people and culture. Rather, it is an assertion made earnestly, by those who are seeking to begin creating the world they envision, rather than waiting for it to be birthed by others through policy, programming or other measures.

"In order to sing together and move forward—to carry the momentum of the weekend into our individual lives—the political power and connected histories of marginalized groups must be brought forward into our consciousness and made a practice."
-Jordan Laney

We convened after lunch to participate in a "getting to know your pack" activity before breaking into workshops. The "gathering" activities focused on helping participants recognize their individual and collective potential. This idea is nothing new to those working in the field, but the deliberate care to include such efforts was radically different from scholarly conferences in which I have recently participated. Ron Eller has suggested that in order to nourish our collective spirit those engaged in Appalachian studies must

> … [m]ove beyond a defensive reaction against the things which threaten us and assume a positive initiative to create a new cultural context for democratic change. Such an initiative requires that we relearn old skills and acquire new perspectives: how to talk to each other, how to share with each other, how to recover collective memories, how to discern common values out of diverse traditions, and how to connect personal troubles with social issues (1986, p. 150).

These large discussion groups where everyone attending literally drew images of their strengths, their "packs," and were given the opportunity to send postcards from the event, consciously sought to engender a shared perspective and collective memory. These, of course, are a sine qua non of future common action.

Friday evening, following the first full day of the gathering, featured two performances, "Higher Ground 5: Find a Way Remix" and "West End Poetry Opera" by Roots and Wings, a poetry group from Louisville, Kentucky. The Higher Ground "remix" performed for IG2BYITM was a reworked and shortened version of a play, which is currently in its fifth installment. The original plays have been:

> … [w]ritten and performed by and for the Harlan community and [are] a component of the Appalachian Program at Southeast Kentucky Community and Technical College (SKCTC). … The series launched 10 years ago with an original production exploring the epidemic of drug abuse in the mountains. Each installment of the series is created after students and volunteers have collected hundreds of oral history stories, which are the creative inspirations for the plays' many scenes depicting community members of all ages and walks of life. *Higher Ground 5* features more than 50 local performers, writers, musicians, and backstage crew who range from children to students to families to senior citizens (Chaney, 2015).

The play's central themes of local (giving/sharing) economies, layoffs, pawn shops and an overall feeling of waiting resonated with my understanding of "making do" in my hometown. "Higher Ground 5: Remix" also treated the challenge of addiction (specifically prescription pain medication) in Appalachia, LGBTQIA issues and gendered roles regarding "work." One performer in the play used the phrase "trash in 1955 is paying my light bill today" referring to the hauling and selling of "scrap (metal)" to pay the bills. These scenes have lingered in my mind's eye and underscored an overall theme for me of the play; the need to speak truth to power and the notion that in order to move forward, those who live in the region must work together.

Roots and Wings performed their "West End Poetry Opera," an ode to the West End neighborhood in Louisville, Kentucky and its legacy within the African-American community. The performance also addressed racial violence—police brutality and the hypersexualization, objectification and subjectification of black female bodies— and the political brutality of the consequences of gentrification for that community and other small tight-knit neighborhoods similar to it.

Intergenerational relationships and political violence against marginalized communities were key themes of both of the performances treated here. The independent scholar Henry Giroux echoed these arguments in a recent commentary:

> Current protests among young people in the United States, Canada and elsewhere in the world make clear that demonstrations are not—indeed, cannot be—only a short-term project for reform. Young people need to

> enlist all generations to develop a truly global political movement that is accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces, the progressive use of digital technologies, the development of new public spheres, the production of new modes of education and the safeguarding of places where democratic expression, new civic values, democratic public spheres, new modes of identification and collective hope can be nurtured and developed. A formative culture must be put in place pedagogically and institutionally in a variety of spheres extending from churches and public and higher education to all those cultural apparatuses engaged in the production of collective knowledge, desire, identities and democratic values (2015, n.d.).

Saturday, August 15, 2015

On Saturday, I led an afternoon workshop that considered the "Pros and Cons of College." My small group proved to be socio-culturally diverse. One participant was a fourth-generation doctoral student at the University of Kentucky, another found "home" in the mountains following an upbringing in Louisville. Three undergraduates came with questions about graduate school and another was a homesteader, yoga instructor and midwife who obtained multiple degrees before returning to "stay" in the region. I contributed a description of my experiences as a first-generation college student now navigating a doctoral program at a major research university. As a discussion "facilitator," I sought to serve as an "opener" or a capacity creator, to help to make space for questions and sharing. The group's discussion revealed a diversity of experiences and raised larger questions about the sacrifices that those who want to remain or return to the mountains must make and what "education" means within that larger context.

Saturday evening's entertainment featured a mix of regional artists, including Sam Gleaves (joined by Tyler Hughes and Ethan Hamblin), who offered stirring three-part harmonies and typically traditional old-time instrumentation. Kevin (Howard) and John (Haywood), a duo from East Kentucky, performed songs from the repertoire of George Gibson, a historian and banjo player credited with preserving and reviving otherwise largely forgotten Knott County picking styles and connections to the music indigenous to the area. Angaleena Presley of country music trio Pistol Annies fame headlined the evening, which closed with Justin Taylor and the Kudzu Killers. The party continued at a local restaurant with Brett Ratliff's side project, the Giant Rooster Side Show, a honky-tonk-rockabilly-esque group taking the stage and rousing the crowd with a Harlan and mining focused set. While thoroughly enjoyable on its own terms, the IGTBYITM gathering self-consciously sought to use culture and the arts as a democratic space and discursive forum, offering acts that represented the many ways in which the

arts can serve as political platforms, spaces for preservation and conservation, sites of remembering and perhaps most importantly, a place to heal in unison.

Departing and reflecting

IG2BYITM ended on Sunday, after an intense power mapping exercise and an open mic session that allowed anyone with the courage to do so to voice their opinions on the gathering and what to do next. This portion of the conference yielded two notable insights for me. First, it brought to light and acknowledged the fact that the IG2BYITM participants were not racially representative of the region. While the group present at the gathering reflected diverse political views and economic and socio-cultural backgrounds, attendees were predominantly white. Second, participant comments shared during this portion of the conference revealed that a desire and fire for change is not dead in the region. Or, in the words of the young poet who first voiced this sentiment, "now I want to write a poem about how the fire is not dead here." She offered this remark after first sharing a previously written poem concerning the loneliness and desperate hardship of living in her hometown.

The fire highlighted and felt by the group has always been here, in Appalachia, just perhaps hidden or forgotten in some spheres. As Laura Briggs has written, "[W]e are impoverished by the loss of this memory of the political power of artists and intellectuals in solidarity with disenfranchised people. We have become embarrassed to sing 'Solidarity Forever'" (2008, p. 84). In order to sing together and move forward—to carry the momentum of the weekend into our individual lives—the political power and connected histories of marginalized groups must be brought forward into our consciousness and made a practice. The pride generated through a moment such as IG2BYITM is a beginning in the process of reclaiming the memory of our not-so-distant memories of political power. Like another African-American Spiritual made popular during the Civil Rights movement and often remembered in spaces like IG2BYITM, we must "keep our hands on the plow" and move forward, even when the fire seems dim. We must also remain open to critiques, willing to evolve beyond institutional understandings of progress and abundance narratives and remain ever willing to rewrite the definitions of purpose and hope for ourselves.

Some years ago, Alan Banks, Dwight Billings and Karen Tice (1993) offered an interesting critique of internal organizing efforts, such as the Appalachian Studies Association, in an essay entitled, "Appalachian Studies, Resistance, and Postmodernism." They sought to join the power of feminist theory with Appalachian Studies and thereby uncover, "how to think about regional identities in new and less restrictive ways" (Banks, Billings and Tice,

1993, p. 31). These authors rejected existing metanarratives in favor of closely examining and celebrating the diversity of Appalachian communities. As I experienced a similar celebration of difference and rejection of essentialism during IG2BYITM, I found myself pondering how to regard the role of "outsiders" in a space largely inwardly driven, organized and focused. That is, I found myself wondering how "the mountains" can come to represent a good life for those who have not experienced life among them, but have instead only been exposed to derogatory rhetoric and simplistic images of these richly diverse communities? I believe in order to create the changes needed in the region its inherent wealth must first be widely perceived and respected beyond its borders. After the open mic and workshop experiences, coupled with my first few weeks back in the classroom, I was struck afresh by the need for critical regionalism and inclusion of as many population groups as possible in all efforts to consider the future of the area.

As the conference ended I found myself reflecting on the work of Peter Cannavó who has suggested that, "regional boundaries and institutions should themselves be temporary and ad hoc, perhaps based on coalitions organized around specific issues" able to mobilize and mimic the alternative structures they are seeking (2007, p. 243). I found myself asking what Cannavó's insight might mean for the (re)consideration of long-established boundaries, the process of reclaiming mountains as homes and life sources, rather than as sites of extraction and what voices might unknowingly be silenced in such processes unless those coalitions' efforts are undertaken with utmost sensitivity.

For those of us working in the region, these sorts of questions will not go away. Those wishing to reside in the mountains must join together to create the space to devise honest and productive responses to these concerns. For those with hope in the places we envision, IG2BYITM and the whispering of the phrase, "it IS good …" has already began to serve as a catalytic moment in the radical ongoing reclaiming and recreating of the Appalachian Mountains as a sustainable and healthy home for those who want to live here.

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Trends in the Nonprofit Sector: A Fresh Call for Change

Sarah Hanks

(Originally published on November 5, 2015)

The Independent Sector (IS) (2015), a national umbrella service organization for nonprofit entities, recently released *Threads: Insights from the charitable community*, a publication highlighting the opportunities and challenges identified by its stakeholders—nonprofit executives, board members, corporate and government leaders—during a series of conversations it hosted throughout the United States. First and foremost, this effort aimed to identify the critical issues facing the nonprofit sector, as well as "bright spots" of innovation, change and resilience that could provide insight into best practices and alternative ways of catalyzing community change in light of current social and economic conditions. The report offers a number of trends, challenges, solutions and perspectives, many of which are not new. They represent calls for change that have yet to be addressed effectively despite the sector's exceptional growth in recent decades and the continuing high demand for its organizations' services and programs.

A Historical Review

The nonprofit sector has experienced shifts—periods of growth and decline—that have mirrored changes in the global marketplace and social fabric of communities, including a period of unprecedented expansion beginning in the 1970s (Cornforth, 2014). This recent phase also marked a time of change in the sector's relationship with government entities. This growth continued into the 21st century with a reported 25 percent increase in the number of nonprofit organizations chartered in the United States between 2001 and 2011, bringing the total number of such institutions to 1,574,674 at the close of 2012 (Roeger and Blackwood, 2012). During this period of expansion, the growth rate of the sector surpassed that of business and government alike, and it contributed products and services in excess of $779 billion, or 5.4 percent of the nation's Gross Domestic Product, while employing more than 14 million people (approximately 11 percent of the American workforce) (Roeger and Blackwood, 2012).

The global financial crisis interrupted this trajectory, resulting in a simultaneous decrease in charitable donations (frequency and dollar value), an increase in citizen and community needs and substantial reductions in federal, state and local budgets, which reduced public support for nonprofit direct services provision (Bridgeland, McNaught, Reed and Dunkelman, 2009). Bridgeland et al. (2009) labeled this turn the "quiet crisis." It meant nonprofits had limited financial reserves to confront a steady increase in demand for their services. These conditions left many nonprofits ill-equipped to do more than react to swiftly changing conditions. Brothers and Sherman have painted a vivid picture of this period of large-scale change:

> Change is the one constant. … Has this ever been truer than during the present time, as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century? Technology, globalization, a devastating economic recession that most would agree has put tremendous strain on nonprofits in the United States—these are just a few of the seismic shifts that have increased the pace of change in our sector (2012, p. 2).

In 2013, more than 80 percent of nonprofits responding to a national survey confirmed this portrait by reporting an increase in demand for their services for the sixth straight year while 56 percent of responding organizations reported they were unable fully to meet the needs of their clients and communities (Nonprofit Finance Fund, 2014).

"As the sector began to experience greater demand for programs and services, questions of accountability and changes in regulatory reporting surfaced with donors and funders seeking confirmation of the impact of their contributions."
-Sarah Hanks

As the sector began to experience greater demand for programs and services, questions of accountability and changes in regulatory reporting surfaced with donors and funders seeking confirmation of the impact of their contributions. Simultaneously, reports of fraud and embezzlement in both the business and nonprofit sectors raised concerns regarding appropriate internal controls, resulting in calls for changes in management processes and board oversight practices. Indeed, funder, regulatory agency and watchdog organization questions regarding the adequacy of board governance efforts to ensure nonprofit organizations are accountable for their actions, remain effective in their delivery of programs and/or services and retain their independence continue to challenge the sector today (Cornforth, 2014). Additionally, nonprofit institution leaders face complex and ever-changing internal tensions that result from their dual responsibility to achieve mission-related goals while also remaining fiscally sound and well governed (Carroll and Stater, 2008).

Threads: Challenges facing the charitable sector

The results of IS's conversations are not surprising in light of the reach, character and complexity of the sector in the United States today. Nine themes or continuing imperatives emerged from the Independent Sector national dialogue with nonprofit organization leaders and stakeholders:

- Vision and Strategy
- Funding-Related Practices and Relationships
- Operations, Capacity, and Governance
- How Organizations Relate to Each Other
- Sector Workforce and Talent
- Diversity and Inclusion
- Engagement with Stakeholders
- Communication and Branding
- Cross-Sector Concerns (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 12).

These issues represent the key challenges facing the sector, according to *Threads* participants. Specifically, those involved offered the following list of challenges facing the sector based on their experience:

- Strained relationships between funders and nonprofits (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 14)
- Pitfalls in impact measurement (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 13)
- Lack of organizational capacity (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 15)
- Ineffective board governance (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 15)
- Behind the curve on technology (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 15)
- Lack of collaboration among sector organizations (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 16)
- Concerns for small nonprofits (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 16)
- Need to better support and develop leaders (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 17)
- Negative impact of low compensation (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 17)
- Transactional and reactive relationship with government (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 19).

This catalogue of challenges is not unique to today's sector leaders. In 2002, for example, Salamon published the following broadly defined issues facing the sector:

- The fiscal challenge: access to sustainable, diverse financial resources to meet program and service needs, especially government funding

- The competition challenge: increased competition from for-profit firms, creating a competitive disadvantage
- The effectiveness challenge: increased pressure to demonstrate effectiveness in an "accountability environment"
- The technology challenge: inability to obtain and maintain the latest technologies, especially for small organizations
- The human resource challenge: concerns regarding low wages, high-turnover rates, and leadership across the sector in recruiting new talent (2002, p. 2).

Participants in the *Threads* dialogue also offered possible ways of addressing the concerns they identified:

> 1. Develop new norms: organizations must define the cultures and skills needed to succeed today.
> 2. Create open dialogue: enhance opportunities for dialogue to transcend all stakeholders within the sector—between organizations, grant makers, community leaders, businesses, and government entities.
> 3. Right-size and co-design solutions: noting the complexity of the challenges facing communities and individuals, collaboration among nonprofit organizations, to include a long-term strategic plan, is needed.
> 4. Share insights and lessons: insights into successes, as well as failures is desired to enhance the sector's overall effectiveness.
> 5. Build systems to support the sector: pooling resources may provide opportunities to engage in activities and services that individual organizations may not be able to achieve alone.
> 6. Advocate for policy change: through better-educated boards, staff, donors, and communities, sector leaders desire a better understanding of how policy change is implemented and strategies to engage in this effort.
> 7. Communicate the value of the sector: by increasing awareness and improving the brand of the sector, businesses, government entities, and communities will better understand the impact of the work done by the sector (Independent Sector, 2015, p. 21).

These paths forward are surely empirically appropriate. They reflect the work of scholars and practitioners during the past two decades and they represent the insights of nonprofit leaders representing a vast sample of the sector. However, these recommendations beg a set of overarching questions: What steps are needed to catalyze effective, long-term change within the sector? How will the sector, collectively, move past the challenges these conversations highlighted? Is it possible for the sector to evolve and

transform, becoming something altogether different, in an effort to address these concerns more effectively? If so, can such occur on a collective, national, or multi-national scale, or should sector leaders strive for smaller-scale, local and regional alignment around specific alternatives? Put differently, the IS *Threads* effort, as helpful as it surely was, raises the issue of: When will our common steps toward sector-wide change match our shared effort to name problems and anticipate solutions?

Threads offered a comprehensive assessment of the state of the U.S. nonprofit sector today (Independent Sector, 2015). My aim here is not to provide a plan or remedy for all of the issues the IS initiative highlighted. Rather, I seek in a small way to inspire new questions that may help sector leaders move beyond rhetoric to hope-filled actions that can realize the scale of change now perceived by so many such individuals as necessary if nonprofits are to realize the promise their stakeholders are now demanding.

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Understanding the Green Economy

Vanessa Guerra

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The concept of sustainable development was first widely embraced by the international community in 1992 at the United Nations (UN) conference on the environment and development—the Rio Earth Summit. Sixteen years later, in 2008, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) launched a variety of green economy initiatives aimed at helping to realize the Rio vision (UNEP, 2011). Together, these steps have made the search for more efficient, equitable and sustainable approaches to development a central focus of urban and regional planning. This article describes what analysts mean when they employ the term the "green economy" and outlines some of the mechanisms that have been or could be used to promote and advance environmental and economic sustainability.

UNEP (2010) has argued that a green economy will result in improvements in human well-being and social equity by significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcity. Such an economy is based on a combination of reducing carbon emissions, enhancing the efficiency of resource use and promoting social inclusivity (UNEP, 2011). In other words, those pressing for a green economy seek to integrate social democratization with environmental sustainability to produce more efficient and equitable societies.

Green and Hay (2015) have suggested that the principal reason why current growth patterns have proven unsustainable is rooted in the fact that they are based on the assumption that infinite growth is possible in a finite system. That orientation has resulted in economic and social processes that have aggressively abused the environment while resulting in rising levels of social inequality. To shift this way of thinking, Egoca et al. (2015) have contended that a green development path should retain and restructure natural capital as a source of public benefits, especially for those living in precarious conditions whose livelihoods depend on those resources. In sum, truly to pursue a green economy represents a fundamental challenge to long-dominant ways of thinking and behavior relative to the environment.

Indeed, several scholars have suggested that if cities do not change their present approach to development and growth soon, by 2050, the world's population will confront an array of grave environmental and social

conditions (Gibbs and O'Nelly, 2015). According to Green and Hay, for example, some likely manifestations of that crisis, if allowed to develop unchecked will be:

- Severe water stress around the globe,
- A rise in international energy consumption of 80 percent, driven disproportionately by China and India,
- A 50 percent increase in greenhouse emissions, pushing the ambient temperature on earth from 3 degrees Centigrade to 6 degrees Centigrade higher by the end of the century and
- The emergence of air pollution as the top environmental cause of early death worldwide (2015).

"It is important to recognize that a shift in current development strategies to more sustainable practices is urgently needed to prevent further global warming and irreversible ecological degradation worldwide. One feasible way of doing so is to advocate and promote the implementation of green economies as a new approach to economic and social growth."
– Vanessa Guerra

As noted above, proponents of a green economy contend that the gravity of these emerging challenges demands new ways of thinking and behaving. The following section briefly synthesizes the existing literature regarding available mechanisms to advance toward a green economy worldwide. First, technological innovations are likely to increase energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, particularly by promoting and increasing use of renewable energy sources. According to Brown (2012), technology will play a significant role in assisting societies to transition from finite fossil fuels-that have remained the dominant source of energy for generations – to renewable energy sources, which are inexhaustible.

However, since demand for electricity, a key consumer of energy, has grown rapidly, cities are facing the challenge not only of implementing new technologies, but also of pressing for innovations in its generation to satisfy existing demand. Additionally, it is important to recognize that analyses of prior experience have suggested that technological fixes tend to be undemocratic and unsustainable, so it will be critical to ensure that clear accountability mechanisms and transparency accompanies such changes (UNEP, 2011).

UNEP (2010) has argued that clean energy technologies need to be developed and integrated into, among other areas, commuting alternatives, waste management and waste disposal methods, existing building modifications and future construction and manufacturing processes. That

UN entity has also suggested that transitioning to a green economy will demand substantial social change including acculturating populations to a shared conception of what it means to be global citizens. According to UNEP and many scholars, the present moment constitutes an opportunity to transform social structures and institutions including,

- Recognizing an emerging need to adjust GDP measures to account for pollution, resource depletion, declining ecosystems and the distributive consequences of natural capital loss (Mundaca, 2014).
- Analyzing current processes to identify who enjoys power in the status quo and who has authority and power to make needed changes (Baer, 2012).
- Recognizing and promoting the social narrative that development should not only be efficient, but must also be fair (Green and Hay, 2015).
- Implementing international fiscal and policy reforms concerning energy market infrastructure and use (UNEP, 2011).
- Promoting efficiencies in health and education priority setting processes (Brown, 2015).
- Accepting the challenge that in order to achieve a green economy, both rich and poor countries alike should adopt a fresh approach to development.

A final mechanism for change consists of investing in capital to protect and empower those sectors that constitute key engines of production including, agriculture, farming, fishing, water treatment and forest protection (UNEP, 2010).

However, although farming, for instance, often constitutes one of the main sources of employment for members of economically disadvantaged groups, population growth, current chemical-intensive planting practices and continuous demand for land contribute substantially to greenhouse gases emissions and to environmental degradation, including deforestation and loss of biodiversity. As UNEP (2011) has argued, the promotion of green agriculture through innovation, investment and policy reforms will not only help to ensure food security on a sustainable basis, but also aid in reducing the external costs of the current industrial farming regimen. The UN environmental agency (2011) has suggested that it is important to promote investment opportunities and policy changes that are broadly appealing internationally as well as replicable and scalable to secure a successful transition to a green global economy.

The tables below summarize three examples of the central areas in which change must occur to create the green economy sketched in this essay, and outline their potential implications for the environment and employment. In conclusion, it is important to recognize that a shift in current development

strategies to more sustainable practices is urgently needed to prevent further global warming and irreversible ecological degradation worldwide. One feasible way of doing so is to advocate and promote the implementation of green economies as a new approach to economic and social growth.

Mechanisms to Promote a Green Economy and their Impact: Example 1

Mechanisms	**Innovation in technology fixes in order to encourage energy efficiency in:** * Transportation models. * Waste management. * Existing buildings modifications and future constructions regulations. * Current manufacturing technics.
Impacts on Environment	Use of inexhaustible energy obtained by natural sources: reduction of greenhouse gasses emission. Negative Externalities: Based in prior practices, technological fixes tend to be implemented by unsustainable methods, which could damage the environment and biodiversity.
Impacts on Economy	Technical fixes can represent a significant investment when implementing them, however, once implemented, those can represent a significant reduction in costs of regular use and maintenance, i.e.: solar panel implementation. Budget limitations: Since investment is needed in order to implement technological fixes, the poorest nations will remain excluded unless global agreements are arranged.
Impacts on Employment	Room for innovation: Creation of innovative managerial positions in order to achieve the established goals. Creation of several technical positions in order to satisfy the employment demand and to guide all the technical procedures of the new implemented models.

Mechanisms to Promote a Green Economy and their Impact: Example 2

Mechanisms	Implementation of public policy and institutional reforms.
Impacts on Environment	Once measurements to account pollution, resources depletion and declining ecosystems are redesigned, it will be easier to reduce environmental impacts such as global warming and biodiversity loss.
Impacts on Economy	Empower the most vulnerable when creating opportunities to overcome inequality will contribute the global economic performance. Investment will be required when implementing fiscal and policy reforms, international collaboration trades, and market infrastructure. Once the distribution consequences of natural capital loss to the poor get recognized, equality will be promoted. Because the green economy is a floating signifier, it creates the possibility of miss-readings so it is vulnerable to be captured by the most powerful and economic fears.
Impacts on Employment	Several jobs positions will be re-structured in order to implement all the required reforms. Creation of new job positions in order to satisfy the demand of new institutional reforms.

Mechanisms to Promote a Green Economy and their Impact: Example 3

Mechanisms	**Investing in natural capital in order to protect and empower those sectors that constitute a key engine to production such as:** * Agriculture * Farming * Fishing * Water treatment * Forest protection
Impacts on Environment	Substantially reduce greenhouse gases emissions and environmental degradation by modifying current farming practices.
Impacts on Economy	Technical fixes can represent a significant investment when implementing them, however, once implemented, those can represent a significant reduction in costs of regular use and maintenance. i.e.: solar panels implementation. Budget limitations: Since investment is needed in order to implement technological fixes, the poorest nations will remain excluded unless global agreements are arranged. Reduce the cost of current industrial farming practices externalities and help to ensure food security on a sustainable basis.
Impacts on Employment	Empower and promote one of the main sources of employment to the most economically disadvantaged. Re-structuring jobs positions while implementing the required reforms. Room for innovation: Creation of innovative and managerial positions in order to achieve the established goals.

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Social Movements, Neoliberal Policy and Indian Democracy

Pallavi Raonka

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Dominant social narratives pressing for the relentless expansion of the neoliberal state through extension of state assistance through grants and other welfare measures have been widely criticized for both the way the programs are set up and for failing to reach those for whom they are intended. Many view such welfare measures as a necessary political offset to the continued rapid growth of corporate capital. India stands out as a unique case of state intervention and redistribution at a time when many governments around the world are vigorously curtailing social welfare expenditures.

During the past decade, the Indian national government has passed several laws, such as the Right to Education Act, National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, Food Security Act and the Right to Information Act, that ensure that individuals receiving state welfare services have rights concerning those benefits. I contend that this situation could only occur because the form that democracy takes in India allows marginalized people(s) to assert their rights. The people's movement that has resulted in these statutes has played a multifaceted role in efforts to initiate bottom-up development as well as in national policy-making. That movement's efforts, in turn, resulted in those policies becoming more sustainable as groups demanded their rights and services and rendered politics more accountable in the process.

At the same time, these new government programs have served as a lifeline for the poorest of the poor during a period of continuing decline in agricultural production and urban area population expansion, with cities experiencing difficulties in absorbing that influx. I argue that the specific ways social movements practice democracy in India may be laying the foundation for more radical governance possibilities in the future.

Scholarly consideration of neoliberalization has often been confined to its origins and manifestations in the North, namely Great Britain and the United States (U.S.). However, in 1991, India, under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Finance Minister, and later Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh,

began a slow process toward adopting such goals. The Indian economy has grown at a consistently high rate since, although there has been some slowing in recent years (IMF, 2015). India's economy expanded 7.3 percent year-on-year in the last three months of 2015, slowing from 7.7 percent growth in the previous quarter, but in line with market expectations (IMF, 2015). By comparison, global growth, currently estimated to have been 3.1 percent in 2015, is projected at 3.4 percent in 2016 and 3.6 percent in 2017. Trade as a percentage of GDP stood at 25 percent in 2011 in India and the country remains one of the most sought-after foreign direct investment (FDI) destinations (Roy, 2014). But even as India has opened its borders to free movement of goods and capital, it has simultaneously maintained social welfare programs at the top of its policy agenda, thus attempting to pursue an Adam Smith notion of the power of free trade to have a noticeable, but not sole impact, to ensure human well-being. India stands out in the neoliberal era as a uniquely large-scale case of continued state intervention at a time when governments around the world have been curtailing state expenditures in virtually all areas except defense (World Bank, 2015).

"India is a unique case in the neoliberal era because numerous social movements have pushed the state to temper the excesses of neoliberal claims by maintaining and extending welfare programs. The logic is sustained by the state's efforts to stem the ill-effects of primitive accumulation of capital with anti-poverty programs."
-Pallavi Raonka

Neoliberalism can be defined as both an ideology and a policy model; in both cases its adherents emphasize the value of free market competition (Harvey, 2005). Although interested scholars continue to debate the defining features of neoliberal thought and practice, the public philosophy is most commonly associated with the extension of laissez-faire economics into non-economic areas of society. In particular, neoliberalism is often characterized by its advocates' belief in sustained economic growth as the means to achieve human progress, its confidence in free markets as the most-efficient mechanism by which to allocate a variety of resources, its emphasis on minimal state intervention in economic and social affairs and its commitment to free trade and capital mobility (Harvey, 2005; Roy, 2014).

Neoliberal "rule of the market" involves cutting public expenditures for social services, massive deregulation of many sectors and privatization of previously publicly owned goods or services. In general, neoliberalism devalues the concepts of "the public good" and "community" in favor of replacing them with "individual responsibility." This ideology has been widely embraced despite the fact that neoliberal states have often been called upon to intervene on behalf of their richest and most powerful actors in order to maintain the power and influence of those groups.

Criticism of development as rights-based approach

With India's neoliberal turn during the past 25 years, a new dynamic logic has tied the operation of "political society" (comprising the peasantry, artisans and petty producers in the informal sector) with the hegemonic role of a "neoliberalized" bourgeoisie in "civil society." In other words, India is a unique case in the neoliberal era because numerous social movements have pushed the state to temper the excesses of neoliberal claims by maintaining and extending welfare programs. The logic is sustained by the state's efforts to stem the ill-effects of primitive accumulation of capital with anti-poverty programs. The question here is how this state of affairs came to be and how this politics works in the larger society.

Chatterjee has argued that the state's balancing act is a necessary political condition for the continued rapid growth of corporate capital in India (2008). The state, with its mechanisms of formal democracy in regular, largely accepted elections, is the space in which the political negotiation of demands for the distribution of resources, through fiscal and other means, are articulated and made manifest through programs aimed at providing the livelihood needs of the nation's population, including its large cadre of poor.

According to some analysts, electoral democracy makes it unacceptable for the government to leave marginalized groups without the means of labor and to fend for themselves, since this carries the risk of turning them into "dangerous classes" (Dreze, 2004). However, for Chatterjee, the emphasis on development as freedom gained through political and economic rights does nothing to challenge the underlying source of the unequal system, i.e. the State and its support of a neoliberal society (Chatterjee, 2008).

While I agree with these critiques in theory, the desperate realities of Indian poverty mean that rights-based development approaches play an important role in making India's grassroots democracy practices unique. India currently has a higher malnourishment death rate than the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, (Dreze and Sen, 2013) for example, and more then 40 percent of India is confronting active insurgency (Report, 2008). This reality underscores the vital importance of the 30 kilograms of food distributed monthly by the national government to families below the poverty line of Rs 350 (USD 5), as required by the Right to Food Act. The Right to Food (RTF) campaign, which secured this state action, is not merely a temporary pressure group that gained increased allocations to public food aid programs. Instead, it is an ongoing social movement with a much broader agenda, playing an important role in challenging the barriers that people face in gaining access to the public programs and resources for which they are eligible, creating new ways to press the state to expand them, and ultimately ensuring the government is accountable for ensuring entitlements.

In this way, hunger and malnutrition have become a political priority that did not end with enactment of the RTF Act, since the Act requires the State to monitor continuously whether resources are reaching their intended beneficiaries. From the perspective of the State, constantly mobilizing social movements such as the RTF campaign constitute continuing pressure in contrast to more temporary initiatives. What critics such as Chatterjee ignore is that these food programs not only provide basic sustenance, but also strengthen marginalized individuals and communities, especially different tribal and Dalit groups, which in turn has encouraged the maintenance of their respective political struggles. Eighty percent of the beneficiaries of the RTF Act are Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Dreze and Sen, 2013).

Bob Marley once said that a hungry man is an angry man. Hungry men (and women) can bring revolutions, but how are such actions possible? Movements and revolutions are a result of planned strategic activities that develop during long periods. How can the angry man fight with an empty stomach? Thus, critiques of rights-based approaches should focus not on the results of formal political processes, such as the Right to Food Act, for doing nothing to challenge the underlying system of neoliberalization, but instead on these as stepping stones to more fundamental changes to political and economic systems.[1]

Why ongoing public pressure is key

The permanence of campaigns such as the RTF highlight the unique quality of Indian informal democratic strategies, such as public hearings, awareness campaigns, street protests and civil disobedience, which serve as an ongoing check on bureaucrats, contractors, dealers and money-lenders who have mercilessly exploiting marginalized individuals for so long. This brings us back to the complementarity between local action and other higher scale processes, such as judicial activism and lobbying at the state level. In all these respects, there is an urgent need to bring the campaign to a higher plane, drawing on the whole spectrum of formal and informal democratic institutions. Thus, the response to the violation of one fundamental right, access to food, is mobilized to work for ancillary issues that in general challenge larger systemic forces of neoliberalization and state oppression.

What made the Right to Food campaign possible? Democracy as space of resistance for robust civil society

As far as formal democratic institutions are concerned, India is doing reasonably well from a historical and international perspective. As Dreze has illustrated, in comparison with the U.S., India fares much better in many

respects: India has a much higher voter turnout rate (the United States is near the bottom of the international scale in that respect), has institutionalized more extensive provisions for political representation of socially disadvantaged groups and is less vulnerable to the influence of "big money" in electoral politics (Dreze, 2004). There is also far greater pluralism in Indian than in U.S. politics in terms of ideological representation. Dozens of political parties, from the extreme left to the far right, are represented in India's lower house, in contrast to the U.S. two-party system (with virtually identical political programs). In short, by contemporary world standards, Indian formal democracy appears in a reasonably good light as far as its institutional foundations are concerned. Having said this, the ongoing challenge for Indian self-governance is how to continue to mobilize populations in the face of continuing challenges such as economic insecurity, lack of education, social discrimination and other forms of disempowerment. The informal democratic processes that thrive in India are key to alleviating these negatives, especially in terms of providing spaces for marginalized communities to exert pressure on governmental institutions.

Notes

1. On one hand, India has very strong rights-based national movements like the Right to Food campaign, while on the other hand, India has witnessed strong Dalit and Tribal Communities involved in the rights-based approach. Together, these have led to the development of skills and resources at the local community level to negotiate with the authorities. Further research needs to occur concerning the interplay between the two and how they share skills, resources and awareness/consciousness of rights and how these have played a pivotal role in not just making political structures more accountable and sustainable, but also in supporting other movements.

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What Machine Kills Fascists? A Critical Reflection on the Political Power of Sound in the Trump Era

Jordan Laney

(Originally published on February 16, 2017)

It is well known that the original writer of the song belted out by a David Bowie like-clad Lady Gaga, "This Land is your Land,"[1] during her Super Bowl 51 performance on February 5, 2017 was the radical American songwriter Woody Guthrie. An iconic photo has preserved him for history holding a guitar with the words "This Machine Kill$ Fascists" in capital letters taped on its body above the strings. Indeed, this image is so well known that the Gibson guitar company has obtained a handsome return by replicating Guthrie's 1945 *Southern Jumbo* model instrument complete with sticker[2] (consumers may use it or not at their option) for a price of $2,429. The idea that a guitar or a song is a machine with the power to elicit violence, peace or productivity, continues to be a radical notion some seven decades after Guthrie sat for the famous photograph.

Folksinger Woody Guthrie with his famous Gibson Guitar (Photo by Al Aumuller)[3]

While teaching the course *Southern Music: Music, Power, Place* at Virginia Tech (Spring semester, 2017) the class's students and I have discussed authenticity and another power of music; its capacity to create places. Conversations about music, specifically sound, as a national signifier have been difficult in our mediated age.

Consumable performances and performers are much more highly sought after in recent years than strictly aural experiences in our nation thanks to live feeds, snapchat, instant replay and our cultural attraction to the visual. For instance, without the colorful drones that accompanied her, a knowledge of Guthrie's politics and live tweeting commentary, many would have had a difficult time connecting *only* the sound of Lady Gaga's performance to politics. This represents one example in which politics and the power of the voice have been usurped or made stronger by the visual, leaving listeners to ignore or fail to acknowledge the very powerful independent effects of sound. Another, and much more easily deconstructed example is Beyonce's powerful Super Bowl 50 performance of "Formation" on February 7, 2016 from her critically acclaimed and extremely popular album, *Lemonade*. The musical accomplishment represented by the album is undeniable; however, it was the *visuals* of the star's performance at football's annual great event that many citizens read as political.

"What labor must we do to attune our ears to the power of voices, especially those of women and of vulnerable populations more generally, to ensure that their interests and concerns receive attention?"
-Jordan Laney

Beyonce in Performance: Super Bowl 50, February 7, 2016 (Credit on vibe.com website: Instagram).[4]

A more personal understanding of the potential political power of sound occurred for me on January 22, 2017 when I rose at 2:30 a.m. to travel with a number of women and men from Blacksburg, Virginia to the Women's March on Washington, DC. My trip was made possible through the generous donations of community members who wanted to be there, but could not participate and kindly made my attendance possible instead. To prepare,

those attending made posters and I also purchased a T-shirt on which I wrote the message "Together Forward, Not One Step Back." I also retrieved my red bandana from its storage place to wear in solidarity with the union miners and mountain top removal activists about whom I often teach. Those travelling together—myself included—did not, however, think about songs or chants we might use during the event. For me personally, this experience mirrored another that occurred just a few months earlier, when I stood in solidarity on the steps of Burruss Hall with students concerned about attacks on immigration, acts of hatred being unrecognized and the need for increased resources for minority students at Virginia Tech and other universities. The irony, as we embarked on our sojourn to the March was, as at the previous event at Virginia Tech, we were seeking to be heard and recognized, an inherently sonic aspiration, but we were not at all mindful of that fact. As we began our trip, we imagined that our messages would largely be shared visually.

These two events, in combination with listening, voting, teaching, protesting, watching and analyzing popular performances, have led me to return to projects that first intrigued me during my initial semester at Virginia Tech in 2013. I was interested at that time in the vocalization of the political; that is, the political as expressed in sound. This essay relies heavily on those early research projects.

Indeed, this *Reflection* explores the voice as a space of resistance in the modern political schema. The questions I originally asked linked to this concern were: How does one account for a shifting, changing or evolving voice? How can voice be expressed in a way to free individuals from imposed identity(ies) and socio-cultural oppression? How do we become aware of what we cannot hear? How can we train our ears to listen? Mbembe has suggested that, "[s]uch research must go beyond institutions, beyond formal positions of power, and beyond written rules, and examine how the implicit and explicit are interwoven" (2005, p.69). There is much deeper research to be conducted on each of these concerns as well as actions to be organized to address them. The scope of this effort is admittedly limited and I welcome further conversations.

Sound

I use the terms "sonic" or "sonic spaces" to describe an area occupied by sound, which includes, but is not limited to the voice. Allegiances are spoken, nations are called to prayer and individuals also learn to exercise their ability to defend themselves by *saying* the word "no." A multitude of studies have explored the intersections of politics and song and these have often received attention on nightly network news. Those reports have addressed, for example, Pussy Riot, T. Rex, Kendrick Lamar, Bono and U2, the Dixie

Chicks, Wagner and recent Nobel Prize recipient Bob Dylan. Songs provide the rhythm and cadences for political movements and eruptions. My interest here is the voice as a political agent, captured by Michel de Certeau's statement, "More reverential than identifying membership is marked only by what is called a voice, (voix: a voice, a vote) this vestige of speech, one vote per year" (1984, p.177).

Robert Jourdain has defined voice, as "… two or more simultaneous, interrelated lines of music. Nearly all music consists of multiple voices, including a bass line, treble line and parts between" (1997, p.343). For Jourdain and a number of other music scholars, voice is a means to a collective sound; music. For others, music is a means to engage in discussions, not of harmony and tonality, but instead of language and lexicons.

History of the voice as political

Music allows for communication beyond words and I propose that sound can catalyze changes beyond policy. This stance implies that the voice can serve as a micro and macro agent of change. Within my own area of study, the geographic and diasporic region of Appalachia, music is intrinsically connected to protest, and women, particularly, have often employed it as a tool of subversive activism. The *Encyclopedia of Appalachia* has described the links between music and the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s:

> The Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s is the subject of several protest songs associated with Appalachia. Guy Carawan, while working at the Highlander Folk School, then located in Monteagle, Tennessee, in the late 1940s and the 1950s, reworked the old African American sacred songs 'We Shall Overcome' and 'Keep Your Eyes on the Prize' for striking textile and tobacco workers. Carawan's version of 'We Shall Overcome' was adopted by Martin Luther King Jr. as the official theme song of the March on Washington, a central event in the 1960s phase of the Civil Rights movement. Carawan's achievement is indicative of the influential stature and unquestionable dignity of Appalachia's rich legacy of protest song (Encyclopedia of Appalachia, 2013b).

The gendered use of the voice in protest movements was also clear in the example of "Aunt" Molly Jackson, who performed "I Am a Union Woman," "Kentucky Miner's Wife" and "Dreadful Memories." According to the entry treating her life in the *Encyclopedia of Appalachia*, "in 1931 she met with a delegation sent by the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners and subsequently traveled to New York City," soon appearing before an audience of twenty-one thousand people "where she discussed living conditions in Eastern Kentucky and shared the songs noted above"

(Encyclopedia of Appalachia, 2013a). The power of the female voice in leading public protest was also evident in Sarah Gunning's "Down on the Picketline" (1932), Jean Ritchie's "The L&N Don't Stop Here Anymore" (1963) and "The Blue Diamond Mines" (1964), Malvina Reynolds' "Clara Sullivan's Letter" (1965), and Hazel Dickens' "Clay County Miner" (1970), "Black Lung" (1970), "The Yablonski Murder" (1970) and "Coal Mining Woman" (c. 1970).[5] These songs became anthems for securing better working conditions for the poverty-stricken workers of Appalachia (Encyclopedia of Appalachia, 2013b). This legacy of the voice in harmony, used to unify and to resist has been on my mind as I observe the current activist activities in the U.S. Jourdain has argued that the disruption of existing norms that these songs represented constituted, "violations of standard expectations [that] continue to be expressive" (1997, p.313). But I wonder about protests today—how are we violating social expectations of expressiveness? How can we subvert standards of oppression, violence, dehumanization, etc. while also working *outside* the often oppressive norms of the popular culture, but *within* the realm of translation? How can we hold to a hope in the power of the voice and yet address meaningfully the frequent systemic voids in the collective? That is, how can we listen and identify what is missing in existing public understandings and expectations and norms?

Shifting the focus from eye to ear

One must look no further than one's television or computer screen to notice the ways in which the feminine voice currently is subverting power. Between the 2017 Super Bowl half-time show by Lady Gaga and Beyonce's Oshun-inspired 2017 Grammy performance, issues of gender, class, race, systemic oppression, and the feminine have recently been highlighted on otherwise white, masculine, heteronormative, neoliberal stages. While Gaga appears tepid in comparison to Beyonce, and the powerful role of the feminine voice was evident, the privilege of the visual in both performances was striking. While the role of women in disrupting power through sound has continued into the Trump era, the means of message dissemination have changed. In a world which now communicates through screens, would those watching these events be able to hear the strains of activism present in these performances without the visual imagery with which each was presented?

Is it possible that our expressions are problematically visually centered? I believe so. Visuals can be misleading and easily manipulated. From crowd size to television programs, what one has seen and accepted previously is difficult to dismiss in our current era. Indeed, it may be that it is possible for sound to violate norms more easily than visuals can. That is, words may be more difficult to censor, manipulate and misinterpret. Sounds are less readily blocked out. Thinking of Foucault's gaze, what if the way out of that

theorist's posited panopticon cannot be seen? (Foucault, 1975). What if it can only be heard and manifest through voice or vocal vibrations? I next briefly provide a few examples of this too often untapped potential of sound and voice.

- *Sound supports*. Walking back from the Women's March to our buses, a man leaned out of an upper story window. He was nodding his head giving us a thumbs-up sign as we walked by. The memory is blurred, but I believe he was wearing a pink beaded necklace in solidarity. Soul-filled music poured out of his window; a female voice from an earlier era. Perhaps it was Nina Simone.
- *Sound disrupts*. As we walked back to the buses too, I stopped, and asked my friends, "Do you hear that?" Playing very clearly, hovering above the marchers returning to their homes, was country western singer Toby Keith's retaliation-driven anthem "Courtesy of The Red, White and Blue (The Angry American)." I did not hear the performances during the march, but rather was swept up in the drums, songs and chants around me. Keith's hyper-masculine voice echoing was not the disjuncture I expected, but it nonetheless reminded me of the power of sound. Ambulances. Whistles. Arguments between neighbors on the other side of a wall. These sounds also routinely disrupted us as we walked and marched and we often found ways to tune them out, but, our experience in Washington convinced me that even one's best efforts are almost always inadequate to that challenge.
- *Sound gathers*. At varying points during the March our large group was swept up, moving apart in a sea of pink hats and posters. One marcher held an American flag high in the air—I would search for it and know my group was not far. When the crowd grew too thick to spot the flag, our group began chanting "LET'S GO HOKIES" and found one another by doing so, much to the interest and annoyance of some of our fellow marchers.

One lesson I took away from my participation in the Women's March is that sound must be consciously wielded. A final anecdote illustrates this point. A few months ago, a group of students stood on the steps of Burruss Hall, as I recounted above, and chanted, "This is what democracy *looks* like." Cameras gathered in front of those students, who were seeking to be heard and recognized. That is, paradoxically, even in the powerful raising of voices together, the protester's chants privileged the visual, and sought *visual* recognition. The look of democracy was also emphasized—yet the chants were all the same. Is this what democracy sounds like? What does democracy *sound* like?

Conclusion

The ability of the feminine to render its needs via collective voice, and the capacity and willingness of a patriarchal system to listen to those claims, translate and hear them, are interwoven in problematic ways. At the March on Washington, participating women were seen through images distribute by friends and family on social media, creating a powerful mirroring of personal politics and judgments. However, and again paradoxically, the intersectional claims raised by those gathered were largely lost in the translation of stories and voices to images "liked," shared and replicated. I am not arguing that the March was not an igniting agent for a significant movement, but that our medium of sharing is immensely important, as often the media we choose (the visual), requires the literal and metaphorical removal of diverse and marginalized voices.

Even with its flaws, the Women's March offered those participating and observing alike, a space to "sing." Returning to Lady Gaga's decision to bring Woody Guthrie's song (if not his message), to one of the nation's biggest stages, I wonder, is it possible that the power of individual and collective voice is too often overlooked today by those organizing public protests of various sorts? What can we learn from previous generations, and how can we best apply their methods of protest in an age of hyper-mediated sharing? How do we find harmony amid our new chaotic understandings of time and space? And most importantly, what labor must we do to attune our ears to the power of voices, especially those of women and of vulnerable populations more generally, to ensure that their interests and concerns receive attention?

Notes

1.Please note I am only referring to her performance of "This Land is My Land," not the lyrics of her controversial song "Born This Way."

2.Retrieved from http://www.gibson.com/Products/Acoustic-Instruments/Round-Shoulder/ Gibson-Acoustic/Woody-Guthrie-SJ.aspx

3.Al Aumuller/*New York World-Telegram and the Sun* (uploaded by User: Urban)—This image is available from the United States Library of Congress's Prints and Photographs division under the digital ID cph.3c30859. Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=4945422

4.Retrieved from: http://www.vibe.com/2016/02/beyonce-boycott-formation-super-bowl/

5. This list of performers is not exhaustive but does reflect the massive body of relevant work women have produced.

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31

Is Climate Change Real? Climate Science and the Human Outlook

Kannikha Kolandaivelu

(Originally published on March 30, 2017)

The question of the immanence and character of climate change received attention in the recent Presidential election campaign in the United States. In particular, the candidates debated how to view the growing concern among scientists and many in the general public about rising levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere. CO2, a greenhouse gas, has both natural and anthropogenic sources. Some of its natural causes include respiration, decomposition, volcanic eruptions etc. Anthropogenic sources include deforestation, power generation, agricultural practices and burning fossil fuels, to name a few. Global CO2 levels have been maintained over time by a delicate process known as "The Carbon Cycle." This is a biogeochemical succession in which carbon, a common element on Earth, is exchanged and recycled through biological, geological, hydrologic

Global CO2 levels have been maintained over time by a delicate process known as "The Carbon Cycle." This is a biogeochemical succession in which carbon, a common element on Earth, is exchanged and recycled through biological, geological, hydrological and atmospheric processes. The carbon cycle occurs across millions of years, or longer. A very small input or output that strays from this fragile balance unleashes a domino effect that affects many other natural cycles and processes, which in turn influence life itself.

There is a misconception that anthropogenic sources are the lone cause of increasing CO2 levels. Natural sources have always been a primary factor raising CO2 levels throughout Earth's history. But, lately, the release of CO2 into the Earth's atmosphere by anthropogenic sources has been increasing carbon dioxide levels considerably. Fossil fuel burning emissions, electricity production using fossil fuels and cement production accounted for 91 percent of human source carbon dioxide emissions in 2014. Deforestation is the second largest human source of CO2 emissions (Van der Werf et al., 2009, p. 737). While these processes have been emitting increased amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, the land and ocean carbon sinks have seen a net decrease in the amount of that element they have been absorbing

in recent decades (Le Quéré et al., 2013, p. 177). The main land sink for carbon dioxide comprises forests and other plant life that take in the gas and release oxygen. With increasing deforestation and land use changes, the amount of oxygen release and carbon absorption is considerably lower now than it was in past decades (Van der Werf et al., 2009, p. 737).

"The approximately 7 billion people on Earth could make a substantial difference in ameliorating and ultimately reversing climate change if we all unite and take measures to preserve and conserve the bounty that we obtain from our Mother Earth."
-Kannikha Kolandaivelu

The ocean sink consists of phytoplanktons and zooplanktons that absorb CO2 from the upper ocean and then carry it down to the depths as they sink, thereby becoming incorporated into oceanic sediments. The carbon dioxide then interacts with chemicals in the sediments to form mineral assemblages that sequester carbon naturally for many years (Raven and Falkowski, 1999). Repeated studies have shown that a substantial increase in atmospheric CO2 emissions accompanied the Industrial Revolution (1760 AD onwards). Assuming a steady state in biological carbon processes, an additional 30 percent increase in carbon intake by oceanic sinks has occurred since the Industrial Revolution (Raven and Falkowski, 1999).

Methane, CH4, another important greenhouse gas, also plays a role in the rise in global average temperatures that is resulting in climate change. Natural sources of CH4 occur mainly in wetlands, which produce about 78 percent of the chemical. Such marshlands are highly temperature sensitive (Christensen et al., 2004). Fossil fuel burning and livestock farming are important human sources of methane (Bousquet et al., 2006). One of the earth's largest methane sinks is its permafrost, a thick layer of frozen soil that circles the globe's poles. Significant spikes in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere and resulting temperature increases are now causing the permafrost to melt, thereby emitting large amounts of CH4 back into the atmosphere (Christensen et al., 2004).

Increasing greenhouse gas concentrations could also eventually warm the oceans, leading to changes in currents that arise from the deep. This would change the microclimates of local regions that depend on those flows for their ways of life. When the deep ocean warms, this could also potentially release the carbon stored in its upper sediments.

Elevated carbon levels change ecosystems substantially, through direct and indirect effects. Certain plants have been able to adapt and increase their photosynthesis levels as CO2 levels have increased, while others have not been able to do so. Rising carbon dioxide concentrations influence plant flower gestation rates, flowering times, longevity and seed quality. Such conditions are also likely to reduce the number of plant pollinators or change

their characteristics (Bazzaz, 1990). Soaring temperatures might also lead to the extinction of certain crucial species of plants, thereby changing entire local ecosystems.

Local, state and national governments and international organizations must take responsibility to educate the general public about the crucial and currently observable changes in climate that are already occurring. Existing evidence, samples, records, publications and facts must be assembled and presented in easily communicable ways that intrigue and enlighten audiences at the same time. Governments of all nations must assign science research related to climate change high priority. The recent U.S. President's proposal to reduce the research budgets of agencies that focus on climate science and related issues is deeply concerning and disheartening. Should budget reductions of the magnitude proposed occur, such action could significantly set back the progress made so far to address climate change worldwide. And, unfortunately, President Donald Trump is not alone in his stance. Climate change doubters and skeptics claim to believe these misguided proposals represent a political "victory" in favor of "sound science."

The general populace must become aware of the global phenomenon that is climate change and fight to preserve our Mother Earth, not just for us, but also for future generations. As mentioned above, the Earth is able to thrive by balancing delicate interconnected natural cycles and processes. A small imbalance in one cycle can potentially lead to a large counter effect that cascades and changes life and comfort as we know it. The approximately 7 billion people on Earth could make a substantial difference in ameliorating and ultimately reversing climate change if we all unite and take measures to preserve and conserve the bounty that we obtain from our Mother Earth.

I conclude with a quotation from the movie "Interstellar:"

> We used to look up at the sky and wonder at our place in the stars; now we just look down and worry about our place in the dirt (Interstellar, 2014).

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PART V

SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND COMMUNITY AGENDAS IN DEVELOPMENT

The essays in this section explore the relationship between development, poverty and globalization. Together they highlight the fact that different dimensions of poverty and social exclusion—among them income, education, health, empowerment, etc.—result in various kinds of deprivations and represent obstacles to positive change at the global, regional, national and community levels (Goldin and Reinert, 2012).

Resilience serves as a common thread across this part's commentaries. In the face of adversity, resilience enables individuals and communities to bounce back, adapt and grow (Magis, 2010). Drawing on the vast literature on resilience, Magis (2010) has outlined several paths that foster that possibility in communities. First, learning to live with change and uncertainty, and actively building and engaging the capacity to thrive in that reality builds individual and collective resiliency. Development initiatives can be a powerful force not only to encourage such attitudes and beliefs in populations, but also to foster social and political processes that address power imbalances in policy making that may undermine communities' capacities to cope equitably and effectively with the vicissitudes of unrelenting change. Second, citizenries can build resilience via collective action and planning, innovation, learning and engaging diverse resources from all of their membership. Efforts to identify social strengths and connections to place, galvanized by agency, self-organizing and collaborative governance can help inform new research directions and practice (Berkes and Ross, 2013).

In the first essay of this part, White reflects on how anti-poverty programs might be designed if their architects started with the daily-life realities of those they seek to assist and developed initiatives accordingly. An's essay outlines the evolution of South Korea's greenbelt policy and briefly sketches its principal effects for key stakeholder groups over time, including the central government, local governments and Seoul and greenbelt residents. Erwin argues that to chart new paths for the future, citizens of small rural communities need to find ways to cooperate with other similar towns and cities struggling to be resilient in a globalized world. She contends residents

of these places should support their traditional cultures and natural landscapes, while remaining grounded in the realities of their present challenges and open to new ways of thinking and social and economic possibilities. Smirnova examines a 'crisis of crisis management' and argues that common strategies of building community resilience often result in the social exclusion and dislocation of poor communities while failing to address structural causes.

Next, Powell Doherty shares her experience during field research in Romania she conducted to assess water quality and sanitation needs of five geographically diverse, but predominantly Roma, communities in order to explore potential improvement options. Laney critically engages *Hillbilly Elegy*, a recent memoir by J.D. Vance, a former resident of mid-Appalachia, and highlights the continuing strength and diversity of the Appalachian region as its citizens confront the region's legacy of resistance and place-based oppression. Guerra discusses the impacts and significance of globalization for the daily lives of individuals throughout the world. She also briefly examines the challenges the phenomenon presents, in order to highlight ways that governance reforms may help public officials develop more sustainable forms of democratic political and economic development. Finally, Berrada discusses the social and economic marginalization of young people in the Middle East-North Africa region and critically considers initiatives to ensure effective youth social and economic inclusion in those nations.

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Pondering the Nexus of Poverty, Human Dignity and Development

Danny White

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Citizens and scholars alike often oversimplify poverty—a complex, multidimensional condition—and define it solely on the basis of material well-being. In doing so, we seem to suggest that poverty is a technical concern that may be addressed by means of a straightforward solution. In this view, governments or philanthropic donors possess the capacity to carry out well-designed programs aimed at assisting those in poverty that employ appropriate technology and result in reasonable measurable outcomes (Wallace et al., 2007). What is missing from this neat equation, however, is the social reality of the poor (Schaaf, 2013). I want here briefly to highlight the paramount importance of human dignity as an element of that too often ignored reality. Additionally, I offer a reminder that self-respect binds humanity together—rich and poor—and is, at some level, irreducible. In what follows, I consider how anti-poverty programs might be designed if their architects started with the daily-life realities of those they seek to assist and developed initiatives accordingly.

About 15 years ago, the World Bank published a well-researched report, *Voices of the Poor,* that thoughtfully argued that the definition of poverty among those experiencing it includes important psychological dimensions, including their awareness of and vulnerability to rudeness, voicelessness, powerlessness and humiliation (Narayan, 1999). This reality suggests that poverty alleviation is not a simple linear problem subject to a like solution. Indeed, these dimensions suggest that indigence is far more complex than our prevailing assumptions and models acknowledge.

The Guardian, a leading London newspaper, recently published an article by journalist Jonathan Glennie (2015), "The saddest thing in the world is not poverty; it's loss of dignity." The essay struck a chord with me for at least two reasons. First, Glennie's commentary served as a reminder that a majority of Americans have only seen pictures or video footage of the living conditions that characterize deep poverty. We have never experienced anything even approximating such situations. Images, it is said, are worth a thousand words, but as powerful as they may be, such depictions cannot adequately

capture the lives of those they address. The photograph that serves as the cover of Katherine Boo's (2012) gripping chronicle of life in a Mumbai slum, *Behind the Beautiful Forevers*, for example, while doubtless haunting, does not capture the nuanced relationships, discord, joy, hope and misery of the individuals her book so richly treats. Glennie's (2015) effort raised a second issue as well—the idea that dignity is more important than wealth. This contention particularly, challenges the common American obsession with consumption, a predilection that often makes it difficult for many in our nation to relate to others, especially the poor, as anything other than the "stuff," the material possessions, they represent or lack.

"Each time we fail to listen to those we would assist, or dismiss them as somehow 'less than' and 'different' from us or imagine that their complex lives can be reduced to linear logic models in which we enshrine efficiency as our cardinal value, we inflict humiliation and shame, and we corrode the dignity of those we would help."
-Danny White

Put somewhat differently, how is it that poverty, defined materially, has become the saddest outcome for human beings that Americans can conceive? Neoliberalism, our nation's regnant public philosophy, argues that the market should serve as our principal vehicle for social choices and that efficiency should serve as our collective primary evaluative yardstick of how to assess value. This view also assumes that economic growth will yield happiness and will, by definition, allow those experiencing poverty to overcome their condition. Advocates of this perspective contend that the sole metric of domestic and international success is growth in a state's Gross National Product (GNP). This dominant theme mistakenly leads us to assess human value and happiness solely in economic terms. If one is poor therefore, irrespective of whether a resident of the United States or another nation, this logic leads its adherents to view such individuals as somehow "less than" because of their obvious lack of economic success.If our development aims focus exclusively on efficiency, markets and GNP, however, the social realities of those we aim to serve will likely remain opaque, unaddressed or both. As an alternative, the human development approach, embraced by Glennie (2015) and Sen (1999) before him, asks Americans to consider first and elementally, the dignity and humanity of others in our development plans. That is, we ought to engage at the outset in a "systematic examination of … how human beings in each society live and what substantive freedoms they enjoy" or lack (UNDP, p. IV, 2010). Even after adopting this lens, however, many differences will remain between Westerners in developed nations and those populations they seek to assist in other cultures. Yet, as Geertz has observed, the similarities are "far too substantial for an easy other-beasts, other-mores relativism to dissolve" (Geertz, 1983, p. 41). And it is when we note these likenesses that our concern for those experiencing poverty evolves into something more

complex than the material, to include the question of dignity and a desire to ensure that our actions do not undermine its possibility in either ourselves or among those we would assist.

If our development aims focus exclusively on efficiency, markets and GNP, however, the social realities of those we aim to serve will likely remain opaque, unaddressed or both. As an alternative, the human development approach, embraced by Glennie (2015) and Sen (1999) before him, asks Americans to consider first and elementally, the dignity and humanity of others in our development plans. That is, we ought to engage at the outset in a "systematic examination of … how human beings in each society live and what substantive freedoms they enjoy" or lack (UNDP, p. IV, 2010). Even after adopting this lens, however, many differences will remain between Westerners in developed nations and those populations they seek to assist in other cultures. Yet, as Geertz has observed, the similarities are "far too substantial for an easy other-beasts, other-mores relativism to dissolve" (Geertz, 1983, p. 41). And it is when we note these likenesses that our concern for those experiencing poverty evolves into something more complex than the material, to include the question of dignity and a desire to ensure that our actions do not undermine its possibility in either ourselves or among those we would assist.

This seems to be so for two reasons. First, dignity represents a sought-after state of healthy emotional being in which individual and collective actions are congruent with thoughts, hopes and dreams for the future. In such situations, populations thrive. In this sense, dignity is a quality all individuals possess and from which they, too, can envision the future with others accorded the same standing. The second way one may come to understand the power of dignity is by pondering those times when we have been treated as if we did not possess it. This mental exercise can remind those who are materially rich that it is not just those "others" at the "bottom of the economic ladder [that] lack dignity," but that all individuals may be robbed of their sense of their own intrinsic worth when treated as inferior, for whatever reasons (Glennie, 2015). All human beings have surely behaved in ways that treated other individuals with contempt and have experienced such disdain themselves (Glennie, 2015). In such times, when one's actions did not align with one's (presumptive) aspirations, those affected, whether individuals or nations have felt not just disappointed, but deeply dissatisfied with their behavior. In fact, in many cases, they may become *hopelessly saddened* by what they have experienced and/or perpetrated. It is the recognition of this gap between hoped-for character and result and actual behavior and outcome that deepens empathy and underscores a desire to understand and ensure dignity for all, regardless of their material circumstances. As nice as it may be, a donation of $100 will not ensure my (or anyone else's) dignity. That is, self-respect cannot be captured by market

concepts. As Glennie has observed, "The thing about dignity, and the reason it is a transformational concept is that it knows no social, economic, gender or ethnic barriers" (2015).

According another person dignity requires that one listen to him/her actively, openly and empathetically. In his powerful *Voices of the Poor,* Narayan (1999) quoted three individuals from different nations who highlighted some of the central implications of poverty for human dignity:

> You know good but you cannot do good. That is such a person knows what should be done but has not got the means—Ghana (1995a, p. 32).
>
> Poverty is lack of freedom, enslaved by crushing daily burden, by depression and fear of what the future will bring—Georgia (1997, p. 31).
>
> Poverty is humiliation, the sense of being dependent on them, and of being forced to accept rudeness, insults, and indifference when we seek help—Latvia (1998, p. 26).

The impoverished, irrespective of where they live, speak of a deep sense of shame and humiliation when describing the impacts of poverty in their lives. Each time we fail to listen to those we would assist, or dismiss them as somehow "less than" and "different" from us or imagine that their complex lives can be reduced to linear logic models in which we enshrine efficiency as our cardinal value, we inflict humiliation and shame, and we corrode the dignity of those we would help. It is not, as Glennie argued, that "we" possess dignity and "they"—the "others" (the poor)—do not. Rather, it is that we must ensure that our actions do not rob those we target of their self-respect or undermine our own, either through discrimination or misguided metrics or both:

> Some of the poorest people are the most dignified. And some of the richest lack dignity. In a world of poverty and injustice, who are the undignified? Is it the poor or the rich? Is it the victim of violence or the perpetrator? Is it those who lose out to corruption or the corrupt official? (Glennie, 2015).

As Glennie properly concludes, "development without dignity—is not worth having" (2015). One might also say it is not worth pursuing in that case either.

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The Effects of Greenbelt Policy in Seoul, Korea

Yehyun An

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A greenbelt usually refers to a band drawn fairly tightly around a city or urban region that planners intend to be permanent, or at least very difficult to change (Jabareen, 2006). These areas are designed as buffers to protect open space, nature, wildlife and ecosystems and to encourage more compact development. The United Kingdom (UK) pioneered the greenbelt system in the 1920s. Population density and land prices are not very different whether one is within or outside of a greenbelt. Rather, these spaces appear to attract individuals who want to live in low-density areas and avoid locations degraded by development. Korea developed its greenbelt policy during the 1970s (Restricted Development Zone; RDZ) on the basis of the UK model with three main objectives: prevention of urban sprawl, preservation of nature near urban centers and national security. Although Seoul's greenbelt had similar objectives to those of other nations when it was created, it has evolved uniquely. This essay outlines the evolution of Korea's greenbelt policy and briefly sketches its principal effects to date.

Since the 1960s, when Korea became an industrial society, the nation's population and commerce have concentrated strongly in that country's urban areas. The rate of annual population growth in the 1970s and 1980s in Seoul, the nation's capital and largest city, for example, exceeded 100 percent. Meanwhile, the city's population density increased two fold. The speed of Seoul's growth and the resulting increase in its density were not comparable to that experienced by other cities with designated undeveloped land areas (Lee, 1999). The city expanded beyond its greenbelt, so that region's density gradients are shaped irregularly.For example, Seoul's greenbelt accounts for 13.1 percent of the total Seoul Metropolitan Region (SMR) land area, but the population within it represents only 1.5 percent of the area's population. The high concentration of residents coupled with the nation's urban containment policy resulted in "an extreme shortage of affordable land for housing and rapid land price appreciation" (Lee, 1999, p.43) in the SMR and relatively low prices (by comparison) for those assets in the greenbelt.

Unlike other nations, Korea has sought strictly to control a wide range of development activities by individuals within its greenbelt. That orientation has provoked a persistent stream of complaints from the region's residents

for three decades, but it has thus far been difficult to reform the policy notwithstanding. This is so because Seoul's greenbelt has generated both significant costs and benefits. Some researchers have argued that the area should be abolished, because the, "greenbelt policy has not been very successful in containing urban sprawl around Seoul, and has resulted in distortions of urban growth patterns" (Kim and Choe, 2011, p. 47). Although the policy has enjoyed high levels of support from the general public (Kim and Kim, 2008), most property owners within its boundaries have opposed it and viewed it as a seizure of their private property (Bengston and Youn, 2006). Meanwhile, others have contended that the greenbelt should continue to exist, because its benefits are substantial. While many researchers have examined the preserved land area's overall costs and benefits, the greenbelt's impacts on specific stakeholders have largely been neglected in spite of their importance. Thus, I here examine closely the effects of the area for key stakeholder groups over time. Arguably, the first beneficiaries of Seoul's greenbelt could be future generations and other species, such as wildlife located within it. However, since no one from the future or from such species can speak for their "fair share" of resources (Campbell, 1996), I have limited the scope of this essay to such interested parties as the central government, local governments and SMR and greenbelt residents.

"Throughout the history of the greenbelt, the central government has been its main beneficiary while those residing within it have paid significant costs for that privilege. The inequity problems in Seoul's designated undeveloped land area have now improved significantly, but much remains to be done."
-Yehyun An

Designation

Greenbelts are typically created by public or nonprofit purchase of open space lands or of farmland development rights (Jabareen, 2006). However, a dictatorial government originally created Seoul's designated green space without purchasing the lands that comprised it by simply zoning them in a new way. That regime maintained the space thereafter. One of the government's original reasons for creating Seoul's greenbelt was to control development near the demilitarized zone. Officials cited this national security objective in their efforts to gain residents' support for it. Ultimately, political and military security concerns prevailed and private property rights were pushed aside to allow the greenbelt to become a reality (Kim and Kim, 2008).

Although the greenbelt has both negative and positive influences on the environment, the central government has benefited from it as an instrument

to control urban sprawl and as a source of land for the future. On the other hand, local governments have borne the direct costs of the area's management as well as the brunt of complaints from its residents. The inhabitants of the SMR have experienced both environmental benefits and costs as a result of the existence of the greenbelt, but generally, they have incurred relative higher costs than benefits due to the higher property prices that it stimulated outside of its bounds and the increased commuting distance it demanded of many commuting from suburbs beyond it to employment in Seoul. Greenbelt resident activities are also strictly limited by regulation and that fact has lowered the value of their properties. Table 1 summarizes the benefits and costs for each stakeholder at the time the government created the region in the 1970s.

Table 1. Stakeholders' Costs and Benefits at Designation

	Environmental	Economic	Social
Central Government	-: urban congestion, sprawl) +: amenity, ecosystem services		+: national security
Local Government	-: urban congestion, sprawl) +: amenity, ecosystem services	-: supervision, illegality control	-: conflicts with residents
Outside Residents	-: urban congestion, sprawl +: amenity, ecosystem services	-: higher land, housing, commuting prices	
Greenbelt Residents	+: amenity, ecosystem services	-: lower land, housing prices	-: limitations on individual rights

Utilization

Even though the boundaries and governing policies related to Seoul's greenbelt did not change much for nearly 30 years, the central government did allow occasional exceptions. For example, the original law allowed for the construction of public facilities in the area when a suitable damage fee was paid. As a result, governments have used the greenbelt for public rental

housing projects, despite the fact these have at least some negative environmental effects and therefore violate one central purpose for creating the space in the first instance

More precisely, these exceptions have negatively affected the environment in terms of loss of ecosystem and amenity services. Only residents in neighborhoods close to the project sites are able to enjoy the improved infrastructure and higher, but still relatively low, property prices created by the new construction. In any case, the central and local governments have benefitted economically and socially from greenbelt development. First of all, the exceptions have allowed governments to implement public projects easily within the area due to the relatively low price of land. While greenbelt residents must be compensated when their property is affected by these public uses, they receive support in accord with relatively low greenbelt land values. Although local governments have generally not opposed use of the area's land for central government projects, some have protested the development of rental housing within the greenbelt (Kim, 2006). Local governments often oppose these efforts because they risk imposing more burdens than benefits on local city administrators (Kim, 2006). The exceptions policy also aggrieves area residents in a subtler way by allowing public developments, even as their use of their own properties remains closely regulated (Kim and Kim, 2008). Table 2 summarizes the benefits and costs of public utilization of the greenbelt for each stakeholder group under consideration.

Table 2. Stakeholders' Costs and Benefits of Public Utilization

	Environmental	Economic	Social
Central Government	-: loss of amenity and ecosystem services	+: lower price of compensation, fiscal savings	+: administrative convenience
Local Government	-: loss of amenity and ecosystem services	+: lower price of compensation, fiscal savings	-: conflicts with landowners +: administrative convenience
Outside Residents	-: loss of amenity and ecosystem services		
Greenbelt Residents	-: loss of amenity and ecosystem services +: Improved infrastructure	+: balloon effect of public projects	-: relative sense of deprivation

Another form of greenbelt use occurs when residents illegally utilize area land. In practice, some inhabitants have illicitly installed temporary structures in which to operate businesses, such as junk shops and warehouses. Even when the government imposes penalties and fines for such usurpations, the profits from these ventures are often greater than those costs, leading squatters to continue or repeat their behavior. Almost 40 percent of greenbelt land is vacant or lightly settled in scattered residential areas, making its misuse relatively easy to pursue.

Private use of greenbelt lands generates environmental, economic and social costs, Historically, local governments have assumed responsibility for surveillance and supervision of the region as well as for the costs of removing illegal structures from it and restoring original conditions to the extent possible. Local governments also address resident complaints and conflicts with wrongdoers. Although the central government subsidizes localities, the social costs of greenbelt misuse are not considered when such allocations are decided. The largest costs of the land area's illegal use fall on nearby residents. These individuals struggle with a degraded environment and lower property values when land located near them is developed in defiance of the law. Table 3 summarizes the costs to each stakeholder of illegal utilization.

Table 3. Stakeholders' Costs of Illegal Utilization

		Environmental	Economic	Social
Central Government		-:loss of amenity and ecosystem services		
Local Governments		-:loss of amenity and ecosystem services	-:supervision, legal costs	-:conflicts with residents and wrongdoers
Outside Residents		-:loss of amenity and ecosystem services		
Greenbelt Residents	General Residents	-: loss of amenity and ecosystem services	-: lower land and housing prices	-: conflicts b/w residents and wrongdoers
	Wrongdoers	-: loss of amenity and ecosystem services	+: profits from illegality	

Release of Greenbelt land for residential use

Since the early 2000s, the central government has released 1,450 square meters of the total greenbelt area for residential use. This step occurred as a result of a policy change and greenbelt residents have benefited from it. Under the new policy, residents can now exert property rights and their land values have increased as a result. However, technical methods of boundary adjustment based on environmental assessments have yielded a fresh challenge (Kim and Kim, 2008), since areas damaged illegally by wrongdoers are evaluated with low scores and receive highest priority for release. This situation has exacerbated existing conflicts between residents and wrongdoers in the greenbelt.

Similarly, a redrawing of the greenbelt's boundaries has created tensions between the central government and local governments (Bengston and Youn, 2006). Local governments have shouldered the costs of managing the many

complaints concerning border adjustments, which released some properties and retained others. Table 4 summarizes the costs and benefits of the release policy for each stakeholder group under consideration.

Taken as a whole, Seoul's greenbelt policy is fundamentally inequitable. The policy was the result of an authoritarian government's top-down planning (Kim, 2006) and an inoperable system from its birth (Kim and Kim, 2008). The greenbelt system was adopted as a precautionary action against the side effects of the National Economic Development Plan that accelerated urbanization and population growth in Seoul. Ensuring social equity was not a priority in the dictatorship's adoption of the greenbelt system. In practice, the regime's planners failed to perform the role of negotiators by requiring residents to accept the policy without educating them concerning its likely effects on their daily lives. Planners also failed to perform their professional role by devising a policy "without sufficient attention given to basic principles of law" (Kim and Kim, 2008, p. 41) and by drawing the boundary "without public input and without serious consideration of the widely accepted criteria for the designation of greenbelts" (Bengston and Youn, 2006, p. 3).

Table 4. Stakeholders Costs and Benefits of Greenbelt Land Release

	Environmental	Economic	Social
Central Government	+: decreased urban congestion -: loss of amenity, ecosystem	-: loss of available land for the future	
Local Government	-: loss of amenity, ecosystem	-: loss of available land for future use	-: conflicts with residents
Outside Residents	+: decreased urban congestion) -: loss of amenity, ecosystem	+: supply of available land, lower land and housing prices	
Greenbelt Residents	-: loss of amenity, ecosystem	+: higher land and housing prices	+: development rights -: conflicts between wrongdoers and other residents

Although the government has now reconsidered the issue of equity in the greenbelt and has reformed relevant policy, the planner's role in those changes is debatable. Reform arose from a presidential campaign pledge and the ruling party, local governments, greenbelt residents, NGOs and urban and regional planners heavily influenced the change process (Kim, 2006).Within that process, the planners' role as negotiators was insignificant, and frequent changes of political power did nothing to assist with greenbelt reform (Kim and Kim, 2008). The process of the greenbelt reform illustrates the difficulties of reconciling benefits and costs among diverse values. Even though it is encouraging that planners are now trying to approach the inequity problem by suggesting alternatives, more action is required. For example, active methods to improve greenbelt management, such as the

imposition of increased damage fees and penalty for illegal uses, should be considered. The central government should also allocate additional funds to purchase land within the zone and to implement various resident support projects. Moreover, planners involved in the reform process should clearly perceive that the key to that efforts' success is "a more macroscopic approach to reorganizing the extent of property ownership" (Kim and Kim, 2008, p.56) and "to fairly redistribute property rights in greenbelt areas among those who are affected" (Bengston and Youn, 2006, p. 10; Kim, 2004).

Throughout the history of the greenbelt, the central government has been its main beneficiary while those residing within it have paid significant costs for that privilege. The inequity problems in Seoul's designated undeveloped land area have now improved significantly, but much remains to be done. Planners can help to redress the remaining concerns by recognizing the wide-ranging effects of the greenbelt policy for stakeholders and working to develop and promote equity among them.

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Ontological Reflections on the Quest for Rural Sustainability

Anna Erwin

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Woody Crenshaw is an organic produce farmer and founding board member of the nonprofit Sustain Floyd in Floyd, Virginia. Crenshaw and his wife Jackie moved to Floyd in the 1970s to, as he proudly recalls, "get back to the land." He is a passionate and visionary leader who is responsible, with Jackie, for reopening the Floyd Country Store, which celebrates the region's culture, music and community by holding Friday night Jamborees—an Appalachian dance party—that attracts a variety of participants, including local residents, Virginia Tech students and international visitors. The Country Store also serves as a meeting place for community groups and collaborates with multiple local businesses and initiatives across Floyd County and beyond. Although the Crenshaws sold the store last year, the new owners are pursuing similar aims, so the Store's role as a festive community-gathering place is likely to endure. Meanwhile, the Crenshaws continue to be very involved in Floyd in initiatives to preserve the rural way of life that both the town and its surrounding landscape represent.

In 2012, the Virginia Tech Institute for Policy and Governance's Community Voices (CV) group invited Woody Crenshaw to speak on the many efforts he has launched and/or supported to sustain the Floyd area (Crenshaw, 2012). In his remarks, Crenshaw explored the question of how small rural communities can prove resilient in our open, globalized society. He did so by reflecting on the spiritual and communal value of spaces such as the Floyd Country Store. I seek to expand on Crenshaw's observations in this essay by proposing an ontological perspective through which to consider his questions. The Floyd farmer and entrepreneur grounded his CV reflection in his appreciation of his community's landscape and cultural assets. Like Crenshaw, I wish to preserve communal spaces that promote the sustainability of the environment and culture of rural areas and peoples. However, I depart from his argument by contending that small communities need to reconceptualize what it means to be small and local in our globalized society. Using Doreen Massey's (2013) ontological argument that space is not defined geographically, but through social connectivity, I sketch a forward-thinking vision of space and place that is representative of the racial and

cultural diversity that currently marks the American way of life. I sought a conceptualization of space that maintains the attachments, or social and economic experiences, that many enjoy at the local level, while likewise ensuring that *all* who live in or likely will reside in our rural communities are able to participate in those possibilities.

"In our nation, small, rural communities are among the last places where social relations are not completely embedded in the market and where we can collectively begin to rebuild the social capital that our country needs."
-Anna Erwin

Place-based programs aimed at securing social and ecological justice have become popular as parts of campaigns for rural revival during the last decade, especially in regions such as Appalachia, that have experienced brain drain as well as the related phenomena of relocation or shuttering of textile and extractive industries. Many justice-oriented place-based campaigns organize around communitarian theories that contend that more equitable social conditions are created through agreements and shared purposes reached via sustained dialogue. Some proponents of local movements have argued that this sort of broad process for sustainable change can be encouraged, if not accomplished, by community members agreeing to consume foods produced within their foodshed, purchasing goods from local businesses to the degree they can and by celebrating traditional culture(s).

Still other analysts have demonstrated that although our Gross Domestic Product has grown significantly in the last sixty years, our citizenry's reported happiness has stabilized and begun to decline during that period. Similarly, many activists argue that in our nation, small, rural communities are among the last places where social relations are not completely embedded in the market and where we can collectively begin to rebuild the social capital that our country needs. Indeed, as Crenshaw demonstrated in his CV presentation, spaces like the Floyd Country Store allow people to be with others and to share a sense of common aspiration and social bonds. Other communal spaces that create this possibility include farmers markets, music halls and locations at which people can cook and enjoy meals together.

But for all of the potential these sorts of possibilities represent, they can be compromised and commodified. For example, during the last ten to fifteen years, many small communities have been working hard to preserve and reinvigorate themselves by embracing programs focused on sentimental imaginaries of agrarian America. Although these place-based efforts have often funneled consumer and state support to rural communities, these sorts of initiatives also run the risk of essentializing local populations and reinforcing fear-based protectionist attitudes towards land, peoples and culture.

There is absolutely no evidence that Floyd, at least not the Floyd Country Store, is such a fear-based, protectionist community. However, when one looks into the nooks and crannies of many communities like Floyd, one is very likely to find a diverse array of cultural backgrounds and ethnicities that are often ignored in campaigns to "bring back" rural life. For example, when speaking of what sustains his region's local economy, Crenshaw acknowledged Floyd County's Christmas tree industry, but he did not note how globalized that *local* industry is. Every year, counties in Appalachia recruit workers, largely from Mexico, to work on Christmas tree farms; thus, this driver of the local economy is actually profoundly embedded in a globalized labor network. Floyd County's Christmas tree industry participates in this network and when you spend time in Floyd on Friday nights, you are likely to encounter many Latino people enjoying the Country Store and Market.

Moreover, and as this example illustrates, while local consumer transactions may feel personal, those purchases are nonetheless typically embedded in an economic system that spans the globe. Likewise, many place-based economic campaigns rely on tourists to provide community stability and growth. In others words, even though these initiatives are based on place, the transactions and mechanisms for sustaining local farmers, vendors, musicians and artists rely on systems that reach, both socially and economically, far beyond the geographically bound community such campaigns purportedly support.

An ontological approach to place that understands space as socially created and not simply geographically defined can recognize the globalized nature of small, local economic ventures. Furthermore, planning with this approach can assist in creating more sustainable and resilient ventures, for the long term. It is thus important not only to retain democratic spaces, but also to maintain and plan them with the understanding that they must change and will inevitably reflect a much more diverse cultural and ethnic landscape than in the past. In many ways, Crenshaw seemed already to be sensitized to this necessary ontological shift in his description of the Floyd Country Store as a place that hosts people from different nations, races, classes, political ideologies and educational backgrounds. A globalized response to Crenshaw's interest in *how* a sustainable future can be constructed for a rural way of life does *not* lie with building four-lane roads, faster trains or more big box stores, all of which Floyd, Virginia now does not have in any case, but with recognition of the cultural and social diversity that American society now embodies and with efforts to create spaces that reflect that heterogeneity, in which people can feel at home, whatever their economic, social or cultural pursuits.

Efforts to secure a future for our rural areas should surely also include infrastructure projects, such as ensuring widespread broadband Internet

connection opportunities, so that rural residents and children can have the same opportunities as those living in larger metropolitan areas. Planning based on the ontological shift I have outlined here would celebrate the rural and the local while rejecting fear-based, protectionist claims. I argue that to chart new paths for the future, citizens of towns like Floyd need to cooperate with other similar communities struggling to be resilient in a globalized world. They must proceed with open minds that support traditional culture and the natural landscape, while remaining grounded in the reality of the present and open to the possibilities represented by the future.

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"Bouncing Back" to Poverty: Exploring the Meaning of Resilience in a Time of Capitalist Crisis

Vera Smirnova

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Although urban development under capitalism has historically demonstrated an extraordinary resilience to economic crises and instabilities, that capacity has usually occurred at disproportionate cost to marginalized communities. Hence, we need to make sure we are not mistaking places that benefit from capitalism as resilient geographies (Lang, 2015). Indeed, many of the hardiest communities appear to be comprised of a "cartel of politicians and financial executives, aided by think tanks and philanthropic organizations" (Slater, 2014).

Many scholars have argued that cities often secure resilience by launching radical reforms for commodification of geographical space to release new room for capital accumulation and enable economic recovery (Davoudi, Shaw et al., 2012). Consider the mid-1970's revanchist reforms in New York City, for example, which aimed nominally to rescue the city from its fiscal crisis (Heynen, McCarthy et al., 2007), but which were accompanied by the displacement of 176,900 renters during the following 10 years (US Census Bureau, 1990). Consider, too, the 200 percent increase in the amount of U.S. agricultural land 'grabbed' by foreign investors during the 2009-2010 post-recession period. That acreage had become available as a result of widespread forced evictions of thousands of farmers from their properties by lenders during the 2007-2009 recession (Sassen, 2014). These examples and many more illustrate that what constitutes equitable resilience remains a poorly understood concept in the context of the modern political economy under capitalism (Heynen et al., 2006).

From a critical geography perspective, the resilience framework does not account for social and political issues related to speculative rounds of capital accumulation and circulation, inequality and uneven development, or what Harvey (2011) has called 'accumulation by dispossession'—the continuous search for new profits from land and housing amidst economic instabilities that otherwise should constitute a central mechanism of securing urban resilience. While treating urban areas as "humanity's greatest invention that makes us richer, smarter, healthier, and happier," (Glaeser, 2011) the

resilience framework assumes that 'bouncing back' following an economic shock is a positive and desirable quality. In this fashion, urban entities strive to bring their economies back from crisis to their previous 'productive state' as soon as possible (Christopherson et al., 2010) irrespective of the practices employed to establish that recovery. Such methods can vary from privatization of resources, gentrification and international land-grabs or by means of 'capitalist enclosure.' In the last cited, state power directs investment flows to targeted and privileged sites to stabilize economic production, thus leading to uneven redistribution of any resulting benefits. These practices cause social exclusion and dispossession of land, property, institutions or the 'commons' and consequently contribute to intensified urban inequality.

"While cities may appear resilient according to familiar measures, such outcomes often occur at the expense of the poor. In fact, it seems possible that with each round of economic crisis, the poverty of those most afflicted by such downturns becomes more resistant to amelioration."
-Vera Smirnova

Drawing upon conceptualizations of crisis developed by theorists of the Frankfurt and Marxist schools of social thought, I argue that common strategies of obtaining resilience do not resolve capitalist emergencies at their root. Instead, these approaches displace crises tendencies in space and time by means of social exclusion and dislocation of poor communities. Bluntly, 'bouncing back to poverty' is not a desirable aspiration for urban communities and, in many cases, should itself be seen as a social and political crisis. The idea of a 'crisis of crisis management' is at the heart of this essay.

Systemic and periodic crisis

During an economic recession, depression or economic stagnation, "geographical and institutional frameworks of capitalist development get destabilized as capital seeks to transcend systems that no longer provide a secure basis for sustained accumulation" (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, p.270). Members of the Frankfurt School first explored this proposition by developing a state-centric understanding of crisis tendencies under capitalism. Jürgen Habermas argued that due to persisting transitions between 'systems crises' and 'identity crises,' instabilities under capitalism are never truly resolved. Instead, these economic crises are often transferred to the political realm, where they increase the likelihood of a 'legitimation crisis,' by encouraging a failure in governing structures (Habermas, 1975).

Following Habermas, Offe (1976) introduced the agency of the state into capitalist crisis theory. For Offe, states operating in tandem with market institutions seek to ensure stable capital accumulation. Nonetheless, they

also must appear neutral to that concern to preserve their popular legitimacy (Jones and Ward, 2002). As a result, governments depend on the stability of capital accumulation for their own functioning. This reality leads to a constant reworking of state's internal structures to avoid fiscal stagnancy. In this fashion, economic crisis is a systematic and dynamic phenomenon embedded in democratic political systems and choice-making.

Harvey (2011) has employed Marxist theories of crisis to examine urban policy issues. In brief, he has contended that states have turned to one of three interrelated 'fixes' when confronting capitalist crises: a 'spatial fix' through sector-based switching of investments, a 'temporal fix' through introduction of new forms of capital circulation and a 'spatiotemporal fix' that combines the first two dimensions of displacement. Nevertheless, and as a result of their contingent character, all of these strategies allow for continuous replication of crisis tendencies through policy failures. It follows that irrespective of their intentions, these state-led efforts can undermine a society's capacity to achieve resilience.

Discussion: 'Crisis of crisis management'

In contrast to Marxist scholarship, the common resilience logic based on neoclassical views of economics treats the capitalist system as endogenously stable and crises as arising from exogenous shocks. In other words, this perspective views economic crises as periodic, and therefore as a temporary disequilibrium. Conceptions of resilience that rest on this assumption highlight and endorse the adaptive capacity of cities to cope with external shocks. This is not surprising, given that the majority of research concerning urban resilience has thus far been predicated on risk management and mitigation studies.

Mainstream views of resilience assume that reinvestment, prosperity and economic growth will help cities cope with instabilities. These, therefore, praise the role of Florida's 'creative class' or Duany's 'New Urbanism' with their implicit successive rounds of urban renewal and gentrification (Duany et al., 2010; Florida, 2004). This perspective shifts attention away from the systemic policy failures and crisis tendencies of modern urban development under capitalism. As Slater (2014) has argued, this sort of thinking produced "the largest global credit bubble ever seen, and then crashed in the most severe financial crisis in the history of capitalism" (the Great Recession of 2007-09).

In sum, while cities may appear resilient according to familiar measures, such outcomes often occur at the expense of the poor. In fact, it seems possible that with each round of economic crisis, the poverty of those most afflicted by such downturns becomes more resistant to amelioration. Thus, 'poverty traps' are emerging as a strikingly negative example of purported

extraordinary resilience. In a vital sense, if urban scholars are to continue to use the term resilience, as now widely understood, they should at minimum strive to account for its underlying consequences.

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Roma in Romania—Of Expectation and Agency

Rebecca Powell Doherty

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Historical context

During this past summer, I had the good fortune to undertake a six-week research trip throughout much of rural Romania. The team I led conducted a water quality and sanitation needs assessment survey in five geographically diverse, but predominantly Roma, communities in order to explore potential improvement options. The Roma are the largest ethnic minority in Europe, comprised of about 12 million individuals across the continent and in the United Kingdom, with the largest concentration located in Romania. While official government statistics place the Roma population at approximately 500,000 in Romania, numerous unofficial NGO estimates suggest that their total number in that nation is closer to 1.5 to 2 million (World Bank, 2015), making them the second largest minority group in the country.

Tracing their origins to northern India, the Roma first appeared in European history around 1100 A.D. (Harmon, 2012). Originally thought to be of Egyptian descent due to their dark skin color, they became known as 'Gypsies' and were greeted with discrimination, imprisonment and for more than 500 years, enslavement. During the course of several centuries, Romanians who enslaved the Roma forced them to work as farriers, coppersmiths, blacksmiths, horse trainers and even bear-handlers, chosen to train the indigenous brown bears of the Carpathian Mountains for circus performances, or to fight humans in modern renditions of gladiatorial combat.

As slavery was fully abolished in the Romanian territories by 1864 and the Roma gained their freedom, they nevertheless continued to gravitate toward these historical skill sets, cementing their reputation as able craftsmen (Petrova, 2004). From the 1860s through the late 1930s, just prior to World War II, the majority population in Romania slowly began to associate the Roma with a nomadic lifestyle, partially the result of being expelled repeatedly from various parts of the country as Romanians increasingly

discriminated against the traveling bands. That prejudice arose from the Roma's "different" skin color and a growing, but unsubstantiated, popular belief that they were thieves and beggars with no moral compass.

Expectations

Unfortunately, Romania's modern society has been only marginally kinder to the Roma than earlier generations proved to be. They are often a convenient scapegoat for that nation's politicians, both conservative and otherwise, seeking to place blame for poor economic policies or performance or failed initiatives. Moreover, they continue to be excluded by both government institutions and their fellow countrymen from general society and deprived of their rights as European Union (EU) citizens to legal documentation, education, health care and municipal services (including trash disposal and water and sewage treatment) (World Bank, 2015).

"The Roma demonstrate agency as they work to improve the circumstances of their communities. From a different point-of-view, however, the agency and the individual capacity they possess to act is both bounded and limited by their formal and informal lack of freedom and welfare rights. In this sense, the Roma of Romania cannot be said to enjoy genuine agency."
– Rebecca Powell Doherty

Given this somewhat bleak outlook, many of the researchers and experts with whom I spoke prior to my departure indicated that I should rethink or at least temper my expectation to rely on one-on-one interviews and the capacity of volunteer participants either to appreciate and embrace the goals of my project or be literate, at even the most basic level. I was therefore quite surprised to encounter numerous Roma more than willing to talk to our research team, answer our questions and share their stories and struggles. Certainly, we did everything within our power to ensure the confidentiality of our participants' responses, and will continue to do so as we work to simulate potential solutions for the many issues that we identified as requiring government intervention and support in order to reach a just and desirable resolution. However, the vast majority of the Roma with whom we spoke were unconcerned with our assurance of confidentiality. In any case, they proved more than willing and able to share their views and concerns.

Our team members spoke to Roma farmers, fruit pickers, craftsmen and bottle scavengers who freely admitted to (on average) possessing only an eighth-grade education (or less) and reading little. Nonetheless, these individuals could explain the need for crop rotation in their backyard plots, how they used salt to treat hastily dug water wells and why a cold, refreshing nearby spring seemed to provide better water than any other source to which

they had access. Despite being unfamiliar with germ theory, they nonetheless engaged in basic shoestring epidemiology and could identify the uptick in diarrheal disease occurrence in their children and readily connect it to warmer weather or heavy rains and flooding.

Perhaps needless to say, my expectations concerning their intellectual preparation, facility and articulateness were in fairly sharp contrast with the reality I encountered. I had anticipated a minority population, severely hamstrung by injustice and popular and institutional racism, and in many respects, that was indeed the case. The Roma have a higher rate of infectious disease than the non-Roma in Romania; they have a significantly lower life expectancy and, as already mentioned, they are more likely to lack basic public services that improve overall community hygiene (water and sewage treatment) (World Bank, 2015). What they are not, however, is helpless or unaware of the conditions they confront or their origins.

The question of agency

Griffin has defined the concept of normative agency as "our capacity to choose and to pursue our conception of a worthwhile life" (Griffin, 2008, p. 45). Talbott has emphasized Griffin's categories of autonomous agency, liberty and welfare rights (Talbott, 2008). According to Griffin, autonomous agency is the highest order human right. The construct inherently supposes not only that an individual possesses capacity for personal choice (liberty) and freedom from dominion, but also a minimum level of education, health and access to relevant information (Talbott, 2008). Given this definition and these characteristics, I suggest that the Roma may be thought both to evidence agency based on individual capacity and simultaneously not to exhibit it. I suggest how this can be so next.

From one perspective, as has already been described, the Roma are hardly either hapless or helpless. Certainly, as Griffin has asserted, they pursue worthwhile lives—seeking employment, raising families, finding joy in their communities and supporting each other, much like any other close-knit group of people. Knowledge in the Roma communities is often self-taught or passed down through generations, based on years of experience and experimentation in the case of agricultural understanding, or anecdotal evidence, in the case of well water treatment. In these ways (and many others), the Roma demonstrate agency as they work to improve the circumstances of their communities. From a different point-of-view, however, the agency and the individual capacity they possess to act is both bounded and limited by their formal and informal lack of freedom and welfare rights. In this sense, the Roma of Romania cannot be said to enjoy genuine agency, as Griffin has defined that concept.

Overall, my experience during my field research suggested that it is essential when working with Roma communities both to recognize and respect their enterprising and instinctive intelligence *and* to advocate for their just treatment by government institutions and the public-at-large. Including Roma leaders and community members in research initiatives acknowledges the very human dignity and, indeed, agency of an enduring, vibrant people even as it provides findings that hopefully can be garnered to eliminate the deeply engrained formal and informal discrimination that this population confronts, wherever its members reside.

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The Unnoticed Contextual Realities of Hillbilly Elegy

Jordan Laney

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At any site on the landscape, multiple definitions of a place are continually in play among those who reside or visit there, sometimes convivial and sometimes antagonistic. Ideas of property, of homeland, of natural resources, of infrastructure; of city, county, school district, economic development zone, environmental hazard; of shit-hole, unspoiled paradise, dullsville; of wildness and weirdness and domestication and discipline–all swirl and interconnect and contend and contest in any given space (Powell, 2012, p. 5).

I have wanted to read *Hillbilly Elegy*: *A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis* by J.D. Vance for a few months. Almost weekly a new review or blog appears concerning this volume, which has become a national best-seller. Because of its personal, memoir nature I found its appeal interesting. I was careful not to read the reviews too closely, but found comments such as "he gets it" or "this is an insider perspective" alluring. While teaching "Introduction to Appalachian Studies" here at Virginia Tech I often work through the local color fiction movement[1] and think, how did people not respond?

How did journalists and correspondents for the *New York Times* as well as scholars not catch these acts of generalizing and aggrandizing on behalf of elite readers and metaphorical fulfilments of the American dream? How did we trade in the breadth of diversity the region has to offer for one view? While reading *Hillbilly Elegy*, I thought, here is how. *This* is how places and people become caricatures of themselves, ourselves. It is not my interest in Vance's writing or personal plight that kept me reading his self-celebratory personal narrative. No, it is knowing that this text is approachable, available, and popular, consumed by many, much as *Deliverance*, *Oh Brother Where Art Thou*, *The Beverly Hillbillies*, and local color fiction have been before. Vance's personal and unquestionably political narrative is an important read in understanding the ways in which societies recreate people, places and feelings about ideologies.

Reading the first few pages and reviewing the acknowledgements of the 31-year old's memoir, it is obvious Vance did not write this text as an Appalachian Studies student. Once one has read the first few chapters, it becomes painfully clear that Vance knows very little about regional history.

He supports essentializations with personal stories, focuses on micro-oppressions rather than the legacies of hope and historically unaccounted for diversity of the region. Rather than celebrate the legacies of resistance and innovation in Appalachia or offer new knowledge, he continues to reproduce Darwinian notions of a land engulfed in a culture of poverty. So why read the book? I finished this volume for several reasons. First, it is being discussed. Second, it is being accepted by some, even some from the region. Third, Vance relies in part on the controversial theorizations of pseudo-political scientist Charles Murray, and that fact intrigued and concerned me. Fourth, I continued to read because in the current political climate it has become increasingly clear that affect trumps truth and this book is a brilliantly positioned example of when emotions—those of an accomplished, cis-gendered, heteronormative, white man—matter to the public and are validated by political rhetoric. Fifth, I continued reading because, as someone from the region, I believe the area's residents have yet truly to address the problematic ways in which we make, recreate and perform one another and for one another and the places for which we allow ourselves to speak.

"The Appalachian story is not given room to swirl, interconnect and contend in Vance's narrative. The hillbilly is not afforded space to be characterized fully." -Jordan Laney

To be clear, the insider/outsider politics that continue to police place-based discussions of Appalachia are largely revisionist and exclusionary. We have yet to respect and understand the scale of oppression within the region. We have yet to develop the imagination for dialogues of rebuilding rather than rage. We have yet to engage critically with the stereotypes that occupy the region in the national psyche.

Finally, I finished this book because many of my challenges as an educator were apparent within its first few pages. Just a few weeks ago, for example, a student astutely responded to questions I had posed concerning the award-winning film, *Stranger with a Camera*. We were discussing the power of photography to "shoot" subjects and how to weigh long-term representational violence against physical violence. The student responded, with a question (creating questions is a very important goal of the course): "How can facts be unethical? How can facts have ethics?" I was thrilled to enter this line of discourse. How can facts—experiences—and the sharing of those have ethical consequences? Moreover, how are they overtly political? These are the questions that guided my reading of Vance's personal story. The fact that his narrative is being read as "the hillbilly story" and seen as one explanation for Republican Party presidential nominee Donald Trump's success in the region was also not far from my mind.

In the spirit of full disclosure, Vance's narrative captures a life experience not unlike that of many with which I was familiar as I grew up in western

North Carolina. However, just because it relates to the experiences of many from the region—or from any poverty stricken area—does not mean, and should not imply, that it represents the story of all of Appalachia. Vance's narrative does not explain the region's systemic or structural inequalities and it certainly does not engage with the power that put them in place. These are just a few of the unnoticed contextual realities of the region that are not addressed by Vance's "elegy." The enthusiastic acceptance of a (neoliberal) "pull yourself up by your bootstraps like I did" narrative and the continuous mentioning of "hillbilly justice" among many of the book's conservative-leaning reviewers speaks to larger racial, economic, gendered, societal issues that have erupted across the national landscape in recent months. Nonetheless, it is clear that Vance's story of "beating the odds" does not provide a solution or plan to better the lives of the oppressed or impoverished of the region.

In this reflective, exploratory engagement with the text, I address alternative births, regenerative hopes, and regional reincarnations that lie outside the scope of Vance's lament, while highlighting some of the dangers his work presents to those who consume it and those it represents. This is my initial response. There will be more to come, I am sure.

But who is dead?

It is perhaps most straightforward to begin with the title of Vance's book, *Hillbilly Elegy*, elegy being a sorrowful song for one who is dead. Yet, Appalachia is not a person, but a place, a place created (like others) through a web of relationships. We read what we assume to be Vance's swansong to a personification of a particular set of characteristics, a trope of a place, an identity; a hillbilly. Vance emphasizes his sorrow over the death of "a hillbilly." Indeed, his text reads at times as eulogistic: praising his pistol packin' cussin' Mamaw, who in his view, literally saved his life. His book is a lament to "a hillbilly," a beloved grandmother, a family, and a culture. Death is a strong term. In order to be determined dead, all **biological** functions that sustain an organism must end. There ceases to be life. In my view, what is lost in Vance's life as he recounts his experiences does not connote death, but instead transition—and not necessarily a totalizing one. Yes, coal is leaving the region (something Vance does not discuss in depth), and yes, drugs are rampant, but there is something else happening, too. There is a resurrection of local foods, economies, and arts in the region. There is also critical work being done on and within Appalachia—with which Vance seems to be largely unacquainted.

There were additional initial questions for which I wished to obtain answers while I read this book—things I would hope to offer the reader of this reflection, but I cannot, since the author did not address them. For

instance, what does Vance mean when he says "hillbilly?" What are the origins of his apparent obsession with "the American Dream?" And has he considered the limits of such a desire? Further, what does Vance see as his relationship to place? He clearly feels he owes his "hillbilly heritage" for his successful career and he claims to love his family's "home" community, but he does not seem to indicate the need to re-invest in the region. Rather, he passes along the advice that "worked" for him, or "Appalachian Values" as he calls them: loyalty, honor, and toughness (Vance, 2016, p. 66). That is, if you work hard, good things will come your way.

A hillbilly mythology

In my view, rather than bidding a fond farewell to his home, Vance is participating in the recreation and performance of the social tropes expected to accompany his identity. He articulated prevailing myths or essentializations within the region within the current political climate through his own family stories, while employing existing stereotypes. Family stories are powerful. Regional agents, such as the Highlander Center in Tennessee and Appalshop in Whitesburg, Kentucky, have proven the power of personal narrative. However, Vance's stories do not highlight structural inequalities and issues. Instead, as he presents his experience, issues and solution are rooted in individuals. In this way, he embraces a neoliberal moral of his story that accords with prevailing extreme representations concerning the region. Myths can be healthy, as they allow for a shared understanding of a culture and often of rituals within it.[2] But here, I use "myths" to suggest the ways in which stereotypes and generalizations work. The "myths" on which Vance relies (which are widely believed) are detrimental to truly understanding the poverty of the region because they pretend that they are the product of individual behavior alone and can be addressed by the same.

Hillbillies are white men. This is perhaps the most blatant "myth" Vance reinforces, and the easiest to discredit. Vance self identifies as a "Scots-Irish Hillbilly at Heart." One long-standing misrepresentation of the region has been that Appalachian people are "Mountain Whites."[3] The erasure of people of color from this story is important. The ways Vance treats race are important (see his comments on why he does not relate to President Obama (Vance, 2016, p. 191)). This myth—that Appalachia is a totalizing white space—is untrue. Movements such as the Affrilachian Poets as well as Black Lives Matter and Indigenous studies have all revealed the roles of people of color in the region's history, and the erasure of these roles in prominent works of historical scholarship.

Intersectional critiques are not a consideration in Vance's text. The role of gender in the plight and death of the hillbilly does not enter his account. As

he observed when discussing the characteristics of his hard-living uncles, "I was in love with the Blanton men" (2016, p. 16). While his Mamaw was an important factor in his life, the work done by women, or the potential work by women goes largely unnoticed. While, yes, she was very important, Vance does not address her labor and the labor divisions (which cannot be separated from regional poverty) her life revealed. Labor and laziness are gendered issues and the solution, if Vance can be said to offer one, is dangerously gendered and simple; "Men need to work." For instance, he laments,

> Too many young men are immune to hard work. Good jobs are impossible to fill for any length of time. And a young man with every reason to work—a wife-to-be to support and a baby on the way—carelessly tossing aside a good job with excellent health insurance . . . this is distinct from the larger economic landscape of modern America (Vance, 2016, p. 97).

I am not convinced it is that simple, nor should it be. Appalachia is not distinct from the larger landscape of America, rather the region is deeply connected. Further, the labor of the "wife-to-be" is never discussed. Vance is apparently unaware of the gendered divisions of labor Rebecca Scott has so carefully analyzed in her scholarship. The alternative economies within the region and Vance's own situation and privilege—especially among his summer co-workers—go unquestioned.

Finally, Vance's unquestionable "You are the answer" mantra reinforces currently prevailing individualistic social norms. Or, in the words of Vance's Mamaw, "[D]on't be like these f—–g losers who think the deck is stacked against them … [y]ou can do anything you want to" (Vance, 2016, p. 36). That is the advice Vance recalls from his Mamaw and that is exactly the neoliberal sentiment so dominant today that discredits structural (read, governmental) assistance or restructuring efforts in areas in which capitalism fails or which the market abandons. This directly influences policy which directly influences the lives of the working class.

The neoliberal dream is complicated and Vance is not the only popular culture writer to cling to it. He advances a perspective that can only be understood within its own structures and systems, which, because they are so dominant in our current culture, we have a difficult time imagining could be otherwise:

> It's [Appalachia is] unquestionably beautiful, but its beauty is obscured by the environmental waste and loose trash that scatters the countryside. Its people are hardworking, except of course for the many food stamp recipients who show little interest in honest work (Vance, 2016, p. 21).

Vance misses an opportunity to make an important connection between "interest in honest work" and the environmental and historical context of labor of the region. Environmental waste scatters the countryside precisely because of the jobs available in the area. Those responsible for that waste (largely coal companies) are not held accountable, rather such a landscape is seen as a reflection of those who have to often been treated as "by-products" by the companies for which they work.

When discussing his upbringing and his own positionality, Vance looks to his grandparents as sources of strength. "Both did their part to ensure that I had the self-confidence and the right opportunities to get a fair shot at the American Dream" (Vance, 2016, p. 23). Vance also acknowledges education as a critical factor in his own ability successfully to realize the "American Dream," but he does not address structural issues that often limit opportunities for others in the region (including his mother). As he noted, "[T]oday people look at me, at my job, and my Ivy League credentials, and assume that I'm some sort of genius, that only a truly extraordinary person could have made it to where I am today" (Vance, 2016, p. 2). Being a white, cis-gendered-heterosexual-het man whose family, for at least for a period in his life, enjoyed an income of more than $100,000 did make me wonder whether Vance's ascent was truly as extraordinary as he appears to believe. A law degree from Yale is a great accomplishment and Vance has much of which to be proud, but he did not realize those accomplishments solely on the basis of his personal capacities. We live in a social system that caters to the success of men like Vance … even those who come from Appalachia. While we are in a patriarchal capitalist economy, we also are living in a time when the dominant social frame systematically blames poverty on the impoverished. That is what is exceptionally strange about this story—Vance's lack of attention to systemic and structural inequalities.

Given this reality, it is important to explore the ways in which Vance understands the neoliberal system that now dominated the United States and how individuals and communities function within it. In lieu of acknowledging that overarching set of claims and its roles in the conditions that Appalachia's residents confront, Vance contends, "To these folks, poverty is a family tradition" (Vance, 2016, p. 3). Time and again, Vance embraces notions of a "culture of poverty" in his memoir. Poor people beget poor people and poverty is their culture of choice seems to be his logic. This proposition is nothing new and it surely reflects and perpetuates a social stereotype of the poor in the United States, but is has also been disproven repeatedly as economists and analysts have learned about how capitalism and varying methods of economic oppression work. Vance's use of fatalism ("it is no surprise that we are a pessimistic bunch" (2016, p. 4)), depiction of the region and his evocation of those with a "hillbilly identity" as constituting a pre-modern space, and his continual (and repetitive) invocation of "hillbilly

justice" (read: violent stories of his uncles beating men unconscious (Vance, 2016, pp. 14, 17)) are all long-lived stereotypic generalizations that Appalachian Studies educators work against daily. These claims are nothing new, and they are certainly not the future of Appalachia. Rather, the future is being built by activists, scholars, farmers, preachers, lawyers, yogis, filmmakers, artists and others who reject such misleading characterizations as they search for possibilities to survive and thrive *together* in the region.

Why *these* myths? Why these stories?

These stories are tired, but they are known. Such generalizations (the region's supposed violence, whiteness, overwhelming poverty and rurality) allow Vance to identify with Appalachia in an essentializing and comfortable way. One quick glance at the "Appalachian Americans" Facebook page and it is clear that the relationships people build with one another, which allow them to self-identify and be a part of a place, are often reliant on dominant stories and value systems, or at least on a common rhetoric and vocabulary. As Powell has observed, "[r]egions are not so much places themselves, but ways of describing relationships among places" (Powell, 2012, p. 10). The ability to re-tell accounts of such ties and his willingness to relate these dominant social generalizations of Appalachia constitute Vance's "membership" in the region for his readers in a way that accords with stereotypes, rather than revealing the inspiring solutions and alternatives now in play across Appalachia. It is easier to draw on a stereotype than to imagine a different way of knowing.

In this way, Vance's account of his life to date finds Appalachia again serving dominant social, cultural and political forces, rather than being explored as the vital and diverse region it is. For Vance, Appalachia is the setting—a relatable and believable one, in his presentation—in which white patriarchal heteronormative capitalist dreams may be born. As he frames his experiences, Vance is a wonderful poster child for the individualistic myth many have adopted in a neoliberal age.

Too often we miss the hidden resistances, the hidden structures of privilege and disenfranchisement because "the story" of Appalachia has been the story of "mountain whites" specifically, white men from the mountains. This makes invisible the diversity and many of the radical movements which the region should be celebrating. For example, how different would this story be if Vance were a woman? Queer? A person of color? Dis/abled? And how different would this story be if we were to think beyond capitalism? These questions and alternative avenues for exploration require an acknowledgment of privilege, which, indeed, is one productive conversation that could possibly come from discussions of this book.

What do we actually learn from this narrative?

Human beings generalize. We essentialize in order to understand, and in doing so, too often learn very little. Our performative self-construction is not questioned in a productive way. We validate our "Appalachian-ness" through the thickness of our vowels and through the food we make and surely this is a dangerous practice. In performing an "authentic" identity, privilege and discussions about intersectional struggles are lost in the dominating myths of what it means "to be" from this region. Vance does this through erroneous contentions, such as the claim that "[W]e do not like outsiders or people who are different from us, whether the importance lies in how they look, how they act, or how they talk" (Vance, 2016, p. 3). But who is "they" and who are "we" and how do we deal with shifts in these seemingly concrete identities?

Shak'ar Mujukian recently published a brilliant blog post, "The Queer Poor Aesthetic," not in response to Vance's text specifically, but to address stereotypical performances of identities and shared experiences without shared socio-economic positionality:

> Class is powerful for another reason: it shapes how we view and in turn treat groups of people. Class structurally disenfranchises and criminalizes marginalized communities: it's how anti-Black and anti-Latinx racism, transphobia, misogyny, and nearly every other kind of oppression legally operate and take real form.
>
> That's why it's necessary to treat class how we treat race, color, gender, and sexuality. But first, we need to start by talking about it. (Checking your class privilege once is like saying 'I'm a white male—I have privilege,' and stopping there.) We need to have an ongoing, honest conversation and *not* abuse the ways in which we self-identify for our own benefit.
>
> Our community has a phobia of privilege—especially when it's ours. Because privilege isn't cool anymore, we're taking great measures to downplay ours and only selectively highlight the ways in which we're oppressed. Because class is relatively invisible and awkward, it's easiest to hide—especially when we're marginalized in other ways …
>
> If we are participating in this movement to destroy and bring visibility to all forms of oppression, we have to stop glamorizing the queers who are highest on the food chain and listen to and empower those who are most marginalized. We have to deconstruct the fucked up, invisible ways that we've been programmed to think and feel. And we must start by being honest about ourselves, our privilege, and our politics (Mujukian, 2016).

Hillbilly Elegy may be Vance's honest account of his life to date, but it is a cripplingly limited gaze. Historically and culturally it is not a full picture of Appalachia. Perhaps Vance is unaware of the powerful movements in the region. Perhaps he is unaware of Appalachian Studies. Affect and somatic modes of intellect are integrated in the neoliberal era. We no longer

distinguish the difference between fact and feeling. So, what is clear by the book's number 9 debut on the *New York Times* bestseller list is that Vance is an author who has found a hungry audience, weaving the stories readers need to hear in a time of affect driven politics; politics not about policy, but about representation of who we want to be and the power we are afraid we are losing. It is a story that celebrates a few individual success stories amidst widespread systemic inequality and fails to acknowledge how we are all deeply connected.

To return to the quotation with which I began this essay:

> At any site on the landscape, multiple definitions of a place are continually in play and at work, sometimes convivial and sometimes antagonistic. Ideas of property, of homeland, of natural resource, of infrastructure; of city, county, school district, economic development zone, environmental hazard; of shit-hole, unspoiled paradise, dullsville; of wildness and weirdness and domestication and discipline–all swirl and interconnect and contend and contest in any given space (Powell, 2012, p. 5).

The Appalachian story is not given room to swirl, interconnect and contend in Vance's narrative. The hillbilly is not afforded space to be characterized fully. With statements such as, "Thanks to the massive migration from the poorer regions of Appalachia to places like Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Pennsylvania and Illinois, hillbilly values spread widely along with hillbilly people" (Vance, 2016, p 21), it is difficult to illuminate legacies of resistance or place-based oppression. "Hillbilly values," as Vance describe them, are tired stereotypes. What Vance does get correct is that migration and intertextual exchanges (horror films, music, cinema, and memoirs) have spread those characterizations and given them an undeserved place in the nation's social psyche. At any rate, to assume people from the region have similar values requires a grand level of essentializing. To assume that these values are something spread like an infectious disease is classist and class-phobic.

Vance concludes his introduction with the assertion that there are "no villains in this story"—just a "ragtag group of hillbillies" (Vance, 2016, p. 9). But there **are** indeed villains. The power to name such rogues represents the potential for change and here, in a critique of place, a celebratory song for the death of a region, authors and storytellers such as Vance are indeed villains—their "swansongs" are simply recreations/reincarnations of the structures that support systemic oppression and challenge transformation in the region. In lieu of embracing dominant neoliberal tropes and blaming those victimized by such thinking, analysts must identify the systemic oppressive self-governance of capitalistic systems as the actual "villain" in Appalachia's complex story.

While I value the power of affect, which Vance's memoir surely represents, what is missing from his story of "death" are the many births of alternative economic structures, creative place-making initiatives, and grassroots campaigns unfolding in the region every day. Indeed, ultimately what is missing from Vance's memoir is the strength and diversity of the region.

Notes

1.Local Color fiction refers to the post-Civil War literature movement which highlighted extreme characterizations of various localities in the United States. Appalachia was by far the most highly written about region.

2.Joseph Campbell (1988) has perhaps most famously written on the topic in *The Power of Myth,* New York: Doubleday.

3.See "Whitewashing Appalachian Diversity" by Rachel Ellen Smith for more on this: http://appvoices.org/2014/02/07/whitewashing-reality-diversity-in-appalachia-2/

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Globalization and Sustainable Development

Vanessa Guerra

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This article illustrates the variety of impacts and significance of globalization for the daily lives of individuals throughout the world. It also briefly examines the challenges the phenomenon presents, in order to highlight the ways that governance reforms may help public officials develop more sustainable forms of democratic political and economic development.

Defining globalization

Sparke (2014) has argued that globalization may be viewed as both a set of interconnections among economic, political and social factors, and as a buzz word. The first perspective suggests that globalization is a set of ties that are currently getting stronger and more influential in such domains as finance, transport and health. The second description suggests that although globalization consists of many relationships, it is also now used broadly rhetorically simply to suggest the reach and power of businesses and markets.

With these descriptions in mind, one may define globalization as the extension, intensification and acceleration of consequential international connections. According to Sparke (2014), this definition implies that individuals throughout the world are tied to globalization as citizens, workers, consumers, managers or shareholders involved directly or indirectly with transnational corporations, international institution or governments.

Sparke (2014) has argued that globalization began in earnest with the advent of neoliberalism, today's dominant public philosophy that advocates assigning as large a role as possible to markets in social decision-making and all segments of the political economy. Austrian economist and philosopher Friedrich Von Hayek, American President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) aggressively advocated and popularized this view. As it has been adopted ever more fully

in the U.S., Europe and beyond, neoliberalism has resulted in dramatic changes in virtually all dimensions of democratic governance as well as in family and community life.

"Developing nation governments must recognize that without efforts to promote adequate political representation and equitable wealth distribution within their countries, the current global economic structure will continue to create and deepen wealth and income disparities while eroding national sovereignty."
– Vanessa Guerra

Although individuals throughout the world may be touched by globalization's impacts directly or indirectly, Park (2013) has contended that the analytic challenge is to identify how those ties, and the public policies aimed at regulating them, affect those they touch. According to Sparke (2014), globalization is influencing people's everyday experiences by its direct application in different sectors, including:

- Reshaping the organization of how goods and services are consumed, produced and exchanged throughout the world, especially by globalizing production and consumption of many goods and services.
- Revolutionizing financial arrangements tied to global trade agreements.
- Reconfiguring the roles of government and governance by changing how policy is imagined and by creating global interconnections that often constitute forms of political and economic control that influence and shape citizens' lives.
- Restructuring global health due to the effects of climate change and international economic growth.

Although globalization affects the daily lives of individuals in nations throughout the world, how countries respond to it as a phenomenon remains a challenge. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that the ongoing globalization of travel and commerce will ultimately result in the erosion of national sovereignty itself by accelerating economic inequality and threatening genuine representation of citizen views.

Globalization and its challenges

The fact that globalization ultimately is a negotiation in which some players are more powerful and influential than others (Heshmati, 2004), makes it harder to understand how to approach international free trade agreements objectively without being influenced by the interests of the most dominant actors in the domain. Given these realities, Sparke (2014) has

argued that it is essential that national and local governments focus on efforts to ensure opportunities for the exercise of democratic voice by means of guaranteeing affected populations' their human rights.

Additionally, since globalization generates profits (which usually go overseas) for multinational corporations (MNCs), it is important that developing nation governments ensure that those firms are fairly taxed on the earnings they obtain from operations in their countries. This step ensures a more equal distribution of income while acknowledging the value created by the labor of those working for the corporations in affected nations. Park (2013) has argued similarly that a share of the profits of MNCs should be redirected via taxation to the populations helping to create them.

Haskel et al. (2012) have likewise noted that famed economist John Maynard Keynes, and later, financier and philanthropist, George Soros, have both highlighted the fact that although globalization can provide cities and countries opportunities, it can also create and increase income and wealth inequality within their populations as some profit from firm activities and others do not.

Schuftan (2003) has illustrated how economic globalization is contributing to growth in income inequality in the United States with the following example: Multi-national corporations shift their production to other countries to take advantage of lower land acquisition prices and pollution standards as well as wages, resulting in significant cost savings and higher profits. However, this trend has reduced the relative number of such manufacturing positions available in the U.S. labor force, resulting in economic hardship for those individuals directly touched and ripple effects for all living in the affected communities.

According to Heshmati (2004) globalization directly benefits those corporations that can pursue it by way of the profits it generates for their managers and shareholders. Meanwhile, competing firms with less capital may be driven out of business and whole communities severely negatively affected by off-shoring decisions. Sheng (2015) has argued that this cycle is a primary cause of the significant and growing revenue and profitability gap between large transnational corporations and businesses unable to operate globally. Many manufacturing MNCs have been able to increase their profits while their line workers have either lost their employment or have faced increased competition from other production sites abroad (Azzimonti and Quaduni, 2014).

As Haskel et al. (2012) have observed, another illustration of globalization's often adverse income equality effects is the difference between the compensation that CEOs of America's largest corporations are paid on average versus the wages of their firms' typical employees. Thirty years ago that gap was a multiple of 20 while today that product is more than 400 times higher. As Sheng (2015) has contended, current wealth disparities

across nations do not necessarily mean that individuals within them are earning less money, but that the salaries they earn are being distributed differently. This is a brief for sustained efforts to include and/or expand human rights and social justice in local and national policy agendas.

What is next?

As globalization continues to grow and large transnational corporations expand and earn higher profits, inequality in national populations is also likely to rise unless steps to stop it from doing so are undertaken. Although these trends are alarming, they may be viewed as an opportunity to develop appropriate policies that support economic growth without creating such vast economic inequalities among citizens.

While globalization has many complex layers, its ill effects are neither inevitable nor unstoppable. Developing nation governments must recognize that without efforts to promote adequate political representation and equitable wealth distribution within their countries, the current global economic structure will continue to create and deepen wealth and income disparities while eroding national sovereignty.

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"Hogra" and Youth Exclusion in the MENA region

Nada Berrada

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Hogra is a word used in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia to describe the anger, rage and humiliation experienced by individuals and communities that have been deprived of their basic human rights. Hogra is the feeling of exclusion one experiences when it becomes evident that you are not being treated equitably or fairly in the provision of public services or in the protection of your civil or human rights. It may manifest itself in an encounter with a public official who refuses, for no defensible reason, to provide a copy of one's birth certificate, when one is denied health care because of their poverty or social background or when a police officer abuses his power during a public protest concerning the need for employment. Hogra describes a perceived loss of dignity.

Hogra is what Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor likely felt when he set himself on fire in response to the degrading confiscation of his wares at the hands of a municipal official on December, 17, 2010. This tragic event became the catalyst of the Tunisian revolution and triggered other serious protests against the institutionalized humiliation that some other governments in the MENA region had also long practiced. Young protesters from Morocco to Yemen criticized a lack of job opportunities during 2010-2011 protests, as well as the difficult political circumstances fueled by the frequent abuse of the rule of law by local authorities in those nations.

Hogra is both a cause and a consequence of the parlous conditions youth face in the MENA nations. Boudarbat and Ajbilou have defined exclusion in the context of Morocco as, "not just a condition, but rather a process which marginalizes certain individuals" (2007, p.5). They have argued that youth exclusion from society is not solely economic, but also political, social and cultural and have emphasized that five main drivers work to marginalize young people: poor economic performance, rapid urbanization, persistent poverty, poorly performing labor markets and family dynamics. These realities explain how exclusion manifests itself in Morocco and in the MENA[1] region more generally.

Social and economic marginalization sets young people from impoverished households apart from mainstream society and limits their opportunities to exercise agency and to participate in a wide range of

activities. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2016), with unemployment levels exceeding 30 percent in most MENA countries and an even greater share of young men and women underemployed or out of the labor force, those nations are deprived of a key source of their future social and economic development. This does not necessarily imply that these youths are not seeking such possibilities. Overall, despite the challenges they face and the difficulties implicit in providing avenues for their productive engagement, MENA nation underprivileged youth represent key potential agents for efforts aimed at securing positive socio-economic change:

"National strategies for youth inclusion should be planned and implemented with young people's participation because, without their vigorous involvement, such policies are likely to reflect their needs poorly and therefore, are as likely to fail." -Nada Berrada

> Young Arabs have a lot of momentum to contribute to their communities and become agents of positive change in their countries' economies. In general, the tension that exists between human potential and utilization lies not in a lack of purpose, but instead in the perceived and real dearth of economic opportunities (Gallup, 2009).

Avoiding Hogra: The imperative of youth inclusion in MENA nations

Indeed, youths represent tremendous social promise in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. They are vital to their societies for at least three reasons. The first is that they constitute more than half the population of the MENA region. The United Nations Population Division (2011) estimated in 2010 that one in five people living in the MENA area belonged to the youth demographic category, that is, aged between 15 and 24. That group included nearly 90 million individuals in 2010. The number of people in this age cohort is expected to grow in most Middle East and North African countries by 2 percent each year for the next 10 years. In comparison, analysts expect worldwide population growth to rise 1.2 percent per year during the same period. This fast-growing young people's cadre in the MENA region has created what analysts refer to as "a youth bulge," a baby boom of sorts. Lin has defined the youth bulge as, "a stage of development where a country achieves success in reducing infant mortality, but mothers still have a high fertility rate" (2012). This results in a relatively high portion of the overall population being comprised of children and young adults.

Understanding the importance of this demographic trend is essential if the region's governments are to help manage the transition of these youths to adulthood effectively.

Not only is this group of young people very large, but they must also navigate

many of life's crucial transitions in a relatively short period as they become adults. The World Development Report on Development and the Next Generation has identified five main possible major transitions that MENA youths may potentially undergo: learning, working, migrating, staying healthy and forming families (World Bank, 2007a; 2007b). This list of milestones includes pursuing secondary and higher education and/or entering the job market, matching their interests and skills with education and opportunities available to them as well as considering migration to obtain better employment and living conditions. However, not all youths have the aim and/or the opportunity to undergo all of the transitions considered by the Report, such as migrating or forming families. In addition, the Report did not analyze explicitly the additional dynamics attending passage from adolescence to adulthood, which include the emotional transformations that accompany that process. Nonetheless, given the large demographic they represent and the pressure they are under individually and collectively to attain economic independence, youths are as important to their countries, as their nations are essential to them in helping manage their transitions to adult life. The mutual dependence between youths and their respective countries is important and significant.

A third reason young people are crucial to the MENA region arises because their success or failure is closely intertwined with the trajectories and fates of their countries. A democratic and economic transition of the MENA area cannot occur without ensuring youth employment opportunities and social inclusion. The "Arab Spring" is a perfect illustration. Young people took to the streets from Morocco to Yemen to protest their governments' inability to govern transparently, secure economic prosperity and encourage job growth. The present scenario in many MENA nations ultimately deprives young people of their innate dignity as they finish even university level education and confront labor markets that simply cannot provide anything like all those who are qualified reasonable employment possibilities.

As Fuller (2004) has explained, a large youth cohort intensifies and exacerbates many existing social problems. For example, it places major new strains on educational facilities, social services, housing and employment needs, which, when unmet, may lead to social instability, volatility and radicalization. This is in no way to imply that the youth bulge is *per se* negative. However, affected governments in the MENA region must cope with the reality that without appropriate opportunities to channel young peoples' energy, skills and potential, radicalism, delinquency and marginalization may find fertile ground.

Challenging assumptions

When thinking about this region-wide challenge, it is important first to emphasize that youth issues are cross-sectoral; that is, young people make demands on and also help to shape many social concerns including, education, health, governance and employment patterns, as well as unemployment. Taking into consideration how important these matters are in society, youth roles deserve sustained policy-maker attention. Ministries directly addressing young people's concerns should seek to coordinate their work with other concerned ministries as well as civil society entities so that youth needs can be met in an integrated way.

Second, national strategies for youth inclusion should be planned and implemented with young people's participation because, without their vigorous involvement, such policies are likely to reflect their needs poorly and therefore, are as likely to fail. Third, as highlighted above, government officials should not view youths as a threat, but instead as sources of tremendous potential for MENA countries. This orientation suggests in turn that all steps aimed at supporting them should be guided by a belief in their potential and not by fear that they represent a ticking bomb. Viewing young people as a threat rather than a partner for development and well-being is likely to undermine the "bulge" cohort's belief in the legitimacy of the government officials with whom they are dealing and perhaps, the credibility of the regime those individuals represent as well. Meanwhile, too, state authorities should not turn a blind eye to the seriousness of a growing sense of Hogra among the area's youths as the growth of the phenomenon represents a social malaise that undermines young people's trust in their country's political institutions.

Last, but not least, social inclusion and participation is paramount to unleashing the enormous capabilities of the young people of the region. Their possibility is not fulfilled solely through education and employment, but also enabled through volunteering and the work of civil society organizations. Needless to say that engagement is not inherently positive, but it represents a potential to be a significant force for civic stability and deepening democratization.

Conclusion

The term Hogra is difficult to translate because it embodies feelings attached to the violation of human dignity. Pertaining to young people, Hogra depicts a reality in the MENA region that helps to underscore the imperative need to ensure effective youth social and economic inclusion in MENA countries. The fast-growing cadre of young people in the MENA

nations represent tremendous potential, but unless the area's governments address the root causes of Hogra successfully, that possibility may never be realized.

Notes

1.The MENA region, as defined here, includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

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PART VI

PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES

The essays in this section explore collective decision making and action in the context of state institutions and civil society. Following Winter (2011), we assume that democracy is predicated on the social character of the citizens on which it depends. More, we assume that democratic institutions must routinely produce citizens with capacities that allow them to engage in meaningful self-governance. This demand implies that citizens must exercise agency and responsibility for themselves while also taking into account what their actions mean for the freedom and capacities of their fellow citizens. Furthermore, as Blunden (2016) has noted, we assume that collective democratic decision processes shape those who participate in them by encouraging participants to develop a social consciousness that is sensitive to the ways that other citizens may understand the world and their capacity to act within it.

Indeed, the notion of collective moral responsibility is crucial in participatory democracy and runs as a central thread through these essays. Isaacs (2011) has argued that moral responsibility must be practiced at both individual and group levels, which inform each other in many ways. She explains that collective moral responsibility is a function of the agency of individuals acting in groups that are capable of intentional action. Although specific people may share a goal and contribute to its achievement, only such groupings are responsible for the ultimate outcome. This view of moral responsibility as a multi-scalar phenomenon is personally empowering, as it suggests that together with others, individuals can make a difference after all.

In the first essay, Hanks analyzes the principles of shared governance and shared leadership in the nonprofit sector. She highlights the importance of the dual roles of donors as monitors of nonprofit organization accountability and as financiers and cheerleaders for social innovation. Walz examines the different schools of thought concerning academic freedom, one of the most important values and an essential characteristic of American higher education, and reflects on how that construct fits within the broader notion of political freedom in U.S. society. His reflection can surely inform higher education leaders as they work to enact more equitable and democratic

policies and practices. Stubberfield explores identity formation in American politics and highlights potential sites of democratic resistance. Ryan explores the ongoing debate over the reach, character and appropriateness of surveillance technologies and the profound questions it has raised related to trust, consent and democratic agency. She considers the potential impacts of these technologies for democratic practices in the United States.

Linder-Zarankin discusses the role of local actors in disaster response with the goal of obtaining a better sense of what capacities these local institutions may bring and of developing strategies by which their leaders could coordinate with emergency authorities and mobilize their resources when disasters strike. Drawing on her personal experiences as a 2016 Paralympics volunteer in Rio de Janeiro and the reflections of several of her peers, Kirakosyan outlines her understanding of the unique ways that the Paralympic context can elicit volunteer motivation and provide personal satisfaction. Keyel explores democratically organized cooperatives as an example of sites in which democracy as active self-governance may be realized in their members' daily lives. Lastly, Stubberfield explores the effects of the so-called "fake news" phenomenon for U.S. politics and explains how this phenomenon has been propelled by capital interests and transmitted by social media users' consumptive choices. He concludes by suggesting that the fake news controversy serves as a reminder of the power of the media in constructing our citizenry's political reality.

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Accountability in the Nonprofit Sector: The Donor's Role in Financing and Monitoring Social Change

Sarah Hanks

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The popular press and other mass communication outlets are replete today with expressions of concern about accountability in the nonprofit sector. The topic is also the focus of scholarly research that typically highlights the multifaceted responsibilities of nonprofit organization managers and trustees to meet the often competing and evolving mission and resource demands of their funders and the groups and communities they seek to serve. The significance of the role of donors in financing and monitoring nonprofit programs and services must not be underestimated. Indeed, it is critical as the sector seeks to address the shifting and evolving challenges facing communities today. This essay provides a brief overview of the growth of the sector and highlights the importance of the dual roles of donors as monitors of nonprofit organization internal controls and reporting and of serving as financiers and cheerleaders of social innovation. These responsibilities are not always readily reconciled, but they must be managed adroitly if nonprofits are to serve as agents of positive social change.

The growth of the sector

The economic impact of the nonprofit sector reaches far beyond the individual organizations and immediate groups and communities it serves. Based on data collected from 1990-1999, for example, the annual cost incurred by governments, directly and indirectly, to sustain the nonprofit sector was estimated to be approximately $165.8 billion, a figure that includes tax deductions, tax exemptions (local, state, and federal), and the "indirect value of other tax preferences" (Lee, 2004, p. 172).

Meanwhile, Petrovits, Shakespeare and Shih (2011) have estimated the sector is responsible for more than $3.4 trillion in assets. Furthermore, charitable giving in 2013 exceeded $335.17 billion, representing approximately 2 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), an increase of 4.4 percent in such contributions compared to the prior year (Charity

Navigator, 2015). During the past four decades, the sector's organizations have maintained this share of the GDP, despite sometimes challenging economic conditions and episodic public concern regarding their accountability, performance outcomes and effectiveness (Ibid).

"Donors play an important role in holding nonprofits accountable for exercising strong internal controls, which often results in more accurate and transparent financial reporting and stronger allocation of resources to key strategic priorities."
-Sarah Hanks

The continued growth of the sector has been driven, in part, by donors who believe nonprofits are positioned to offer more cost-effective services that better meet the needs of marginalized populations than many governmental entities (Ebrahim, 2003). Ebrahim has highlighted the relationships these expectations create, "There is thus a resource interdependence (albeit often asymmetric) in which NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] rely on donors for money, and donors rely on NGOs for their reputations in development" (2003, p. 814). Funder beliefs and aspirations create a variety of often competing accountability claims that play significant roles in shaping the management and governance contexts and potentials of the nonprofit organizations they support. In particular, financial supporters provide NGOs incentives to serve certain social needs and groups and not others, and to do so only in the ways those individuals perceive to be appropriate and effective.

Administrative controls and reporting

Although they vary widely by organization within the sector, metrics of effectiveness and performance can reveal both community support for a nonprofit's mission and how its backers envision its services will affect those targeted. Donors play an important role in holding nonprofits accountable for exercising strong internal controls, which often results in more accurate and transparent financial reporting and stronger allocation of resources to key strategic priorities. As Petrovits et al. have reported, "donors give less to organizations that overstate mission-related expenses and understate fundraising expenses, providing support for the idea that donors can unravel low-quality financial statements" (2011, p. 332). They further assert that, "organizations with internal control problems receive 3.8 percent less public support and 2.1 percent less government support in the years following the exposure of an internal control weakness" (Petrovits et al., 2011, p. 335). Supporters do not appear to be concerned with organizational compliance with national initiatives as a criterion for giving, as robust as those are. However, their financial investments often lead to deeper involvement in governance functions within the organizations they support.

For example, Callen, Klein, and Tinkelman (2003) found that major donors serving on finance or audit committees sought systematically to reduce administrative costs and increase program-related expenditures, thus enhancing the relative capacity of their organizations' efforts to achieve its mission. This finding was consistent with prior research that major donors can influence management expenses by securing representation on an appropriate committee (Hodge and Piccolo, 2005). Yetman and Yetman (2004) have asserted that "market-based governance" (i.e., the involvement of donors, lenders, and other intermediaries in oversight and governance activities) consistently results in higher-quality reporting due to the immediate, personal and pragmatic relationship among management and governing stakeholders. These authors also have suggested that the accuracy of reported charitable expenses varies in expected ways such that users, often donors, lenders and other regulatory agencies can have more confidence in the financial reports of organizations employing market-based strategies (Yetman and Yetman, 2011). Donor involvement in governance constitutes a critical component of organizational oversight, shaping the perception of financial reports, the quality of internal controls and the mission-orientation of the organization.

Tension at the intersection of philanthropy and accountability

The tension at the intersection of primary funder responsibilities —supporting social change and holding organizations accountable for their effectiveness and mission attainment—highlights the significance of donors' engagement in philanthropy as a cornerstone of the nonprofit sector. As Ebrahim (2003) has observed, the interdependence of these responsibilities may serve the sector well, inspiring engagement and active citizenship to ensure that the charitable purposes of one's investment are achieved. This tension, one of competing roles, places donors in a position to influence the character of social change. It also allows givers to play significant roles in determining accountability measures and the design of relevant public policy. Nevertheless, ultimately, supporters' rights are limited—legally and socially. Aside from pursuing an active role in governance and oversight efforts, a dissatisfied donor has few options except to limit future financial contributions.

Is this tension adequate to moderate the value of philanthropy within the sector, and simultaneously, result in effective accountability measures for nonprofits? Does this present risks that may jeopardize donor engagement? How are these tensions managed, practically, within the complex and ever-changing environment in which nonprofits find themselves situated today? As the sector responds to these and other tensions that arise as a result of

engaged governance and management, it is imperative to reconsider the role of donors in financing and monitoring social change and in securing NGO accountability.

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Academic Freedom: Anarchistic Brouhaha or Ordered Liberty?

Jerald H. Walz

(Originally published on December 10, 2015)

In his classic essay, *Two Concepts of Liberty*, political philosopher Isaiah Berlin (2002) argued that freedom can be understood in two forms: negative and positive. Negative freedom is "*freedom from* interference" (Warburton, 2001, p. 5). Positive freedom is the "*freedom to* do something" (Warburton, 2001, p. 8). For Berlin, positive freedom answers the question, "By whom am I to be governed?" while negative freedom addresses the question, "How much am I to be governed?" (2002, p. 39). Although Berlin argued that throughout history negative and positive freedom had come to be in "direct conflict with each other," he nevertheless understood that some might consider the two "concepts at no great logical distance from each other—no more than negative and positive ways of saying much the same thing" (2002, p. 178).

Indeed, some political thinkers (Gray, 1991, p. 7; MacCallum, 1967) have argued that all freedom can be simplified to the formula: *X* is free from *Y* to do or be *Z*. Regardless of the fact that Berlin (2002, p. 36) rejected the single, simplified formula that "all" freedom is both simultaneously negative and positive,[1] it is nevertheless a useful way to synthesize and conceptualize the ideas that encompass "freedom." This essay examines, under the lens of this formula, the different schools of thought concerning academic freedom, one of the most important values and an essential characteristic of American higher education (Alexander and Alexander, 2011; American Association of University Professors [AAUP], n.d.; Kaplin and Lee, 2014; O'Neil, 2011; Poch, 1993).

Most scholars enjoy academic freedom in higher education institutions in the United States. One definition of the construct, developed by 23 university presidents at a conference held at Columbia University in 2005, suggested that it is, "the freedom to conduct research, teach, speak, and publish, subject to the norms and standards of scholarly inquiry, without interference or penalty, wherever the search for truth and understanding may lead" (Global Colloquium of University Presidents [GCUP], 2005). Additionally, a professional association, the American Association of

University Professors (AAUP), has issued declarations asserting and defining university faculty members' academic freedom (American Association of University Professors, 2015).

> "Whichever view of academic freedom one adopts, the challenge is to balance freedom with order. [...] Ultimately, academic freedom is rooted in a broader idea of political freedom that allows government to control the governed and, hopefully, itself."
> – Jerald H. Walz

Although throughout its history the AAUP has sought to define academic freedom canonically, Fish (2014) has identified five separate schools of thought concerning the concept. He has hypothesized that these perspectives fall along a spectrum between two opposing views, "marked by the transfer of emphasis from *academic*, which names a local and specific habitation of the asserted freedom, to *freedom*, which does not limit the scope or location of what is being asserted at all" (Fish, 2014, p. 4). At one end of the distribution are analysts who suggest that academic freedom is "peculiar to the academic profession and limited to the performance of its core duties," while at the other end, it is "a general, overriding, and ever-expanding value," and the university is just one setting in which it is exercised (Fish, 2014, p. 6). As such, the greater the assertion of "academic freedom," the smaller the limiting force of the adjective *academic* is likely to be emphasized. Thus, the views Fish identified can be arrayed along a continuum between these two poles or definitions, illustrating the reach of academic freedom. The choices extend from right to left along a spectrum, from the most conservative view of academic freedom to the most radical, from professional service at one end to political action at the other, from an emphasis on the academy to an emphasis on the larger question of freedom (Fish, 2014). Figure 1 illustrates these schools of thought. By examining these five views, I investigate how the spectrum of academic freedom fits within the broader notion of freedom; that is, of where *X* is free from *Y* to do or be *Z*.

Figure 1. **Five schools of Academic Freedom (adapted from Fish, 2014).**

Academic freedom as revolution	Academic freedom as critique	Academic exceptionalism	For the common good	It's just a job
Freedom	←	*Emphasis*	→	Academic
Expanding	←	*Purpose*	→	Limited
Political	←	*Professor's role*	→	Professional
Left	←	*Politics of the academy*	→	Right

At the right pole stands the professional or *"It's just a job"* view (Fish, 2014). Purveyors of this argument contend that academic freedom protects only "the distinctive task—the advancement of knowledge"—that professors legitimately perform as paid and trained professionals, and in which they have professional competence, and to which they have been assigned by contract or course catalogue (Fish, 2014, p. 10). Fish (2014), the self-proclaimed sole member of this perspective, has sharply distinguished academic work from the practice of politics. He has argued that an imperative arises from the nature of scholarship, which he has dubbed "academicizing" (Fish, 2014, p. 31). This obligation requires discussing classroom topics in an, "academic context where inquiries into its structure, history, significance and value are conducted by means of the traditional methods (textual, archival, statistical, experiment) of humanities, social science, and physical science scholarship" (Fish, 2014, p. 31). Thus, in this version of academic freedom, a topic of discussion is the "object of analysis rather than the vehicle of an agenda" (Fish, 2014, p. 32). In this view, professors are free from interference as they seek to address their job-related functions for the benefit of their students.

Moving to the left along the continuum, the next school of thought is called, *"For the common good."* Adherents of this perspective share many characteristics with the "It's just a job" proponents, especially the understanding of the academic role as distinctive. However, those embracing this stance justify academic freedom by connecting it to democracy, to the refinement of public opinion and to solving society's problems. Democracy, this argument goes, can only flourish when citizens possess capacity to make wise decisions (Fish, 2014). This is "democratic competence" or "the cognitive empowerment of persons within public discourse, which in part depends on their [citizens'] access to disciplinary knowledge" (Post, 2012, p. 34). According to this understanding, professors are "the [civic] priests of our democracy" whose "special task" is, "to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who in turn make possible enlightened and effective public opinion" (*Wieman v. Updegraph*, 1952, p. 196). That is, scholars should enjoy academic freedom because democracy can only function effectively if the knowledge they produce is available to the citizenry (Fish, 2014). Thus, this perspective subordinates academe's professional values to the "higher" values of democracy, justice, freedom and the common good. Professors may pursue scholarly inquiry without interference because doing so will benefit society and serve the commons.

Continuing left along the spectrum of possible justifications for academic freedom, the third view, a logical extension of the second, is the *"Academic exceptionalism or uncommon beings"* school. Proponents of this conceptualization argue that since scholars have an uncommon

task—extending knowledge and (often) countering common public opinion—they are themselves distinctive intellectually and morally, and should not be bound by the same laws and regulations that apply to ordinary citizens (Fish, 2014). Since they are exceptional, they should enjoy a type of freedom different than ordinary citizens do—academic freedom. Like those who embrace the "common good" view, proponents of this perspective often cite Justice Felix Frankfurter's contention that professors serve as the "[civic] priests of our democracy" (*Wieman v. Updegraph*, 1952, p. 196). Further evidence of this point-of-view may be found in federal court cases where public university professors have argued that even though they are employed by a state, they should not be considered "public employees" in the same way others engaged in civil service are (Fish, 2014). In one such case, several scholars argued that a state law, "even if the Act is valid as to the majority of state employees, … violates the First Amendment academic freedom rights of professors … and thus is invalid as to them" (*Urofsky v. Gilmore*, 2000, p. 409). One commentator has argued the point differently, but with the same emphasis on academic exceptionalism: "The professoriate … whatever its legal status … should not be thought of in terms of an employment relationship *at all"* (Finkin, 1988, p. 1339). In this view, scholars are free from most interference to perform tasks to which they alone are uniquely situated: extending knowledge and informing public opinion.

The *"Academic freedom as critique"* school sits still further left along the spectrum shown in Figure 1. In this fourth understanding of academic freedom, the professor's responsibility is to offer dissent and provide critique, "to see through the conventional wisdom and expose its contradictions" (Fish, 2014, p. 12). This requires academic freedom because it "protects those whose thinking challenges orthodoxy" (Scott, 1996, p. 163). Even accepted scholarly practices that constitute professional norms are open to scrutiny:

> 'As long as voices of dissent are only admissible if they conform to accepted professional norms, then dissent itself is limited so that it cannot take aim at those norms that are already accepted [and] new fields or disciplinary paradigms,' will not be discovered (Butler, 2006, p. 114).

In this way, academic freedom not only protects dissent, but also underpins political engagement and social progress. Indeed, some progressives contend this progress is the sole possession of the political left, since conservative thought protects the status quo and is reactionary (Fish, 2014). This understanding blurs the lines between the academic profession and political activism and results in an almost boundless conception of academic freedom

(Fish, 2014). In this view, professors are free from almost all interference outside and inside academe to offer dissent and promote social progress through political activism.

Finally, the *"Academic freedom as revolution,"* or fifth perspective, is located at the extreme left of the continuum illustrated in Figure 1. In this understanding, academic freedom is radical, individual and unlimited, and professors act as iconoclasts (Fish, 2014). This argument allows scholars to advance social justice through education defined as political action, even breaking free from the "constraints" of the "corrupt" university and academy to do so (Fish, 2014, pp. 14-15). Giroux, for example, has contended that such teaching includes fighting for,

> An inclusive and radical democracy by recognizing that education in the broadest sense is not just about understanding … but also about providing the conditions for assuming the responsibilities we have as citizens to expose human misery and to eliminate the conditions that produce it (Giroux, 2008, p. 128).

In this view, professors are free from all interference, whatever its source, to promote radical democratic activity, inside and outside the university.

Denis Rancourt, a former physics professor at the University of Ottawa, exemplifies this approach (Fish, 2014). Having recast a course on environmental physics into a seminar on revolutionary activity (Fish, 2014), Rancourt became known for the practice of "academic squatting." This term has been used to describe instances when a professor radically transforms an assigned course responsibility into a class in political activism (Rancourt, 2007). As Rancourt (2007, p. 108) has argued, "Academic squatting is needed because universities are dictatorships, devoid of real democracy, run by self-appointed executives who serve private capital interests." Those who embrace this argument see academic freedom as possessing no bounds, except those voluntarily adopted by individual professors (Fish, 2014).

Whichever view of academic freedom one adopts, the challenge is to balance freedom with order. What James Madison argued in *Federalist 51* concerning governing society might easily also be applied to the academy:

> If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it control itself (1961, p. 322).

The idea of ordered liberty, "the ability to pursue the good in common with one's fellows," (Frohnen, 2006, p. 510) offers one solution to the challenge of

balancing freedom and order, both in society and academe. Applying this construct to academic freedom allows those pursuing scholarship freedom, while also maintaining the integrity of their shared enterprise. Surely, this latitude is equivalent at least to the narrowly defined academic freedom available from the *"It's just a job"* school of thought, but it is almost certainly more circumscribed than the radical, atomistic conception envisioned by the *"Academic freedom as revolution"* view.

Ultimately academic freedom is rooted in a broader idea of political freedom that allows government to control the governed and, hopefully, itself. This same freedom allows professors to govern their colleagues and themselves. In other words, freedom and self-restraint go hand-in-hand. Academic freedom as ordered liberty ensures that professors are free from many—and perhaps most, but certainly not all—constraints on their individual ability to pursue scholarly inquiry, without creating a social brouhaha.

Notes

1.Berlin took exception to the idea that "all" freedom is both negative and positive. Instead, he argued, "A man struggling against his chains or a people against enslavement need not consciously aim at any definite further state. A man need not know how he will use his freedom; he just wants to remove the yoke. So do classes and nations" (2002, p. 36).

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Beyond Interests: Symbiogenic Resonance and the Democratic Subject

Alex Stubberfield

(Originally published on March 31, 2016)

Wendy Brown's book, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution*, ends on a down note (2015, p. 222). In her view, Americans are doomed to lose our democratic identity through the creep of *homo economicus* as the hegemonic subjectivity through which we interpret and construct reality. She is at a loss as to what can be done to arrest this continuing phenomenon and does not believe U.S. society can recover from the overwhelming force of neoliberal political rationality as it reinterprets the objects of liberal ideology. In disdainful and mournful prose, she laments the major trends now occurring in what she takes to be the final battleground—higher education in the United States—as institutions of higher learning shirk their duties to students and faculty in order to reorganize to capture funds and treat students as cash registers. There is no room to save democracy in Brown's Kafkaesque picture of the subject if the last bastion of liberal values falls to the forces of unfettered competition and corporate-speak. Unfortunately, recent trends in American life appear to affirm her argument as we see the rise of authoritarianism on the right, and paranoia and fear infecting our political process. What hope can our democracy have if it loses the battle over its acculturation apparatus to those who advocate a continuing politics of dispossession and claim moral superiority over the growing legions of have-nots?

Ironically, Brown misses the formation of political subjectivity in her analysis. She does not see a way out of our present dismal situation because she has not considered all of the forces that organize the identity of Americans, and it is only through identity formation at the individual level that we may gain ground in understanding ourselves again as democratic subjects. Below, I employ Connolly (2013) and Cheney (1983) to sketch a fuller understanding of democratic mobilization and identity formation. I contend that Brown situates her argument at a structural level, which leads her to understand the formation of the subject by exploring the forces of political rationality, but that this is a myopic and misleading perspective. Connolly's work concerning *resonance* and *symbiogenesis* can and should be used to supplement Brown's understanding of *symbiosis*—a mutual

relationship shared between two disparate rationalities of social being. Connolly's theory operates at the group and individual level. Brown, on the other hand, is concerned with the structural level of subjectivity. Cheney (1983), meanwhile, is typically read in communications departments, but he situates his analysis concerning the formation of identity at the level of the individual, and it is that fact that offers a way out of the social predicament to which Brown has pointed. I argue that individual identities are not fixed and static, but are in constant flux as people interpret, reinterpret, and construct their social worlds. Corporate identities meanwhile are laden with values representative of individual organizations and play a role in personal formation. Nonetheless, while counterintuitive, I believe that democracy and the democratic subjectivity can be saved through the representations of corporate actors, so long, of course, as these messages are appropriate ones. I highlight two potential sites of democratic resistance in the conclusion.

"Citizens do possess the individual and collective capacity to inject democratic sensibilities and values into popular culture. Nonetheless, it will not be enough to pay mere lip service to democratic values—we must daily display, embody and demonstrate them."
-Alex Stubberfield

Brown, Connolly and symbiogenic resonance

Symbiogensis is a process of self-organization first applied to democratic and specifically American politics by William E. Connolly in *The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism* (2013, p. 27). Symbiogenesis is a notion of causation he had described in an earlier article, "The Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance Machine" (Connolly, 2005) There, he sought to explain how self-organization is possible through the use of *resonance* and, specifically, *resonance machines.* A resonance machine may be imagined as the confluence of practices—such as rituals, affinities and sensibilities— attaching to particular subjectivities shaped by shared identities and values. It is the amalgam of articulated and unarticulated desires operating at both conscious and subconscious levels based in and constitutive of group identities without sharing particular allegiance to any one source. A year later, Brown employed the concept of symbiosis while advancing an argument aimed at explaining—in terms similar to those Connolly has employed—how neoliberalism and neoconservatism interact in American politics, even though they, at times embrace disparate values (Brown, 2006). Her argument did not include resonance as a concept, but she did recognize the process of symbiosis as including the interests of individual subjects.

Connolly grounded his notion of resonance in identity to understand how disparate ways of being—in his analysis, the economic and religious—can be included in a single subject. He argued resonance is fueled by larger interests, such as church and industry, that operate at the level of groups. Connolly also suggested that resonance is broader than interest politics and operates at the level of symbolic representation through how individuals interpret reality (2005, p. 879). As he has suggested, "the evangelical-corporate resonance machine subsists as an unsung melody. It reverberates back and forth between leaders and followers, until it becomes uncertain who directs and sings the chorus" (Connolly, 2005, p. 879). Reverberation and an indeterminate chorus and chorus leader imply that resonance is an unconscious activity. Thus, his analysis goes beyond articulated interests because an interest, to have power in deliberation, must be apparent to the subject. Resonance, instead, operates at both the manifest levels of conscious thought, and as part of the background noise of personal identity. This "noise" aids in the construction of meaning constraining subjects' ability to manipulate symbols by creating broad public understandings of being *qua* subject. The interpretive frameworks for the construction of symbols adopted by subjects are thus grounded in both personal and group identity but operate exclusively at the public level. It is these shared understandings of being that help ground his notion of self-organization in democratic politics without reference to conscious activity at the level of interests. In an indictment of George W. Bush, he offered the following example of political messaging and symbolic interpretation:

> The crowd responded to the SUV as a symbol of disdain for womanly ecologists, safety advocates, supporters of fuel economy, weak willed pluralists, and internationalists. Bush played upon the symbol and drew energy from the crowd's acclamation of it. Resentment against those who express an ethos of care for the world was never named: a message expressed without being articulated (Connolly, 2005, p. 879).

Thus, symbols constitute a source of power in democratic politics and can operate subconsciously at the group level. For Connolly, symbiogenic organization is grounded in identity, connected through public understandings of being and reliant on interpretation as an activity at both the individual and group levels.

Brown's use of symbiosis adds another level of complexity to Connolly's work by suggesting that political and economic rationalities can converge at the public level. There is no need for her to address identity as she develops a structural narrative to argue that the subject created from the convergence of neoliberalism as political-economic rationality, and neoconservatism as political-moral rationality is gradually leading to the erosion and displacement of the democratic subjectivity (Brown, 2006, p. 702). Although

the rationalities clash and occasionally contradict one another in the values they evince, for Brown, she believes their symbiotic relationship spells the doom of the democratic subject. As she has contended,

> Neoconservatism sewn in the soil specifically prepared by neoliberalism breeds a new political form, a specific modality of governance and citizenship, one whose incompatibility with even formal democratic practices and institutions does not spur a legitimation crisis because of the neoliberal devaluation of these practices and institutions that neoconservatism then consecrates (Brown, 2006, p. 702).

Connolly's work concerning the evangelical-capitalist resonance machine connects Brown's argument to the level of identity via recognizing how symbiogenic organization occurs between subjects conditioned by structural political-economic rationalities. Brown's arguments are best understood at the structural level of *subjectivity,* while Connolly's contentions can be understood at the level of identity. Taken together, these theorists suggest a way to understand the connection between identity, economics, politics and interpretation.

But how is identity formed? While both theorists recognize the importance of identity, neither discusses how it arises. Why are certain people more prone to linking with the evangelical-capitalist resonance machine? I suggest this inclination can be explained in terms of consumption and messaging. Specifically, corporate speech acts and the consumption of their representations help explain—although not exhaustively—variance across individual and group identities. Individuals are at least partially what they consume, and what you consume is what is presented to you and selectively incorporated into your way of knowing the world. To clarify: I do not believe that we as consumers are brainwashed and helpless to buffer firms' messages. That stance would misunderstand how desires are manufactured and therefore the foundations of consumer society. If something is unappealing to our palates *writ large,* Americans can and daily do reject it and it disappears from the metaphoric menu.

However, to extend the metaphor, our choices of what to consume are to considerable degree constrained by what firms offer us. An example of this is the production of films and the repetition of genres and plots within them. We've all seen *a* romantic-comedy or *a* Western, and these forms are the result of larger archetypes and dominant social constructions that constrain and contextualize representation. Indeed, they make representation and information consumable. In this sense, Americans are agents in the production and consumption of representations that both populate and result from larger epistemic frameworks. The intersection of representation

and politics is essentially about what and how a subject consumes and what ideologies and rationalities lie behind consumed representations.

Cheney and the corporate 'I'

In "The Rhetoric of Identification and the Study of Organizational Communication," Cheney adopted a Burkean perspective on the formation of identity and performance through messaging to understand the dynamics involved in identity formation and group membership (Cheney, 1983). He specifically targeted the communications practices of American corporations in his analysis. Organizations have a vested interest in identity alignment between organizational and individual values at the level of employee identity (Cheney, 1983, p. 152). Taken as a collective, corporate organizations actively disseminate information both internally to their employees and externally to other publics, including would-be customers and investors. They attempt to persuade actors within their environment to adopt their values and aspirations and in so doing they play important roles in shaping individual identities as well as recursively shaping organizational culture. Cheney's focus only concerns written messages and his research is limited to in-house publications used to disseminate information to employees in the hope of creating value alignment and organization- specific identities (1983, p. 149). However, his discussion of identity formation can help interested scholars understand how the individual subject is created and exists in society.

Cheney was concerned with *identification* as process and not merely *identity*. As he argued, "Still, one finds relatively little attention to the working of identification as *the* symbolic process underlying basic tendencies in social relations—what Burke terms 'congregation' and 'segregation'" (1983, p. 143). Process implies exchange and flux, thus identification emerges as a result of a dynamic unfolding arising from multiple opportunities to define and come to understand oneself in relation to others. Further, as symbolically freighted, this ongoing set of exchange opportunities essentially shapes the meaning of public signification. This process is more than just language use, as signification concerns representation. Thus, images, rituals, daily practices, and more subtle day-to-day interactions all constitute sites of identification. This implies that identification operates at both discursive and non-discursive levels of interaction and need not present itself solely as a process of conscious thought, but can subconsciously influence deliberation constraining interpretation of signification through the mediation of individual and group identities.

At the level of groups, Cheney argued, "Our corporate identities are vital because they grant us personal meaning. Burke writes: "The so-called 'I' is

merely a unique combination of partially conflicting 'corporate we's'" (1983, p. 143). Corporate identities or group identification act through their subjects to help to form and produce personal meaning. The 'I' as 'corporate we' can be thought of as the amalgam of consumed corporate identities through which the subject understands herself and her relationship to social existence. Thus, corporate identities play a mediating role in the construction of interpretation and assist in symbolic exchange among subjects. The conflict inherent in the construction of the 'I' is grounded in conflicting group values adopted by the subject and communicated through corporate representation. For example, an eco-friendly humanist who identifies as an Apple user may have to square their values with that firm's supply-chain that may include gross violations of human rights during the construction of their products. The adoption of communicated representations is vital to the survival of organizations and these actively attempt to persuade subjects to adopt their depictions as constitutive of personal identity.

In terms of internal communications, organizations attempt to *socialize* employees for purposes of values alignment, which allows them greater control of their internal stakeholders as they adapt to the modern condition of a decentralized workforce (Cheney, 1983, pp. 147, 157-8). Whole or partial adoption of corporate values and the formation of individual identity partly through group identities, suggests the porous nature of individuality in relation to collectivity. As Cheney argued,

> As we observed in the sample of house organs [internal communications newsletters], corporations often assume congruence of individual and organizational values, goals and interests. In the process, distinctions between organization and society become rather fuzzy (1983, p. 156).

Individual personae are a mix of group identities grounded in shared values. A Hokie, for example, is a member of the Hokie Nation who sees their identity through a prism of values communicated, projected and represented by Virginia Tech. Virginia Tech is not merely its community values, which are frequently affirmed and communicated overtly. To be a Hokie is only part of one's individual identity, but it influences the adoption of other corporate identities. Presumably, for instance, to be a Hokie, one cannot be a neo-Nazi, as this identity conflicts with Virginia Tech's "Principles of Community" (Virginia Tech, 2016). Here, and through the prism of 'Hokie' as an identity, we can extend Cheney's work to include stakeholders beyond employees.

Conclusion

The example of a Hokie, or Hokiehood, still restricts Cheney's theory to communications with internal stakeholders and leaves the analyst with a two-dimensional view of identity. Connolly and his conception of *resonance machines*, however, allows the analyst to bridge the gap between organizations and identity and blur the distinction between internal and external stakeholders. Resonance machines operate in space-time and ground Connolly's notion of causality to include notions of three-dimensional process:

> If this is correct, no political economy or religious practice is self-contained. Rather, in politics diverse elements *infiltrate* into the others, metabolizing into a moving complex—Causation as resonance between elements that become fused together to a considerable degree. Here causality, as relations of dependence between separate factors, morphs into energized complexities of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in which theretofore unconnected or loosely associate elements *fold, bend, blend, emulsify and dissolve into each other*, forging a qualitative assemblage resistant to classical models of explanation (Connolly, 2005, p. 870).

That is, a resonance machine is a nexus of exchange between modes of representation and includes forces such as popular culture, consumable products, social practices and rituals and symbolic interpretations grounded in overlapping communities. His discussion of the evangelical-capitalist resonance machine is revealing:

> This resonance machine infiltrates perception and inflects economic interest, even as it subordinates the latter on occasion. So it is important to come to terms with the *affinities of identity* that energize the assemblage. … Affinities of *sensibility* also connect them across links and differences in formal doctrine. The complex becomes a powerful machine as evangelical and corporate sensibilities resonate together drawing each into a larger movement that dampens the importance of doctrinal differences between them (Connolly, 2005, p. 871).

As subjects, the identities of Americans form a crucial link as sites of symbolic exchange that allow the machines of our social being to run. Our group affinities and sensibilities allow movement in democratic politics. We are not helpless pawns, but active beings in the formation of our social world. Meaning, existence, agency, and identity are, to varying degrees, within our personal purview. Americans must carefully choose sites of resistance at which to exercise their innate agency to rescue their democratic identity and stem the growing hegemonic domination of *homo economicus* in society.

Returning to the Hokie example: rituals and consumptive acts help to shape individuals relative to the context in which they are ensconced. We are keyed into specific cues that affirm group sensibilities that may override our more rational selves. Popular culture is a site of resonance for Connolly that adds texture and dimension to resonance machines (Connolly, 2005, p. 874). As Hokies, we jump when we hear Metallica's 1991 song, "Enter Sandman" playing in Lane Stadium. Football is a culturally significant artifact in the Hokie Nation, and whether we accept or reject the sport and rituals included in its participation, our identities are shaped by its existence and link us to much larger populations and their beliefs and norms through a valuation and recognition of the sport as a part of a broader popular culture. Citizens do possess the individual and collective capacity to inject democratic sensibilities and values into popular culture. Nonetheless, it will not be enough to pay mere lip service to democratic values—we must daily display, embody and demonstrate them. Film, television and other outlets of popular culture representation can become sites for the dissemination of democratic values. Clearly, artists inhabit a special position in this possibility.

Following Cheney, another site of potential democratic injection are organizations themselves. One suggestion is to recognize the embeddedness of organizations within greater society and as members of a larger social ecology. Organizational identities need not disappear from the landscape of business practices, but a deeper sense of how they also shape their environment by the roles they play in helping to form and organization-specific cultures impels the interested observer to understand their impacts on representation itself. Americans cannot allow the continued dominance of *homo economicus* as a construct for understanding stakeholder behavior if we are to save democratic subjectivity. We must individually come to understand that discursive practices, rituals, and signification enter our politics through our understandings of self, relative to others. Democracy is fragile, but we should not mistake fragility for weakness. The battle concerning democratic subjectivity begins with each citizen's relationship to others.

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Surveilling to Remember: The Impact of Technology on American Democracy

Mary Ryan

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I still follow the politics of my home state of Wisconsin. On April 5—the date of Wisconsin's spring election and presidential preference primary—I tracked Facebook carefully, and routinely refreshed local news pages and watched election results on local media outlets. I learned that one Presidential candidate was allegedly campaigning within feet of a polling site in Waukesha.[1] It was even rumored he had been inside the location. Some people were taking photographs of him. Others were asking if anyone had filmed video of the Republican presidential candidate, especially inside the polling location. Not everyone was confident of the legality of his actions, but most people posting comments were uncomfortable with what they perceived as his unethical behavior, characteristic of voter intimidation.[2] While this account concerns political campaigns, they represent only one process by which to gain insight into how citizens informally regulate perceived threats to their self-governance. This essay discusses the use of sousveillant technology and considers its potential impacts on democratic practices in the United States.

Brief history of sousveillance

The formal study of surveillance dates to publication of Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon* in 1791.[3] Nearly two hundred years later, Mann developed the related concept of sousveillance, or the recording of an activity by a participant in an activity, from an analysis of Garfinkel's 1967 ethno-methodological approach to breaching norms (Bakir, 2010, 16). Mann conducted his initial research in the 1980s, before the advent and ubiquitous use of hand-held computers, digital cameras and smart phones. By developing WearCam and WearComp, Mann sought to connect sousveillance technology directly with personal agency and power (Mann, 2001; Mann, Nolan and Wellman, 2003). These devices allow a user to watch, record and broadcast her surroundings. Mann hoped that sousveillance would enable people to stand against or contravene the state's oversight of

their activities. He also suggested that such individual involvement in surveilling government activities might also cultivate a better informed citizenry, since one could learn much about what is happening in government through such observation.

"Sousveillance surely provides the technological ability for more people to engage in strategic political communication, as its existence implies that the state no longer enjoys a monopoly on political communication. Sousveillance also suggests that possible exposés of corporate or public official wrongdoing are no longer likely to be the province of a small cadre of journalists alone."
-Mary Ryan

The relative informality of sousveillance contributes to its accessibility, but may also invite abuse. In practical terms, sousveillance faces fewer impediments to the distribution of its content than commercial media products do. Sousveilliant technologies are much simpler to use than traditional production tools, reducing the need for expert knowledge. Mann understood that inappropriate use of sousveillance devices would be scrutinized, but he argued that such attention would arise from the inherent nature of sousveillance as a way of individuals exercising control over a recorded moment and gaining insight into their personal epistemology (Mann, 2005). Sousveillant technology makes errors visible, unlike secretive surveillance cultures whose overseers are unlikely to allow their errors to be detected publically (Mann, 2001). Other researchers have described privacy breaches arising from surveillance issues as empowering. One analyst, for example, has contended that webcams and exhibitionist acts enabled by technology can transform surveillance regimes into a kind of "spectacle" that emboldens citizens (Koskela, p. 208).

A case study

The ongoing debate over the reach, character and appropriateness of sousveillance technologies is a vital one for democratic societies, as the line between exercising appropriate agency and behaving bombastically is sometimes a fine one. Bakir has highlighted the inappropriate use of handheld technology devices by U.S. Army and CIA Abu Ghraib prison guards to record human rights abuses in Iraq in 2003 as an example of what these technologies can both encourage and reveal. Susan Sontag captured the moral repugnance and gravity of that situation by comparing it to an earlier travesty, photographs of lynchings of African Americans in the South:

> If there is something comparable to what these [Abu Ghraib] pictures show it would be some of the photographs of black victims of lynching

> taken between the 1880s and 1930s, which show small-town Americans grinning beneath the naked mutilated body of a black man or woman hanging from a tree. The lynching photographs were souvenirs of a collective action whose participants felt perfectly justified in what they had done. So are the pictures from Abu Ghraib. If there is a difference, it is a difference created by the increasing ubiquity of photographic actions. The lynching pictures were in the nature of photographs as trophies—taken by a photographer, in order to be collected, stored in albums; turned into postcards; displayed. The pictures taken by American soldiers in Abu Ghraib reflect a shift in the use made of pictures—less objects to be saved than messages to be disseminated, circulated (2004, paragraphs 6 and 7).

Photojournalists or news reporters did not shoot the photos of Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse; U.S. soldiers and CIA employees perpetrating the abuse used their personal digital cameras to record their atrocities (Bakir, 2010, p.88). In a sousveillance culture, individuals determine what they find atrocious or beautiful and what is appropriate to record, which images to share and to whom the information should be distributed. This example illustrates that these technologies are not simply about capturing a child's first step and emailing it to family or posting it to Facebook for one's "friends" to like. Instead, a sousveillance culture can raise profound questions related to trust, consent and democratic agency.

The place of consenting and forgetting in democracy

The Abu Ghraib disgrace and the repulsive history of lynching demonstrate that society might not always like the portraits sousveillance helps us see. Yet, there is evidence that communities are not always willing to countenance such evidence, however plain or clear it may be. Discursive amnesia, the public or collective forgetting, downplaying or decontextualizing of economic or political events that call a country's or group's actions into question for the sake of individual well-being can challenge even patently obvious injustices so as to preserve dominant understandings. As Lee and Wander have argued, these "specific acts of collective forgetting perpetuate privilege and interest in a particular economic and political context," and through these episodes, "a group identifies itself not only through what it publicly or officially recalls, but also through what it systematically forgets" (1998, pp. 152; 154).

Paradoxically, sousveillance can appeal to activists and others who seek to remember or raise awareness of various issues in America, in turn amplifying their voices of dissent. Yet, just as there are challenges with "motivated forgetting" (Lee and Wander, 1998, p. 153), the self-preserved Abu Ghraib videos and photos of moral outrages as well as earlier photos

documenting community picnics at lynchings suggest that sousveillant technologies can reveal a painful individual and collective willingness to countenance deeply unjust and undemocratic behaviors as well.

Michael (2015) recently thoughtfully explored the issue of consent and her argument has implications for sousveillance. She pointed out that such technologies can capture images of people who have not granted their consent to be recorded. When this happens, Michael considers it to be a human rights violation, suggesting that every individual has a basic right to control their image and go about their life without the intrusion that being recorded represents. It is unclear if Michael holds government surveillance efforts to the same standard, but it would seem both sousveillance and surveillance run a high risk of violating individuals' rights in just such a fashion. Her critique also raises additional significant legal and moral questions, such as whether government or authority figures, or even advocates protesting extreme oppression of their civil rights, are justified in violating human rights for the sake of what they may perceive to be a greater good.

Sousveillance surely provides the technological ability for more people to engage in strategic political communication, as its existence implies that the state no longer enjoys a monopoly on political communication. Sousveillance also suggests that possible exposés of corporate or public official wrongdoing are no longer likely to be the province of a small cadre of journalists alone. Critically, however, sousveillance is primarily focused on the technology that enables it. In this sense and at its best, it merely provides potential mechanisms by which to transform popular social demands and moral outrage into community or policy changes. Meanwhile, however, American society must pay due diligence to the pressing moral and democratic questions that frame the ways in which sousveillance technology is now increasingly being employed.

Implicit in the preceding cautions is a still deeper challenge raised by the growing ubiquity of surveillance and sousveillance technologies alike, first observed by the American philosopher and educator John Dewey. Commenting in the aftermath of World War II, Dewey argued in 1950 that, "living as we now do in what is almost a chronic state of crises, there is danger that fear and the sense of insecurity become the predominant motivation of our activities" (p. 247). He explicitly connected fear-ridden choices with civic health by suggesting that, "when we allow ourselves to be fear-ridden and permit it to dictate how we act, it is because we have lost faith in our fellowmen—and that is the unforgivable sin against the spirit of democracy" (Dewey, 1950, p. 248). Dewey wrote about a society far less surveilled than America is today. The challenges associated with the socially corrosive effects of widespread public fear and the human rights abuses it can portend to which he pointed are even more salient today.

Conclusion

Technology is perhaps most often seen as an avenue to making life "better." Sousveillance provides unprecedented tools to human society and likewise presents an enormous opportunity for citizens to organize, promote and share personal thoughts, opinions, behavior and stories with broader populations. Yet this potential may not be realized. As Mann recognized, there is nothing about sousveillance that prevents its appropriation by the Panoptic, traditional surveillance state (Mann, 2001). That is, although Mann conceived sousveillance with the intent of resisting the Panopticon, there is nothing intrinsic in most of these technologies that mandates or controls their usage exclusively for that purpose. Thus, we find ourselves in a de facto 21st-century Panoptic battle: How do we use individual communication technologies now available to enable new civic agendas rather than to privatize society still more completely, or to invade the rights of our fellow citizens or to provide new modes of oversight for a state now bent on "protecting" us, at our collective behest, from our own fears? How will we harness our ability to reflect human nature, agency and political struggles creatively and compassionately and with an authenticity that has never before been achieved? Can we use the personal technologies increasingly available to build stronger communities or will we be content, instead, to fall into self-absorption and Snapchat with the cool kids until the next iPhone model is released while the government oversees more and more elements of our daily lives?

Notes

1.The Presidential candidate I reference here is Donald Trump, but since this essay is concerned with the act of photography and videotaping, and not his campaign ethics, I have chosen not to name him explicitly in the central text.

2.For the record, the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board formally investigated these complaints, but found no wrongdoing, as the cited Stein newspaper story reported.

3.Bentham foresaw surveillance occurring in places such as schools, prisons and workplaces and suggested that the use of "total" surveillance would prevent people from misbehaving and increase their own self-regulation of their behavior. He included three kinds of oversight in his total Panopticon concept: actual, implied, and potential. Michel Foucault (1977) described the Panopticon as a method of social control in which individuals regulate their own behavior by conforming to social rules exerted by those in power.

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A Latent Resilience Capacity: Public Libraries and Community Emergency Response

Michal Linder-Zarankin

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Despite recent shifts toward a more community-collaborative approach to emergency management, little attention has been given to the role social and local groups, including, particularly, faith-based organizations as well as public libraries play in current disaster preparedness and response processes. Whether they confront natural disasters, technological and biological hazards or humanitarian emergencies, many local actors set aside their routine activities and assume crisis-related roles and responsibilities to meet the needs of their communities. Such organizations possess a latent potential to respond, drawing upon their strengths to assist diverse actors with a wide range of economic and social-psychological resources to help address post-disaster needs (Murphy, 2007). Although government emergency authorities play a central role in managing disasters and addressing response and recovery needs, their traditional bureaucratic structure is not always designed to respond to the unpredictable turbulent environments created by such events. This scenario contains at least the potential to elicit new behaviors from local actors situated to respond to disaster-related imperatives that public agencies may not otherwise always be well positioned to tackle.

To date, disaster scholars have largely focused on charting the character of faith-based and local nonprofit organizations in post-disaster scenarios (Auer and Lampkin, 2006; Sutton, 2003). Little analytic work, however, has systematically examined the roles of public libraries in disaster response and planning processes.This essay explores the question of how library managers and directors might perceive their roles in disaster response differently to obtain a better sense of what capacities these local institutions may represent in disasters and to develop strategies by which their leaders could coordinate with emergency authorities to mobilize their resources when disaster strikes. Public libraries have assumed a variety of roles in the past to support communities responding to natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes Katrina in 2005, Irene in 2011, Sandy in 2012 as well as tornadoes in Joplin, Missouri

and Tuscaloosa, Alabama in 2011). The reopening of libraries following disasters has become a metaphor for a community's return to normalcy and stability.

> "Although many public libraries address community needs following disasters, their efforts have rarely been recognized and their capacities have not been systematically harnessed [...] Libraries have generally not been formally and systematically included in disaster planning policies."
> -Michal Linder-Zarankin

The ocean tidal surge associated with Hurricane Sandy, for instance, resulted in massive social and environmental consequences for the greater New York City region. Despite the destruction, Brooklyn's libraries sent bookmobiles to affected neighborhoods as soon as flood waters receded, and libraries in Queens used their space to collect clothing donation and distribute clothing items to people affected by the storm. Without formal roles in disaster response, yet with the know-how and local knowledge of the community and its members, various library branches throughout the city offered an array of services, ranging from serving as information hubs and providing access to relief fund paperwork to serving as shelters and food and clothing distribution sites in the aftermath of Sandy.

Although many public libraries address community needs following disasters, their efforts have rarely been recognized and their capacities have not been systematically harnessed. In a study of libraries' response to disasters in Joplin, Missouri, for example, a local fire chief confessed "he had no idea that the library had been involved in the recovery effort" and a former Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) director stated that "FEMA did not have public libraries on the radar as a potential resource in disaster recovery" (Veil and Bishop 2014, 722). Although FEMA had officially changed its approach in 2010 to include libraries as essential community organizations in disaster affected areas, making them eligible for temporary relocation funding, libraries have generally not been formally and systematically included in disaster planning policies.

The limited formal role envisioned for public libraries in disaster plans, on the one hand, and their actual responses following disasters, on the other hand, highlights a gap between emergency authorities' recognition of the asset libraries represent in disaster response and their actual contributions and involvement in the aftermath of a crisis. This unintended mismatch has led to "unplanned" response activities and redundancies while minimizing libraries' formal collaborative efforts with emergency authorities. Indeed, scholars and government officials have recently stressed the importance of identifying community actors and developing a collaborative emergency preparedness approach prior to disaster situations (Robinson, Eller, Gall, and Gerber, 2013; FEMA, 2011). The severe consequences of Hurricane Sandy,

for example, reinforced the need, "to incorporate NGOs, faith-based organizations, and businesses into federal and local disaster plans before disaster strikes" (Bucci et al., 2013, 10). Similarly, in 2011, FEMA developed the *Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes and Pathways for Action,* with an eye to engaging and empowering various parts of the community while encouraging greater awareness among these to work together to deliver disaster relief and recovery services (FEMA, 2011).

Local actors, including public libraries, vary in their perceptions and assumptions about their roles and capacity to assist in natural disasters as well as the appropriate forms their reactions might assume (Comfort, 1994). Although anticipating the response behaviors of organizations that do not routinely deal with disasters is a challenging task, arguably one should attempt to comprehend their perspectives and forecast their behavior. Perhaps one way to do so for libraries would be to ascertain how library managers and directors perceive their institutions' roles in disasters and to what extent they would be willing to act to address community needs during such events, rather than urging them to behave according to a fixed plan developed without their engagement (Dynes, 1983).

Disaster scholars have identified the "response to disaster" phase as a dimension of social structure (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). Emergent social structures reflect spontaneous organizational structures such as new programs or the establishment of new relationships (Neal and Phillips, 1988). During situations of collective stress, for instance, individuals and groups become more cohesive; they often suspend their routine activities and assume disaster-related responsibilities to aid those affected by the crisis (Auf der Heide, 1989; Quarantelli, 1986). A central theme in the sociology of disaster literature is that organizations and social roles, during the response stage, often exhibit stability-flexibility dynamics. Responses range from instances of spontaneous activities to provide succor to one or more groups to the precise execution of previously adopted formal plans. Importantly, organizations do not always automatically follow their established routines when addressing disasters since circumstances may demand different courses of action.

Researchers have devoted considerable attention to examining organizational responses to disasters. Less attention, however, has been given in the literature to the role of human agency; that is, the question of how managers and leaders respond to the environments and choices they confront in post-disaster situations. Organizations adapt (or not) to complexities in their environment as their managers and leaders interpret those contexts and determine whether and how to act (Boisot and Child, 1999). Individual leaders and managers possess unique traits and dispositions that allow them to act creatively to meet social demands and to perform activities in innovative ways (Webb, 1998). Put simply, any effort to

anticipate the potential decisions and actions of local organizations, such as public libraries, that do not routinely deal with disasters necessitates an understanding of how the managers and leaders of those organizations are likely to interpret their environments and perceive their disaster related roles (Weick, 1995).

In an effort to understand library leaders' perspectives concerning disaster response more fully, I outline a palette of possible directors and branch managers' preferred responses in the face of a hypothetical disaster scenario. Table 1 shows three types of responses (ignore, reduce or absorb) that library managers may choose to address following disasters. These represent scenarios arrayed along a stability-flexibility continuum. The extent to which managers might choose to rely upon familiar norms and routines to fit events into pre-existing frames or would draw from other resources to manage emerging needs will reflect their underlying assumptions of their organizations' appropriate roles in disaster response.

Table 1. Library Managers' Perceptions of Roles and Projected Behavior

Response scenarios	Ignore Complexity	Reduce complexity	Absorb complexity
Changes in Role	Conventional Role Defensive	Role Adaptation Reactive	Role Transformation Proactive
Changes in Routine (projected behavior)	Conventional Library Routines	Conventional Library Routines Adding Non-conventional Routines (few)	Decreasing Conventional Library Routines Adding Non-conventional Routines (many)

Source: Boiset and Child, 1999; Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005

Depending on their view of contextual conditions and the decisions they make further to those assessments leaders may choose to *ignore* intricacies in their environments and maintain conventional library roles and activities following a disaster. Alternatively, they might seek to *reduce* complexity in their environment by selecting certain processes aimed only at accommodating to the convolution in their immediate environment. In such scenarios managers may be constrained by existing administrative arrangements (e.g., whether they are included in local emergency response plans or whether they are well positioned to exercise discretion in response to the conditions they perceive) and are therefore likely to alter their

activities to conform to those constraints. Finally, leaders may choose to *absorb* complexity by creating additional response options such as developing "outside of the box" strategies (e.g., when libraries provide shelters, space for medical care or organize distributions of donations). In such cases, their organizations will adapt to changing conditions, but the processes they employ may not endure beyond the perceived crisis event. For a public library, adopting a strategy of complexity absorption means at least temporarily deploying the organization's assets as if a first responder. In such cases, the changes undertaken are deliberately transient, which allows for a provisional response to new environmental conditions (Boisoit and Child, 1999).

Conclusions

Disasters provide an opportunity to observe and understand the emergence of changes in organizations and social structures in response (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977). Recent disasters have prompted a number of social organizations and groups to develop "outside of the box" mechanisms to address pressing community needs. In undertaking those steps and roles those entities have often demonstrated new resilience capacity through the execution of deliberate choices and actions. Since disaster planning is better prepared, in part based on how leaders and managers are likely to act in an emergency, it is of theoretical and practical importance to project the behavior and chart the underlying assumptions of leaders as they make disaster-related decisions. Exploring these dynamics is important as their variability suggests that leaders, in this case, library managers, may respond to disasters in a variety of ways. The challenge is to learn how to mobilize and incorporate such efforts systematically into a broader planned whole community response.

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45

What is Special about Paralympic Volunteering?

Lyusyena Kirakosyan

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The importance of volunteers at sport mega events has increased during the last several decades as athletics have risen in social importance and generated ever higher levels of popular participation and expectation (Carnicelli-Filho, 2014; Green and Chalip, 2004; Moragas, Moreno and Paniagua, 2000). As Green and Chalip (2004) have pointed out, not only have volunteers become vital to the success of the events they serve, but also to the broader economic and social development to which those occasions are expected to contribute. The growth of the Olympic and Paralympic Games since the 1980s, and the broader media coverage that their increasing scope and size have spawned, has made volunteers essential to their success (Carnicelli-Filho, 2014; Green and Chalip, 2004; Kellett, 2008; Rönningen, 2000).

Indeed, many analysts consider the Olympic Games the apex of mega-events due to their ability to provide excitement, prestige and numerous social benefits to athletes, audiences and volunteers alike (Kellett, 2008). A growing literature specifically examines the history and different dimensions and factors affecting Olympic volunteering (see Bladen, 2010; Carnicelli-Filho, 2014; Chalip, 2000; Green and Chalip, 2004; Kemp, 2002; Lynch, 2001; Moragas et al., 2000; Pound, 2000; Rönningen, 2000, among others), but there is little empirical research on these issues as they are evidenced in Paralympic volunteering (Kellett, 2008). Among the few who have treated the topic, Kellett (2008) has suggested that the experience of volunteering at the Paralympic Games differs from that of engagement with the Olympics. This brief essay outlines my understanding of the unique ways that the Paralympic context can elicit volunteer motivation and provide personal satisfaction. I draw on my own experiences as a 2016 Paralympics volunteer in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and the reflections of several of my peers who share their insights in the video accompanying this essay.

The history of Olympic volunteering dates to the Games held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1912, at which only six volunteers assisted (Lynch, 2001). By 1956, however, when Melbourne, Australia served as host, about 500 volunteers supported the event (Ibid). Some 70,000 volunteers worked behind the scenes at the Olympics in London in 2012, while the recent Rio

event saw 50,000 individuals so serve. The Official Report of the Barcelona, Spain Olympic Games of 1992 was the first formal document to define explicitly the Olympic volunteer: "the volunteer is a person who makes an individual, altruistic commitment to collaborate, to the best of his/ her abilities in the organisation of the Olympic Games, carrying out the tasks assigned to him/her without receiving payment or rewards of any other nature" (cited in Moragas et al., 2000, p. 134). The available literature on volunteer motivation across different event contexts provides insight into building and maintaining commitment among those individuals. Scholars have identified both personal and social factors that motivate people to serve as Olympic volunteers. For example, Moragas et al. have outlined the following as key incentives for Olympic voluntarism:

"Paralympic athletes inspired and touched volunteers as they witnessed their triumphs and travails, and changed volunteers through their interactions with them, as those 'helping' learned to value and encourage the athletes' distinct capacities. In short, the Paralympic experience encouraged a deep empathy among the event's volunteers."
-Lyusyena Kirakosyan

- The spirit of solidarity and peace enshrined in the Olympic philosophy;
- Commitment as citizens, members of an association or nation;
- Individual challenge;
- Belonging to a group;
- Identification as a member of that group;
- Various forms of individual gratification (2000, p. 147).

Another study by Green and Chalip (2004) highlighted such motivating factors as a desire to help, opportunity to socialize with people sharing common interests, meeting new people and becoming friends with them, recognition of shared purpose and common identity, sense of excitement, celebrity atmosphere and learning, among others. Indeed, those who volunteered at the Rio 2016 Paralympics, whose reflections are compiled in the video shared here, uniformly described their volunteer experiences as extraordinary. As a group, their reasons for volunteering were quite similar to those discussed in the literature. My peers indicated that they were motivated to volunteer by a genuine desire to be helpful, the opportunity to meet new people, becoming friends with other volunteers, special possibilities to broaden their horizons, the chance to be a part of the excitement of a global sporting event, by the sense of community they gained from engaging with other volunteers, spectators and athletes, and by opportunities to gain and share knowledge.

These volunteers also articulated what made their Paralympic volunteering experience distinct, and the theme of mutuality echoed across their testimonies. Jordan (1986) has argued that mutuality depends on interaction, interest in and appreciation of the other, a capacity for empathy, emotional availability and responsiveness. She has argued that mutual empathy involves both an acknowledgment of sameness in the other and an appreciation of the difference of the other's experience. Mutual empathy contains opportunity for shared growth and impact. The Paralympic volunteers came to understand that their experience involved more than simply making it possible for the athletes to perform their best, as challenging as that could be at times. Those with whom I spoke came to realize that assisting others had encouraged them to change and grow in often unforeseen ways. Paralympic athletes inspired and touched volunteers as they witnessed their triumphs and travails, and changed volunteers through their interactions with them, as those "helping" learned to value and encourage the athletes' distinct capacities. In short, the Paralympic experience encouraged a deep empathy among the event's volunteers. As Jordan (1986) has observed, as we reach out to understand the experience of the other, something new grows in us. This encouragement of empathetic imagination applied to the Paralympic volunteering experience, as volunteers became more aware of the limiting power of labels and came to value the unique identities of the remarkable people with disabilities competing in the Games' various events.

In conclusion, at their best, both Olympic and Paralympic volunteers provide an example of solidarity and selfless work that not only assists the Games, but also provides manifold opportunities for each participating volunteer to grow personally as well. Moragas et al. have argued that the importance of the Olympic volunteer movement lies in the following:

- From the political point of view, it represents the uniting of individual energies into a common project, a new form of participation and the expression of a great public momentum;
- From the economic point of view, the Olympic volunteers lead to a major reduction in salary costs and, if adequate training is provided, the result can also be a more-highly qualified population;
- From the cultural point of view, volunteerism involves basic education in multi-culturalism and solidarity (2000, p. 151).

These positive characteristics are equally applicable to the Paralympic volunteer movement. But, drawing on my experience, I would add that from a moral perspective, Paralympic volunteerism goes to the heart of our mutual understanding of one another and contributes to our sense of a shared humanity.

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Cooperatives and an Ongoing Practice of Democracy

Jake Keyel

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The United States (U.S.) recently completed a national election. Millions of people went to the polls and voted for President as well as for legislators and considered referenda on multiple issues. Shortly before the election, current U.S. President Barack Obama told a crowd in North Carolina that the "fate of the republic" and the "fate of the world" depended on how they planned to vote (BBC, 2016). Yet, despite the asserted high stakes, only 58 percent of eligible voters cast a ballot on November 9, 2016 (Bialik, 2016). This response is typical and turnout is consistently much lower for state and local elections (Holbrook and Weinschenk, 2014). Indeed, local political contests often attract fewer than 20 percent of registered voters.

Not only did less than 6 in 10 registered voters participate in this year's national vote, but on election night, popular comedian Stephen Colbert also told his audience that the election had taken up "precious brain space" (Luibrand, 2016). He argued that whether "your side won or lost," Americans do not have to "do this" for a while. He concluded by saying it was now time to "get back to your life" (Luibrand, 2016). Along similar lines, journalist and political writer Matt Taibbi wrote days before the election that Americans should turn off politics permanently. He asserted that the only meaningful avenue most Americans have for political expression is voting every four years and he urged Americans only to think about politics when such concerns intersect with their "real lives"(Taibbi 2016). Colbert and Taibbi's comments reflect a common misconception that conflates democracy with voting and asserts a sharp distinction between democratic participation and daily life.

However, as Rothschild has argued, there is very little "flesh on the skeleton of democracy" if it only consists of periodic voting (2009, p. 1038). Indeed, according to Sen (2005), casting a ballot is only one part of the "much larger story" of democracy. In addition to voting, democracy entails the exercise of "participatory reasoning and public decision-making" (Sen, 2005). Perry has argued aptly that without people actively participating in ruling themselves, "there is no democracy—no rule (kratia) by the people (demos)" (2014, p. 205).

"Reducing or eliminating in cooperatives the distinction between professionals who make decisions and nonprofessionals who carry out tasks prescribed by those in authority provides individuals an 'education' in the capacities necessary for self-governance."
– Jake Keyel

With this robust view of democracy in mind, I here explore democratically organized cooperatives as an example of sites in which democracy as active self-governance is realized in their members' daily lives. I have first sought to problematize the idea that democracy entails only voting in periodic government elections. Secondly, in view of the fact that many Americans are not even participating in this weaker understanding of democracy as voting, I follow Rothschild's argument that democratic cooperatives represent one possibility to "catalyze" political interest and engagement among more Americans (2009, p. 1024).

Cooperatives as sites of lived democracy

Directly challenging Colbert and Taibbi's assertions of a binary distinction between democracy and private life, there are many individuals who participate in organizations that practice democracy on a daily basis. Many such entities fall under the "cooperative" umbrella. Cooperative organizations are "owned, controlled and operated for the benefit of their members" (Cultivate.Coop, 2016). They typically adhere to seven principles of cooperation: voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy and independence; education, training and information; cooperation among cooperatives; and concern for community (NASCO, 2016). The degree to which active and regular democratic participation occurs varies by cooperative (Low, Donovan, and Gieseking, 2012).

However, there are more than 200 cooperatives in the U.S. and thousands around the world that actively work to include all members in decision-making processes with equal standing (Kennelly and Odekon, 2016, p. 165). These include what are typically called "worker cooperatives," which are owned and managed by each firm's employee/owners—examples include the Arizmendi Bakery in San Francisco, California, and New Era Windows in Chicago, Illinois—as well as a network of living cooperatives organized as the North American Students of Cooperation (NASCO). These organizations often do not operate along hierarchical rational-bureaucratic models of authority, but rather on the basis of what Rothschild-Whitt has called collectivist-democratic authority (1979, p. 511). According to Rothschild-Whitt, democratic control is the "foremost characteristic" of such entities (1979, p. 518).

The decision-making mechanisms used by democratically organized cooperatives vary. Such organizations often operate on the basic assumption of one-person, one-vote (Estey 2011, p. 358). Some use majority-rule voting while others pursue consensus building strategies (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979, p. 512). Additionally, individuals may cast their votes publicly or by private ballot (Harnecker, 2009, p. 31). Ng and Ng have argued that, in theory, any organization can incorporate varied democratic practices (2009, p. 83). However, the cooperatives of interest here institutionalize such processes and require, as Ng and Ng have suggested, "open meetings" in which all members have equal decision- making authority (2009, p. 83). The key point is that all members of such organizations have equivalent standing not only to participate in decision-making processes, but also to authorize, through majority voting or consensus, their collective decisions on a regular and on-going basis.

Democratically structured cooperatives assume different organizational forms. Some operate as for-profit businesses while others pursue non-profit objectives. According to the Democracy at Work Institute, there were 256 worker-owned and managed cooperatives in the United States in 2013, which operate on a one-person, one- vote rule.[1] Other organizations, such as NASCO, coordinate democratically structured living cooperatives in which residents share equally in the responsibilities of daily life, such as cooking and cleaning, and make decisions collectively on issues pertinent to their households (NASCO, 2016). In cooperatives, members—employee/owners in for-profit worker organizations and residents in housing entities—participate daily in decisions that affect their lives. Such practices demonstrate that democratic organizational governance is possible in both the economic and personal/private spheres. The next section explores how these experiences can help to build citizen engagement in wider political processes.

Cooperatives build democratic capacities

Democratic self-governance has intrinsic value (Sen, 1999, p. 10). Individuals and groups should have the ability to participate in decisions that affect their lives (Fraser, 2008, p. 411; Scholte, 2002, p. 285). Democratic cooperatives can facilitate this process.[2] Additionally, beyond the valuable exercise of self-governance for cooperative members, participation in such organizations can also help members build the virtues and capacities necessary to participate in democratic public institutions at all levels of governance.

According to Perry, democratically organized workplaces can work to break down class divisions among members (2014, p. 206). Reducing or eliminating in cooperatives the distinction between professionals who make

decisions and nonprofessionals who carry out tasks prescribed by those in authority provides individuals an "education" in the capacities necessary for self-governance. This participation teaches citizens how to be active rather than passive as well as how to include the views and interests of others in their deliberations (Perry, 2014). Furthermore, workplace cooperatives offer institutional arrangements that facilitate prolonged and meaningful contact among people of different backgrounds. Perry has argued such interactions in democratic workplaces have more potential to reduce prejudice based on race, gender and other identity markers than occurs in hierarchical, capitalist workplaces (2014, pp. 206, 216).

Two studies addressing worker cooperatives in Hong Kong and Venezuela have offered further insights into the value of daily democratic practices as incubators of civic virtue and capacity. Ng and Ng have asserted that conflict is inherent to participatory democracy (2009, p. 185). Members of the three Hong Kong cooperatives these scholars studied found this characteristic emotionally taxing. However, participants in one of the cooperatives reported that their engagement had helped them improve their interpersonal and conflict management skills and that they had become more patient and tolerant through their involvement in the organizations (2009, p. 197). Harnecker has also argued that many Venezuelan cooperative members became more active in their communities as a result of their participation in such organizations (2009, p. 35).

These findings, both in the United States and other contexts, point toward the daily practice of democratic self-governance as a potential component of addressing societal divisions and building the skills necessary to ensure civically engaged citizens. Given that voter turnout is particularly low in the U.S. compared to many other nations, the country might look toward democratic cooperatives as an alternative space in which individuals can exercise self-governance and as a model that may build engagement with broader democratic processes.

Conclusion

Varman and Chakrabarti have perceptively observed that the practice of democracy is an "evolving reality" (2004, p. 187) that requires acknowledging the difficulty of building democratic norms and negotiating the contradictions and challenges of maintaining them. For this reason, calls such as Colbert and Taibbi's to disengage from active self-governance or to define it as only periodically relevant to the supposed "real world" are misguided in their conflation of democracy with the act of voting and failure to recognize the difficult, on-going civic virtue and engagement necessary to maintain self-governance.

Finally, in a thoughtful exploration of democratic practices in the workplace, Pausch concluded that: "Citizens cannot become convinced democrats if they—in their daily lives, in schools and in their workplace—do not experience democracy" (2013, p. 16). Democratically structured cooperatives represent one mechanism by which individuals in the United States may begin to build daily experiences of lived democracy that offer the potential for encouraging wider and deeper citizen engagement in their collective self-governance. While the number of democratic cooperatives is relatively small, these organizations serve as an existing nucleus that suggests that alternatives are possible as well as templates for building new and restructuring existing organizations.

Notes

1. Forty-two percent of these cooperatives started as hierarchical capitalist businesses (Democracy at Work Institute, 2015).

2.Though cooperative organizations are primarily of interest here for the ways in which they both practice and teach democratic self-governance, there is also evidence to suggest that worker-owned and managed cooperatives are at least as efficient as hierarchical capitalist businesses and in some cases more so (Kennelly and Odekon, 2016, pp. 167–68). Additionally, the Democracy at Work Institute reports that a 67 organization sub-sample of the 256 worker-owned and managed cooperatives in the US had a slightly higher average profit margin than comparable hierarchically organized firms (Democracy at Work Institute, 2015).

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"Fake News" in Informational Ecology

Alex Stubberfield

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This essay grapples with the latest weapon in information warfare in the United States: "fake news." The introduction of "fake news" into the political discourse by the Donald Trump administration has exposed the fragility of the political reality constructed and disseminated by media outlets. I contend that the effects of this phenomenon within the informational ecology of U.S. politics are not new. Rather, fake news is the latest iteration of informational partisanship within our democratic capitalist society, the (re)production of which has been amplified and accelerated by the rise of social media. As a remedy, I suggest abandoning claims to objective knowledge supported by media sources.

To be exact, fake news as a term dates to the Progressive era in American politics when William Jennings Bryan (one of the first "populists") used it in his publication, *The Commoner* to attack anonymous articles unfavorable to his campaign (LaFrance, 2017). The term gained contemporary popularity after a bizarre incident in which a North Carolina man, having consumed "fake news" posted to Reddit, drove to Washington D.C. with an assault rifle to "investigate" an alleged child-prostitution ring run by Hillary Clinton in the basement of a pizzeria (Goldman and Kang, 2016). His arrest sparked national attention to the political implications of online media and the dissemination of less than reputable information through outlets more interested in serving as advertiser click-bait than watch-dogs of democracy.

Since the incident, and ironically, given its provenance, the Trump administration and the American right have shown little restraint in using the term and have weaponized it to attack news outlets such as *CNN*, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post,* or as a label for any story potentially damaging to the image of the White House (Blake, 2017). Most recently, former House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich attempted to connect "fake news" to "fake education" in an assault on American universities (Gingrich, 2017) through a sympathetic media outlet, Fox Broadcasting (Maxwell, 2017).

Fake news, as a term, has been used to dismiss information, questions, inquiries and stories threatening to the perceived standing, credibility or legitimacy of the Trump administration. The President, employing Twitter

(Trump, 2017), has claimed that any inquiries into his ties with Russia, and that nation's possible hacking of the November 2016 United States national election (Sanger, 2016), are motivated by fake news propagated by Democrats to damage his administration and draw attention away from their election losses (RT News, 2017). The effect of the vacuity of "fake news" as a signifier is particularly dizzying considering the recent resignation of Trump's national security advisor, Michael Flynn, following a news account exposing his discussions with the Russian ambassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak (Phipps, Yuhas, Borger and Siddiqui, 2017), after the Department of Justice had warned the White House that Flynn was potentially vulnerable to manipulation by the Kremlin (Smith, Siddiqui and Jacobs, 2017).

"Recognizing that we are participating in a market when we read our standby publications and that this market will perpetually reinforce frames tailored to our tastes should help us remember that no news is objectively reported and that claims to objectivity fall apart when considering the larger political ecology of information."
-Alex Stubberfield

Indeed, Flynn had allegedly deceived Vice President Mike Pence concerning the content, frequency and duration of his contacts with Kislyak for several months. Trump and several White House officials have repeatedly denied any ties to the Kremlin and Kellyanne Conway, councilor to Trump, has downplayed what this episode might suggest concerning the President's judgment or ability to make prudent staff choices (Hains, 2017). After NBC journalist Matt Lauer dismissed Conway's comments as nonsensical, Trump used Twitter to condemn the news accounts of Flynn's conversations, without elaborating on his relationship to Russia (Trump, 2017b). Members of the press and Congress have repeatedly asked the President to approve an independent investigation of his relationship with Russia (and that of his recent campaign) since he has maintained such an effort would reveal nothing, but he has steadfastly refused to do so.

Meanwhile, he has assumed a defensive posture and created a carnival-like spectacle as he has flung "fake news" charges against his perceived opponents calling for such an inquiry. Not surprisingly, his relationship to the mainstream media has descended into acrimony (Garcia, 2017). For example, Trump was forced recently by several journalists to clarify a comment concerning the media as the "enemy of the American people" that he repeated at the recent annual Conservative Political Action Conference. He defended his contention by asserting that his comment was directed at "fake news." The difficulty with his clarification, however, is that he appears to consider any critical or unflattering press coverage as "fake," so much of the mass media was included in his broad claim.

In vertigo-inducing displays, left- and right-wing media outlets have adopted "fake news" as part of their political and epistemic vocabulary (Ingraham, 2016; Lahren, 2017). Fake news is not a new phenomenon—think *The National Inquirer*—but its virulence in our nation's political ecosystem has been aided by the internet, as its transmission occurs at virtual light speed through social media. In fact, recent research has exposed an elaborate network of social media sites as dissemination points for misinformation, mixed with legitimate news (Ingram, 2016). Algorithms beyond the control of any single actor sort information based on popularity and user viewing habits, leading to an organic system of dissemination to individual viewers. This system is driven foremost by data analytics that are part of a pursuit of profits attached to website advertising fees. That is, "fake news" is, at bottom, propelled by capital interests and transmitted by the social media users' consumptive choices.

Regardless of its purveyor, or the administration's use of the term, fake news is a kind of deliberative pollution that preys on information bubbles formed based on internet users' digital footprints. Sophisticated click-bait advertising entices users into confirmation biases already dangerous to democracy and creates more doubt concerning the veracity of information counter to their existing beliefs. Again, this is no new phenomenon. In his farewell address former President Barack Obama mentioned a "great sorting" of information through media outlets as dangerous to the exercise of democratic citizenship (Obama, 2017).

Massive media conglomerates, for example, now move daily to capture the attention of viewers and hold their viewership by shaping information so as to ensure it is palatable to that audience. The subtlety of such media frames prime the deliberative environment toward debates concerning taste rather than reason, as news comes to resemble entertainment, rather than cultivating citizens to serve as "the anxious, jealous guardians of democracy" (Obama, 2017). To the extent this trend now holds popular sway, citizens are daily being molded into consumers of entertainment rather than true participants in the democratic process. The rise of the 24-hour news outlet and subsequent ratings war between CNN and Fox News have neatly split the polis into two broadly consumptive camps able to access information with the click of a TV remote. In the pursuit of profit, these news channels have created distinct identities that have become their brand signatures in their quest for ratings and advertising dollars. Capitalism created the need for spin and each of these channels has catered to the subtle and specific tastes of broad swathes of information-consumers. Regardless of the side of the aisle one may personally prefer, this great sorting has continued and new skirmishes (Nazarian, 2017) between these institutions occur daily as they contest for market preeminence (Nashrulla, 2016).

President Trump's distaste for specific media outlets is also nothing new. The Nixon administration's bald hostility toward the media is well known (Major, 2015, p. 484). However, Nixon stepped into an environment already charged with hostility toward the "mainstream media" and exploited that situation. *Human Events*, a well-known conservative publication, had already been at work carving out a conservative counter space in the media since 1961 Major, 2015, p. 487). That journal's greatest contribution to the national discourse was the idea of a "liberal media," which claimed that major media outlet frames were strong and structurally biased political force in the national dialogue. The idea that the most widely cited and admired mass media outlets were "liberal mouthpieces" accelerated the rise of media partisanship and news consumers began to divide along ideological and party lines (Hemmer, 2014). These differences are most conspicuous today when media organizations such as Fox or Breitbart claim to be "fair and balanced" because they will broadcast or print what other major organizations will not. This argument allows these news outlets to frame other journalism as biased as a part of their attempt to tear down the façade of journalistic objectivity. The counter narrative spun by their opponents is that outlets such as Fox serve the Republican party's interests (Easley, 2017) or, in the case of Breitbart, cater to white nationalist sympathies (Borchers, 2017).

The branding narratives and counter narratives mirror the challenges that fake news poses for democracy. Taste plays a role in citizen/consumer informational insularity and it appears to be working to undermine the foundational capacity of the demos to act in the public interest. The weightlessness of information transfer, the consumptive practices of viewing publics, the motive force of profit in producing informational bubbles and the clear partisanship of media outlets suggest that information transfer in our democratic capitalist society is inherently biased. Discerning "fake news" from fair and balanced representation rests on a citizen's ability to parse reality and requires critical reflection. Fake news may represent the latest iteration of information challenge presented to the demos, but its effects, as I have argued, are not new. It is very easy to get turned around in the bewildering environment of online media. In order to see the forest for the trees, I suggest that readers and viewers abandon claims to knowing the absolute truth of any matter reported in the spirit of recognizing the limitations of their consumptive practices.

Recognizing that we are participating in a market when we read our standby publications and that this market will perpetually reinforce frames tailored to our tastes should help us remember that no news is objectively reported and that claims to objectivity fall apart when considering the larger political ecology of information. Rather than a weapon to demonize the

opposition, the presence of fake news in our conceptual framework can humble our more rabid moments as it serves as a reminder of the power of the media in constructing our political reality.

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PART VII

DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL IN(EX)CLUSION

In reviewing the conceptual literature on social exclusion and inclusion, Saunders (2015) has argued that the two concepts are related and not simply opposites. Some scholars and practitioners view social exclusion as 'the problem' and social inclusion as 'the response,' without exploring the relationship between them. Others have been concerned that this approach shifts the policy focus by downplaying the role of issues, such as discrimination, social structure and institutions that often feature prominently when analyzing exclusion (Ibid). As a result, Saunders has suggested that employing the term social exclusion helps focus on who is responsible in a way that calls for social inclusion do not.

Levitas and her colleagues have offered the following working definition of social exclusion that seeks to capture the intricacy of the concept:

> Social exclusion is a complex and multi-dimensional process. It involves the lack or denial of resources, rights, goods and services, and the inability to participate in the normal relationships and activities, available to the majority of people in a society, whether in the economic, social, cultural or political arenas. It affects both the quality of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion of society as a whole (Levitas et al., 2007, p. 9).

Levitas et al.'s 10-dimensional analytic model identified a range of risk factors associated with social inclusion, including economic and social resources and culture, political and civic participation, health and well-being and crime, harm and criminalization (2007, p.10).

The eight essays in this section address different forms of social exclusion and inclusion in diverse contexts, from exclusion of Indigenous beliefs, customs and knowledge of nature and agriculture in policy-making processes to police brutality and long-lived injustice in medical research and global health. In the first essay in this part, Kennedy reflects on how her life experience; in particular, being exposed to traditional Cherokee and Appalachian practices early in life, engaging deeply with members of various other Native-American nations and living for two years with indigenous

people in Uzbekistan, has influenced her understanding of the connections among Nature, politics and food. Halvorson-Fried examines the arguments that justify anti-discrimination employment practices, whether based on justice and morality or on the potential for increased profits, and argues that the motivations that underpin policy action matter a great deal to the pursuit of democratic ideals. Ryan outlines the history of modern police brutality and offers steps aimed at reducing its occurrence and corrosive impacts on citizen confidence and goodwill. She argues that such efforts will contribute to re-instilling confidence among citizens in government. Flahive examines Joshua Oppenheimer's 2012 documentary, *The Act of Killing* and its wider implications for our collective understanding of the sources of human depravity and evil. Flahive suggests that, ultimately, the documentary urges its viewers to acknowledge and devise means to overcome, both the systems of injustice that human beings construct to justify systematic murder or oppression and the narratives they employ to perpetuate and legitimate those structures.

MacAuley reflects on academic disciplines' resistance to change and to different apparently strange ideas that scholars rejected in the name of safeguarding the holy grail of professional legitimacy. In her second essay in this section, Kennedy ponders the historical significance of the many Native American sounding names she sees on road signs during her periodic drives south from Virginia to Tennessee She relates Indigenous beliefs, customs and knowledge to her understanding of the sacredness of land and reflects on how dominant societal norms might change if Native American ancestral voices, via ancient stories of land and nature, were widely employed to teach morality, identity and resiliency. Powell-Doherty employs her essay to contend vigorously that health organizations should uphold ethical principles when involving large groups of vulnerable people in medical and health research instead of favoring donor interests, government relations or resource availability. Finally, Waltz examines the question of whether and how academic freedom protects the freedom of speech of a faculty member exercising his or her responsibilities in institutional governance.

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Where the Wild Things Grow: Nature, Politics and Indigenous Ontologies

Rachael Kennedy

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It is spring and my yard and the nearby forest are bursting with a bounty of edibles. I do not mean items in my garden. I literally mean my lawn and the forest. It surprises people when I tell them that I eat out of the forest and munch on "weeds" growing in my yard. Over the years, I have come to expect the questions, "Are you *that* poor?" or "How often do you make yourself sick?" I enjoy explaining that many indigenous peoples and those embracing the wildcrafting phenomenon take joy in eating foods that live around them and work hard to keep them undisturbed. I garden as well and I have been known to let Poke and Pigweed grow amongst my vegetable seedlings. This shocks many of my gardening friends until I tell them that both are excellent greens when served at the right time. During the rest of the year, these "weeds" serve as pollinator attractants.

You may be wondering why I am writing about wild foods for a *Reflections* essay. The briefest response is that eating is a political act and we need to raise critical questions about how our actions reproduce agricultural and development policies. A fuller explanation would include a discussion of the intersectionality of agricultural policy, development processes, food insecurity and indigenous ontologies. Pressing deeper, I find that my own life experience, in particular being exposed to traditional Cherokee and Appalachian practices early in life, engaging deeply with members of various Native-American nations and living for two years with indigenous people in Uzbekistan, has greatly influenced my worldview about the connections among Nature, politics and food.

The modern world now sits on the precipice of a great transformation. The wild, in all its beauty, is shrinking. Many of the "persistent cultures" that has argued are instrumental in "retaining sets of values not found in the modern marketplace" are being forcibly integrated into the neoliberal world we have created and are finding their values superseded, ignored or jettisoned in that process (Nabhan,1989, p. 83). With each generation, more people forget their connection to Nature and the land, air, fire and water

(Louv, 2008). Agriculture, as a cultural product, is profoundly stressed and yet technocracy tells us to place hope in genetic manipulation and technology.

"Eating is a political act and we need to raise critical questions about how our actions reproduce agricultural and development policies."
-Rachael Kennedy

Some people are delving into indigenous knowledge systems to learn what other approaches to thinking about our modern "wicked problems," including ensuring safe and healthy food for all of our population, are possible. Taking time to ponder and highlight the "old ways" can challenge us to live more sustainably and potentially be more open to new possibilities for social transformation. Given this reality, I find myself pondering the ongoing trend to devalue and dismiss wild things, specifically foods, as that impetus fuels our modern agriculture production system and on-going development and to consider what this might mean for our society.

Nabhan has lamented our collective loss of a sense of the wild in our lives and how that trend is reflected in our culture of food production:

> These plants are being separated from one another as their cultural habitats are being torn apart. Something that has long kept our cultigens and even our peopled landscapes healthy and tolerable is now disappearing. That valuable entity is wildness. If it is lost from the world around us, we will lose something within ourselves as well (1989, p. 45).

Nabhan's observation led me to think about seed and planting ceremonies in which I have participated. Each event aligned with the belief that without intact landraces (seeds), entire ecosystems begin to wobble; such rites have greatly influenced my own relationship to food.

One of the most profoundly moving seed ceremonies I have attended occurred in October 2013 on the Taos Pueblo. We made a sacred circle comprised of both native and non-native people and tribal leaders proudly read the "Declaration of Seed Sovereignty" that the Taos people had deliberated over, ritualized and thereafter presented to the United States Congress as a statement of the rights of seeds and the self-determination of the tribe in protecting them. It was an honor to be a part of the event. Some might be surprised to learn that these rites and oaths are still being commemorated as a living tradition. Others might say that we were engaged in a fantasy world by imagining that humans and plants relate to one another. Indeed, still others might argue it is foolhardy to try to save local seeds against the onslaught of genetic manipulation and rapid urbanization.

Nevertheless, for Native Americans, other indigenous peoples and those honoring their beliefs, these ceremonies are not unusual. They represent the

continuation of an ancient tradition. As both Hurt (2002) and Shiva (2010) have observed, aboriginal individuals, specifically women, have been seed keepers for more than 7,000 years. During that time, a sacred relationship between humans and wild things evolved into a sophisticated spirituality. As Brascoupe noted in *Reflections of a Native American Farmer,* "A relationship with the land, plants, animals, rain, thunder, and lightning makes one's religion more meaningful than simply going through the motions" (1999, p. 160).

The "ecology of the heart" practiced by many tribal peoples creates a sacred place for wild things to live peacefully among cultivated plants and among humans (Nabhan, 1989, p. 84). Historically, early explorers' drawings evidenced these practices. For example, renderings of pre-contact villages depicted their agriculture styles inside and outside of village boundaries, including the arrangements of corn plants with wild plants, groups harvesting wild rice in the tributaries and migrant groups moving about to tap maple trees for syrup (Hurt, 2002). Across the globe on the African continent, tribal peoples also created deep relationships with wild plants, specifically the yam, and enacted an "ecology of the heart" that allowed for harmonious and resilient living in the rainforests (Yosuoka, 2013).

This human-wild things relationship yielded deep knowledge of the rhythms of plants and became a symbol of tribal identities as a result (Cajete, 1999). Brascoupe (1999) recalled his grandmother teaching him to pay close attention to the environments of numerous healing plants; their deep bond was kept alive by his people's desire to share this intimate knowledge generation after generation. Brascoupe (1999) believes, as his grandmother did before him, that if this connection between individuals, the land and its vegetation is lost, the tribe's members will also lose their identity.

Worldwide, indigenous peoples are rising up to voice their ontological beliefs concerning the human-nature connection and the heritage practices that have arisen from that bond. I wish to emphasize here that we can learn by listening intently to the wisdom represented in these traditions and that we may find benefit in asking two difficult questions. First, how can these Native people's beliefs about the integrative and integrating role of Nature's wild things influence our society's agricultural and development policies? And, second, once a wild thing is lost, will we ever discover the true cost of its extinction?

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Why Motivations Matter in Addressing Discriminatory Hiring Practices

Sarah Halvorson-Fried

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Anti-discrimination employment practices can be justified in several ways. First, there is the justice argument. Inherited systems of unequal schools, unfair housing and exclusionary network-based hiring practices have created a pervasive legacy of discrimination that often makes economic justice impossible. Proponents of efforts to ensure basic human rights argue that governments should support interventions that help to address this problem. However, this justification falls short for many. Even prior to the adoption of affirmative action as employment policy in the early 1970s to tackle this concern, many members of the public sought to roll back efforts to ensure such action on behalf of affected groups, arguing that such initiatives violated "equal opportunity" tenets and constituted "reverse discrimination."

When arguments based on justice and morality failed to persuade policymakers and the public to continue to address structural employment discrimination, proponents contended that more racial equity would lead to a better (e.g., more robustly growing) economy. Benner and Pastor have suggested that, contrary to classical economic theory, there is a link between inequality and stagnant economies:

> The impact of equity on growth may have something to do with the ways in which less equal areas under-invest in basic education, the impact of social tensions on economic decision making, the erosion of 'social capital' that can tie a region together, and perhaps the effects on health problems and hence worker efficiency (2012, p. 6).

These undesirable circumstances then cause firms and workers that can do so to leave or simply not invest in their locations and communities. Regional studies have calculated the specific opportunity costs of continued hiring inequality. PolicyLink, for example, found a $16.4 billion economic "inequality deficit" in 2011 in Minnesota, and predicted that figure would rise to $18.3 billion in 2015 (Tran and Treuhaft, 2014).

At the firm level, the "business case" for diversity, inclusion and equity policies has been ascendant since Roosevelt Thomas argued in a 1990 article

in the *Harvard Business Review* that demographic diversity is good for company economic performance as long as it is managed properly. In this view, firms benefit from workforce diversity by possessing a staff better able to relate to an increasingly heterogeneous customer base, as well as from the array of perspectives they represent, leading to more innovative ideas (Jayne and Dipboye, 2004).

"The motivations that underpin policy action matter a great deal. Securing nondiscriminatory hiring is more than a question of incentivizing behavior, but also of allowing decision makers to understand the often negative import of their actions for social justice and equality in a society that otherwise prides itself on its democratic ideals."
-Sarah Halvorson-Fried

Thomas's bottom line-focused justification for fair treatment and subsequent "diversity management" solution has been criticized by civil rights advocates who claim that failure to center employment practice interventions on conceptions of justice and human rights undermines the significance of this concern (Janssens and Zanoni, 2014; Kersten, 2000). That is, these activists have suggested that Thomas and those who have adopted his contention have thoroughly instrumentalized the argument for equal treatment in hiring along economic criteria. Firm leaders are urged to ensure heterogeneity to serve economic gain and not because freedom or justice demand such treatment for all individuals irrespective of their race, ethnicity, gender or other characteristics.

It is interesting to inquire into why these motivations matter. Do they influence the effectiveness of efforts to ensure fairer hiring practices? Some analysts have contended they do, but the empirical evidence concerning the proposition is limited. Groeneveld and Verbeek (2012), for example, found in a study of Dutch firms that "soft" diversity management policies were more effective than "hard" affirmative action policies in retaining higher percentages of "minority" employees. Their analysis suggested that a diversity management strategy based on a dollars-and-cents approach can be more effective than a justice-based one. This finding might lead one to conclude that profit or performance-based motivations for workforce hiring fairness are superior to those based on justice and human rights.

One reason analysts are interested in determining what incentives result in "good" (in this case, less discriminatory) behavior is that identifying those can inform the design of policy interventions. If policy scholars could learn what makes farmers switch from conventional to organic or more sustainable methods, for instance, they might be able to develop policies to incentivize them to do so. If analysts found that farmers are motivated by long-term profit rather than by concern for the environment, for example, they could use that fact to seek to persuade them to change their hiring, planting and

harvesting practices. In short, it seems likely that understanding the provenance and purport of motivations may make it easier for advocates to ensure that practices change. The "business case" argument for employment equity draws on this idea. Similarly, incentive-based policy strategies assume that personal or corporate gain is the primary motivator of human behavior.

However, whatever their supposed efficacy, these steps fail to help the people whose values and actions they hope to change think critically about their beliefs and behaviors and their social implications. By substituting a profit-based affirmative action argument for one predicated on civil and human rights, "diversity management" ignores the historical and continuing structural social inequities that led to a need for government intervention in the first place. As Agocs and Burr have observed,

> To the extent that it lacks a clear focus on discrimination in employment and the disadvantage it creates, managing diversity blurs the issue of inequality and does not engage questions of how organizational policies, procedures and practices create discriminatory barriers that perpetuate inequality on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity and disability. … The result has been a silencing of discourse about discrimination and about the responsibility of organizational decision makers to provide remedies (1996, p. 38).

Put differently, the motivations that underpin policy action matter a great deal. Securing nondiscriminatory hiring is more than a question of incentivizing behavior, but also of allowing decision makers to understand the often negative import of their actions for social justice and equality in a society that otherwise prides itself on its democratic ideals.

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Good Government, Community and Policing: Police Brutality and Civic Peace

Mary Ryan

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Public trust in American political institutions is vital to the country's civic health. Today, however, the citizenry's confidence in our governments at all levels seems to be weakening and very public incidents of police brutality are one important factor eroding that trust. Put more broadly, public institutions can help shape communal life, but unchecked problems within those entities can likewise foster a lack of citizen confidence, in turn enervating democratic possibility. Police and law enforcement agencies are significant to the vitality of American social life because they are the governmental arm charged with public safety. Moreover, individuals regularly interact with representatives of these institutions.

Police brutality—the verbal harassment, physical beating and shooting of civilians by law enforcement officers—deserves broad discussion and attention, given its implications for justice, governmental accountability and transparency. Who determines the response to police cruelty is as meaningful as the behavior itself. Law enforcement officials should be educated to exercise caution when applying force and to keep their eye on the big picture, that they are part of an institution designed to uphold democratic legitimacy. The danger implicit in police use of weapons and physical restraint arises when officers violate this tenet.

As philosopher Hannah Arendt observed, such cases can lead to changed behavior sets and result in new imperatives: "In order to maintain the system, the empowered ones begin to act as rulers and resort to force. They substitute force for the assent of the people" (2013, p. 93). This essay outlines steps aimed at reducing police brutality and its corrosive impacts on citizen confidence and goodwill. It does so first, by sketching the history of modern police viciousness and next, by describing possible reforms that promise to mitigate the loss of life caused by law enforcement officials and restore social faith—across the socioeconomic spectrum—in the institutions they represent and, perhaps either simultaneously or as a byproduct, contribute toward re-instilling confidence in government more generally.

Contemporary understanding of lethal force

Police brutality is not new. *The Chicago Tribune*, for example, reported on a police assault and abuse of an inmate in 1872 at Chicago's Harrison Street Police Station (Tribune, 1872). The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the current understanding of police department use of force 26 years ago in its unanimous opinion in *Graham v. Connor*:

> The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. The test of reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application (1989).

"The dissonance between law enforcement official brutality and the persisting struggle concerning what constitutes collective social identity and responsibility has prompted much needed collective dialogue concerning how we define ourselves as a people."
-Mary Ryan

Since that landmark decision, law enforcement agencies across the nation have argued that a reasonable use of force need not take into account an officer's past conduct, provocation of individuals or escalation of a situation due to questionable judgment(s). This narrow interpretation of the High Court's decision now dominates current state policies. For example, no state statute requires that police employ nonviolent means before lethal power is used, nor do any restrict deadly force only to situations in which serious, life-threatening injury to officers is likely. Finally, nine states (Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming) and Washington, D.C., do not place any statutory limitations on law enforcement officials' use of lethal force. There are many possible explanations for a reliance on evaluating policing methods in light of specific incidents alone; one in particular not only places police brutality at the center of a wider cultural problem, but also helps to illuminate how institutions can reflect broader changes in society.

Notably, this transition to widespread embrace among police departments of what might be dubbed in-the-moment policing reflects philosopher Iris Marion Young's general observation that the "triumph of a more individualist understanding of social relations … weakens or even destroys the idea of collective responsibility" (2011, p. 9). This view suggests that recent episodes of police brutality may be a symptom of a larger societal shift

in which the nation is becoming more divided and individualistic as its prevailing norms demand that each person (or group) look out for him/her/itself.

That is, we must ask the question: Are we too tolerant of violence committed by police because we can rationalize it as not affecting our individual community or neighborhood? How we answer this question, I think, helps us articulate a response to a query posed by a recent American Theater Company play, *The Project(s),* "who gets to decide what a community is?" Embedded in police violence discussions are debates concerning identity, privilege, unchecked power, stakeholder accountability and leadership (both among community activists and public leaders). Ultimately, the present controversy concerning police role and actions suggests that our society is grappling with what we want our collective community to be. The dissonance between law enforcement official brutality and the persisting struggle concerning what constitutes collective social identity and responsibility has prompted much needed collective dialogue concerning how we define ourselves as a people.

Roadmap to reform

In an attempt to address broad public outcry surrounding the recent rash of highly publicized incidents of perceived police brutality (including the cases of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Michael Johansen, James Boyd, John Geer and Zachary Hammond), some elected officials and law enforcement agencies, including leaders in Missouri (Moxley, 2015) and Ohio (Dayton, 2015), have suggested reforms to curtail such incidents in the future. These recommendations largely relate to ensuring better police training and preparation for their roles. While such steps are doubtless necessary, improved education alone is unlikely to transform entrenched practices and views. As Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Cornel West have suggested, "Either you change the whole system, or you merely try to soften its harsh effects through 'reformism'"(1998, p. 29).

Indeed, as these scholars have argued, the scope of a change influences its effectiveness. Saving lives and restoring law enforcement agency integrity and public standing suggests that the following steps should receive careful consideration as critical factors in any reforms undertaken:

> 1. Place the primary responsibility for change on public and private, and especially local institutions, particularly law enforcement entities and mass media, that influence public norms and sociocultural practices. Although society must find ways to foster peaceful communities, institutional leadership must avoid callously caging people, figuratively or otherwise (Meiners, 2007).

Law enforcement is a democratic institution supported by tax dollars and it should take seriously its responsibility to carry out duties that serve the public meaningfully.

2. Utilize artistic processes, such as documentary theater, playback theatre or writing circles, to promote inter-group understanding and reflection on internalized discrimination and to foster healing between police and those historically injured and disadvantaged by unjust treatment.

3. Identify opportunities to share political ownership (namely economic resources, positions of authority and political representation) with members of historically disenfranchised groups. This will help curtail abuses of power by law enforcement agencies.

4. Narrow the definition of when reasonable force legally may be employed, as Cordell (2014) has suggested, by drawing on the example of the Seattle and Los Angeles Police Departments. In Seattle, officers cannot use physical restraint, "against individuals who only verbally confront them unless the vocalization impedes a legitimate law enforcement function or contains specific threats to harm the officers or others" (Cordell, 2014). In Los Angeles, the use of deadly violence must include, "consideration of not only the use of deadly force itself, but also an officer's tactical conduct and decisions leading up to the use of force when determining its reasonableness" (Cordell, 2014). These changes are significant because they allow for fuller and more accurate understandings of misconduct that include officer responses to victim behavior.

5. Patrol officers in departments across the United States are currently well schooled in how to use their weapons. That training is essential, but more emphasis must be placed on helping police develop conflict management and communication skills so they are better equipped to deescalate difficult situations so that weapons are not often used (Police Executive Research Forum, 2015).

6. Law enforcement officers should be required to wear body cameras, the use of which should also be carefully regulated. Both Krupanski and Cordell (2012 and 2014, respectively) have contended that body-worn cameras (BWCs) promote transparency among police officers by holding them publicly accountable for their actions, which in turn decreases the likelihood of later civil litigation when a citizen-law enforcement interaction becomes tense. The police department of Rialto, California, with 115 sworn officers, became the first such entity to require BWCs in 2009. A study of such camera footage in Rialto found that this use of photography coincided with a 59 percent drop in use of force

incidents and an 88 percent decrease in citizen complaints of police misconduct (Cordell, 2014).

7. Cities and counties should establish independent civilian law enforcement review boards to hold officers accountable, instead of relying on internal police investigations alone. Civilian oversight of law enforcement is practiced in the European Union as well as South Africa, Canada and Belgium (Cordell, 2014). Readers can review a complete list of such review agencies in the United States at the "Resources" section of the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement website (NACOLE, 2015).

Many of these reforms might give the impression that power lies in the hands of bureaucratic administrators. On the contrary, this essay cautions against this perceived imbalance of power, recognizing that the smooth operation needed to preserve the importance and necessity of democratic governmental institutions can only occur with public engagement. We all have a say in what a good community is. Police brutality fractures our collective social contract, but fulfilling this nation's premises and promise require us to speak out when our representative institutions abuse their power and trust.

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The Act of Killing: Reckoning with the Violence of the Past and the Stories We Tell

Robert Flahive

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What does it mean to participate in a mass killing and how does one live with those acts? Director Joshua Oppenheimer's searing 2012 film, *The Act of Killing,* explores these questions by focusing on a small group of mass murderers 45 years after their participation in the 1965 Indonesian anti-communist purges that resulted in the deaths of between 500,000 and one million people. The director invited the killers who took part in the mass murder to reenact their roles in assorted "films within the film." These creations show the murderers' attempts to reconcile "unspeakable horrors" with the "victor's history" of a heroic triumph over "communism:" a narrative celebrated by many of those who participated in the killings who still occupy key political positions (Oppenheimer, 2013, 22:00). Oppenheimer deftly probes the relationships among the individuals he tracked along three separate threads: memories of their murderous acts, performances reenacting those episodes and the stories they told themselves to rationalize and justify those deeds. Yet these concerns also hint at an uncomfortable truth: all human beings are implicated in the production of history. This essay first describes Oppenheimer's exploration of how the killers currently cope with their past heinous acts and then segues to examine several wider implications of this acclaimed documentary.

Each individual is a participant in the present, but just as crucially, each of us is also involved in the reification of today's dominant narratives when we accept, remain complicit in, and do not challenge longstanding assumptions or the claims upon which they are constructed (Grovogui, 2013; Kirschenblat-Gimblett, 1995; Landsberg, 2004). This is not to suggest occurrences in the past can be changed, but rather that dominant historical narratives—particularly of the triumphal—varietyevolve in a society at a particular moment and crystallize over time. Nonetheless, that frame can be considered through different perspectives that challenge the hegemonic narrative it represents. Doing so may highlight the fact that widely accepted frames of past events may not be benign, but may instead be perpetuating oppression or injustice of varying sorts.

Postcolonial scholars and oral historians offer two slightly different views on "recovering" histories marginalized by dominant social imaginaries. Postcolonial scholars cultivate counter-narratives to challenge hegemonic or established histories (see Abu-El Haj, 2001; Gregory, 2004; Grovogui, 2013; Said, 1979) while some oral historians explicitly seek out marginalized or "subaltern" perspectives to encourage more nuanced social narratives (Cline, 2006; Gluck, 1977; Portelli, 1991; Thomson, 2006). Neither of these approaches quite fits what Oppenheimer undertook in *The Act of Killing*. The director focused on the killers' intoxicated boasting of their past horrific acts, their animated imagined reenactments of their crimes and the consequences of those actions that arose for each as they began to wrestle with the deep contradictions between their past behavior and the rationalizations they had long provided for it. *The Act of Killing* allowed the killers space to confront the ways their active participation in the Indonesian genocide affected them personally, their victims and their families, Indonesian society and, indeed, all of humankind.

"In addition to this increasing recognition of what actually occurred and dialogue concerning it in Indonesia, the documentary's audience also confronts a need to recognize its own complicity in the reification of the anti-communist narrative and support for the oppressive power structure that has supported that 'explanation' since the genocide occurred."
-Robert Flahive

Oppenheimer's focus on the murderers' testimony and imagination challenges extant assumptions concerning the production of history and research into past crimes. The film's concentrated attention on the killers turns Wieviorka's (2006) notion of the "era of the witness"—the rise of individualized victim testimony to explore wider narratives—on its head. This shift does not necessarily suggest a lack of sympathy with the victims and their families, but it does engender greater empathy for the long-term consequences of their actions for the murderers. Similarly, the killer-centric approach also challenges what Weizman (2014) has referred to as the "forensic turn" in research on past mass killings—the shift in evidence investigations from Wieviorka's "testimony" of victims (subjects) of trauma to consideration of both individual accounts and the interpretation of material remains, including buildings, as sensors of violence.

Oppenheimer lingers on the perpetrators' provocative, gut-wrenching displays of delusion and boasting of horrific acts less to highlight their inhumanity, although this is the instinctual viewer reaction, but rather, to illuminate the "cracks in their façade that the genocide was heroic" (Oppenheimer, 2015). For Oppenheimer, these fissures are an invitation to reflect on the humanity of the killers and their coping mechanisms with past

deeds. These momentary breaks in their long-held rationalizing defenses revealed both how these individuals had shielded themselves from their past acts, while also signaling the potential for reflection-based transformative change (Oppenheimer, 2015). In this sense, *The Act of Killing* opens space to recognize the agonizing effects of these acts for the perpetrators, as well as the stories they tell themselves to cope with killing on a mass scale.

The documentary focuses closely on one killer in particular, Anwar Congo, who had been a petty gangster when the genocide erupted, but became one of its leaders and the reputed killer of 1,000 individuals. Viewers become fellow travelers with him as he plunges into a fever dream of escapism in his self-produced reflection in his "film within the film." Oppenheimer juxtaposes the delusional rehearsals of elaborate scenes with Congo's moments of personal reflection. Audiences witness his restless nights, listen to him explain karma on a dock in darkness, watch his cha-cha dance with wire around his neck immediately after demonstrating how he killed hundreds of victims using such wire, view him drinking beer and singing American song classics with friends, observe him as he receives a medal from former victims in a scene from his kitschy film production and ultimately serve as witnesses as he retches repeatedly during an agonizing scene in which he appears to experience an autonomic response to reckoning with the import of his past actions. While some argue that Congo was acting in this scene, Oppenheimer has contended that it represented his spontaneous response to his reflections on the horrors he had committed (Oppenheimer, 2014b, 23:01-23:10). Nevertheless, Congo's confrontation in this scene with his responsibility for hundreds of atrocities hinted at the pain embedded beneath the layers of self-pity, rationalization and delusion he had constructed in the decades since the genocide.

Oppenheimer has suggested that he sought to show that "we (human beings) are our past" (Oppenheimer, 2014b). That is, "We live [the present] in memory and through different states of time" (Oppenheimer, 2015). Therefore, "if our past lives on in us, it suggests that [the] trauma [of] that past also lives on in a painful way" (Oppenheimer, 2015). The film focuses on the memory, performances and "stories we tell ourselves" to suggest how the trauma of his genocidal past shaped Congo and other killers. The persistent and progressive bubbling up of the long-suppressed trauma associated with his past murders serves as the central defining force in the film.

Congo, like all of the killers Oppenheimer filmed, at first openly boasted about his past deeds. He proudly demonstrated the way he used wire to kill more efficiently and with less blood than other means. In a later interview, Oppenheimer observed that such boasting was not an act of pride, but rather a form of escapism from the horrible acts he (and others) had committed (Apple, Inc. 2013, 13:08). As the film progresses the audience slowly comprehends how individuals can use memory to shield themselves from a

self-reckoning for their deeds. Landsberg (2004) has characterized this escapism as evidence of a negotiation between the past and the present. It is this phenomenon, as revealed by Congo especially, that is the central puzzle for the audience in the documentary.

The killer's boasting is presented in various ways as he describes his past acts in the documentary's "film within the film." Viewers encounter this aspect of his persona in the staged pogrom of a village by Panchisila Youth, one of the paramilitary groups (which still exist in Indonesia) with which Congo and his colleagues collaborated. Oppenheimer filmed this organization's current rallies as well as additional elaborate reenactments of killings as part of his protagonist's film noir production. Finally, the director showcased an elaborate dance sequence and celebration of Congo's murders in which two victims symbolically offered him a medal and thanked him for killing them beneath a majestic waterfall. *The Act of Killing* focuses on the gaps in Congo's performative subterfuges to amplify the disconnects present in each. Oppenheimer's camera follows unenthusiastic dancing at the Panchisila Youth rally, revels in the stunning beauty of the landscape in the dance sequence in which Congo receives a medal and chronicles the killer's moments of confusion and contemplation after playing the role of a victim in his film within the film.

Throughout, these memories and performances are underpinned by the collective "stories we tell ourselves," through the eyes of the murderers. Indeed, various killers and current members of Panchisila Youth describe the meaning and etymology of the word for gangster, "preman," derived from the Dutch version of "Free man," in the film. This refrain suggests a kind of independence and honor associated with devotion to a purpose as a rationale for the genocide (preventing and/or defeating "communism"), despite the fact many of those who participated in the mass killings actually murdered for status, money and power (Film Ireland, 2014). Indeed, perhaps the most significant "story" to which the perpetrators clung in the film is the notion that all of the victims of the genocide were communists. Nonetheless, the killers also recounted that, anyone in a union or who crossed them was also liable to be murdered, thereby undermining their own primary rationalization for their acts (Oppenheimer, 2014a).

While the audience joins Congo and his accomplices as fellow travelers on his journey of reflection, the end of the film points to two difficult passages yet to come. First, the people of Indonesia have yet to embark fully on a process of reconciliation among those affected by the genocide. *The Act of Killing* screenings in Indonesia and around the world opened space for discussions of the 1965-1966 anticommunist purges, which had theretofore simply not occurred. The topic is now openly considered today, but the government has not issued a formal apology to those who lost loved ones in the mass killings (Oppenheimer, 2013).

In addition to this increasing recognition of what actually occurred and dialogue concerning it in Indonesia, the documentary's audience also confronts a need to recognize its own complicity in the reification of the anti-communist narrative and support for the oppressive power structure that has supported that "explanation" since the genocide occurred. As Oppenheimer has observed,

> [the film] holds up a dark mirror first to Anwar, then to Indonesian society as a whole, and I hope, by spending this time with Anwar, that we will see ourselves in that dark mirror, too. Both as individuals and as a society that depend, for every single article of clothing that we are wearing, for everything that I'm touching right now, depends on men like Anwar to enforce conditions of cruelty everywhere that everything we buy is produced (Oppenheimer, 2014b, 25:30-25:06).

While the implications of this remark are not explored in the film, Oppenheimer's comment extends Congo's reckoning to all human beings. *The Act of Killing* urges its viewers to acknowledge both the systems of injustice that human beings construct and the narratives they employ to perpetuate and legitimate those structures. In other words, Congo's escapism, as revealed in his strangely carnival-like film within a film's treatment of his past unspeakable acts, resonates with our own willing roles in acceding to such violence, not as direct participants perhaps, but as indirect beneficiaries of the systems upon which Congo's actions—and hundreds of others like him in Indonesia and—beyondare too often predicated.

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Who is Talking? Paradigm Shifts, Knowledge-Power and the Aquatic Ape

Lorien MacAuley

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One cannot help but notice an ongoing tension in academia between the active pursuit of new knowledge and a tendency to cling to old ideas and theories. Kuhn (1970) wrote about the resistance of academic disciplines to change, coining the phrase "paradigm shift," which embodies, rather than a simple series of logical/rational decisions, a number of political considerations, social factors, issues of identity negotiation and elements of culture. But what does a paradigm shift look like in "real time"? And, just because we understand Kuhn's idea, does that make it any easier to recognize a fresh knowledge claim as a new paradigm (or part of one), or something that is just "out there," given that we each have our constructed understanding of knowledge, which, in the case of the academy, is considered to be legitimate, vetted and valorized in society? Using the intriguing example of the aquatic ape hypothesis of human evolution, I explore paradigm shifts in the academy in this article, and how they are intertwined with social and cultural factors.

In 2002, while studying Biology at Longwood University, I enrolled in a Human Evolution class. The beloved professor leading that course, Lynn Ferguson, who was known for his love of creepy crawly cave insects and his tangents about banjo playing, had us read about the "aquatic ape hypothesis," a little-known idea that suggests that humans may have evolved on the water's edge as semi-aquatic marine mammals (see Vaneechoutte, Kuliukas and Verhaegen, 2011). I was very interested, but my life and studies led me elsewhere and the construct became an occasional fleeting fancy on which to muse when on a beach vacation.

Flash forward to last summer, when I attended a seaside wedding, where I met a doctoral student of anthropology, studying human evolution. Whether it was the sound of the surf, the crying gulls or the champagne, I dared to ask her whether she had studied the aquatic ape hypothesis. Her reaction was unexpected. She seemed suddenly cagey and offered only a few ambiguous remarks about how that theory was "a little out there" and her professors "didn't really believe in it." She explained that "no one really talks about it." I

was a little surprised, thinking the idea to be a fascinating hypothesis concerning human evolution, one that surely, in the decade and a half since I learned of it, scientists had sought to develop or debunk. I was again intrigued, this timeless about the theory itself, and more about the question, what is it about academics that makes us resist new ideas and change? To paraphrase ethicist Paul Thompson (2015), social critics should learn a little something about the things about which they theorize. In that spirit, I briefly describe the aquatic ape hypothesis before discussing knowledge politics more broadly.

"I would like to think that academia is changing, breaking boundaries and embracing new forms of knowledge. But, perhaps, our collective grasp of reality is actually so tenuous that we become sufficiently distracted by the socialized symbols and coded language surrounding new knowledge that we reject fresh ideas that do not accord with our prevailing assumptions and frames."
-Lorien MacAuley

In 1970, Elaine Morgan, an educated—but nonacademic—BBC journalist in Wales, read a then-popular book, *The Naked Ape* (Morris, 1967), which briefly mentioned Sir Alister Hardy's (1960) little-known theory that humans evolved as semi-aquatic. She was captivated by the concept and researched and compiled evidence of the aquatic ancestry of modern Homo sapiens. Soon, she was attending academic conferences to present the idea to trained anatomists and evolutionary biologists. Indeed, she wound up writing several books on the subject (Morgan, 1973; 1982; 2011).

Lest you think the theory does not "hold water," allow me to explain a few key points. As the argument goes, early hominids probably spent much of their time at the water's edge (near a wooded saltwater marsh, perhaps), swimming and diving for fish and shellfish. Since our closest relatives are chimpanzees, we can compare our differences with those primates to lend insight into what may have changed to create conditions to develop humans as a new species. Unlike chimpanzees, we are strictly bipedal, with our lower limbs in line with a flexible spine, an arrangement that makes us good swimmers. Human infants instinctively hold their breath and kick to the surface under water, unlike baby chimps, who do neither as a matter of course. Unlike chimps, we can control our breathing and hold our breath, and that capacity makes complex speech possible. Unlike land animals, we lack the ability to conserve salt (like marine mammals, we sweat it out, whereas salt is scarce on land) and we need to drink more water each day than do most terrestrial species. Like marine mammals, we are largely hairless, and instead, even the thinnest of us has a layer of insulating fat just below the skin (think blubber). This fat layer provides excellent insulation in the water, but its weight and heat-trapping abilities are disadvantages on land. Many other explanations exist for why humans differ so greatly from

chimpanzees (involving weapon/tool use, thermoregulation, ability to run, sexual behavior, etc.), but they have all been dismissed by evolutionary biologists/anthropologists. So, the aquatic ape hypothesis is a fascinating notion that seems promising.

Despite the intuitive appeal of the evidence she had amassed, however, when Elaine Morgan presented her ideas at academic conferences, she was openly ridiculed by members of the scientific establishment (Vaneechoutte, Kuliukas and Verhaegen, 2011). So, why did researchers initially largely ignore, deride or dismiss her work? In fact, in recent years, scientists have begun to take Morgan's ideas more seriously (Foley and Lahr, 2014; Kuliukas, 2014; Rae and Koppe, 2014; Rhys-Evans and Cameron, 2014; Tobias, 2002; Vaneechoutte, 2014; Vaneechoutte, Kuliukas and Verhaegen, 2011; Verhaegen, 2013), and she has recently been awarded two honorary doctorates. These facts beg the question of why it took the scientists in her chosen field so long to examine her hypothesis.

Indeed, only one peer-reviewed critique had been published concerning the aquatic ape hypothesis until recently. That article became well known, and even years later, Morgan was repeatedly informed that her theory had been debunked. In his critique, John Langdon argued:

> Umbrella hypotheses ranging from mainstream science to the paranormal maintain their popularity among students, general audiences, and scholars in neighboring disciplines. One reason for this is that simple answers, however wrong, are easier to communicate and are more readily accepted than the more sound, but more complex solutions (1997, p. 479).

However, Langdon's appraisal did not seriously consider the basic arguments of the aquatic ape hypothesis and misunderstood those contentions in any case. Kuliukas later criticized Langdon's effort as "based on cursory and superficial comparisons" (2011, p. 213). Given this reality, it appears fair to ask what scientists saw as so compelling about his article.

Williams has observed that the history of the aquatic ape hypothesis reveals much about the "constructions of scientific authority and knowledge" (2011, p. 199). Langdon's (1997) language concerning "umbrella hypotheses" that amount to "simple answers" constituted a strong rebuke to any student or more junior researcher/faculty member who might otherwise have found the argument interesting. Also, this rhetoric clearly drew a line at the boundaries of the discipline (biology), by suggesting the hypothesis was popular among "students, general audiences, and scholars in neighboring disciplines" (Langdon, 1997, p. 479). A mention of students, the lowest rung on the academic ladder, signaled that your status as a scholar would be compromised if you found the hypothesis intriguing. Langdon's language also suggested that even if scholars from other fields might be interested, they were not members of the club with purview of the topic. And so,

Langdon drew a line in the sand: his critique clearly communicated that serious consideration of the hypothesis should be off-limits for card-carrying members of the evolutionary biology field.

Nowadays, as a student of social theory, the aquatic ape hypothesis has come to represent a perfect example for me of knowledge politics in action. The history of this idea reminds me of Lave and Wenger's (1991) situated learning theory, which explains how a community of practice forms as a group mutually engages in a joint enterprise over time. A community of practice emerges around the teaching, learning and research activities in any university department or field of study, such as evolutionary biology—which is why we call it an "academic community." Lave and Wenger contended that repeated social interactions foster common cultures among participants, complete with rules of engagement, social norms and boundary objects that govern who is "in" and who is "out." Newcomers in a field must negotiate this identity and follow the rules that existing members have created to become "experts" in the community. Unfortunately, such behavioral norms are notoriously tacit in character (Collins, 1970). Nonetheless, this system builds knowledge via the social interactions and learning of its participants.

Lave and Wenger (1991) were careful to point out that the experts in a community are likely to mount a powerful defense when the existing rules and social norms governing their work are challenged. As I mentioned above, Kuhn (1970) famously argued that such calls for basic changes in an academic group's self-understanding may constitute a "paradigm shift." He suggested that such changes were fraught with political dimensions, including the vagaries of scholarly careers and other social and cultural factors, not to mention power considerations linked to academic institution status and roles. Foucault (1980) famously argued that knowledge claims cannot be divorced from power, since we, as humans, balance our perceptions of the world against what we find to be socially acceptable, in line with our ideas of cultural norms and socialized identity. Our ideas of social acceptability come from our sense of who we are, how we have been acculturated, and the coded behavior of the symbols with which we surround ourselves. For example, what is socially acceptable for a particular woman is not always socially appropriate for a man, or for an individual from a different background or status (Fausto-Sterling, 2008).

Humans build new knowledge by viewing it through their existing paradigms. The problem is, individuals often forget that those ways of knowing are guiding their understanding. That is, the assumptions underpinning those frames very often go unexpressed or are taken for granted to the point that they become invisible to those embracing them. As Gramsci (1995) observed, certain ideas attain cultural hegemony. These concepts are constantly reinforced, reified and ultimately reproduced through a multitude of unnoticed and unacknowledged actions. Bourdieu

(1977) has similarly theorized that societies reproduce ideas, identity and social behavior (including academic research, teaching, learning and writing) by means of cultural symbols and coded behavior, of which individuals are not often cognizant.

Knowledge generated and vetted by academics is the most important knowledge there is, at least as far as individuals in our society are acculturated to believe (Giroux, 1992). Part of producing scholarship accepted by others involves speaking, acting and writing using accepted symbols and coded language that result in positive responses from those audiences, whose members are recognized in their fields. Some of this process of legitimation makes sense (such as when the peer review process works), and some of it does not (such as when a dazzling presentation at a conference leaves everyone initially satisfied, but further reflection reveals a lack of originality or substance). So, if one can successfully engage in the rules of the game and (re)create an acceptable symbolic interaction, one can produce a perspective that is acknowledged and venerated by those engaged in one's field of social action. But, if this is so, that fact implies that the rules of the game may be stacked against all but the relatively few who are able to discern them and act in acceptable ways.

In light of this argument, please imagine Elaine Morgan, an intelligent and thoughtful journalist, but also a mild-mannered country woman, daughter of a coal-miner and evidencing a strong Welsh accent, presenting on the aquatic ape hypothesis at an academic conference of mostly English male scientists in the 1970s. Her profession, look, demeanor and gender were all unlikely to result in her inclusion in the prevailing community of practice to which she was appealing. By her symbolic and coded behavior, she likely violated the rules of engagement and social norms of the field to which she was seeking to contribute. She also lacked the accepted boundary object—the "entry card" to the club—a doctoral degree in the discipline. Moreover, the substance of her ideas was far different from the usual, and her language was that of a writer, not a trained scientist. In short, she lacked the correct codes and symbols to demonstrate her compliance with the rules of the game, the long accepted hegemonic assumptions of evolutionary biologists. As a result, powerful experts in the field did not grant her or her work legitimacy (Langdon, 1997).

The result was a marginalization of Morgan's ideas. Now, however, because her arguments truly were arresting and original, they are slowly being considered seriously by evolutionary biologists and anthropologists. But for a baffling 40 years, were these ideas rejected simply on the basis of "who" was talking, or how it was said? And are we comfortable with such factors shaping our collective understanding of the origins of humankind?

I think of my own discipline, agricultural and adult education, and wonder what new radical, profoundly different and at first apparently strange ideas

have been pushed aside by the academic community, who carefully guard and protect the holy grail of professional legitimacy. I would like to think that academia is changing, breaking boundaries and embracing new forms of knowledge. But, perhaps, our collective grasp of reality is actually so tenuous that we become sufficiently distracted by the socialized symbols and coded language surrounding new knowledge that we reject fresh ideas that do not accord with our prevailing assumptions and frames. I end with this uncertainty and promise myself that I will listen, really listen, to the intellectual substance of (what seems to be) the next wild idea I encounter, whether in conversation or at the next academic conference in which I participate.

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Musings on the Human-Ecology Imaginary

Rachael Kennedy

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Contemplating events at the Oceti Sakowin Camp in Standing Rock, South Dakota, many people have found it hard to connect Indigenous values with their own beliefs about their relationships to the land on which they live. I am no sage, nor was I raised in an Indigenous culture. However, in the name of creating community among *Reflections* readers, and emerging from my concerns arising from the dispute concerning possible use of sacred Sioux Tribal land for an oil pipeline in South Dakota, I am stimulated to share a recent personal epiphany regarding my understanding of the sacredness of land.

I periodically drive south from Virginia into Tennessee and travel Interstate 26 as it winds its way into North Carolina, and I am always intrigued by the many Native American sounding names on the road signs. I find myself wondering what I might discover in the Watauga watershed and what the names Unicoi, Okolona, and Unaka signify in historical terms. When did Sycamore Shoals State Heritage Park and Winged Deer Park, near Johnson City, Tennessee, come into being and what was there before the land was set aside as public parks? As I zip by in my car at 70 miles-per-hour, I wonder what stories this land and these waterways could share. And, yet, as intrigued as I am year after year, I never take time to stop and learn more about this area or the specific places that have long captured my attention.

I never delve into the history, the stories or the traditions, past and present, of this portion of eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina. I simply speed by, in my time-pressed existence, to my destination. However, recently, while in Asheville, North Carolina visiting friends, I read *Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache* (Basso, 1996) and it occurred to me that these sites I pass every few months and whose names always strike me, are likely attached to the language of my Native American and Appalachian ancestors who lived in these regions. I found myself wondering whether there were, and possibly still are, family stories about these locations. On a recent trip, I mused about why this possibility had not previously crossed my mind; why I had not sought out the wisdom surely contained in these places.

As I continued to reflect, I found myself asking what it would mean to live in a world that actively drew on the knowledge represented by places. Would such a society treat land as a sacred being sought out for companionship? Would residents of such a society rethink elements of their otherwise currently technocentric lives? Would our public policies be different? Would we disavow today's reigning dictum of profit over place?

"The Western Apache teach that the knowledge of place aligns individuals with their highest potential for wisdom." -Rachael Kennedy

Anthropologists, such as Basso who authored the book on the Western Apache, dedicate their professional, and often personal, lives to exploring and sharing the stories and cultural understanding of diverse groups that are otherwise too often not given voice. These scholars may be viewed as agents who help us see our collective assumptions. They do so by acknowledging the complexity of the woven fabric created by the cultural stories told and documented by Indigenous peoples and by recognizing that those narratives are recounted with supreme facility generation after generation to teach, heal and preserve shared beliefs.

But their work also points to something still deeper concerning human beings and their relationship to the land they inhabit. Indeed, it suggests something so deep that it could penetrate my analytical, pragmatically trained mind and force me to recall the knowing that surely is, under the many layers of modernity, within each of us. It is about this abiding, deep-seated awareness that Basso astutely observed, "Inhabitants *of* their landscape, the Western Apache are thus inhabited *by* it as well, and in the timeless depth of that abiding reciprocity, the people and their landscape are virtually as one" (1996, p.102, emphasis in original). That is, the Western Apache belief system highlights the intersubjectivity of human-land reciprocity. Basso's book offers many more strikingly perceptive and thoughtful statements synthesized from conversations with Western Apache tribe members during a more than 30-year period. Each such observation, like the "arrows" discussed by the tribe members, pulled me deeper into thoughts about the symbiotic, communicative relationship between nature spirits and human beings, or as it might also be regarded, the human-ecology imaginary.

The interviews and stories Basso recounted also prompted me to reflect on how our society considers the constructed relationship between space and time. The Western Apache portray that linkage in healing ceremonies that transcend the concept of time. Their ontology stands in direct opposition to modern life and science. To the broader public, such a perspective is either not in its collective consciousness or is ignored or denied as unorthodox. Perhaps for this reason, few researchers cross the boundary of "appropriate" inquiry to share such views that were born in a time before science came to

dominate our individual and collective sensibilities. For this reason, too, individuals, Indigenous or not, often do not share their non-conforming views concerning relationships to land, space and time in public venues.

Nonetheless, I found myself wondering how dominant societal norms might change if ancestral voices, via ancient stories of land and nature, were widely employed to teach morality, identity and resiliency? How could we open individually and collectively to the offers of healing such a possibility would represent? How could individuals with no Indigenous affiliation enter into such relationships? Could this be done without unethical appropriation or cooptation of Native beliefs and customs?

These substantial questions only begin to scratch the surface of the potential insights offered by the Western Apache and other Indigenous peoples. From the Western Apache tradition, I have been pondering the belief that wisdom arises from three antecedent conditions: *bíni' godilkǫǫh* (smoothness of mind), *bíni' gontŁ'iz* (resilience of mind) and *bíni' gonŁdzil* (steadiness of mind) (Basso, 1996, p. 131). Basso revealed that, for the Western Apache, steadiness of mind is achieved by looking inward and eliminating all inner incongruences, whereas, resilience of mind is attained by learning how to cope with and recover from external forces. Once these attributes are attained, a person may develop smoothness of mind, "the primary mental condition required for wisdom" (Basso, 1996, p. 131). I find it deeply intriguing that the Western Apache believe:

> none of these conditions is given at birth, each must be cultivated in a conscientious manner by acquiring relevant bodies of knowledge and applying them critically to the workings of one's mind. Knowledge of places and their cultural significance is crucial in this regard because it illustrates with numerous examples the mental conditions needed for wisdom as well as the practical advantages that wisdom confers on persons who possess it (Basso, 1996, p. 130).

I was struck by this contention because the Western Apache beliefs felt so profoundly relatable to my life. The tribe teaches that the knowledge of place aligns individuals with their highest potential for wisdom. For this reason, I became convinced that I owe it to myself to further explore eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina and seek to learn from the places located there that still retain their Native names. My first steps toward developing a relationship with the area follow. My knowledge to date is paltry and must be supplemented by sustained efforts to come to know this terrain first hand, but it represents a start.

- Okolona: A marker along the highway within Johnson City, Tennessee simply states the name without descriptors. However, the term most likely comes from the Chickasaw word Okalaua,

meaning peaceful, yellow or blue water. Interestingly, more than one scholar has proposed that tribal people who were moved with the 1887 Dawes Act were taken from Tennessee and placed into what was later called Okolona County, Mississippi.

- Sycamore Shoals State Historic Area: European settlers proclaimed a town in this area in 1772. The "Transylvania Purchase" of 1775 transferred Cherokee lands to those colonizers, which resulted in a series of attacks on the newcomers by the tribe. Tennessee established the park in 1976 on the grounds of Fort Watauga, constructed 200 years before, in 1776, to protect settlers from continuing Cherokee attacks. The Watauga River runs through the area, creating shoals flush with fish and wildlife.
- Unaka: The name Unaka is rooted in the Cherokee language symbols ???, and term *unega*, meaning "white," and is the historic name of the subrange of the Appalachian Mountains bordering Tennessee and North Carolina. They are said to be comprised partly of white stones/quartz. The Cherokee National Forest and the Pisgah National Forest protect sections of the Unaka Mountains; the Appalachian Trail traverses their crest. Unaka is also the name given to an unincorporated community in Cherokee County, NC, located within the Nantahala National Forest.
- Unicoi: The Unicoi Mountains run through the small town of the same name nestled near the Cherokee National Forest. The name Unicoi also comes from the Cherokee root word *unega*. In this context, it refers to the low-lying clouds and fog that often drape the Southern Appalachian Mountains in the early morning or on humid or moist days. Unicoi is a main resupply point for Appalachian Trail hikers and Nolichucky River enthusiasts. It is also a hub and home to workers of the CSX railroad. The community's first post office opened in 1851.
- Watauga watershed: The name's meaning is lost to history, as reported by John Preston Arthur in his 1915 classic ethnology of the region (Arthur, 1915). The Tennessee portion includes parts of Carter, Johnson, Sullivan, Unicoi and Washington Counties in the northeast part of the state and drains approximately 614 square miles into the Boone Reservoir. The region contains two Designated Natural Areas: Watauga River Bluffs Designated State Natural Area, a 50-acre site, and Hampton Creek Cove Designated State Natural Area, a 693-acre reserve. The watershed contains 123 documented rare plant and animal species.
- Established in 1991, Winged Deer Park, near Johnson City, is a 200-acre district park. The Robert Young Cabin, built in the early 1770's, is the oldest building on the property. The park also commissioned the Massengill Monument to honor Henry

Massengill Sr. and Mary Cobb, who in the 1760s were considered the first permanent European settler family to the area.

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Ethics Versus Efficiency in Global Healthcare

Rebecca Powell-Doherty

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The recent shifts in the United States (U.S.) political climate and the questionable ethics of some in U.S. political leadership have led me, like many others I would imagine, to reflect on my role in politics, as an advocate for change, a representative for how I interpret the concept of justice, and perhaps most importantly, on the professional path I have thus far chosen. I have spent the last thirteen years surrounded by and involved in biomedical research and clinical medicine, experience I hope one day to apply to international development initiatives. Being intimately involved in biomedical research means that I, like my peers in the field, am required to have an in-depth understanding of the ethical responsibilities associated with such inquiry.

The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) requires proof of ethics training for funding eligibility, and every facility in which I have worked has had the additional requirement of yearly updates to ensure individual awareness and facility with that guidance. Trainings that fulfill this obligation cover and review everything from the United States Public Health Service Tuskegee Syphilis experiment in which African Americans who contracted that disease between 1932 and 1972 were left untreated, so as to examine its effects, and the wide variety of abhorrent human experiments conducted by the Nazis during World War II that led to the Nuremberg Code and the principle of voluntary consent (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949). Updates also address the Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1948) and the Helsinki Accords (Riis 2003), the Belmont Report (the report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research released in 1978) with its four key ethical principles for human-related research and the rights and protections for non-human research animals (National Commission, 1978).

As violations of the current standards of ethics outlined in the Nuremberg Code, the Belmont Report and elsewhere continue to occur, the vast majority of scientists nonetheless, I believe, daily make every effort to uphold and often surpass those requirements. This essay explores an issue that seems to have escaped today's medical research ethical safety net and which has been

justified on the basis of *cost and efficiency*. I offer an Aristotelean argument concerning vertical and horizontal justice as both a rebuke to the global healthcare community for permitting this situation and as a means to rectify it.

"Ethical principles, particularly with regard to how to treat large groups of vulnerable people in medical and health research, are not a new phenomenon. Indeed, they date *at least* back to Aristotle, whose work provided a simple, rational test for how to apply such standards as non-maleficence, beneficence, justice and autonomy."
-Rebecca Powell-Doherty

During the course of a recent literature review, I came across a curious subset of the human rights literature that highlighted the rather appalling idea of a healthcare and research 'double standard.' This scenario arises from a debate concerning whether a 'placebo' group is appropriate when testing a new pharmaceutical, combination of pharmaceuticals or any other medical treatment not yet approved for general use by the Food and Drug Administration in the United States. The currently agreed upon ethical standard, known as clinical equipoise, is that a placebo group is *not appropriate* if an approved treatment for the same disease or condition exists, and indeed, should a pharmaceutical company attempt to bypass this requirement in a study taking place in the United States, regulatory intervention would be swift and the penalty or cost imposed would be significant. Biomedical researchers are required to provide the existing standard as a baseline of care and determine whether the new treatment constitutes an improvement compared to the old, rather than with respect to nothing at all (a placebo). The ethical principles governing this specific issue are beneficence (efforts to ensure that benefits outweigh risks) and non-maleficence (do no harm). There is no proviso in the Belmont Report or in current regulations for an exception to these principles.

Those who attained majority before the mid-to-late 1990's may well remember the Pfizer case involving the now withdrawn antibiotic *Trovan*, a (then) new treatment for meningococcal meningitis. A lawsuit, that was settled out of court for $75 million, asserted Pfizer, in a 1996 meningitis outbreak in Nigeria, gave a reduced dose of the gold standard *ceftriaxone* to a control group to skew a study concerning the efficacy of *Trovan* to maximize the likelihood of demonstrating the superior efficacy of the new drug.

Plaintiffs also argued that Pfizer had falsified documents that indicated it had obtained informed consent from patients to participate, as well as general approval from the Nigerian government and their own institutional review board (IRB) for the clinical trial to take place. The study participants were children, and eleven of them died while many others suffered blindness, deafness and paralysis. It remains unclear whether those who acquired

chronic conditions did so as a result of their disease (meningitis) or as a result of *Trovan's* side effects. The drug was discontinued shortly after its regulatory approval, as evidence emerged of severe liver toxicity associated with its use (Petryna, 2006).

When the situation that occasioned the lawsuit came to light, the public outcry was substantial and swift condemnation of Pfizer by the World Bank (WB), World Health Organization (WHO) and the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee followed. Given this history, one can be forgiven for surprise at learning that the NIH and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) both vigorously defended a series of drug trials in 1994 in sixteen African countries that tested a shorter dosing regimen of an anti-retroviral (ARV) drug designed to reduce vertical (mother-to-child) transmission of HIV-1 by using a placebo group, as opposed to the longer-dosing regimen then considered the gold standard treatment for the virus. The rationale? Both funding organizations asserted that a placebo control was acceptable because the trials took place in 'resource-poor settings' and that the current standard of care *in those countries* did not include ARV therapy (Landes 2005). In another surprising example, Nicholson et al. have demonstrated that the WHO actually *officially recommended* a placebo in lieu of a gold standard treatment for multiple drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) between 1993-2002, but only for pharmaceutical trials taking place in low-and-middle-income countries (Nicholson, 2016). The justifying rationale for this course of action was once again that these nations were 'resource-poor' settings and the gold standard of treatment was not, in fact, customary in them. This was so according to WHO officials because insufficient infrastructure and government systems made it too difficult and costly to implement the standard of care enjoyed in the developed world.

This assertion failed to address the question of how individuals who were not treated adequately for MDR-TB affected the global fight against antibiotic resistance in general and whether their lack of care put the rest of the world's population at greater risk of contracting these diseases. Sadly, there is no shortage of other examples similar to those I have presented here. While the neo-liberal celebration of unfettered free-market enterprise in which development and business currently operate may explain such instances as the Pfizer fiasco, it by no means offers a rationale for why three global flagship healthcare organizations would forego ensuring the basic ethical premise of medical and pharmaceutical research of beneficence that they had a significant hand in establishing.

The argument can be offered, and likewise rejected, that competing values and donor interests play a greater role in determining what projects and studies are funded and how they are designed than does ethics (Gonzalez-Block, 2004). However, regardless of donor interest, government relations,

resource availability or literally any other proffered rationale, WHO (and NIH and the CDC) purport to uphold specific ethical baselines in their work and are (or should be), therefore, bound by them.

Ethical principles, particularly with regard to how to treat large groups of vulnerable people in medical and health research, are not a new phenomenon. Indeed, they date *at least* back to Aristotle, whose work provided a simple, rational test for how to apply such standards as non-maleficence, beneficence, justice and autonomy (per the Belmont Report) (Culyer, 2015; Landes, 2005). Aristotle offered a two-point evaluative approach to making ethical judgments: vertical and horizontal equity.

Horizontal equity requires that individuals who are similar in relevant ways (i.e., individuals who have MDR-TB, HIV-1 or meningitis, as in the examples outlined above) must be treated in the same way. Vertical equity, meanwhile, demands that people unlike one another in categorical ways must be treated differently *in proportion* to their differences. One example of how such can be practiced is the use of a sliding scale for fees at a health clinic in which wealthier individuals pay more for their care to help subsidize the treatment of those who cannot afford to pay, or cannot pay as much. Culyer has argued that this idea is not only Aristotelean, but also appears in the works of Karl Marx (Culyer, 2015). I find it notable, too, that this ethical premise is taught in very nearly every major world religion.

Paradoxically, however, in the clinical trial examples sketched above, the WHO, NIH and the CDC, rather than interpreting the vertical equity principle as a directive to provide *increased* aid to those at greatest risk, instead concluded that need constituted a rationale for *decreasing* assistance and adhering to lower standards of care for such individuals. Notably, this convention was not adopted during a moment of crisis, as with the recent Ebola virus outbreak, during which officials waived the traditional process of approval for potentially viable vaccine candidates in light of the gravity of the situation underway. Even in such a moment, however, the ethical imperative of beneficence was arguably met in the Ebola crisis in that the course adopted was implemented in the view that those receiving a potentially lifesaving vaccine could possibly yield greater benefit than the risk(s) associated with its use, especially when compared to the risk of contracting (and dying from) the virus.

A straightforward course correction for these three major health organizations and any others that have elected to violate ethical principles in developing nation contexts is, quite simply, to apply the standards of care that they employ in trials and projects conducted in high-income countries. It is important to emphasize that such uniformly applied ethical criteria in 'resource-poor' settings may be very expensive indeed. However, this stance is firmly based on the human rights claims (as they pertain to human medical research) of the Helsinki Accords and the Belmont Report principles these

organizations (and their major Western state sponsors) claim to uphold. This fact suggests that compliance with this approach is a non-negotiable imperative if WHO and other medical research organizations wish to retain any semblance of moral authority and ethical legitimacy.

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Academic Freedom and Shared Governance: Does One Protect the Other?

Jerald H. Walz

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In 2004, Delaware State University President Allen Sessoms suspended and initiated dismissal proceedings against Wendell Gorum, a tenured professor in the Mass Communications Department. During a routine audit the university registrar had discovered that Gorum, "without the professor-of-record's permission, had changed withdrawals, incompletes, and failing grades to passing grades for 48 students in the Mass Communications Department," which he chaired from 1997 to 2004 (Gorum v. Sessoms, 2009, p. 182). While Gorum admitted making the changes, he asserted that he had sufficient authority to do so and that such alterations by department chairs were common practice at the University (Gorum v. Sessoms, 2009). After further investigation and multiple hearings, an ad hoc disciplinary committee concluded that "Dr. Gorum's actions undermine the very tenets of the educational profession and rise to a level deserving condemnation by the academic community" (Ibid, p. 183). The group proposed that Gorum be severely disciplined, but not fired. President Sessoms, citing Gorum's "unprofessional" and "highly reprehensible" conduct, nevertheless recommended to the University's board of trustees that the professor's employment be terminated, and the board unanimously approved the action and dismissed him (Ibid, p. 183).

Gorum subsequently filed suit in federal district court alleging that his firing "was a retaliatory action to punish him for engaging in speech … protected by the First Amendment" (Gorum v. Sessoms, 2009, p. 183). Specifically, Gorum claimed that Sessoms retaliated against him not for the acts investigated, but instead for three unconnected speech-related actions:

- For his objection to Sessoms' candidacy and selection to the university's presidency;
- For his actions as an advisor to a student athlete facing suspension; and
- For his withdrawal of an invitation for Sessoms to speak at a fraternity's prayer breakfast, for which committee he had served as chair (Gorum v. Sessoms, 2009, pp. 183-184).

When the federal district court granted summary judgment for Sessoms concerning these allegations, Gorum appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Even though it considered the professor's arguments unrelated, "makeweight attempts to counter his dismissal for doctoring student grades," the appellate court nevertheless examined the professor's speech-related claims (Gorum v. Sessoms, 2009, p. 188). Applying analysis described by the U. S. Supreme Court in the *Pickering-Connick-Garcetti* (1968, 1983, 2006) line of cases, the appellate court upheld the district court's judgment, arguing that Gorum had not engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment in the three matters under consideration, since he did not speak "as a citizen" on "a matter of public concern" in any of them (Gorum v. Sessoms, 2009, p. 185). Put another way, the Appeals court concluded that because Gorum's speech related to internal university matters, those remarks directly related to his "official duties" as a professor and department chair, and "the First Amendment does not shield the consequences of 'expression employees make pursuant to their professional duties'" (Ibid). In short, the professor's claim failed. Relying particularly on the Supreme Court's decision in *Garcetti v. Cellabos* (2006), the appellate court reasoned that the

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-Jerald H. Walz

> official duty test [applies] because Gorum's actions so clearly were not 'speech related to scholarship or teaching,' and because we believe that such a determination here does not 'imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities' (Gorum v. Sessoms, 2009, p. 186).

Because of legal decisions such as *Gorum*, professors at some public colleges and universities in the United States question whether speech expressed in their governance role(s) is protected by academic freedom. That is, scholars within the profession differ concerning whether academic freedom affords protections to professors' intramural speech undertaken as part of their responsibilities for governance of their institutions. Notably, the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, and so the question of whether academic freedom reaches shared governance remains unaddressed.

This essay examines the literature that has investigated the question of whether academic freedom protects intramural speech that arises as a result of a faculty member's exercise of responsibilities on behalf of institutional governance. The literature is, at best, mixed concerning this issue. Some analysts have contended that such professional activity is "inextricably

linked" to academic freedom (Gerber, 2001, p. 22). Other authors have refuted that argument, suggesting that expanding the concept of academic freedom to include shared governance goes too far and renders the construct meaningless (Yudof, 1988). At this writing, the issue remains far from settled.

Defining academic freedom and shared governance

In the United States, academic freedom is almost universally accepted as a valued principle of higher education (Kaplin and Lee, 2007). However, "there is little consensus regarding the meaning of [the concept] although there is agreement that it is something worth protecting. … It is, at best, a slippery notion, but a notion worthy of analysis" (Kaplan, 1983, p. 6). Indeed, Fish (2014) recently argued that five "schools of thought" concerning academic freedom exist and each defines the character and scope of the idea differently.

Scholars have determined the meaning and reach of academic freedom by examining norms related to it that have been established through custom and usage and by analyzing the public statements concerning it developed by relevant professional organizations, such as the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) (Kaplin and Lee, 2007). For example, the AAUP has sought to describe and ensure academic freedom throughout its long history as an organization representing the academy in the United States (AAUP, 2015). In its *1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, for example, the Association declared that faculty are:

> (a) entitled to full freedom in research and in publication of the results, …
> (b) entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, … and
> (c) are citizens, members of a learned profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak, or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline (AAUP, 2015, p. 14).

In short, the AAUP has suggested that faculty capacity to research, publish and teach as they wish, within very broad boundaries, as well as enjoy free speech as citizens constitute core elements of academic freedom (AAUP, 2015). The AAUP's *1940 Statement* did not address the question of intramural speech—i.e., professorial speech linked to a university's internal affairs or governance.

Universities typically operate two systems of governance simultaneously: one is legal: it grants authority to trustees and the administration; the other is academic: it rests on the professional authority of the faculty (Birnbaum, 2004). The term "shared governance" denotes "a tripartite arrangement among three major stakeholders—governing boards, administration, and faculty" (Austin and Jones, 2016, p. 138). According to Hirsch, "Ideally,

shared governance in universities assigns specific rights and responsibilities to its three stakeholders i.e., provides for a separation of powers, and establishes a structure and process for stakeholders to interact in specific undertakings" (2001, p. 147).

As with academic freedom, the AAUP has articulated what it considers to be a compendium of best practices of shared governance in its *Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities,* adopted in 1967 (AAUP, 2015). The *Statement* addressed each of the three major stakeholders involved—governing boards, administration and faculty—and suggested, "The variety and complexity of the tasks performed by institutions of higher education produce an inescapable interdependence" among these stakeholders (AAUP, 2015, p. 118). Within this arrangement, faculty maintain primary responsibility for core academic matters such as curricular quality, rigor and content, teaching methods, faculty personnel matters and student-related issues directly related to the educational process (Dill, 2014). The governing board and administration are obliged to secure and maintain adequate financial resources and to implement institutional policy and procedures effectively and equitably. Faculty, board members and administrators share responsibility for strategic planning, budgeting, establishing immediate and long-term program goals and participating in the presidential selection process (Dill, 2014).

Yes and No: Scholars debate academic freedom and shared governance

The AAUP's position on academic freedom and shared governance notwithstanding, scholars have continued to debate whether that principle protects faculty members engaged in such activities. Some analysts, such as Gerber (2001), Finkin (1988, 1993) and Finkin and Post (2009), have argued that academic freedom necessarily includes professors' role(s) in institutional governance. According to these scholars, academic freedom protects faculty members from administrative discipline for their speech concerning internal university concerns. Other analysts, such as Brest (1988), Fish (2014), Olivas (1993) and Yudof (1988), are not so sure. They have argued that academic freedom shields only the "core" scholarly activities of teaching, research and publication and faculty member rights of public speech as citizens. Thus construed, the construct falls short of protecting professorial engagement in shared governance and intra-institutional (intramural) speech. I turn next to an examination of these competing perspectives.

Academic freedom protects intramural speech and shared governance

Intramural speech refers to faculty remarks that concern any action, policy or personnel decision of their university (Finkin and Post, 2009). The term is

frequently linked with the idea of shared governance, as Gerber employed it in a widely-read essay: "It is hard to imagine effective governance if faculty do not enjoy the right to speak freely without fear of reprisal on issues related to their own institutions and policies" (2001, p. 23). For its part, the AAUP in a statement approved by its Committee T on College and University Governance in 1994, asserted that shared governance and academic freedom "are closely connected, arguably inextricably linked" (2015, p. 125).

One argument scholars assert for viewing the faculty role in institutional governance as protected by academic freedom involves whether professors are employees or enjoy another status in relationship to the university (Finkin and Post, 2009). Since issuing its *1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure* (AAUP, 2015), the AAUP has contended that faculty members are more than mere employees with limited rights, but also appointees with broad freedoms, including academic freedom and its twin protections, tenure and a role in institutional (shared) governance. In this view, as appointees and not employees, scholars possess a status independent of the university's trustees and administration: in a university, "trustees hold an essential and highly honorable place, but … the faculties hold an independent place, with quite equal responsibilities—and in relation to purely scientific and educational questions, the primary responsibility" (Ibid, pp. 6-7). Such standing "renders any institutional policy or decision a fair subject for faculty comment or criticism" (Finkin and Post, 2009, p. 124). In short, in this view, the status of faculty as independent appointees ensures their freedom of speech when engaged in university governance. While not explicit in the *1915 Declaration* and the *1940 Statement*, the AAUP nevertheless sought to establish this contention through its committees' investigations and via reports it issued throughout the 20th century (Ibid, p. 116).

Another argument for including a broad conception of professorial speech under the protection of academic freedom suggests that faculty members may be seen as modern-day professionals analogous to the journeymen artisans of the early American Republic who were highly skilled, independent, professional and self-governing (Finkin, 1993). These early craftspeople, the argument states, practiced their vocations in complete freedom, including the exercise of freedom of speech, intra- or extramurally. College and university professors began to organize their profession at the turn of the 20th century, forming associations such as the AAUP that sought to codify and assert similar freedoms for the professoriate. Indeed, in 1940 faculty achieved a standing that journeymen artisans enjoyed in the early Republic with publication of the *Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure* (AAUP, 2015) jointly issued by the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges. Thus, just as "the mechanic of the new Republic asserted

simultaneously an independence of craftsmanship that brooked no supervision, a vigorous defense of workplace rights—of artisanal dignity and self-respect—and a robust liberty of political association and expression" (Finkin, 1993, pp. 378-379), faculty now argued for their right to academic freedom: to teach, research and publish, speak as private citizens and engage intramurally as "officers of an educational institution" (AAUP, 2015, p. 14). Accordingly, "the *1940 Statement* resonate[d] against an older ideal" (Finkin, 1993, p. 379).

A third argument concerning affording academic freedom protection to intramural speech and shared governance asserts that American faculty are citizens not only of the nation, but also of the university with which they are affiliated (Finkin, 1988). Within both realms, residents enjoy certain rights. Much as a national citizen enjoys freedom of speech, a university faculty member enjoys academic freedom, including in their activities linked to institutional governance. Those pressing this view contend that since that right is a scholarly professional prerogative, professors enjoy protection for their intramural speech, the core claim of which, "concerns … freedom of professional utterance not shared with the citizenry at large" (Ibid, p. 1323). As such, these advocates suggest that academic freedom protects faculty speech related to any matter of professorial concern, including, but arguably not limited to, admission standards, administrative leadership, appeals to accrediting agencies, awarding degrees, athletic policy, library policy, salary policies, presidential selection and petitions to the AAUP.

Furthermore, in this view, conceding that academic freedom did not cover intramural speech and, "reserving the profession's claim of freedom of expression only to narrowly defined disciplinary discourse, [i.e., only to teaching or research and publication,] … would produce a profession in a sense 'half slave and half free'" (Ibid, p. 1341). Moreover, these analysts contend that the academic freedom of intra-institutional speech also flows from the principle of equality: faculty are peers with and ought to share the same freedom of speech that trustees and administrators enjoy. Additionally, limiting faculty speech within the organizations in which they work would inhibit institutional operations, since universities seek not only truth, the focus of research, but also wisdom, the object of governance. The administration cannot possibly possess all knowledge when developing and implementing its educational policies. Therefore, faculty engaged in governance-related speech ought to be considered "institutional citizen[s]" and not "officious intermeddler[s]" (Finkin, 1998, p. 1342).

A final argument some commentators have offered states that shared governance serves the needs of civil society and is necessary for two special reasons. First, it enables the discovery and dissemination of knowledge. Second, it provides a liberal education. Notably, citizens require both such understanding and capabilities to engage actively in democratic civil society

(Gerber, 2001). As a result, this perspective suggests that academic freedom and shared governance are "inextricably linked" and faculty members should enjoy the same protection in their workplace speech that they do when engaged in teaching, research and publication and their roles as private citizens. Furthermore, these analysts argue, effective institutional governance requires that faculty have the freedom to speak "without fear of reprisal on issues relating to their own institutions and policies" (Ibid, p. 23). Additionally, in the absence of a shared faculty role in university governance, especially in academic affairs, "liberal education, with its emphasis on the development of critical thinking and humane values, may eventually become an arcane concept" (Ibid, p. 24).

Academic freedom only includes and protects core scholarly activities

However, some commentators do not accept these arguments. They contend instead that faculty speech linked to internal university governance should be seen as separate from academic freedom and beyond the protections that construct affords faculty. Brest, for example, has suggested that "the claim that the penumbra of intramural speech is inextricably linked to the core of true academic freedom of inquiry needs a stronger argument" (1988, p. 1361). For Brest, employing a core and penumbra approach used in some legal arguments has been stretched too thin when applied to academic freedom and intramural speech. Despite the, "tendency to travel further and further from the core [scholarly activities]" that academic freedom protects (e.g. teaching, research, and publication), "at some point, most of us get off the train" (Ibid, p. 1361). Some analysts, including Brest, contend that there is a significant difference between criticizing a university president "for her parking policy or the paint color she chooses" and making an unpopular or controversial argument within one's scholarly discipline (Ibid, p. 1361). Engaging in the former encroaches on administrative rights and responsibilities, while the latter represents an appropriate focus, well within the realm of the professional activities of a scholar.

Some scholars have contended that extending academic freedom to the faculty governing role shields "the scholarly enterprise from outside interference …, but only grants limited protection to professors' intramural speech … against *institutional* interests" (Olivas, 1993, p. 1837). This is so, these scholars argue, because academic freedom applies only to professorial speech that adheres to professional standards and is the product of "training, developed expertise, and scrupulous care" (Ibid, p. 1835). That is, for these analysts, academic freedom should apply only to speech related to "scholarly" matters. Furthermore, when protected, "non-professorial" speech should be shielded for all—scholars and staff alike. In this view, professors engaged in

non-academic speech should not be able to claim any more or less protection for such communication than can any other member of the university community (Olivas, 1993).

Similarly, another group of scholars has suggested that a conceptualization of academic freedom that includes intramural speech separates the idea from its conceptual moorings to the point of rendering it meaningless (Yudof, 1988). In other words, placing all speech within the university under the shelter of academic freedom corrupts that umbrella concept by making it more about professional autonomy than pursuit of truth. Regarding this conceptual extension of the construct, one commentator has asked, "why [do] academics, with respect to matters not directly related to teaching and scholarship, have a higher order of liberty in the workplace than others?" (Ibid, p. 1355). Questions about salary, working conditions, office space, parking and many other concerns are necessary to sustain a university. But why, this argument continues, should faculty have a right to protected speech on these intramural affairs when others do not? This question leads to the logical suggestion that any group claiming a professional status should also be accorded the measure of autonomy analogous to faculty academic freedom (Yudof, 1988).

Seen in this way, assertions of academic freedom become just one more way to promote "a progressive view of labor-management relations" (Ibid, p. 1355). That said, these commentators also caution that professors enjoy "academic" freedom because of their unique professional roles—discovering new knowledge and disseminating analyses of existing understandings—that require freedom that other occupations do not. Therefore, "the temptation" ought to be resisted, "to bring all talk about conditions that have an impact on professional autonomy, no matter how far removed from teaching and research, under the umbrella of academic freedom" (Ibid, p. 1356). To summarize this argument, "Academic freedom is what it is. … If academic freedom is thought to include all that is desirable for academicians, it may come to mean quite little to policy makers and courts" (Ibid, p. 1357).

Finally, some scholars have argued that the attempt to afford the protections of academic freedom to shared governance represents an assertion of faculty supremacy (Fish, 2014). According to one such analyst, "professors cling to medieval privileges while demanding modern trade union benefits," the effect of which creates "a status with the autonomy of a community member, the security of a corporate employee, and the obligations of neither" (Keller, 2004, p. 169). Furthermore, in this view, whether the management of university governance is top-down, shared or bottom-up is immaterial to the production of quality scholarship. Rather, "teaching and scholarship could flourish or fail" regardless of the nature of the system of university governance (Fish, 2014, p. 41). That is, for these critics, faculty members rightly have a responsibility for participating in

governing the affairs of their profession and the institutions with which they are aligned, but the scope of those activities is limited as they relate to organizational governance. Administrative decisions related to the greater university environment may affect academic work, but such decisions are secondary to faculty responsibilities and are appropriately the province of the administration (Fish, 2014). It is enough for professors to engage in the academic work of their profession through teaching, conducting research and publishing (Fish, 2008).

Conclusion

Overall, commentators favoring the separation of intramural speech and shared governance from academic freedom appear to have a stronger case than those arguing that intramural speech and shared governance fall under the protection of academic freedom. This is so in good measure because the claims for including intramural speech and shared governance under the rubric of academic freedom raise difficult questions. Two examples suffice: Must all speech protected under academic freedom be academic? If, as university citizens, intramural statements are protected for faculty, why not protect them for other university citizens, especially students and staff? Moreover, while it may be laudable for faculty to enjoy freedom of speech as they participate in shared governance, that right can and should stand on its own, apart from academic freedom. Free speech and participatory democracy are touchstones of American government. Perhaps these freedoms should also be accorded to faculty (and others) within the university community, but it is not necessary to attach them to the concept of academic freedom to do so.

Given this reality, it would be better to declare that faculty have a general right of free speech, including intramural utterances, or a delimited freedom of speech when fulfilling a specific role in university governance and discharging their governance responsibilities. By securing these freedoms separately, in addition to, but apart from academic freedom, faculty would avoid muddling important distinctions. Ensuring these rights independently would also provide stronger support for claimants such as Gorum, who argued that the administration retaliated against him for his activities while engaged in intramural speech and university governance. As Gorum discovered, judges currently decide such cases in accord with existing First Amendment jurisprudence. Under these precedents, judges are inclined to view faculty members at public colleges and universities as they do other public employees, who neither benefit from academic freedom, nor freedom of speech, when speaking or acting within the scope of their "official duties," leaving faculty intramural speech and shared governance unprotected. Today's faculty seeking to protect speech offered in their governance role can

surely articulate mechanisms that would afford such protection, but stretching the concept of academic freedom to do so should not be among them.

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Rob Flahive is a second-year ASPECT student interested in the relationship between modernist movement architecture/urban planning and decolonization processes, the spatial and political implications of UNESCO World Heritage Site inscription, and the logistical infrastructure necessary for the use of military violence. He has an enduring curiosity in the ways individuals intersect with wider global processes, and this inspires him to teach at the university level. He holds an MA in Political Studies from American University in Beirut and a BA in English Literature from Washington University in St. Louis. He finds it hard to imagine life without fall leaves, espresso, pizza (or some bread/cheese combo) or Fairouz.

Johannes Grow is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Alliance for Social, Political, Ethical, and Cultural Thought (ASPECT) program. He received his Master's degree in Public and International Affairs (MPIA) and a B.A in International Studies from Virginia Tech. His research interests include: Contemporary Social and Political Theory, Empire, International Relations, European Studies, Postcolonial Theory and Critical Geopolitics. Johannes currently teaches International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Virginia Tech.

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Sarah Halvorson-Fried received her Master's in Urban and Regional Planning from Virginia Tech in 2016. For her master's thesis, she researched employment and income inequality in the New River Valley in partnership with the Dialogue on Race Employment and Income Gap Issue Group. She now works as a researcher at Harlem Children's Zone, a nonprofit organization dedicated to ending inter-generational poverty in Harlem through education, health, and community development services.

Sarah Hanks is a Ph.D. candidate in Agricultural, Leadership & Community Education with academic and research interests in the fields of problem solving, change management, and nonprofit governance. Prior to returning to graduate school, Sarah spent eight years as an executive within the YMCA, serving communities in Washington and Virginia. In addition to her academic pursuits, Sarah serves as the Executive Director of the Children's Museum of Blacksburg, a member of the Community Voices team, and is active in several professional organizations.

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

Rachael Kennedy earned her Ph.D. in the Department of Agricultural, Leadership, and Community Education in Spring 2017. Kennedy won a Fulbright Scholarship to Turkey for 2015-2016 and learned much from the Turkish people during her time in that country. During the summer of 2017 she was in Azerbaijan completing a U.S. State Department sponsored Critical Language Scholarship. This is a summer overseas language and cultural immersion program for undergraduate and graduate students.

Jared Keyel is a doctoral student in the Planning, Governance and Globalization program in the School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Tech. His research interests include critical migration and refugee studies, international ethics, and deepening democratic practices. Prior to enrolling at Virginia Tech, he worked for five years in the non-profit sector with organizations serving new immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees – particularly from the Middle East and North Africa. Jared is a founding editor of Community Change, a peer-reviewed, graduate student-run journal that explores interdisciplinary approaches to the processes and practices that produce democratic change at all levels of society. He also currently serves as the treasurer for the Blacksburg Refugee Partnership. Jared holds a Bachelor's degree from Nazareth College in Sociology and a Master's degree in International Relations with a concentration in Middle Eastern Affairs from Syracuse University.

Kannikha Kolandaivelu is stepping into her third year as Ph.D. student in the Department of Geosciences starting Fall 2017.She obtained her Master's degree in Geosciences from the same department. Kannikha earned a B.E. in Civil Engineering at Anna University in India. Her interest in learning more about the inner workings of our planet Earth brought her to Virginia Tech. She is focusing on Thermal Geophysics for her doctoral research. In addition to science she is interested in short-story writing, mostly fiction; authoring blog posts; reading and pondering the purpose of life and human existence. She recently worked as an independent research consultant for NASA and the DEVELOP program based in Wise, VA, for the summer 2017 where she is part of the Texas Health and Air Quality team.

Rebecca Landis completed her Master's degree in the Department of Agricultural, Leadership, and Community Education at Virginia Tech in 2016. She is interested in the connections among faith, food and social justice. Her research focused on community food work as a critique of the industrial agri-food system, and the role of critical reflection in imbuing values from alternative food discourses into practitioner's work. Before coming to Virginia Tech, Rebecca received her Bachelor's degree in Conservation Biology from the State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry and spent time working on a farm in Washington State. When not ruminating on her place in dismantling social injustice, Rebecca likes to spend time outside with her spouse and dog, and marvel at the wonderful creation human beings were given to steward.

Jordan Laney is a faculty instructor for the Department of Religion and Culture at Virginia Tech and a doctoral candidate in the interdisciplinary ASPECT program. Her dissertation research focuses on bluegrass music festivals as sites of identity construction. Jordan serves as a Diversity Scholar (2014), Graduate Academy for Teaching Excellence (GrATE) Founding Fellow, co-editor emeritus of SPECTRA: The ASPECT Journal, Berea College Appalachian Sound Archives Fellow (2015-16), and member of the Appalachian Studies Association steering committee. Jordan's research, teaching, and service are informed by her experiences as a first-generation college student from the Appalachian region. She hopes to continue developing educational programs that critically examine the intersectional and hidden histories of rural areas to prepare communities for more just futures.

Michal Linder-Zarankin is a Ph.D Candidate in the Center for Public Administration and Policy, School of Public and International Affairs, at Virginia Tech and a Graduate Assistant at the Global Forum on Urban and Regional Resilience. Her teaching and research interests address inter/intra-organizational behavior before, during and after crises and disasters, with an emphasis on the range of individual, groups and community organizations; responses to large-scale emergencies. Her dissertation entitled: *A Latent Resilience Capacity: Examining Individual and Organizational Factors Influencing Public Library Managers' Willingness to Engage in Post-Disaster Response and Recovery* is focused on the role public libraries play in disaster relief. Michal holds a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Sussex, UK, and an MPA from the University of Missouri, Columbia.

Lorien MacAuley has worked in Virginia, West Virginia, and Washington State in program planning, implementation, and evaluation for community food, environmental and outdoor education, public recreation and community development and gardening initiatives. She has worked in nonprofit, county, state, and federal government settings. She recently completed her Ph.D. in Agricultural, Leadership, and Community Education at Virginia Tech, while working for the Virginia Beginning Farmer and Rancher Coalition. Her research interests are centered on agricultural education and extension, community viability, community development programming/ planning, alternative agrifood movements, food ethics, performative sociocultural practices in the food system, and knowledge politics. Her dissertation focused on on-farm apprenticeships as they relate to alternative agrifood movements and identity politics.

Saul N'Jie is from Churchill Town, The Gambia. He recently completed his Ph.D. in the Planning, Governance and Globalization program at the Virginia Tech School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA). He has earned a bachelor's degree from Bluefield State College, a Master's degree from Virginia Tech, and a graduate certificate in Nonprofit and Non-Governmental Management from that same institution. Saul's dissertation examined the potential effectiveness of commercial and nonprofit, cooperative (mostly women farmers and gardeners) microfinance institutions. Saul is a Visiting Faculty Professor of Political Science and World Geography at Bluefield State College in Bluefield, West Virginia.

Natalie Patterson graduated from Virginia Tech with her Master of Urban and Regional Planning in May 2017. She continues to present her research concerning opportunities for personal agency and independence for persons with disabilities. She is currently serving as a Loan Analyst with the National Housing Trust in Washington, DC where she works to develop strategies to increase and preserve affordable housing across the country.

Rebecca Powell-Doherty is a recent graduate of Virginia Tech, with an MPH and two certificates. She previously received her B.S. in Biology from NC State University in 2005 and her Ph.D. in Immunology from UNC Charlotte in 2010. Upon completion of her doctorate, she spent some years teaching undergraduate science courses and conducting post-doctoral work in the areas of inflammation and hemorrhagic shock. During her time at Virginia Tech, she developed an interest in combining a scientific understanding of disease with social applications for improving the lot of those disproportionately affected by it. As a result, she has relocated to the Oxford, UK area to pursue global health and development related opportunities.

Pallavi Raonka is a third -year doctoral student in the Sociology department at Virginia Tech. Her areas of interest include social movements, global political economy, subaltern theories, development and South Asia. She is investigating the longstanding contentious relationship between Adivasi(indigenous) and State actors in the context of the ongoing Maoist Insurgency in Jharkhand, India. Pallavi received her BA in Psychology from Maharaja Sayajirao University of Vadodara, India, and her M.A. in Rural Development from the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, India. She is currently doing pre-dissertation fieldwork in the eastern part of India.

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Jamie Sanchez, Ph.D., is currently an assistant professor in the Cook School of Intercultural Studies at Biola University. Additionally, she is the Program Director for the Ph.D. in Intercultural Studies. Her research investigates ethnopolitics, identity, and resistance in Northern China. Dr. Sanchez is a graduate of the ASPECT Program at Virginia Tech where she also taught in the Department of Religion and Culture. While in ASPECT, Dr. Sanchez was also a member of the Board of Visitors Think Tank, was a Diversity Scholar, and was inducted into the Edward Bouchet Graduate Honor Society. Prior to starting her doctoral work, Dr. Sanchez worked in Northern China for more than eight years. Her professional experience includes business consulting, business startup and management, personnel training, and teaching.

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Alex Stubberfield is a third-year Ph.D. student in the Alliance for Social, Political, Ethical and Cultural Thought (ASPECT). He earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Philosophy at SUNY Brockport and continued his education at Virginia Tech earning a Master's degree in Philosophy, and a Masters of Public and International Affairs with a graduate certificate in Nonprofit and Nongovernmental Organization Management. His research concerns political theory, media, social theory, culture and corporate citizenship. He currently teaches politics as an instructor in the Political Science department.

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Danny White is a Ph.D. student in Planning, Governance and Globalization at Virginia Tech with a focus on sport in development and social capital. He earned a B.S. from the University of South Carolina, an M.A. from Virginia Tech, and a graduate certificate in Collaborative Community Leadership from Virginia Tech. Danny works full time as the Associate Athletics Director of Student-Athlete Development at Virginia Tech. He has designed and taught study abroad courses in the Dominican Republic, Switzerland, and Rwanda, all aimed at understanding sports role in broader society and development. He enjoys running, reading, surfing, good coffee, and spending time with his wife Meredith and their children, Addie, Will and Amelia.

Editors

Max Stephenson, Jr. is a Professor of Public and International Affairs and the Director of the Institute for policy and Governance at Virginia Tech. His current research and teaching interest include collaborative governance, leadership and democratic politics, arts and community change processes, NGO's and International development, peacebuilding and humanitarian relief. He is the author or editor of several books and more than 60 refereed articles and book chapters. Stephenson earned his bachelor's (1977), master's (1979) and doctoral (1985) degrees from the University of Virginia.

Lyusyena Kirakosyan currently serves as a Senior Project Associate at the Virginia Tech Institute for Policy and Governance and a governance and development consultant for nongovernmental organizations. Currently, her research interests focus on critical disability studies, particularly in the context of Paralympic Games and Paralympics legacy. Since January 2016, she has been a research member of the Brazilian Paralympic Academy that focusses on inquiry into paralympic sports in Brazil. She earned her Ph.D. in Social, Political, Ethical, and Cultural Thought (ASPECT) from Virginia Tech in 2013, her master's degree in Management from the Hult International Business School in Boston, MA, and her bachelor's degree in Economics from Yerevan State University in Armenia.

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The 55 essays in this volume illuminate deeper political trends and both give and signal the alarm that social change is necessary if self-governance in the United States and beyond is to be preserved. Taken together, these articles speak truth to power and highlight forcefully the need for dramatic change. It has been our privledge to compile them for a broader readership.